Acta Juridica by unknown
ACTA 
JURIDICA 
HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief Vilmos Peschka 
HU ISSN 1216-2574 
О 
Akadémiai Kiadó Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Budapest Dordrecht / Boston / London 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUHLES 
Editor-in-Chief VILMOS PESCHKA 
Board of Editors GÉZA HERCZEGH, ISTVÁN KERTÉSZ, 
TIBOR KIRÁLY FERENC MÁDL, ATTILA RÁCZ, 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ, TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
Editor VANDA LAMM 
Acta Juridica Hungarica presents the achievements of the legal sciences and 
legal scholars in Hungary and detai ls the Hungar ian legislation and legal 
l i terature. The journa l accepts articles from every field o f t h e legal sciences. 
Recently the edi tors have encou raged contr ibut ions from ou t s ide Hungary, 
w i th the aim of covering the legal sciences in the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Manuscripts and editorial co r respondence shou ld be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
H - 1 2 5 0 Budapest, P. O. Box 25 
Tel.: (36 1) 355 7383, Fax: (36 1) 375 7858 
Distributors 
for Hungary 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ 
P. О. Box 245, H - 1 5 1 9 
Budapes t , Hungary 
Fax: (36 1) 464 8297 
h t t p ://www. akkrt. h u 
for all other countries 
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS 
P. O. Box 17, 3300 Dordrecht , 
The Netherlands 
Fax: (31) 78 639 2254 
ht tp ://www. wkap. nl 
Publication p rogramme, 2000: Volume 41 (in 4 issues). 
Subscription price: NLG 495.00 (USD 236.00) pe r annum including 
pos t age & handling. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica is abs t racted/ indexed in Information Technology 
a n d the Law, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science 
Abstracts. 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2000 
AJur 41 (2000) 1 - 2 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
V o l . 4 1 . Nos 1 - 2 . 2000 
C O N T E N T S 
STUDIES 
Francis A.GÁBOR 
Csaba VARGA 
Lajos RÂCZ 
Renata UITZ 
Gábor SULYOK 
Quo Vadis Domine: Reflections on Ethnic Self-
Determination in Central-Eastern Europe 3 
Philosophy of Law in Central and Eastern Europe: 
A Sketch of History 17 
Union with Transylvania in 1848 and the Path 
Leading There 27 
Does the Past Restrain Judicial Rev iew? 47 
Humanitarian Intervention: A Historical and 
Theoretical Overview 79 
K A L E I D O S C O P E 
Dragan BOLANCA Protection and Preservation of the Mar ine 
Environment in the Republic of Croa t ia 109 
MAGYAR 
TUDOMÁNYOS AKADÉMIA 
KÖNYVTARA 
H U N G A R I A N A C A D E M Y OF S C I E N C E S 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Vol. 41. N o s 1-2. 2000 
AUTHORS 
Francis A. GABOR, Professor o f Private International Law 
University of Memphis School of Law, Memphis 
Csaba VARGA, Professor of Law 
Institute for Legal S tudies of the Hungarian Academy o f Sciences, Budapest 
Lajos RACZ, Head of Department of History of Law 
Faculty of Law, Eötvös University of Sciences, Budapest 
Renata LUTZ, PhD Candidate, Central European University, Budapes t 
Gábor SULYOK, Assistant of Publ ic International Law 
Institute of Law, Eö tvös University of Sciences, Györ 
Dragan BOLANCA, Associate Professor of Mar i t ime Law 
Faculty of Law, Universi ty of Split, Split 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
2000 41 Nos 1-2, pp. 3-16 
1216-2574 / 2000 / USD 5 .00 
© 2000 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
STUDIES 
Francis A. GÁBOR' Quo Vadis Domine: Reflections on 
Ethnic Self-Determination 
in Central-Eastern Europe 
The global world order of the XXIst century still has to be built on the historical 
experiences of multi-cultural societies in spatial coexistence. The Tribal psycho-
linguistic group identities are rooted in distant millenniums and have survived 
over the centuries. Following the Westphalian peace treaty in 1648, the modern 
concept of the sovereign nation-state was born and public international law was 
developed to harmonize and prevent conflicts among these new actors in human 
history. 
The borders of the nation-state, however, were drawn without regard for the 
ethnic identity of the human subjects. Therefore, the map of the post-Westphalian 
Europe showed a mosaic of sovereign powers controlling multiethnic societies. 
This jig-saw puzzle has created the tension and conflicts within the nation-state 
system for the last 350 years. 
In the light of the Kosovo tragedy, the article offers a historical perspective 
on the unstable international legal protection of ethnic minorities in Central-
Eastern Europe, which led to the outbreak of ethnic violence in the post-cold war 
environment. Contemporary issues in ethnic self-determination are explored, 
The writing of this Article was supported by a research grant provided by the University of 
Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. The author wishes to express his appreciation to 
Denise Ceule, a student of his at the University of Memphis, for all of the assistance given in the 
writing of this article. 
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followed by a reassessment of the emerging new concept on ethnic self-
determination in the region. The article emphasizes the urgent need for the 
development of an effective international legal and institutional framework for 
ethnic self-determination. 
I. The Internationally Protected Ethnic Self-Deterniination 
Model front a Historical Perspective 
Upon conclusion of the devastating first world war, a new political and social 
reality emerged from the ruins of the disintegrating Eastern European empires; 
people were looking for their cohesive inner forces in a cry for self-determi-
nation. As central authorities collapsed, the movement for national self-
determination was led by a renaissance in ethnic identity. The old map of Central-
Eastern Europe was carved up to new, more homogeneous, nation-states. 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia emerged through the self-determi-
nation of their constituents and declared their own state.' 
The Versailles treaty system arbitrarily changed national territories and 
borders, and thereby planted the seeds of the second world war. All attempts to 
create a reliable protection of ethnic minorities failed.2 There were very few 
attempts to create some level of protection under international law. However, 
minority treaties under the supervision of the victorious Antant powers were 
within bilateral treaties and were entered between the newly emerged nation-
states and the successor states of the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The minority treaties were between Poland, Croatia and Slovenia kingdom, 
Czechoslovakia, and Greece. These treaties theoretically provided very attractive 
protection for the collective rights of nationals.1 The treaties guaranteed the full 
and complete protection of life and liberty without discrimination. These 
freedoms included the exercise of religion, basic civil and political rights. 
Minorities were entitled to use their own language and establish their own schools 
and other charitable, religious and social institutions.4 It was particularly 
significant that the use of their own language was guaranteed in courts and 
1 BROLM AN, C. et al. (eds.): Peoples and Minorities in International Law ( 1993) 3-2 . 
2 Id. 
3 ROBINSON, J. et al.: Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure? ( 1943) for in depth discussion 
of the failure of the League of Nations minorities system. 
4 KYMLICKA, W.: The Rights of Minority Cultures, at 82-86. 
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religious and other public meetings.5 The main objective of these minority 
treaties was analyzed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its 
advisory opinion on Minority Schools of Albania.6 The Court found that treaties 
were guaranteeing ( 1 ) perfect equality for minorities and citizens and (2) suitable 
means for the preservation of the ethnic particularities from their tradition and 
national characteristics. The minority treaties also guaranteed the collective rights 
for groups of minorities, granting them the authorization to petition the League 
of Nations. The minority treaties only applied to countries where minorities were 
created by the transfer of territories following the Versailles peace treaty 
system.7 
The affected countries felt that the application of these treaties had a 
discriminatory impact and sought their abolition. The lack of effective enforce-
ment in the League of Nations, compounded by the resistance of the affected 
states, contributed to the dismal failure of the minority treaties to create an 
effective agreement for protection of ethnic minorities.8 
Without any exaggeration, the unsettled international legal status of ethnic 
minorities can be considered one of the major causes of the second world war, the 
most devastating destruction in history claiming 55 million lives. The lack of 
international standards for the protection of ethnic minorities provided 
ammunition to the emerging fascist powers during the period between the two 
world wars. It offered justification for an aggressive course of action in the name 
of protecting their own ethnic minorities from the oppressive regimes of the 
successor state. The League of Nations tolerated the minority treaty system's 
gradual collapse in the late 1930's.4 At the same time Hitler made an appealing 
justification for Germany's course of aggressive action in the name of protecting 
oppressed german ethnic minorities in the infamous Munich Accord which led to 
the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The justification of preserving and protecting 
the German ethnic minorities also provided justification for the invasion of 
Poland which led to the outbreak of the second world war.10 
From the ashes of the most devastating human tragedy in recent history, a new 
international legal order emerged in 1945. The United Nations was created to 
5 Id. at 103. 
6 Minority Schools in Albania, PCIj, Ser. А/В, No. 64, 1935, at 17. 
7 BROLMAN: op. cit. at 85. 
8 Id. 86. 
9 KOVÁCS, P.: A nemzetközi jog és a kisebbségvédelem (International Law and Protection 
of Minorities). Pro minorate könyvek. Osiris, 1996, 42^16. 
10 Id. at 40-41. 
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preserve peace and security and prevent any reoccurrence of war. In Article 2, 
Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter, the use or threat of use of force 
became illegal and a violation of a peremptory norm. At the same time, a new 
code emerged protecting human rights in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter 
and similar language was employed in the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights of 1948." 
There was a greater understanding that the human being individually deserved 
fundamental rights and protections under international legal orders. Therefore, 
specific references cannot be found for the protection of minorities in the United 
Nations Charter or the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Learning from 
the devastating experience of the minority treaty system and the tremendous 
tragedy of the second world war, the international community was not ready to 
gamble and extend protection to certain groups of ethnic minorities. Thus, the 
basic code on the protection of human rights only addressed the individual.12 The 
traveaux préparatoire reflected the United Nations' countries' concerns about 
preventing immigration of any group and the collective rights of minorities. The 
concerns could threaten a nation's sovereignty and undermine the integration of 
immigrants in their home country.11 
The Covenant of Political and Civil Rights provides specific protection of 
individual human rights. Article 27 of this Covenant refers to persons who belong 
to a group of religious or linguistic minorities. The Covenant provides that they 
shall not be denied the right in their community to enjoy their own culture with 
other members of their group, to practice their own religion, and to use their own 
language.14 This article, however, also reflects a clear individualistic approach. 
In other words, no group or collective rights are recognized and protected. It still 
remains to be seen whether an open-minded interpretation of Article 27 of this 
Convention is forthcoming. Such an open-minded interpretation may lead to an 
intrinsic recognition and protection of ethnic minorities and cultures of ethnic minorities.15 
The grand design of the post 1945 world order and the model of international 
cooperation and protection of the individual in the framework of the United 
Nations' system collapsed in the midst of the cold war from the late 1940's. This 
11 See generally, SOHN, L. В.: How American International Lawyers Prepared for the San 
Francisco Bill of Rights, 89, American Journal of International Law ( 1995) 540-553. 
12 See BROLMAN: op. cit. 86-98. 
13 Id. at 99-101. 
14 Id. at 109-110. 
15 Id. at 111-113. 
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period can be characterized by the great failure of the international model 
protecting the human rights of the individual in his or her collective capacity. 
The collapse of the communist domination of Eastern Europe in 1989 created 
a quest for the international protection of individual and collective human rights 
within nation-state systems with a new global perspective.16 
II. Contemporary Issues in Ethnic Self-Determination 
Ethnic self-determination for minorities living within a sovereign nation-state has 
not received support from international scholars and experts. In this context, the 
notion of self-determination was subordinate to the static principle of uti 
possidetis or "territorial integrity".17 The Helsinki Final Act emphasized the 
viability of the post-world war II boundaries of Eastern Europe that were drafted 
in the Yalta agreement. The preservation of the status quo on the basis of the 
transitional separation of the spheres of influence began in 1945 and was a 
binding principle until 1989.18 
After 1989, the sudden collapse of both the external and internal Marxist 
central authorities created a dangerous power vacuum in the Eastern European 
region. The struggle for ethnic self-determination became the dominant 
ideological force in the course of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav tragedy offers the most compelling case for a new 
approach to the different levels of self-determination in the post-cold war 
period.14 In Yugoslavia, it became quite obvious that territorial integrity and 
ethnic self-determination could not be peacefully reconciled in the midst of the 
collapse of the central political and economic authorities. The struggle for ethnic 
self-determination led to genocide and "ethnic cleansing". People retracted into 
their tribal stage trying to destroy historical human realities.20 Thus, the vague 
notion of ethnic self-determination has become a destructive force. 
16 GEROE, M. R.—GUMP. T. K.: Hungary and a New Paradigm for the Protection of Ethnic 
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1995, 
673-677. 
17 See BROLMAN: op cit., 59-70. 
18 CLESSE, A. et al. (eds.): The International System After the Collapse of the East-West 
Order, 1994, 54-60. 
19 SNEEK, J. W.: The CSCE in the New Europe: From Process to Regional Arrangement, 5 
Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 1994, 1-6. 
20 See BROLMAN: op cit., 21-27. 
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More recently, the concept of ethnic self-determination has been the central 
theme of the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo is a province in Serbia, the dominant 
republic in Yugoslavia. Ninety percent of the population in Kosovo is ethnic 
Albanian; many of whom desire independent statehood apart from Serbia and 
Yugoslavia. The military unrest between Albanian guerrilla forces and the 
Serbian military has displaced over 270,000 ethnic Albanians—most are homeless 
due to Serb attacks.21 In addition, Western officials estimate that at least 600 
ethnic Albanian civilians have been executed by Serb forces. The question here, 
as in the earlier Yugoslavian conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is whether Kosovo 
Albanians have an international right to self-determination and secession. 
In 1989, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic removed Kosovo's wide-
ranging regional autonomy. In response to this action, Kosovo Albanians 
attempted to restore their autonomy by building political and social institutions. 
When these peaceful tactics failed, however, the Kosovo Liberation Army 
emerged and the violence began. Many Kosovo Albanians are fighting for 
independent statehood, while the Serbian government wants Kosovo to have 
limited autonomy within Serbia. 
In October of 1998, after being pressured by the international community, 
Serbian authorities announced plans to restore regional autonomy to Kosovo, 
including returning control of the police and judiciary systems to the local 
population. Although this is a step in the right direction, many Kosovo Albanians 
want nothing short of full autonomy with a right to self-determination. The 
international community seems to reject this Albanian demand for Kosovo 
independence, and instead prefers some form of internal self-determination for 
Kosovo, through limited autonomy, without violating Yugoslavia's territorial 
integrity.22 Until international legal standards are set concerning the right of 
ethnic self-determination, the conflict in Kosovo will continue.21 
The reality of the quest for ethnic self-determination reflects two markedly 
contrasting trends in the post-cold war environment. The economic and political 
integration in the European Union has been manifested by emerging supra-
national decision-making which limited the sovereignty of the member states. 
The ethnic-religious-linguistic minorities have been receiving wide scale 
21 See "Uncomfortable Peace in Kosovo", Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 14, 1998, at 4. 
22 See MALIQUI, S.: Politics—Kosovo/Serbia; Beyond Dmica, International Press Service, 
Mar. 25, 1998. 
23 See PERIC-ZIMONJIC, V.: Yugoslavia: U.S. Twists Yugoslavia's Arm to Negotiate with 
Kosovo, International Press Service, Oct. 14, 1998. 
Quo Vadis Domine: Reflections on Ethnic Self-Determination in Central-Eastern Europe 9 
recognition and protection in the emerging body of the European Minority 
Rights.24 Institutional framework also has developed for the effective protection 
and implementation of these rights.25 In summary, a high level of economic and 
democratic development can resolve the contemporary concept of ethnic self-
determination by preserving the multi-ethnic society's integration into the modern 
sovereign nation-state and the European Union.26 
III. Reassessment of Ethnic Self-Determination in Eastern Europe 
One of the Greatest Challenges for Post-Cold War Eastern 
Europe lies in the unresolved questions of ethnic self-determination. The 
unprecedented human tragedy of two world wars did not resolve these questions. 
The Marxist-dominated regimes in Eastern Europe made extraordinary efforts to 
ignore and oppress any open debate on the question of ethnic self-deter-
mination.27 The turning point came with the unexpectedly fast collapse of 
communist control as the "velvet revolution" swept across the region in 
1988-1990. The astonishing pace of political transformation has not been 
accompanied by balanced economic transition to free market economies. Most of 
the countries have been suffering unprecedented economic crisis.28 Ethnic 
conflict has re-emerged as the political central authority has been weakened by 
the ongoing economic crisis. 
From the historical perspective, this ethnic conflict is merely the continuation 
of unresolved questions in international law: how to protect ethnic minorities 
living in the territory of another sovereign nation-state when the borders of 
nation-states do not necessarily follow the historical settlement of ethnic 
populations. After each world war, people and national borders were artificially 
rearranged, disregarding any effective protection of ethnic minorities.29 
Therefore, it is not surprising that issues of ethnic self-determination remain 
to be addressed by the global community of nations in the post-Cold War era. 
24 WIPPMAN, D.: International Law and Ethnic Conflict, 1998, 2-21. 
25 Id. at 7-19. 
26 KRESOCK: Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: A Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 
27 Cornell International Law Journal, 1994, 203. 
27 BROLMANN: op. cit., 3-27. 
28 Id. at 29-35. 
29 Id. at 77-101. 
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In classic public international law, the individual human being, or individual 
ethnic group, did not receive any particular protection. Thus, state sovereignty 
dominated over any claims for individual or ethnic self-determination. 
In the midst of the devastating tragedy of the second world war, the human 
being's special inalienable right to international protection emerged. Following 
the adoption of the United Nations Charter, a new body of customary inter-
national law developed for the protection of human rights. 
The concept of the fundamental human right of personal self-determination 
has been recognized in Article 55 of the United Nations Charter,1" and has 
received authoritative construction by several widely accepted United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions. During the 1960's, colonial demands for in-
dependence were fostered by widespread recognition of the doctrine of national 
self-determination. Some scholars even believe that this principle has achieved 
the force of a "peremptory norm", reflecting world public policy.11 
An understanding of the fundamental human right of determination can lead 
the foundation of the ethnic self-determination. Individuals, based on their 
cultural, psycholinguistic, ethnic identity belong to certain groups. From the 
historical perspective, these groups have leaped together in a certain territorial 
setting. As the nation-state concept emerged these groups' identities became the 
constituting element of the evolution of the nation-state. It is quite obvious that 
the multi-ethnic groups have lived together within the boundaries of most of the 
modern nation-states. 
Different models of accommodations developed between the majority ethnic 
groups and the minority ethnic groups within the boundaries of a nation-state. 
There are several alternatives that can be explored regarding the concept of ethnic 
self-determination. In Central-Eastern Europe, for instance, a significant number 
of the Jewish population has been living, particularly in Hungary and Russia, who 
survived the holocaust and their position is clearly not to claim any ethnic identity 
but rather to strive for complete assimilation. Assimilation of the Jewish 
population particularly accelerated during the Communist domination in the 
region. Jewish people changed their names; they avoided any identification of 
being Jewish; and they made all effort to fully assimilate into the national 
community all over Central-Eastern Europe. Assimilation for other national 
groups is not so obvious. However, the tendency is that if the ethnic minorities 
30 See generally, SOHN: op. cit.. 540-553. 
31 BROLMAN: op cit., 38-53. 
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are really mixed and have a smaller percentage in a particular territory, some 
trend of assimilation clearly can be observed." 
The ideal solution for the problem of ethnic minorities is the co-existence in 
a multi-cultural society. In the cosmopolitan setting of major cities in Central-
Eastern Europe, this has been the prevailing approach to the problem. Even in the 
Yugoslavian tragedy, the capital of Bosnia-Sarajevo was one of the real multi-
ethnic societies, where inter-marriage among Muslim-Bosnians, and Serb-
Croatians was commonplace and twenty-eight percent of the population enjoyed 
inter-marriages and close relationships among the different ethnic groups.33 
Turning now to the bigger issues in ethnic self-determination in Central-
Eastern Europe, first, it has to be considered what other alternatives are feasible 
under the current international legal regime protecting ethnic minorities. Earlier, 
we discussed that in the inter-war period, the relative weakness of the treaty 
regime protecting ethnic minorities under the auspices of the League of Nations 
that actually collapsed on the eve of the second world war. There is really just 
recently a trend in the framework of the European Union and the Council of 
Europe to develop a new body of laws on protecting ethnic minorities, addressing 
the basic needs of the free use of their language, religion, and access to enjoy 
their national culture.34 
The ideal solution would be to give a more precisely defined body of 
international law for protecting ethnic minorities and building a real, effective 
institutional framework on the observation and implementation of minority 
rights.35 Perhaps the existence of such a system would have prevented the 
tragedy of the Yugoslavian civil war which lead to ethnic cleansing, genocide, 
and other unprecedented crimes against humanities in resolving the problem, 
which was not properly treated or addressed under the current body of public 
international law. At the least, the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in 
Kosovo, clearly have no faith and no reliance on protection under public 
international law of their minority rights for preservation of their national culture, 
language, and other basic phenomena of existence.36 
32 KYMLICKA: op. cit., 80-85. 
33 Id. at 86-87. 
34 Id. at 88-89. 
35 KRESOCK: op. cit. 207. 
36 Id. at 208. 
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IV. International Legal Framework for Ethnie Self-Determination 
In this context, we should discuss the protection of ethnic groups to achieve their 
internal right or potentially the feasibility of external right of self-determination. 
The idea of national self-government speaks of groups determining the character 
of their social and economic involvement, their fortunes, the course of their 
development, and the fortunes of their members by their own actions. The first 
question is: What groups qualify for the right to exercise self-determination? The 
group should have a common character and common culture that encompasses 
many, varied, and important aspects of life; a culture that defines or marks a 
variety of forms or styles of life, types of activities, occupations pursued, and 
relationship.37 The membership in the group is a matter of mutual recognition. 
The membership also involves self-identification and reflects a manner of 
belonging. The membership is not exclusive and many people belong to several 
groups that answer to this description. 
The groups of the defined ethnic minority has a historical occupation or 
particular territory, which can be a certain unit within a federal state or can 
basically be just one particular territorial unit as a province or a smaller territorial 
division.38 The struggle for self-determination to lead to external recognition of 
forming a new sovereign entity received an impetus on the United Nations 
Charter and, in particular, led to recognition of the liberation of people under the 
Colonial domination in the early 1960's and 1970's and also people under 
military occupation like the Palestinian people in the Middle East. They 
recognized the right to struggle for external self-determination eventually leads 
to recognition of their statehood.39 
The contemporary international community consist is quite reluctant to extend 
the right of self-determination for ethnic minorities living within the boundaries 
of a multi-ethnic nation-state whether they are unitary or federal systems. The 
danger of disintegration and secession, and the threat of violence and de-
stabilization, led to the unanimous understanding that self-determination of an 
ethnic minority, having a certain majority in a particular territory unit, is not 
recognized under current international law.40 
There is a notion of drawing a distinction between internal and external self-
determination. An internal self-determination essentially protects a defined ethnic 
37 KOVÁCS: op. cit. Зб^Н. 
38 Id. at 43—45. 
39 CASSESE, A.: Self-Determination ofPeoples-A Legal Reappraisal, 1995, 214-218. 
40 Id. at 315-319. 
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minority within the territory which receives well-defined rights of constitutional 
democratic protection of all their minority rights. This legal foundation is 
enshrined in the gradual development of the body of human rights, particularly 
following the European model.41 
Internal self-determination essentially means that a minority can develop a 
certain level of autonomy which starts on the level of cultural autonomy 
preservation of the cycling characteristics of the linguistic and educational as well 
as the religious traditions and all other aspects of the national culture. Usually 
there is a trend, which more or less became the boiling and unsettled issue in the 
Kosovo crisis, assessing the viability of an external self-determination of a very 
defined ethnic group under territory whose internal self-determination was 
denied.42 Its fundamental minority rights would be disregarded by an oppressive 
regime.41 Under these exceptional circumstances, there is a possibility for this 
ethnic minority, having the historical majority on a certain territorial unit of the 
nation-state, reach external self-determination or sovereignty.44 However, this 
is not a settled norm of international law and it is not well recognized in the 
Kosovo conflict, at least at the time of writing this note.45 There are 
destabilizing aspects of external self-determination which lead to the collapse of 
the nation-state system which have to be closely monitored and balanced against 
the fundamental denial of group minority rights within a certain nation-state. 
In the light of the Kosovo conflict, new norms of customary international law 
have been emerging promoting the crystallization of rules on internal self-
determination of peoples of a sovereign state. Traditionally, the international 
community expressed a very cautious approach in recognizing internal self-
determination of ethnic minorities living within the boundaries of a sovereign 
nation-state.46 It is evident that the political underpinning of this position is the 
fear that minorities, by invoking self-determination, might claim a right of 
secession. This is because self-determination is still primarily conceived of as a 
means for achieving independent statehood. 
41 KOVÁCS: op. cit. 63-70. 
42 Id. at 72-74. 
43 For a survey of the various views on this issue, see LERNER: Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law, 15-16. 
44 CASSESE: op. cit. 359-364. 
45 Id. at 365. 
46 BROWNLIE, I.: The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in the Rights of 
Peoples 5 (James Crawford ed., 1988). 
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The current crisis in Kosovo can lead to the reassessment of the absolutist 
concept of self-determination. While self-determination for an ethnic minority is 
still divisive by its very nature, it would still mean a contest for power, control 
and authority. However, if a right to self-determination also meant something less 
than a legal right to sovereignty, the concept can be reassessed as an iron shield 
protection against gross violation of minority rights.47 
The Kosovo experience at the end of the second millennium should be treated 
as the first XXIst century international approach to ethnic self-determination. 
From the vantage point of internal self-determination, the effective protection of 
the ethnic minority should focus on the fine-tuning of the needs of the particular 
ethnic minority. Essentially, it is for the minority group to declare what type of 
protection it seeks: autonomy, regional self-government, cultural autonomy, 
participation in the national decision-making process, and so on.48 In this context, 
self-determination basically means the right of the population concerned to freely 
express its wishes about its destiny. The minority group should participate in the 
decision-making process of the national central authority.49 
V. Final Remarks 
The threshold question under contemporary international law is how to 
effectively implement protection of minority rights without an effective 
international central authority for this purpose. 
Thus, at the current stage of the relative weakness of the international 
institutional framework, the optimum approach should focus on internal self-
determination of ethnic minorities without undermining the territorial integrity 
and the political stability of sovereign states. The present legal regime for the 
international legal protection of minority rights is certainly weak and insufficient. 
Perhaps the whole Yugoslavian civil war and ethnic cleansing could have been 
avoided if such a regime would have been firmly established.50 
Ethnic minorities should have the right for preservation of their separate 
identity. Any form of forced assimilation should be effectively prevented by 
47 FRENCH, Th. M.: Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law 4 (Catherine Brolmann, René Lefeber and Marjoreine Zieck 
eds., 1993). 
48 CASSESE: op. cit. 232-295. 
49 Id. at 317-319. 
50 Id. at 325-328. 
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developing an internationally guaranteed constitutional framework enabling 
members of minorities to enjoy their own culture, to speak their own language, to 
practice their own religion, and so on. At the same time, states should grant 
constitutional participatory rights to them, guaranteeing their participation in the 
national decision-making process. This process would allow the particular ethnic 
group to fully integrate into the national, political, and power structure on a 
national and local level while, at the same time, maintaining and developing their 
own identity.5' 
Ethnic minorities located in specific territorial areas should be allowed to set 
up regional and local governmental structures endowed with legislative and 
enforcement powers in local police and security matters, social services, culture, 
and education.52 The movement for extensive personal and territorial autonomy 
in the form of self-government, however, has been resisted by most of the national 
governments in Central-Eastern Europe, particularly since the second world 
war.55 
Yugoslavia before 1989 offered a relatively effective ethnic self-government 
model, as ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo province and ethnic Hungarians in the 
Vojvodine province enjoyed extensive cultural and territorial autonomy.54 In the 
midst of an escalating economic and political crisis in 1989, the autonomy of these 
provinces was abolished. Consequently, ethnic communities in the disintegrating 
federal systems felt quite insecure. In 1991, the EC Peace Conference on 
Yugoslavia placed great emphasis on the effective protection of the ethnic 
minorities in the newly created states of Bosnia and Croatia under international 
law.55 Thus, this focus on minority rights reflects the continuous rejection by the 
international community to recognize the external ethnic self-determination which 
would undermine the sovereign nation-state system.56 
The concept of external ethnic self-determination requires a careful 
reassessment in the light of the Kosovo tragedy. The unprecedented ethnic conflict 
raises intriguing questions under an emerging new regime for the international 
protection of ethnic minorities within the sovereign nation-state system, such as: 
51 KOSKENNIEMI, M.: National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice, 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 241, 250 (1994). 
52 Id. at 253. 
53 CASSESE: op. cit. 339-343. 
54 Id. at 268-273. 
55 Id. at 272. 
56 Id. at 273. 
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1. the precise criteria of gross oppression of basic minority rights which bars 
the internal self-determination, 
2. can lead to the internationally recognized right for external self-
determination of minorities situated in a geographically coherent area of a nation 
state, and 
3. the new set up of international institutions for dispute settlement and 
conflict resolution in the struggle of external ethnic self-determination.57 
The tragic Kosovo experience at the end of the second millennium should lead 
to a careful reassessment of the role of the United Nations security system in the 
post-Cold War ethnic conflicts. Half a century of neglect of the complex area of 
ethnic self-determination should be addressed by the invisible faculty of 
international legal scholars. 
57 Id. at 363-365. 
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Central and Eastern European philosophy of law started its independent life in the 
second half of the last century by developing its identity and gradually 
distinguishing itself from the trends prevailing in the region, mainly German and 
Austrian ones, but also from the French and Italian influence. Its formation bore 
the imprints of natural law, dominant in Europe at the time and in Central Europe 
primarily transmitted through Anton Martini's book on the principles of natural 
law,1 as well as of Immanuel Kant's and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's 
philosophy. Under the guise of natural law, currents actually competed with each 
other, ranging from the conservative actions of the Church to enlightening 
secularization, from feudal patriarchalism to contractual theories (designed for 
confirming or rejecting privileges), from the refutation of the ius resistendi to the 
approval of revolutionary republican ideas, or from the political use of a Christian 
natural law to launching the fashionable science of the law of reason (called 
Vernunftsrecht).2 By that time, national languages had already gained ground in 
legal philosophy,1 replacing Latin and German. For the contemporaries, Hegel 
1 MARTINI, K. A.: Erklärung der Lehrsätze über das Naturrecht, Vienna, 1787. 
2 PAULER, T.: Észjogi alaptan (Grundlehre des Vernunftsrechts), Pest, 1854. 
3 E.g. in Hungary by SZ. SZILÁGYI, J.: Természeti törvénytudomány (Science of the law of 
nature), Máramarossziget, 1813. 
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was the main symbol of philosophical protest against officialdom. He was 
somewhat opposed to the German historical school of law (with Gustav Hugo's 
textbook on natural law in 1798 as the first expression of the kind), being 
distinguished from the former by its respect for the past. 
In Central Europe, the last decades of the century signalled the formation of a 
positive social theory based on the ideal of science. As local variations, an 
artificially built view of history, rooted in the early developments of historical 
jurisprudence, took shape within its framework (e.g., Ágost Pulszky's recon-
sideration of Sir Henry Maine's The Ancient Law attached to his Hungarian 
translation published in 1875,4 or Jivojina Peric's evolutionism published in 
Serbia in 19085), just as the simplistic materialist theory which reduced law to the 
act of comprehension (e.g., Julius Pikler in Budapest in 18976). Perhaps the most 
successful and lasting theory was the psychological theory of law by Leo N. 
Petrazycki, professor in St. Petersburg at the time, which, reasoning on the motives 
of human behaviour, based its explanation on the individual legal consciousness 
as a phenomenological fact.7 The reaction was just as varied, like the flat 
refutation by arguments of natural law (e.g., Alexander Esterházy in Kaschau in 
1897,8 or Tomás Garrigue Masaryk, professor in Prague at the time, according to 
whose work published in 1900, natural law has to be taken as an ethical maximum 
to be transformed into positive law as an ethical minimum9), or the realization of 
the need for reconciliation between positivism and moral considerations (e.g., 
Felix Somló in Budapest in 1910ю). It is not by mere chance that Rudolf 
Stammler's theory of "just law" from 1902" became the division line, and the 
recognition of its unsustainability provided inspiration for seeking refuge either in 
4 PULSZKY, Á.: Jegyzetek (Notes), in: MAINE: A jog őskora (The Ancient Law), Budapest, 
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1875. 325-443. 
5 J. Peric's look at the evolutionist school in jurisprudence ( 1908). 
6 PIKLER, J.: A jog keletkezéséről és fejlődéséről (On the emergence and development of 
law), Budapest, 1875. 
7 PETRAZYCKI, L. N.: Law and Morality, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 
1955. 
8 ESTERHÁZY, S.: A bölcseleti jogtudomány kézikönyve (Textbook of philosophical 
jurisprudence), Vols. I—II, Kassa, 1897. 
9 T. G. Masaryk on natural law and historical law (1900). 
10 SOMLÓ, F.: Masstäbe zur Bewertung des Rechts. Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschafts-
philosophie, 1910, Vol. III, 508-522 & 589-591. 
11 STAMMLER, R.: Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte, Berlin, Guttentag, 1902. 
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axiology or in logical formalism (e.g., V. A. Saval'sky in Moscow in 1908,12  
Julius Moór in 1911 and Felix Somló in 1914, both in Hungary,15 P. Georgescu 
in Romania in 193914). This is why laying the philosophy of the science of 
positive law on the value-free foundations of jurisprudence became a need of 
primary importance again, following the patterns of two classical thinkers of the 
era, John Austin in London (and his magisterial work from 1861) and Karl 
Bergbohm in Leipzig (and his magisterial work from 1892), by Somló in Hungary 
in 1917.15 
Farther East, in the region dominated by the Byzantine heritage, the orthodox 
variant of natural law represented the ideological framework. From the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, however, rivalling positions became more and more 
feverishly formulated within it, spanning from Kantianism16 to Hegelianism,17 
from Italian-inspired national self-assertion18 to positivism19 in Romania, from 
the ascetic mysticism of V. S. Solovyev, reminiscent of early Christianity,20 to 
Lev Tolstoy's cry against violence.21 In Russia proper, philosophy of law 
became accepted only in the last few years of the nineteenth century. The 
textbooks of N. M. Korkunov and P. Redkin on the history of legal philosophy 
12 SAVAL'SKY. V. A.: Osnovi filosofii prava v nauchnom idealizma marburgskaya shkola 
filosofii: Cohen, Natorp, Stammler i dr (Foundations of legal philosophy in the scientific 
idealism of the Marburg school of philosophy), I, Moscow, 1908. 
13 MOÓR, J.: Stammler "Helyes jogról szóló tana" (Stammler's doctrine on right law), 
Budapest, Pfeifer, 1911. and A jog fogalma és az anarchizmus problémája Stammler jog-
philosophiájában (The notion of law and the problem of anarchism in Stammler's legal 
philosophy), Budapest, 191 1., as well as SOMLÓ, Bódog: A helyes jog elméletéről (On the 
theory of right law), Kolozsvár, 1914, Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesült jog- és társadalomtudományi 
szakosztálya. 
14 GEORGESCU, P.: Conceptul si idea dreptului ín doctrina lui R. Stammler (Concepts and 
ideas of law in R. Stammler's doctrine), Bucuresti, 1939. 
15 SOMLÓ, F.: Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig, Meiner, 1917 and 2nd ed. 1927 (reprint by 
Aalen, Scientia 1973). 
16 KUNITZYN, A. P.: Pravo estestvennoe (Natural law), Sanktpeterburg, 1818. 
17 NIEWOL1N, K. N. in the volume II (history of legal philosophy) of the encylopaedia of 
jurisprudence (Kiev, 1839), according to whom law is "the expression of justice, actualising 
godly existence in the world of morality." 
18 В ARNUTIU, Simeon: Dreptul natural privat (Private natural law), Iasi, 1868, and Dreptul 
natural public (Public natural law), Iasi, 1870. 
19 MISSIR, P. on legal philosophy and natural law ( 1904). 
20 SOLOVYEV, V. S. on law and morality (1897). 
21 ÍL'YN, I. A. on Tolstoy as against communism (1910), Ponyatie prava i sili. (Notions of 
law and coercion) Vopros filosofii ipsikhologii, 1913, 101. 
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in St. Petersburg,"" as well as the ones of P. I. Novgorodtzev and E. N. 
Trubetzkoy on natural law in Moscow,23 exerted the main influence by their 
repeated editions. A regional turning point in how to think in legal philosophy 
was provoked by the discussions related to Savigny's work and the historical 
school of law (e.g. U. Kollotay in Poland, a number of Serbs, Novgorodtzev 
publishing in 1896,24 as well as A. Tamosaitis, publishing in 1929 in Lithuania). 
As to the trends born in Russia, the discussion of V. S. Solovyev's teaching done 
on law and morality in 189725 and Petrazycki26 (by Venelin Ganev in Sofia 
from 1914,27 J. Lande in Krakow from 1916, and E. Bautro in Warsaw from 
22 KORKUNOV, N. M.: Lekcii po obshchey teorii prava (Lectures on the general theory of 
law), 1887; on decree and law (St. Petersburg, 1894); Istoriia filosofii prava (History of legal 
philosophy), five editions until 1908; REDKIN. P.: Iz lekcy po istoriifilosofii prava i sviazi iz 
istoriey filosofii vo'obshche (From the lectures on the history of legal philosophy with a look 
at the history of philosophy in general), St. Petersburg, seven editions between 1889 and 1891. 
23 NOVGORODTZEV, P. I.: Istoriia novoi filosofii prava: Nemetzkiie ucheniia XIX veka 
(History of the new legal philosophy: German teachings in the 19th century), Moscow, 1898, 2nd 
ed.: Moscow, 1899; Kant i Hegel v ill ucheniyah о prave i gosudarstve: Dva tipichnikh 
postroeniia v oblasti filosofii prava (Teachings of Kant and Hegel law and state: Two typical 
trends in legal philosophy), Moscow, 1901; Ucheniia novogo vremeni XVI-XVIII. v.: Lekcii po 
istorii filosofii prava (Teachings of the new era in 16th to 18th centuries: Lectures on the history 
of legal philosophy), Moscow, 1901, XVI-XIX. v. (16th to 19th centuries), Moscow, Knizhnoe 
delo 1904; Moscow, I. Vlassov, 1910, 2nd ed.: 1912, XVI-XVIII. v. i XIX. v. (16th to 18th and 
19th centuries), 4th ed., Moscow, VUszsaja Skola, 1918; TRUBETZKOY, E. N.: Istorii filosofii 
prava drevnei (The history of legal philosophy: ancient), Kiev, 1899, novoi (new), Kiev, 1898, 
noveishei (modern), Kiev, 1896. 
24 NOVGORODTZEV, P. I.: lstoricheska shkola yuristov ее proizhozhdenia v sudba: Oput 
kharakteristiki osnov shkolu Savigny v ih sosledovatelnoin razvitii (The historical school of 
jurists, their achievement and assessment: characteristic traits of Savigny's school in its 
subsequent development), Moscow, 1896. 
25 NOVGORODTZEV, P. I.: Ideia prava vfilosofii V. S. Szolovyeva (The idea of law in V. S. 
Solovyev's philosophy), Moscow, 1901 and JASHTSHENKO, A. S.: Filosofiia prava Solovyeva 
(Solovyev's legal philosophy), St. Petersburg, 1912. 
26 TRUBETZKOY, N. N.: Filosofia prava prof. L. 1. Petrazhitzkogo. (Prof. L. I. Petrazycki's 
philosophy of law), Voprosu filosofii i psikhologii 1901/2, 9 -34 and REISNER, M. A. (1908) 
in Moscow, PALIENKO, N. (1908) in Harkov, as well as GANEV, Venelin: Imperativno-
atributivnata teoriia na prof. Petrazhitzk. (Prof. Petrazycki's imperative-attributive theory), 
Spisania na Yuridicheskoto druzhestvo, II, 1904, 6 & 10. 
27 GANEV, V.: Kurs po obshcha teoriia na pravoto [1921], 4th ed., revised by Neno Nenovski, 
Sofia, 1995. 
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192528) became the crystallizing point, determining the further development of 
legal-philosophical thought. In addition to this Eastern European variety, the 
wave of scholars from the Balkans, getting their doctorate degrees in law in Paris 
before the first world war must also be mentioned, which, relying mainly on 
François Gény's revolutionary work (Méthode d'interprétation et sources en 
droit privé positif), became a school-generating example also for interwar 
Romania and Serbia (by, e.g., Mircea Djuvara in 1913,24 and Jivan Spassoyevitch 
in 1911,30 respectively). 
The years preceding the first world war signalled the launching of the so-called 
Vienna-school in mastering and spreading philosophical positivism (issuing the 
journal Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht from 1921 on), and Hans Kelsen's 
concept of the 'pure theory of law' grew into an international trend (by S. 
Rundstein in Poland,31 Leonidas Pitamic in Slovenia,32 Vojtech Tuka in 
Slovakia33). Almost simultaneously, a school in Brno was formed (with their own 
journal Internationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts / Revue internationale de 
la théorie du droit from 192634) by Frantisek Weyr, author of the 'normative 
theory' based upon Schopenhauer's early concept of sufficient reason,35 
28 LANDE, J. on norm and phenomenon of law (Krakow, 1925); BAUTRO, E. on feeling of 
law as the symptom and form of unconsciously abbreviated thought (Warsaw, 1925) and Die 
Idee der Totalität in der Philosophie und Rechtstheorie. Internationale Zeitschrift fiir Theorie des 
Rechts, 1928-1929, Vol. 3, 156-194. 
29 DJUVARA, M.: Le fondement du phénomène juridique: Quelques réflexions sur les principe 
de la connaissance juridique, Paris, 1913. 
30 SPASSOYEVITCH, J.: L'Analogie et l'interprétation, Paris, 1911. 
31 RUNDSTEIN, S. on legal interpretation and science of law (Warsaw, 1916) and on the 
structure of law (Warsaw, 1937). 
32 PITAMIC, L.: Denkökonomische Voraussetzungen der Rechtswissenschaft. Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1917-1918, Vol. 3 ,339-367; Zur neuesten Rechtskraftlehre. 
Zeitschrift fiir öffentliches Recht, 1923-1924, Vol. 4, 160-164; Drzava, Ljubljana, 1927 and Zur 
Lehre von der richterlichen Funktion (in Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht: Festschrift für Hans 
Kelsen, Wien, 1931, 295-308). 
33 TUKA, V.: Die Rechtssysteme, Berlin & Vienna, 1941. 
34 Cf. KUBES, V,—WEINBERGER, O. (eds.): Die Brünner rechtstheoretische Schule, Wien, 
1980. 
35 WEYR, F.: La théorie normative. Rocenka právnickéfakulty Masarykovy university 1925, 
Vol. IV, No. 3; La notion de "Processus juridique" dans la théorie du droit (in: Studifîlosoftco-
giuridici dedicati a Giorgio del Vecchio, Modena, 1931 ); Natur und Norm. Revue internationale 
de la théorie du droit, 1931-1932, Vol. VI, No. 12; Die Rechtswissenschaft als Wissenschaft vor 
Unterschieden. Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 1935. 
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Jaroslav Kallab, a student of Windelband's and Rickert's axiology,3'1 as well as 
Jaromír Sedlácek37 and Karel Englis.38 After the first world war, pheno-
menology and the analytical interest in aprioristic-deductivist realism also 
demanded ground (in the oeuvre, e.g., e.g. N. Alexeev in Russia from 191834 and 
Czeslaw Znamierowski at Poznan from 192140). Yet, the interwar period was 
mainly shaped by generations which undertook the critical reconsideration of 
Kelsen's 'pure theory of law', i.e., Djuvara, as a neo-Kantian eclectic critical 
idealist in Bucharest,4' Ganev, analyzing normative concepts as ideological tools 
for shaping future in Sofia,42 Moór, trying to reconcile positivism and natural law 
in Budapest,43 as well as Djordje Tasic in Belgrade,44 Ceko Torbov, a student 
36 KALLAB, J.: L'oggetto della scienza guiridica. Rivista internazionale difilosofia del diritto, 
1922, Vol. 2, 14-22 and Le postulat de justice dans la théorie du droit. Revue internationale de 
la théorie du droit, 1926-1927, Vol. 1, 89-99. 
37 SEDLÁCEK, J.: Interprétaton et application de la règle de droit. Revue internationale de la 
théorie du droit, 1932-1933, Vol. 7, 180-185 and II concetto realistico ed il concetto 
normologico della norma giuridica. Rivista internazionale difilosofia del diritto, 1933, Vol. 13, 
153-174. 
38 ENGLIS, K.: Apologia finalitatis, Prague, 1946. 
39 ALEXEEV, N. on introduction to the study of law (1918) and to the foundations of legal 
philosophy (1923), and on the creative judicial act as the primary source of the law ( 1934). 
40 ZNAMIEROWSKI, Cz. on subject and social fact (1921) and psychological theory of law 
(1922). 
41 DJUVARA, M.: La théorie de la cause à la lumière de la théorie du Droit. Revue 
internationale de la théorie du Droit, 1932, Vol. 6, Nos. 2-3, 91-105; Relatività e diritto, à 
proposito del parallelisimo fra la struttura logica del mondo fisico e quella del mondo giuridico. 
Rivista internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, 1935, Vol. 15, No. 3, 309-327; Considération sur 
la connaissance en général et sur la connaissance juridique en particulier (in: Annuaire de 
l'Institut, 1935/1936, Vol. 2, 83-96); Dialectique et expérience juridique. Zeitschrift für Theorie 
des Rechts, 1938, Vol. 12, No. 4, 295-315; Considérations sur la structure de la connaissance 
morale et juridique, Bucharest, 1940; L'idée de convention et ses manifestations comme réalités 
juridiques. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 1940, 110-158; Über das Verhältnis des 
Rechtserkenntnis zur soziologischen Erkenntnis. Zeitschrift für deutsche Kulturphilosophie, 
1942, Vol. 9, No. 1,39-45. 
42 GANEV, V.: Kurspo obshcha teoriia na pravoto: Uvod: Metodologiya na pravoto, ( 1921 ; 
1932; 1933; 1946), re-ed. & preface Neno Nenovski, Sofia, Akademichna Izdatelstvo "Prof. 
Marin Drinov", 1995. 
43 MOÓR, J.: Das Logische im Recht. Internazionale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, 1928, 
Vol. II, No. 3,157-203, Reine Rechtslehre, Naturrecht und Rechtspositivismus (in: VERDROSS, 
A. (ed.), Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht: Festschrift gewidmet Hans Kelsen zum 50. Geburtstage, 
Wien, 1931, 58-105), Creazione e applicazione del diritto. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia 
del Diritto, 1934, Vol. XIV, No. 6, 653-680, Recht und Gewohnheitsrecht. Zeitschrift für 
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of Leonard Nelson on Kantian natural law in Sofia,45 Eugeniu Sperantia, an 
idealist in Cluj,46 Vladimir Kubes, a disciple of Nicolai Hartmann in Brno,47 and 
József Szabó, undertaking to rationalize the irrational at Szeged.48 As a counter-
effect to the rigour of the purist defence against methodological syncretism, a 
number of synthetic philosophies were also born (e.g., by Torna Zivanovic in 
Serbia from 1927,44 Horváth's synoptic view from 193650 with István Bibó in 
Szeged, as well as István Losonczy's neurophysiological realism at Pécs.51 
This nourishment was brought to an abrupt end by the Soviet Union, as the 
real winner of the second world war, imposing its own regime on the region. 
With the liquidation of P. I. Stutshka, M. A. Reisner and E. B. Pashukanis, 
A. J. Vishinsky's 'socialist normativism', formulated in 1939, could no longer 
provide considerable developments for legal-philosophical thought. Although the 
entire region was destined to share the same fate,52 the tradition of analytical 
linguistico-logical theorizing in Poland proved to be strong enough to survive 
öffentliches Recht, 1935, Vol. XIV, No. 5, 545-567, Der Wissenschafts-Character der 
Jurisprudenz. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1941, Vol. XX, No. 1, 20-37. 
44 TASIC, D.: Le réalisme et le normativisme dans la science juridique. Revue internationale 
de la théorie du droit, 1926-1927, Vol. I, 165-182 and 1927-1928, Vol. 2, 23-56. 
45 TORBOV, C.: Filosofiia na pravoto i yurisprudentziia (Philosophy of Law and 
Jurisprudence), Sofia, 1930 and Osnovniat printzip na pravotov: Pravo i spravedlivost 
(Fundamental Principles of Law: Law and Justice), Sofia, 1940, as well as Estestveno pravo i 
filosofiia na pravoto (Abstract: TORBOV, Z.: Naturrecht und Rechtsphilosophie. 92-107), Sofia, 
Universitetska Pechatnitza, 1947. 
46 Cf. his Basic principles of legal philosophy (Cluj, 1936) and Introduction to legal 
philosophy, Cluj, 1946. 
47 From the syntheses of his late years, see Grundfragen der Philosophie des Rechts, Wien & 
New York, Springer, 1977; Ontologie des Rechts, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1986; Theorie 
der Gesetzgebung, Wien & New York, Springer, 1987. 
48 SZABÓ. J.: A jogászi gondolkodás bölcselete (The Philosophy of the Juristic Thought), Acta 
Universitatis Szegediensis: Sectio Juridica-Politica, Tom. XVI Fasc. 2 (Szeged, 1941 ). 
49 On the system of a synthetical philosophy of law (Belgrade, 1927). 
50 HORVÁTH, В.: Rechtssoziologie, Berlin-Grunewald, Verlag für Staatswissenschaften und 
Geschichte, 1934 (ARSP Beiheft 28). 
51 BIBÓ, I.: Le dogme du "bellum justum" et la théorie de l'infallibilité juridique: Essai 
critique sur la théorie pure du droit. Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit, 1936, Vol. X, 
No. I, 14-27 and Rechtskraft, rechtliche Unfehlbarkeit, Souveränität. Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht, 1937, Vol. XVII, No. 5, 623-638; LOSONCZY, I.: Über die Möglichkeit und den 
Wissenschaftscharakter der Rechtswissenschaft. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 1937, Vol. 
XVII, No. 2, 145-194. 
52 Cf. VARGA, Cs. (ed.): Marxian Legal Theory, Aldershot—Singapore—Hong Kong—Sydney, 
Dartmouth & New York, New York University Press, 1993. 
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with outstanding journals (as with Archívum Juridicum Cracoviense published 
from 1966 and Studies in the Theory and Philosophy of Law from 1986) and 
magisterial oeuvres (Kazimierz Opalek, Jerzy Wróblewski," Zygmunt 
Ziembinski54). As for Hungary, less fortunate local traditions relied on neo-
Kantianism, which could be easily swept away by Georg Lukács and his neophyte 
Muscovite comrades. Notwithstanding of devastating effects in the short run, the 
outcome grew into a scholarship with considerable historical and comparative 
interest, generating further reformist tendencies (with the journal Acta Juridica, 
starting in 1959), ending in an open-minded philosophizing on law in Marxism 
with social-theoretical—and, thanks to Lukács's late ontology of the social being, 
even ontological—pretensions (Imre Szabó,45 Gyula Eörsi,56 Vilmos Peschka). 
Marxist theories of law worthy of international attention were also formed in 
Serbia,57 Czechoslovakia (especially Viktor Knapp) and Romania (Revue 
roumaine des Sciences juridiques (1956-)58 and particularly Anita M. 
Naschitz59). 
Today's endeavors, with the reintroduction of classical and contemporary 
trends from Western Europe and the Atlantic world, are mostly directed toward 
filling the vacuum left behind by the forced interruption of development. 
Identifying and reassessing national traditions are to meet the needs of 
contemporary synthesis and the necessity to reintegrate such neglected fields as 
natural law and, with theoretical foundations, the doctrinal study of law 
(Rechtsdogmatik). Sensibility toward philosophical issues and emphasis on 
53 WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: The Judicial Application of Law, ed. Zenon Bankowski & Neil 
MacCorntick, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1992. 
54 ZIEMBINSKI, Z. (ed.): Polish Contribution to the Theoiy and Philosophy of Law, 
Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1987. 
55 SZABÓ, I.: Les fondements de la théorie du droit, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1973. 
56 EÖRSI, Gy.: Comparative Civil (Private) Law: Law Types and Law Groups, the Road of 
Legal Develoment, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979. 
57 LUKIC, R. D.: Théorie de l'État et du Droit, Paris, Dalloz, 1974. 
58 Especially IONASCO, Tr.—BARASCH, E. A.: Les constantes du droit: Droit et logique. 
Revue roumaine des sciences sociales, Série de Sciences juridiques, 1964, No.2, 132-143. 
59 NASCHITZ, A. M.—FODOR, I.: Rolul practicii judiciare in formarea si peifectionarea 
normelor dreptului socialist (The Role of Judicial Practice in the Formation and Perfection of 
the Norms of Socialist Law), Bucharest, Ed. Academiei, 1961 and NASCHITZ, A. M.: Wert 
und wertungsfragen im Recht. Revue Roumaine des Sciences sociales, Série de Sciences 
juridiques, 1965, No. 1, 3-23 & Le problème du droit naturel à la lumière de la philosophie 
marxiste du droit. Revue Roumaine des Sciences sociales, Série de Sciences juridiques, 1966, 
No. 1, 19-40. 
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historical and comparative approaches will surely survive the forced encounter 
with Marxism. Hopefully the demand for interdisciplinary explanation (that is, 
an ontological reconstruction integrating macro-sociology, autopoietical systems-
theory or cultural anthropology) can also survive as one of the characteristic traits 
and strengths of the Central and Eastern European philosophy of law. 
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Lajos RÁCZ Union with Transylvania in 1848 
and the Path Leading There 
"Whoever the chancellor will be, it is inevitable to 
support him in realising the Union in principio" 
(a letter by Baron József Eöt\'ös to Imre Mikó: 
October I860) 
"I can assure you, gentlemen, I will never concede to 
the unification of Transylvania and Hungary" 
(a statement by Emperor Francis Joseph I to 
the Rumanian delegation from Transylvania 
in the spring of 1861) 
As it clearly can be seen from the above quotes, even before the Compromise 
(Ausgleich) of 1867, the agreement between the Hungarian nation and the 
Habsburg dynasty, the concepts of the Court in Vienna and the liberal political 
forces of Hungary were absolutely different on the constitutional relations 
between Hungary and Transylvania. To understand this sharp difference in 
opinions, one has to know about the historical background. At the same time, 
foreign politics had a significant role in the fact that the statements of Emperor 
Francis Joseph I had been forgotten by 1867. Among others, the Hungarians con-
sidered the confirmation of the legitimacy of the April Laws of 1848—which 
provided for the unification of Hungary with Transylvania—an important 
condition of the Compromise. 
I. Time Span 
It may seem a simplified statement, but the constitutional terms between 
Transylvania and Hungary can be illustrated with a sequence of dates. These 
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dates are: 1544, 1606, 1628, 1690, 1723, 1791, 1836, 1848, 1867. These dates 
sign the constitutional acts which were landmarks in the relationships between the 
two sides. 
1. The date of 1544. in the history of Transylvania is considered as an 
important landmark, as this was the first provincial Diet of Transylvania where, 
beside the three nations of Transylvania, the delegates of the Tiszántúl's 
Hungarian comitats (later referred to as Partium) also participated.1 Earlier, a 
sovereign Transylvanian province had not been mentioned. True, the above 
mentioned Diet, which was summoned by Governor György Fráter, was a 
necessary, although not direct consequence of the Turkish conquest, i.e. the 
country's falling into three parts. Thus, the creation of the state of Transylvania 
is the result of foreign political factors. Detailed research in the field has proved 
that a tendency of inner integration had started well before 1544. The Diet 
discussed here was merely the completion of this tendency. 
1.1. One of the particular features of the medieval Hungarian state, even if 
viewing it with Western-European eyes, that separate provinces did not form. 
Before the Battle of Mohács in 1526, only the Croatian-Slovenian-Dalmatian 
regional governments can be mentioned as an example. The autonomous state or 
province of Transylvania was created in its aftermath. This fact is important, 
among other things, in the history of public administration, if one considers that 
in Hungary we still do not have regions as a part of a three-tier public 
administration system. Presumably, the reason can be found in the lack of the 
feudal regional governments. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there 
were initiatives throughout the centuries, and such a regional government would 
appear or stabilise where a member of a reigning royal family had obtained 
powers for regional government. For example, the duke, lateiMn connection with 
the younger kingdom—the viceroy of Croatia, the viceroy of Macsó, János 
Corvin's dukedom of Liptó, the dukedom of Szepes imagined by the Szapolyai, 
or the Eastern-Hungarian regional government of the rex juniors. These forms of 
1 HORVÁTH. M.: Magyarország történelme (The History of Hungary). Vol. IV. Pest, 1871. 196. 
The invitation to the Diet was sent on behalf of Queen Izabella, see: Erdélyi Országgyűlési Emlékek 
(Memories of the Transylvanian National Assembly) (ed. Sándor Szilágyi), Vol. I. Budapest, 1876. 
122, 187-188. In the preamble law the delegates of the Diet are referred to as: "Per universitatem 
Dominorum et Nobilium Regni Transylvaniae et Hungáriáé Ditionis Majestatis suae." 188. To 
guarantee this, the annual session of the Diet of the feudal classes of Tiszántúl and Transylvania was 
ordered here in Torda: "Singulis annis celebrentur huismodi congregationes generales, omnibus 
ordinimus diconis Maiestatis suae tam Hungaris quant Transsilvanis." 190. 
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government are basically similar to the territorial sharing inside the royal families 
of Western-Europe, conventional at that time. Luckily for the medieval 
Hungarian state, these arrangements were not long-lasting. 
In the second half of the XHIth century, regional government—as a 
reminiscence of the dukedom of Bihar-Nyir^was created in Transylvania, as Béla 
IV, later his son, István V—as royal princes, during the reign of their fathers—got 
provinces here in the eastern part of the country. Probably, these territories were 
the partes Transsilvanas, the parts of Transylvania, and some other north-eastern 
counties.2 After the royal family of the Arpáds died out, regional government as 
such got out of the vocabulary. This is also suggested by the consequent use of 
the word Chancellery. In charters one can come across only Transylvanian parts, 
i.e. the above-mentioned partes, but no reference to a province.3 Transylvania 
was governed by three kinds of public administration units. These were the 
Hungarian comitats, the Szeklers (Székely) and the Saxonian provinces. Each of 
these was directed by a high-ranking regional royal official: the voivode in each 
of the seven Hungarian comitats; the comes siculorum, i.e. the Szeklers bailiff 
in the Szeklers provinces; the comes saxonum, the Saxonian bailiff in the seven 
and two Saxonian provinces. 
It is worth noting the Szeklers bailiff was a rival of the voivode. Particularly 
after redrawing the borders during King Lajos the Great, further non-Szeklers 
territories got under the jurisdiction of the Szeklers bailiff. In the north, the 
comitats of Máramaros, Szatmár and Ugocsa; the district of Beszterce; in the 
south, Háromszék, Brassow and Barcaság were subject to the rule of the Szeklers 
bailiff.4 Translated, it means they were responsible for the protection of the East-
Carpathian borders. At the same time, the power of the voivode was also 
strengthened by obtaining the title of the Bailiff of Comitat Szolnok in the Xlllth 
century.5 
It is also worth paying attention that church administration is not uniform in 
the whole partes Transsilvanas. The Bishop of Transylvania, who until 1918 had 
been officially called episcopus Transsilvanus, and not the Bishop of Gyula-
fehérvár after his see, had jurisdiction over the comitats and the Szeklers, but not 
2 KRISTÓ, Gy.: Feudális széttagolódás Magyarországon (Feudal Disunity in Hungary). Budapest, 
1979.48-49. SZ1RMAY, A.: Szatmár vármegye (Comitat Szatmár). Vol. Buda, 1809. 39. WENZEL, 
G.: Árpádkori Új Okmánytár (New Collection of Records of the Árpád Era). Vol. VIII. Pest, 1872. 
5-7. FEJÉR, Gy.: Codex Diplomaticus. Vol. 7/3. Buda, 1835. 41. 
3 GYŐRFFY, Gy.: Gyulafehérvár kezdetei, neve és káptalanjának registroma (The Early Years of 
Gyulafehérvár, its Name and the Register of its Chapter). Századok, 1983. Vol. 5. 1113-1116. 
4 LÁZÁR, M.: Erdély főispánjai (The Bailiffs of Transylvania). Századok, 1887, 1888, 1889. 
5 PÓR, A.: Erdélyi vajdák (The Voivodes of Transylvaniya) (series). Erdélyi Múzeum, 1893. 
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the Saxonian. (N.B. the church administration system of the Saxonian dates back 
to the dynasty of the Árpáds). The Provost of Szeben was in charge of church 
administration on their territories, Fundus Regius and Királyföld. In Brassow and 
Barcaság it is the Dean of the Brassow Chapter to manage church administration. 
Both institutes of the Church are supervised by the Archbishop of Esztergom on 
behalf of the monarch till Reformation.6 The comitats of Kiaszna, Szatmár and 
Ugocsa, west of the Meszes Mountains were under the jurisdiction of the 
Transylvanian Bishopric. In the Middle Ages they were also referred to as the 
Vicarage of Meszes, an autonomous church unit. On the other hand, the 
Archdeaconry of Kalotaszeg was part of the Diocese of Várad; in secular 
administration, part of the Comitat of Bihar till 1544.7 
This differentiated system of public administration well illustrates and also 
preserves the gradual integration of parts of Transylvania in the state organisation 
of medieval Hungary. At the same time, the lack of provincial autonomy, the 
result of disintegration can be clearly seen. 
1.2. A significant shift in this differentiated system can be observed since 
1440. Then, the King appoints János Hunyadi, Viceroy of Szörény to be the 
Voivode of Transylvania; while Lőrincz Újlaki, Viceroy of Szörény is appointed 
the Bailiff of the Szeklers.8 Through administration, particularly war 
administration the voivodes can oversee all Transylvania with the exception of 
the Saxonian. The explanation can be found in foreign politics. The Turks 
reached the southern borders at this time and the feudal provinces of the 
Transcarpathians became Turkish. Therefore, it was the task of the voivode to 
strengthen border defence and to co-ordinate war operations in the three parts, 
within the country borders. 
The political integration of the country started when, in 1437. after defeating 
the peasant war, the leaders of the three parts, i.e. the three nations signed the so-
called Kápolna Union.4 Afterwards, it became a routine to summon a so-called 
partial Diet for the nations of Transylvania more and more often, presumably for 
the Turkish danger. Previously, the Court guaranteed this privilege only for the 
Croatian-Slovenian-Dalmatian territories. To sum it up, the three factors: 
personal Union of the posts of the voivode and the Szeklers bailiff; Kápolna 
Union as a provincial political pact; and the partial Diets together resulted in a 
6 ORTVAY T.: Magyarország egyházi földleírása a XIV. század elején (The Church Register of 
Land in Hungary at the Early 14th Century). Vol. I. 1891. 57-63, Vol. II. 1892. 607-768. 
7 Ibid. Vol. II. 1892. 579. 
8 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. II. 1871. 545. 
9 Ibid. 513. 
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process of gaining gradual independence in the parts of Transylvania. For Her to 
achieve the status of an autonomous province, later that of an independent 
country, further impacts of foreign politics, among them the acceleration of the 
Turkish conquest was necessary. 
1.3. The development in this process is indicated by the fact that the widowed 
Queen Izabella moving from Buda to Transylvania in 1541, and her son, János 
Zsigmond, the elected king keep their title of Hungarian monarchs. The title of 
Prince of Transylvania is first mentioned only two decades later, in the Concordat 
of Speyer. It was not used systematically until 1594. Beside the Hungarian 
documents, the political statement of the Porte also proves the Turkish conquest 
had a significant role in the process of gaining independence in Transylvania. 
When Gábor Bethlen was forced by the Turks to return from his successful 
military expedition in the Upper Hungary (Felvidék), the senior mufti of the 
Sultan clearly stated to the Transylvanian delegate to the Porte they do not let 
Bethlen Gábor unite the conquested territories with Transylvania, in spite of him 
being the King of Hungary. They claimed Transylvania to be the possession of 
the Sultan.10 
The independence of Transylvania from the Kingdom of Hungary is 
sanctioned in the Concordat of Speyer in 1570. Also, the Habsburgs recognised 
again the title of prince of Transylvania in 1595, after the marriage of Zsigmond 
Báthory with the Habsburg royal princess Maria Krisztierna. 
1.4. From 1544 to 1604, the date of the Revolt of István Bocskai, the 
constitutional autonomy of Transylvania had been stabilised. A provincial 
identity seemed to appear, which later was referred to as transylvanism in general 
historiography. 
Bocskai's political testament is a revealing document. This is interesting 
because on the one hand, Bocskai referred to Transylvania as his homeland; on 
the other hand, he regarded the independence of Transylvania from Hungary to 
be provisional. This well-known document stated that Transylvania's inde-
pendence was necessary as long as the Hungarian crown belonged to the 
Germans." This statement is significant because István Bocskai made it when 
he was the Governor of Hungary elected by the Hungarian feudal classes beside 
10 BORSOS, T.: Vásárhelytől a Fényes Portáig (From Vásárhely to the Sublime Porte). Bukarest, 
1972. 394-395. Borsos quotes the senior mufti: "Even if István Bocskai had been the king, the 
sublime sultan would never have let him take possession of Transylvania." 
11 BOCSKAI, I.: Testamentomi rendelés (Destination from the Testament). In: Magyar 
gondolkodók, XVII. század (Hungarian Thinkers, XVlIth century). Budapest, 1979. 14. 
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being the Prince of Transylvania. Although, when the Sultan sent him a crown, 
probably in acknowledgement of unification, Bocskai expressed his gratitude, but 
had it placed in his treasury. One can conclude that the common political opinion 
of the time still considered the division of the country provisional, despite the fact 
the Peace of Vienna concluded by Bocskai acknowledged the independence of 
Transylvania. 
2. A big change took place in the reign of Gábor Bethlen. True, at the 
beginning he followed traditions in his policies, and confirmed the independence 
of Transylvania in peace treaties. After the death of his first wife, he had the 
intention of marrying a Habsburg royal duchess, and this new constitutional 
situation could have enabled Gábor Bethlen as Prince of Transylvania to be 
appointed the Governor of Hungary. As he could not fulfil these endeavours, he 
tried to arrange for the final and complete independence of Transylvania from 
Hungary. On the one hand, he initiated a new custom according to which the 
European Protestant states guaranteed the peace treaties of the Transylvanian 
princes with the Habsburgs. On the other hand, he tried to secure the Polish 
crown for himself. In 1628, being seriously ill and considering an imminent 
succession, he started to make arrangements for the Seven Comitats. He wanted 
to prevent them from being returned to the Habsburgs, and to keep them under 
the jurisdiction of the Transylvanian Prince. He suggested that the Seven 
Comitats should not be unified with Transylvania,12 but György Rákóczi, as a 
governor should rule them. 
As a peer in Upper Hungary, Rákóczi refused Bethlen's suggestion, but later 
as a reigning prince he seemed to consider this possibility. His testaments and 
political steps suggest so. He wanted his eldest son to inherit the Transylvanian 
estates and the title of Prince of Transylvania; and his other son, Zsigmond to 
inherit the Hungarian estates and the title of Governor of Hungary. It would be 
a long story to analyse the inner-, and foreign-political ideas underlying his will. 
Miklós Zrínyi also indicated Zsigmond Rákóczi as the potential successor to the 
Hungarian throne in his conception of a national kingdom. Zsigmond was also 
considered as the successor to the Polish throne. The Bethlen conception seemed 
to take root in the political thinking of Transylvania, and there were no intentions 
to integrate the two sovereign states even in the case of unifying Hungary.13 In 
12 HERCEGH, G.: Magyarország külpolitikája (The Foreign Policy of Hungary ). Budapest, 1987. 
142-148. KEMÉNY, J.: Önéletírása (Autobiography). In: Kemény János és Bethlen Miklós müvei 
(The Works of János Kemény and Miklós Bethlen). Budapest. 1980. 95. 
13 HERCEGH: op. cit. 150-154, PÉTER K.: A magyar romlásnak századában (In the Century of 
the Hungarian Depravation). Budapest, 1979. 68, 120-121. 
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spite of the Turkish control, the princes of Transylvania had good relationships 
with the western Protestant states, and joining the European Protestant Union, 
became an acknowledged and considerable factor on the political stage. Suffice 
it to refer to the territorial expansion of the principality and the international 
treaties concluded during the Thirty Years' War with the Swedish, the Polish, the 
French monarchs, and Holland. 
3. The next landmark is 1690-1691 when the Habsburgs fighting off the 
Turks, occupied, then annexed the Principality of Transylvania. Diploma 
Leopoldinum, the document signed then and laying down the constitutional inde-
pendence of Transylvania, determined the history of Transylvania until 1848. 
In connection with its creation, at least three conceptions clashed. The earliest 
idea of the Court in Vienna might have been the unification with Hungary. 
Miklós Bethlen, the Transylvanian commissary who created the Diploma, remem-
bered in his Autobiography that at first he was invited to accept the title of 
voivode of Transylvania, but he refused it.14 At the same time the people of 
Transylvania wanted to preserve the autonomous Transylvania. They regarded 
Mihály Apafi (II), the immature prince as a guarantee to realise their aim. Also, 
through Protestant connections, they turned to England and Holland for media-
tion. Possibly as an answer, the Habsburg troops invaded the province, contrac-
tually provided for its financing, but they promised the status of the principality 
would remain pendant till the maturity of Mihály Apafi. Provisionally, a governor 
is appointed who governed with the Council of the Principality. 
But the tactless political decisions of Transylvania (often prompted by selfish 
power struggles, e.g. the marriage of Mihály Apafi with the sister-in-law of the 
governor, without letting the court know) forced the court to stop the autonomy 
of this province and place Transylvania directly under its control. In vain did 
Miklós Bethlen try to redefine the conceptions concerning former freedom, and 
adapt them to the new situation, in his memoir, Noah's dove with the olive 
branch. This step resulted in his lifelong detention, as well as Mihály Apafi's 
internment in a palace in Vienna.15 Another consequence was that the Habsburg 
Emperor as the King of Hungary became the Prince of Transylvania. Apparently, 
it was unity, as the Holy Crown entitled the monarch to rule in both countries, but 
with separate feudal assemblies, wielding power with a Hungarian and a 
14 BETHLEN M.: Élete leírása magától (The Description of his Life by Himself). In: Kemény János 
és Bethlen Miklós művei (The Works of Kemény János and Bethlen Miklós). Budapest, 1980. 821. 
15 BETHLEN, M.: Olajágat viselő Noé galambja (Noah's Pigeon with Olive Branch). In: Magyar 
gondolkodók, XVII. század (Hungarian Thinkers, XVIIth century). Budapest, 1979. 283-296. 
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Transylvanian Chancellery. Later, we are going to write about the foreign 
political motives behind this situation. 
Therefore it is surprising that Ferenc Rákóczi II, during the Rákóczi War of 
Independence did not unite the two countries on purpose, although he had the 
political opportunity. He was elected and appointed the ruling prince of 
Transylvania and the commander of Hungary separately; he had separate councils 
and chancelleries for he two countries. The foreign political motives are clear, as 
long as the commander of Hungary could have been significant for the French 
Court, which regarded him as the military leader of the opposition of the 
Habsburgs in the East. On the other hand, he had a general reputation in European 
politics as the prince of Transylvania. It is also indicated by the fact that when he 
was considering his resignation as the commander of Hungary and offered the 
Polish throne, he did not think of renouncing as the prince of Transylvania, 
recognising the international weight of this post, especially after the Ottoman 
independence ceased.16 (N.B. the feudal classes of the two countries did not wish 
unification, as the Huszti Confederation mentions the co-operation and not the 
unification of Transylvania and Hungary.)17 
4. Afterwards, autonomous government in Hungary and Transylvania 
becomes steady. Thus, the Kingdom of Hungary is in personal-union with Tran-
sylvania, as well as with the Croatian-Slovenian-Dalmatian Kingdom. These 
provincial autonomies were further strengthened by the Transylvanian and the 
Croatian Diet. It is also worth mentioning the idea of Union did not come up 
either in the Szatmár Peace Pact, or in connection with Pragmatic Sanction 
(Pragmatica Sanctio), despite the fact that both acts implied this possibility. 
Mihály Horváth, an excellent historian, in his work on the history of Hungary, 
writes Palatine Pálffy, who was loyal to the Habsburgs, suggested the Hungarians 
deserved something for accepting Pragmatic Sanction.18 Finally, after a long 
16 RÁKÓCZI, F.: Vallomások-emlékiratok (Confessions-Memoires). Budapest, 1979. 310-311, 
354-355. HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VI. 1872. 508-509, HERCEGH: op. cit.. 1987. 172-174, 184. 
17 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VI. 1872. 605-
18 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VII. 1873. 1 12-113: calls and remarks of the palatine written to his 
protonotary István Szluha, who had been known as a supporter of Rákóczi, dated of 1722: "I wonder 
what we could claim for our success from our noble King..." further "...the succession will be 
proposed to the Court... and the country should consider what concession to ask for." N.B. both the 
protonotary of the palatine and the protonotary of the cardinal, as well as Pál Ráday were suspicious 
at the Court of Vienna. They were supposed to obstruct the succession of the female line to the throne 
(112) The irony of history that Szluha was to propose and offer the bill of pragmatica sanctio to the 
Diet (121). 
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consideration, the interested parts asked the confirmation of the feudal privileges, 
and laying down of the legal term "indivisibiliter ac inseparabiliter". In spite of 
the ideological success of the Rákóczi War of Independence, the issue of union 
with Transylvania did not emerge. 
5. Some change came only after the death of Maria Theresa. In the 1780s, 
Joseph II unified the Hungarian and the Transylvanian chancelleries in more 
steps. This meant the main organ of Transylvanian public administration, the 
Gubernium came under the jurisdiction of the uniform Hungarian Chancellery.19 
Although, this administrative unification did not result in a constitutional union 
between the two countries. The constitutional autonomy of Transylvania 
remained unchanged within the framework of the big Josephinian reforms in 
public administration. 
6. After the death of Joseph II, the idea of the Union, as an offset of the 
starting national movement in Hungary, emerged again at the Hungarian Diet in 
Pozsony (Bratislava). Joseph II put off decision-making, saying he cannot decide 
without the Transylvanian Diet.2(1 Then, the Hungarian comitats and the Szeklers 
supported the Union, but without success; the Saxonian expressed their protest 
well before the Diet, so this issue soon got out of breath. 
Before 1848, the question of the Union21 came up again in connection with 
the Partium revision, in the Diet of 1832-36. The final solution was not until 
1848. 
19 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VII. 1873. 513: "The two chancellories were in fact unified by the order 
dated of 14. Aug. 1782. This unified chancellary will be called either Hungarian or Transylvanian, 
depending on the country it administers for ... the Hungarian Chancellary organised in this way will 
be the highest government authority in each province of the Hungarian Crown, with the exceptional 
right to appeal to the ruling prince." See also: Erdély története (The History of Transylvania). Vol. 
II. ed.: László Makkai-Zoltán Szász. Budapest, 1986. 1099-1100. An interesting remark is that the 
State Council, part of central government, originally did not support the idea of unification, because 
they regarded it as the Union of Transylvania with Hungary. Instead, they suggested the 
Transylvanian Chancellary be subordinated to the Czech-Austrian Chancellary. 
20 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VIII. 1873. 47, 137-138. 
21 HORVÁTH, M.: Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméből (Twenty Fire Years from the History 
of Hungary). Vol. I. Genf, 1861. 346-353. 
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II. Transylvania in the Habsburg Monarchy 
Transylvania within the Habsburg Monarchy can be studied in two aspects, i.e. 
its role in home, and foreign politics. 
1. Without going into details about the constitutional status of Transylvania 
within the Monarchy, we would just refer to Diploma Leopoldinum and its later 
amendments which provided regulation. It is suggested, that in spite of the 
constitutional autonomy and independence from Hungary, the main tendency was 
gradual melting in the Empire, which had resulted in a quasi-perpetual provincial 
status by the first decade of the XlXth century. The obvious reason for this 
intention to merge was the political lesson, which the Ottoman Empire had also 
realised, that Hungary unified with Transylvania would acquire an economic and 
military-political potential which could challenge the Habsburg in a case of 
favourable foreign political circumstances, and might endeavour to regain 
independence. Not only the XVII-century military actions of the Transylvanian 
princes, but the Rákóczi War of Independence and the military events of the War 
of Independence of 1848^-9 proved this political suspicion was not without 
reason. 
All the circumstances mentioned above were favourable for melting. This 
process, which Rákóczi even hastened with his motion, did in fact start at the 
beginning of the 1700s. It is worth paying attention to the methods which Vienna 
used when trying to melt Transylvania. The list of these methods is very 
informative, even if the statesmen of the Court were not always careful about 
selecting the right methods. It is still not clearly defined whether it was the 
sometimes hesitant steps of the leaders of the Habsburg Monarchy, or the strength 
of the Hungarian (Hungarian and Transylvanian) feudal opposition which 
determined the outcome, i.e. the prevention of the Habsburg imperial unification 
("Gesammtmonarchie"). 
1.1. The first restriction is in connection with renouncing the ruling power. 
Until the Diploma Leopoldinum, for the feudal classes of Transylvania, the main 
tools of restricting the royal powers were the definition of Electoral Conditions 
and oath-taking of the ruling princes, which were added to the most important 
Transylvanian codifications ( Approbata constitutions, Compilata constitutions). 
They became meaningless after the Habsburg rule started. After sanctioning 
Pragmatic Sanction, Transylvania constitutionally became a hereditary prin-
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cipality.22 The monarchs ascending the throne would take an oath on keeping 
Diploma Leopoldinum, at most. The traditional method of creating constitutional 
pacts, the so-called conditions became out-of-date (N.B. it demanded from Ferenc 
Rákóczi II a lot of bargaining skill to sign such a pact), as in practice the 
Transylvanian Diet could do no more than accept the new monarch. It must be 
mentioned that in Hungary remain the oath-taking ceremony and the letter of 
credit as possible tools of limiting royal powers. It sometimes took months at the 
Diets to bargain over such a document with the Habsburg commissioners. At the 
Hungarian Diets in Pozsony (Bratislava), the tradition of crowning ceremonies 
survived even after Pragmatic Sanction. At the same time, in Transylvania the 
new monarch would just visit the province some years later, instead of being 
crowned the ruling prince in a traditional crowning ceremony. 
1.2. The Diets became less significant. They are held, but can be summoned 
only by the monarch. In 1948, in lack of the royal order, the governor took the 
risk of summoning the Diet in fear of an even bigger danger. The membership of 
the Diet also changed in accordance with the wish of the leaders of the Monarchy. 
As against the Hungarian Diet, in Transylvania, beside the representatives of the 
comitats, the Szeklers provinces and the privileged towns, there was not a 
protocol concerning members to be invited. The monarch had the traditional 
privilege, dating back to the era of principality, to invite as many members as he 
wished to secure the votes he needed.23 The Saxonian, who were gradually 
finding their German roots during the Habsburg rule, regularly and voluntarily 
joined this safe parliamentarian majority, and seemed to be steady and loyal 
supporters of the central government to secure their privileges. Similarly, at the 
end of the XVIIIth century, the bishops of the Orthodox Church, then already 
with certain privileges, started to represent the loyalty of their nation to central 
government. 
22 HORVÁTH: op. cit. Vol. VII. 1873. 106-109. Note Pragmatica sanctio was sanctioned in some 
other provinces well before it was sanctioned in Hungary in 1723. The line of succession itself was 
laid down by Charles III in 1713. Interesting that the Croatian, when probably informed about these 
royal plans, pronounced in their provincial assembly that the king of Croatia will be identical with the 
king of Austria, Stiria and Karintia, in March 1712, a year earlier than the declaration of Charles in 
1713. In Transylvania, the female line of succession was sanctioned by the Diet of Szeben in 
September 1720. 
23 TRÓCSÁNYI, Zs.: Az Erdélyi Fejedelemség korának országgyűlései (National Assemblies of 
the Age of the Transylvanian Principality). In: ÉTT. Új sorozat (ÉTT New Series). No. 76. Budapest, 
1976. 24. HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. I. 1864. 427. 
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The membership of the Transylvanian Diet was constitutionally important 
because this was the authority which, according to the Diploma Leopoldinum, 
was to offer or appoint the senior public administration officials (governor, 
chancellor, treasurer, councillors of the government. Beside delegating 
representatives, the Habsburg Monarchy, of course, had a wide choice of 
opportunities to secure to the full its interests, for example, by summoning or 
postponing sessions, or appointing special commissioners to fulfil senior 
government positions. 
1.3. Similarly, the monarch had many opportunities to exert his influence at 
the level of local authorities. While during the era of principalities, the Szeklers 
and the Saxonian could appoint their own senior officials, during Habsburg rule, 
it was the authority of the central government to appoint, and the comitats, the 
Szeklers provinces and the towns could only offer candidates. To offer 
candidates, the central government was to summon local authorities. Sometimes 
it was impossible to summon local officials because of vacancies in the offices, 
and these anomalies contributed to a silent reduction of local autonomies. 
Particularly the Metternich government used such methods during the so-called 
Francis reaction.24 
1.4. Central government's most important tool of intervening in Transylvania 
was the troops stationed there (against neighbouring Turks). The commander of 
these troops, who was commanded by the War Council in Vienna, was a general 
based in Nagyszeben. As the contemporary Transylvanian parable had it, even the 
governor was a nobody compared with the General of Nagyszeben. The research 
of Zsolt Trócsányi revealed that during the reign of Maria Theresa, the major 
government offices of Transylvania were not filled for about a decade, and the 
Court tried to introduce military government throughout the province25 
Although the popularity of this endeavour was equivocal, probably, the 
reminiscence of this was the military border zone initiated by Maria Theresa. As 
a matter of fact, a feudal and archaic, but for the government a reasonably cheap 
method was used. The Szeklers of the border zone, the Rumanian of the Fogaras 
and Beszterce were organised into regiments of border defence and had to serve 
24 HORVÁTH: Vol. VIII. 1873. 528-532. Same author: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. I. 1864. 
347-350, 424-427. 
25 TRÓCSÁNYI, Zs.: Kísérletek teljes katonai uralom létrehozására Erdélyben (Attempts to Initiate 
Comprehensive Military Rule in Transylvania). Századok. 1983. No. 5. 983-1011. 
Union with Transylvania in 1848 and the Path Leading There 39 
there in return for freedom of tax.26 The resulting scandal, the peril of Mádéfalva 
are lavishly treated by many authors. 
1.5. Here we would like to focus on the general tendency which was the 
consequence of creating the military border zone. The reign of Maria Theresa 
meant modernisation in the interest of the silent unification of the monarchy. A 
crucial element in it was territorial revision in the constituent countries. In 
Hungary, beside creating the border defence zone in the south, she also reformed 
the status of Fiume as a Corpus separatum. It was she who redeemed the towns 
in Szepes pawned by King Zsigmond. Transylvania was honoured the title of 
ruling principality27 in 1765, in the malicious opinion of contemporaries, as a 
compensation for the lost Silesia. While the defence zone was not too large 
compared with the whole territory of Hungary, it was the one-third of the territory 
of Transylvania, i.e. these territories were under the direct military administration 
of Vienna. 
Concerning the international aspects of the above said, we suggest that the 
ever 'rebellious' Hungarians were forced to surrender by the Court retaining the 
constitutional independence of Transylvania and melting it in the Empire. 
Slightly exaggerating, we could say then this was the price of constitutional 
autonomy in Hungary, as the military zone created around the country also served 
to prevent any deviation from the framework of this autonomy. The numerous 
ethnic minorities of Hungary were regarded as the second line of the defenders 
of the monarchy in case of a rebel. It is well-known they were a priority when 
Vienna considered support. 
2. This problem leads to studying the international role of Transylvania. Even 
in connection with the creation of the military border zone, one is tempted to 
make comparisons with contemporary Europe. The two prototypes of 
contemporary European absolutism were the French and the Prussian. 
2.1. The French, following the traditional Burgundián example, had a finance-
oriented system of administration. They introduced the 'intendant' system which 
was a local financial administration accountable only to the central government. 
Consequently the intendant, a dependant of central government, was the ultimate 
arbiter in all local maters, while the traditional autonomies remained unchanged. 
It resulted in a system which enabled the government to control the whole 
country through financial administration, a neuter field. 
26 Erdély története... op. cit. Vol. II. 1027-1032. 
27 HORVÁTH: Magyarország történelme... op. cit. Vol. VII. 1873. 348. 
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2.2. In contrast, the Prussian method, a military administration keeping control 
through local commissariats, originated from the Swedish, and spread after the 
Thirty Years' War. In this system, the local commissar is responsible for all 
branches of local government, as the whole state is supposed to serve the army. 
This Prussian method was so efficient that finally they managed to melt Branden-
burg, Prussia and Pomerania—constitutionally three different states—into a new state, 
the Prussian Kingdom.28 The Hohenzollern proved the superiority of the Prussian 
method in Central Europe when they occupied Silesia, an Austrian possession. 
2.3. The Habsburg Government was experimenting with both methods of 
administration and decided for the French finance administration in the long run. 
Although, at hard times, and in the periphery of the country, they tried to adapt the 
Prussian military way, even as late as 1850, the defeat of the Hungarian War of 
Independence. 
Meanwhile, the fight for national unity started well before the XlXth century 
in contemporary Germany. According to the international literature, the potential 
candidates in this process are Bavaria, Austria, Saxonia and Prussia.29 For 
reasons not to be discussed here, Bavaria soon dropped out of the competition 
and Saxonia lost at the end of the XVIIIth century. Only Austria and Prussia 
remained to be considered. Similarly to Saxonia, they became powerful bordering 
on the German-Roman Empire, and both extended their territory, through 
occupying territories from neighbouring, weaker countries. 
These 'preying' states could develop mostly unifying the newly-acquired 
territories. The classical example is Prussia which unified three countries. 
Something similar took place in Austria, but at a slower pace. After the Battle of 
Fehérhegy, they melted Bohemia, later they shared Dalmatia and Galicia of 
Poland. Apparently, Transylvania had to face the same lot in the XVIIIth century. 
(N.B. comparison with Croatia deserves a detailed analysis, as more than half of 
that country was border zone.) The only solution for Transylvania seemed to be 
a Union with Hungary, because both the countries speak the same language and 
they share a common political culture. Together, as earlier in history, they could 
have represented a considerable power, in a favourable political situation, even 
superiority against Vienna. The lack of a complete Union later resulted in 
tragedies for the Habsburg. The German Union without the Habsburg, later the 
dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918 was the price. 
28 GLADDEN, E. N.: A History of Public Administration, Vol. II. London, 1972. 152-154, 
158-165. 
29 ANDERSSON, P.: Az abszolutista állam (The Absolutist State). Budapest, 1989. 326-338. 
Union with Transylvania in 1848 and the Path Leading There 41 
Considering all that said before, it was obvious that Vienna's interest was to 
retain the constitutional independence of Transylvania, consequently to merge 
with it. The foreign political situation also strengthened this intention. After 1690 
the Ottoman Empire was not any more a real danger on the Balkan, and it was a 
real possibility to drive back the Turks. The feudal states depending on the Turks, 
in the outer Carpathians and the northern Balkan would have been happy to ally 
with the Habsburg, in turn for freedom from the Turks. At the end of the century 
it became obvious the Russian czar was interested in these territories. Moldva and 
Havasalföld were also aware of the wisdom that the way to Austria leads through 
Transylvania. Therefore, Austria, had to reevaluate the war-political role of 
Transylvania and strengthen the tendencies of independence and melting. Among 
other things, that was the reason why Austria would now and then intervene in 
the ethnic questions of the region. If necessary, even by forcing the Rumanian 
and the Ruthenian to convert to the Uniate faith. Another reason for such 
intervention was the Habsburg endeavour to balance the political opposition 
among the traditionally powerful Transylvanian aristocracy, the Hungarian 
comitats and the Szeklers provinces. 
III. The Way to the Union 
1. In the XlXth century, there was a long way to the Union enacted by two free 
Diets—in Pozsony (Act VII of 1848); in Kolozsvár (Act I of 1948)—in the spring 
of 1948. Not only Vienna, but many of the ethnic groups of Transylvania 
obstructed this process to the Union. On the other hand, beside the temporal 
weakness of the Empire, changes in mentality and the related social changes also 
contributed to the declaration of the Union. A great achievement of 1948 and its 
political strife was that the Union forced from Vienna remained the condition of 
the Compromise of. 
Concerning the obstruction it is worth mentioning the aristocracy of 
Transylvania initially had doubts about the Union, fearing its ancient privileges 
would be curbed. The historiography of the last century was uniform in the 
opinion the nobility of Transylvania was much more passive—either because of 
their lands or for other reasons—than its Hungarian counterpart in the first half of 
the XlXth century. Therefore, the agents of social changes were the enlightened 
and liberal aristocracy.30 The Saxonian were, as usual, against the Union for fear 
30 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. I. 350,427^431; and Erdély története... op. cit. Vol. III. 
1269-
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that they would lose their privileges, meanwhile the Rumanian had an ambivalent 
attitude. They, especially the intelligentsia agreed with the reforms, but they 
stipulated the guarantee of their national identity, i.e. they wanted to secure to be 
admitted as the fourth nation of Transylvania. Some of them even then considered 
the idea of unifying the Rumanian territories, though with some foreign political 
considerations in their mind. (N.B. the idea of unifying the territories of the 
voivodes with the Empire.)31 
The real force behind the unification was the Hungarian liberal nobility 
representing those progressive European thoughts which enabled many nations 
to create their national states after many crises. The question of unity had been 
a big issue in the neighbouring German Empire since Napoleon, not less so in the 
Italian provinces which was quite close to Hungary. It is obvious one of the main 
aims of national revival was to unite people with the same language and cultural 
background into national states. The idea of the national state emerging in parallel 
with liberalism had a definite role in the political life of the Reform era. 
2. As seen from the present, one of the manifestations of the above treated 
trends was that territorial revision in Hungary was an issue at the Diets of the 
Reform era. Here we would like to refer to the civilisation of the military border 
zones and the question of the Partium. Closely related to these issues is the 
introduction of Hungarian as an official language, which was opposed in Vienna 
in spite of the failures of making German the single official language of the 
Empire. The members of the contemporary Diets were heavily engaged in these 
topics, as well as with the Union. 
2.1. As it has been mentioned earlier, after the Diet of 1790 the question of 
Union seemed to become dormant for the postponing tactics of the monarch. Still, 
the unsettled question of the Partium kept it alive. It is necessary to bear in mind 
that Partium originally meant the comitats of Tiszántúl (territory east of the river 
Tisza) which became part of the three nations of Transylvania after the Diet of 
Torda in 1544. Later on, the number of the comitats belonging to Transylvania 
had changed, but some of them were Transylvanian at the time of the Diploma 
Leopoldinum. Then, despite of Miklós Bethlen's strifes, a large proportion of 
these comitats (e.g. Máramaros, Bihar, Békés) were returned to Hungary, while 
the Kővár area: the Comitats of Közép-Szolnok, Kraszna, Arad and part of 
Zaránd Comitat remained in Transylvania. (N.B. Miklós Bethlen wrote the 
31 Erdély története... op. cit. Vol. III. 1306-1309 and following pages. 
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Transylvanian wanted to keep all of the Partium because of the taxes which were 
comparatively much higher than during the Turkish rule.) 
At the Diet of 1790, in connection with the Union it was declared the 
territories of Partium, parts of Transylvania in terms of public administration, 
were constitutionally Hungarian territory. The feudal classes came up with this 
fact at the Diet of 1832-36; moreover, they debated the issue separately, at the 
beginning of the session. They claimed Partium be reannexed to Hungary as soon 
as possible. Contemporaries suggested Miklós Wesselényi had a significant role 
in forming this view. He thought settling the question of the Partium was the key 
to the Union with Hungary. The solution was largely hindered by the selfish 
behaviour of the Transylvanian who, despite an obvious legal situation, 
obstructed the reannexation in an alliance with the Habsburg. At the beginning 
of her reign, at the Diet of Pozsony Maria Theresa promised to reannex the 
Partium, but only if the Diet of Transylvania would not object. In 1751, the Diet 
of Transylvania, without consulting the comitats concerned, argued—referring to 
an order by Charles III—that the Partium had always been a part of Transylvania. 
The representatives of the Partium resented this offensive method at the Diets of 
Pozsony and Kolozsvár in 1790-92. Then, they were promised to return the 
Partium. 
2.2. This promise was not fulfilled and the issue was again on the agenda of 
the Diets of 1825-27, and 1830. Then again, Vienna, allying the Transylvanian, 
resorted to the tactics of postponement (N.B. from 1811, for more than two 
decades no Diet was summoned in Transylvania) until the Diet of 1832 did not 
intervene to stop that practice. The representations edited by the poet Kölcsey, 
and for which the diplomatic motivation was written by Wesselényi, had two 
important demands. Firstly, it demanded the immediate reannexation of the 
Partium, regardless of the Transylvanian Diet. Secondly, it required the 
immediate summoning of the Transylvanian Diet to debate the question of the 
Union with the Diet of Pozsony in session. The opposition members of the Diet 
sent letters concerning this question to the comitats of the Partium and the 
Transylvanian to emphasise the importance of the issue. In these letters, they 
suggested the active involvement of the addressees in finding a solution.12 
As this action was successful ( the details and the difficulties of which we 
cannot discuss here), the monarch gave his assent to one of the bills, i.e. he 
sanctioned the reannexation of the Partium (Act X of 1832). Presumably because 
of its fears about the Union, Vienna compromised accepting the bill about the 
32 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. I. 346-353., Erdély története... op. cit. Vol. III. 1296. 
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Partium as the smaller trouble. In regard to the Union, they applied the good old 
method, when after a long time of petitioning the monarch summoned the Diet 
in Transylvania in the spring of 1834. Wesselényi and the more enlightened 
Transylvanian aristocrats, together with some of the intelligentsia started to 
submit and debate reform amendments even earlier. 
2.3. In historical reports they were referred to as the wandering patriots,11 
because they made a tour in the whole of Transylvania thus managing to form a 
competent opposition for the Diet. Beside Wesselényi, the names of Domokos 
Teleki and Károly Szász, a professor of law should also be mentioned. The 
spiritual leader of the movement was, of course Wesselényi, whose charisma 
could best be illustrated by the case when his Szeklers followers bought him an 
estate in Makkfalva to secure him a seat in their assemblies.34 But, Vienna did 
not hesitate too much to dissolve the determined Transylvanian Diet which was 
organised this way, and which dared appoint their own candidate for speaker.15 
2.4. Regardless of Vienna's temporal successes in its government strategies, 
this was not entirely forgotten. They sued Wesselényi, Kossuth and the youth of 
the Diet in vain. The Hungarians introduced the question of the Partium, 
traditionally following the path of legitimacy, a reason for which being the 
postponement tactics of the government. The Transylvanian courts of law 
appointed in Vienna declared law of Unification of the Partium with Hungary 
unlawful. The high bailiffs of the concerned comitats prevented the counties 
summoning assemblies for electing representatives to the Diet. The Diet of 
Pozsony responded by taking a constitutional action against the absent comitats 
of the Partium. To a great suiprise, the law-court approved the claim of the Diet 
of Pozsony and fined the concerned comitats. The opposition of the Diet, quoting 
the Law of Wladislas II, made a motion asking to call the high bailiffs to account. 
In connection with the same issue, Pozsony sent other representations to the 
monarch asking him to assent to the Bill of Union agreed on by the formerly 
dissolved Transylvanian Diet. The answer was postponement.16 
33 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. I. 425. 
34 TRÓCSÁNYI, Zs.: Wesselényi Miklós. Budapest, 1965. 229 provides a lot of details in 
connection with members of the Transylvanian opposition who made tactful actions similar to that 
when Wesselényi was made a representative of Udvarhelyszék. 
35 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. 1.430-, TRÓCSÁNYI: Wesselényi Miklós, op. cit. 233-, 
Erdély története... op. cit. Vol. III. 1276—. 
36 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. II. 244-245. MISKOLCZY, A.: Társadalom, nemzetiség 
és ellenzékiség kérdései az erdélyi magyar reformmozgalomban (The Issues of Society, Nationality, 
and Opposition in the Transylvanian Reforms Movement). Századok, 1983. No. 5. 1051-1096. 
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Similarly, postponement was the strategy when the court decision against the 
absent comitats was to be implemented. Then, the question of the Partium 
seemed to be the clear evidence of the government strategies of Vienna at the 
Diet of 1847. Kossuth, in his two-hour speech calmly analysed the grievances 
Vienna had caused to Hungarian parliamentarism and legislation." Although 
his speech was met with the greatest approval, the government did not do 
anything, so these problems were to be solved by the Diet of 1848." 
3. The course of legislation of March 1848 is quite familiar and elaborated in 
the historiography of Hungary. These works unequivocally point out, beside 
underlining the constitutional significance of the laws of 1848, that this 
legislation was hastened because of the revolutionary situation, therefore it has 
some deficiencies. It relates to this question and therefore significant that 
although the Hungarian Diet in Pozsony had enacted the bill of the Union with 
Transylvania, they were waiting for the Transylvanian Diet to strengthen it. This 
decision of the Diet was soon made without studying the important details of the 
unification, due to the shortness of time. Both Diets decided that after declaring 
the Union, they would work out the details of unification later. 
The Transylvanian Diet pronounced (Act 1848/1 paragraph 3) that until a final 
agreement "the structure and personnel of public administration and jurisdiction 
will not change". This passage caused many problems. As it is indicated in the 
literature, the Court of Vienna, after sanctioning the forced laws, soon faced the 
predicted danger that the Union of Transylvania with Hungary meant for them. 
Their reaction was a double-front attack. On the one hand, the Court wished to 
treat the Transylvanian and the Hungarian incomes separately. On the other hand, 
they wished to restitute the formerly abolished Transylvanian Royal Chancellery, 
which could have facilitated their direct intervention in the domestic affairs of the 
province.14 For the Court, a sufficient guarantee could have been the planned 
maintenance and direction of the Transylvanian military border zone from 
Vienna. 
The "responsible independent Hungarian Ministry" also realised this problem 
and started co-operation with the so-called Union Committee, removed from the 
Transylvanian Diet to the Hungarian central government, to facilitate the 
democratic procession of the Union. As a result of this co-operation, the 
Hungarian government was ready to appoint Transylvanian officials and set up 
37 HORVÁTH: Huszonöt év... op. cit. Vol. II. 546-548. 
38 Ibid. 615. 
39 F. KISS E.: Az 1948—19-e s magyar minisztériumok (The Hungarian Ministries in 1848A9). 
Budapest, 1987. 164-182, particularly 166-168, about the military border zones. Footnote 7. on 166. 
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a separate Transylvanian section, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Ministry of Justice.40 
The imminent War of Independence prevented this question being consti-
tutionally elaborated, and the governments coming after the Compromise of 1867 
had to face and solve them. 
40 Ibid. 170-172. 
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Renata UlTZ Does the Past Restrain Judicial 
Review? 
References to History and Traditions in 
Constitutional Reasoning 
"You must understand that after what Germany 
lived through under Nazism, it would have been 
impossible to restore capital punishment." 
Jürgen Habermas' 
Introduction 
Arguments invoking the past are among the most often invoked arguments in the 
reasoning of constitutional review fora? Although arguments relied on in 
constitutional reasoning are not self-legitimating,3 the legitimacy of references 
to history is hardly ever questioned. The reasons for such a high stature or 
1 In response to a question concerning his views on capital punishment, at Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Mass. (1986). BERMAN, H. J.: Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, 
Morality, History, California Law Review, 1988. Vol. 76, 791. 
2 For an argument that history is a common denominator from which constitutional argument 
may proceed see SUNSTEIN, C.: The Idea of the Useable Past, Columbia Law Review, 1995. 
Vol. 95,604. For present purposes the scope of the term "constitutional reasoning" is restricted 
to the arguments made by constitutional review fora (i.e. high courts exercising constitutional 
review and constitutional tribunals). Scholarly arguments advanced in the academic discourse 
are not covered by the forthcoming analysis, although some of the findings might be applicable 
even in the latter context. 
3 See SUNSTEIN, C.: Five Theses on Originalism, Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy, 1996. Vol. 19, 311 submitting that no approach to interpretation is self-justifying, as all 
approaches depend on personal judgment. 
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esteem for arguments invoking the past are manifold. Some of these reasons 
seem to be rooted in the belief that the unavoidable continuity of past, present 
and future makes past experience relevant for present and future.4 Others argue 
that constitution-making—as other human acts in politics—starts from a his-
torically determined context;5 or, from a lawyer's point of view one may argue 
in a somewhat similar vein that law is a "sediment of history".6 Again others, 
who are more focused on the nature of legal interpretation as textual inter-
pretation, would argue that constitutions as old written documents cannot be 
interpreted without keeping an eye on the context in which they were authored.7 
Nonetheless, as Justice Holmes duly submitted, "(h)istoric continuity with the past 
is not a duty, it is only a necessity".8 
This essay intends to explore the basic features of historical narrative as 
applied by constitutional review fora and as perceived by commentators, lawyers 
and theorists. The first part of the essay analyzes whether references to history and 
4 RÜSEN, J.: Studies in Metahistory, Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 1993. 5. 
Also, historian Donald Kagan: "The institutions and ideas that provide for freedom and 
improvement in material conditions cannot flourish without and understanding of how they came 
about." KAGAN, D.: Why Western History Matters, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 28, 1994, A. 12. 
In addition see Gordon's submission: "Every important political or legal argument is an 
argument either changing, preserving or recovering something in the past, which in tum relies 
on a narrative account of what has been changed and why." GORDON, R.W.: Foreword, The 
Arrival of Historicism, Stanford Law Review, 1997. Vol. 49, 1026. 
5 POCOCK, Introduction (in: BURKE, E.: Refections on the Revolution in France (1790) 
POCOCK, J. G. A. (ed.) Indianapolis, Hackett, 1987. vii). Bobbitt noted that the legitimacy 
of historical argument is often tied with the perception of the constitution as a contract. 
BOBBITT. Ph.: Constitutional Fate, Theoty of the Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1984. 26. 
6 BICKEL, A.: Least Dangerous Branch, The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1986. 235. In this approach law is the product of the historically 
developing ethos. On the historical school of jurisprudence see BERMAN, op. cit., 780, 
788-791. The leading European figure of the school is F.-K. von Savigny. See also KR YGIER, 
M.: Law as Tradition, Law and Philosophy, 1984. Vol. 5, 237. See DWORKIN, R.: Law's 
Empire, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1986. 227 et seq. submitting that the 
historicity of the legal system is not vertical but horizontal, a feature which contributes to the 
integrity of the law. 
7 "[Cjonstitutional texts are ... the starting point for the definition of constitutional norms. 
Constitutional norms to be applied by present-day judges cannot simply be found in texts 
formally adopted two Centuries ago. As applied today, 'old Constitutions' are those texts as 
presently construed." SMITH, Introduction (in: Constitutional Justice under Old Constitutions, 
SMITH, E„ Deventer, Kluwer, 1995. xvii). 
8 The bon mot is attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes. 
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tradition form objective or neutral grounds for interpretation, and, in somewhat 
broader terms, whether arguments in history are capable of serving as a restraint 
on constitutional interpretation. The basic premise of the essay is that historical 
narratives invoked in constitutional reasoning are in essence similar to any other 
historical rhetoric. Thus, historical references made by constitutional tribunals are 
examined in the light of findings of historiography. The focus of the second part 
is on the relationship of common law reasoning and arguments in history and 
tradition. The essay makes an attempt to conceptualize repetition—the core notion 
underpinning historical narratives—in the light of basic tenets of common law 
reasoning. In addition to fundamental concepts of common law, respective works 
of Edmund Burke are also consulted. 
The essay concludes that historical narratives are teleological and normative, 
and no constitutional rhetoric relying on the past can escape these basic attributes 
of historical narratives; thus, one may find that historical narratives are inter-
pretive perse. It is also argued that common law legal reasoning seems to display 
features similar to historical narratives. Also, the common law rhetoric is able to 
accommodate references to past events, which support attempts at departure from 
established practices. The direction of such potential departures depends on the 
interpreter, since past events do not and cannot provide clear guidance. There-
upon it is suggested that even the most profound adherence to history and 
traditions is unlikely to serve as a substantive restraint on constitutional 
interpretation. 
I Preliminary Observations 
1.1 Illustrative references, legislative history and framers' intent 
Before discussing in detail arguments invoking the past, it is important to 
distinguish the references that are targeted by the present analysis. The present 
essay will not cover illustrative references to history, arguments in legislative and 
drafting history, or arguments based on the intentions of the drafters of the 
constitution. Although such arguments refer to past events, analytically they 
belong to doctrinal arguments relied on in legal reasoning. 
References to history may provide excellent illustrations and serve as 
examples or counter-examples in constitutional argument,4 demonstrating 
9 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 ( 1996) Justice Stevens submitted that 
"(a)dvertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in colonial days, the 
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instances of good moral.10 Such references are often ahistoric as their primary 
purpose is to demonstrate the victory of the past ideal over time and individual 
events." One shall also note the common features of historical exempla and 
analogical reasoning, means often applied in doctrinal argument.12 
For present puiposes arguments invoking the past are considered to include 
references to past events other than the legislative history of a statute in a narrow 
sense, and the intent of the framers of a constitution.13 References to legislative 
history and to the intent of the framers are the most common examples of doctrinal 
arguments in legal reasoning.14 Although these references are not going to be 
public relied on 'commercial speech' for vital information about the market. Early newspapers 
displayed advertisements for goods and services on their front pages, and town criers called out 
prices in public squares. Indeed, commercial messages played such a central role in public life 
prior to the Founding that Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support 
of his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to Barbados." (internal 
references omitted). 
10 KRAMER, L.: Fidelity to History, Fordham Law Review, 1997. Vol. 65, 1635. 
11 These attempts often display a longing for origins, for myths of ancient virtues and even 
nostalgia for an ancient way of life. See LEGOFF, J.: History and Memory, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1992. 141 showing how arguments in history and tradition were used to 
construe mos maiorum in the ancient Rome. On Coke's ahistoric, semi-mythical vision of custom 
see McCONNELL, M. W.: Tradition and Constitutionalism before the Constitution, University 
of Illinois Law Review, 1998. 175-183. It was submitted recently that all those references which 
argue that a term or norm has a historically defined meaning are in fact ahistoric, as they fix the 
meaning of the term or norm and they do not allow alterations by time. GORDON, R. V.: The 
Struggle over the Past, Cleveland State Law Review, 1996. Vol. 44, 125. In Gordon's 
terminology it is a static argument. 
12 Although a review of such illustrative references might reveal interesting aspects of the 
jurisprudence of a constitutional tribunal and the legal system in which the tribunal operates, 
such an analysis does not belong to the stream of the present argument. 
13 Contemporary US discourse on originalism is centered around the intent of the Framers, 
drafting and ratifying history. Framers' intent and drafting history are a lot less significant in the 
jurisprudence of courts where the drafting and ratification of the constitution are not perceived 
or construed as supreme founding gestures. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of 
Germany might be an example. This is certainly not to mean that the German Constitutional 
Court's jurisprudence lacks references to the past. See e.g. the Mephisto case (30 BVerfGE 173 
(1971)) or the Holocaust denial case (90 BVerfGE 241 (1994)) where the reasoning of the 
German Constitutional Court rested on reasons reflecting the Court's perception of history (and 
the perception of the Holocaust, in particular). For edited English translations of the decisions 
with commentary see KOMMERS, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (2lld ed.) Durham-London, Duke University Press, 1997. 
14 References to shared values of the community (as a distinct form arguments in tradition) are 
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examined here in detail, they have a few aspects that are worth noting. Legislative 
history in a narrow sense is a record of legislative events or the lack thereof 
preceding the entry into force of the legal norm interpreted.15 Sometimes 
legislative history may include references to the legislative records of the act 
concerned, although most constitutional review fora refuse to recount the votes 
that a bill received in the house. Even if such a record of previous legislation is 
supplied with underlying policy or other considerations, typically these arguments 
remain within the domain of doctrinal arguments.16 
The case of the intent of the framers of the constitution is more complex, 
especially because it is a major source relied on by originalists and other 
interpreters with intentionalist inclinations.17 As a result arguments presenting 
the intent of the framers may be difficult to distinguish from arguments in 
history.18 It is important to see, however, that while a reference to the framers' 
also excluded for reasons to be explained below. 
15 As an example of legislative action which does not qualify as legislative history in the above 
sense see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In the case the US Supreme 
Court had to decide whether continuous congressional apportionment allotted for a dam 
constituted a waiver of the bans enacted in a prior statute applicable to the dam (Endangered 
Species Act, 1973). 
16 In rare cases review fora might use legislative history to show that Congress refused to enact 
a certain norm, or that a certain interpretation of a provision was not to be supported by the 
words of a particular provision. For instance in the US in the Pentagon Papers case the 
government argued that Congress intended to authorize the president to exercise the power 
contested in the case. In this case. Justice Th. Marshall showed that Congress twice refused to 
enact the legislation which would authorize the president. New York Times Co. v. US, 403 U.S. 
713, 746(1971). 
17 In contemporary US discourse there is a debate whether and to what extent it is legitimate 
to refer to pre-Founding history and tradition in constitutional argument. See e.g. BROWN, R.: 
Tradition and Insight, Yale Law Journal, 1993. Vol. 103,191 contesting the application of pre-
Founding historical evidence, since the Founding Fathers intended to break from most political 
traditions. In Canada the issue whether and to what extent the intentions of the Fathers of the 
Confederation shall be taken into account injudicial decisions has not been resolved and is rarely 
ever discussed. Nonetheless, Canadian courts tend to consider Confederation history and in 
Charter cases history has a central role to play. VAUGHAN, F.: The Use of History in Canadian 
Constitutional Adjudication, Dalhousie Law Journal, 1989. Vol. 12,66 et seq. The history of the 
Charter (including earlier drafts of the text) is widely relied on injudicial opinions. Note that in 
Canada it was maintained for a long time that the founders were practical men without theories 
and their reasons were limited to the problems of the moment but not beyond. This view has been 
challenged only recently. 
18 See Friedman commenting that "Justice Scalia, for example, has come under fair criticism 
for insisting that in order to obtain constitutional protection, a constitutional right must have been 
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intent offers guidance with invoking authorities from that particular segment of 
the past, references to history and tradition intend to assert the authority of 
specific past trends or events.19 
1.2 The past: facts and arguments 
When considering references to the past in constitutional reasoning one may 
argue that there is a difference between references to the past as the facts of the 
case and as argument supporting a position in interpretation. Such a position may 
be based on a submission that depending on the character of the submission (i.e. 
facts of a case or historical arguments) different standards of persuasion may 
apply.20 Historical data are introduced by the litigants in the form of factual 
submissions and are subject to the rules of evidence. A high court is restricted to 
the array of facts as established by the trial court.21 When introduced by the 
recognized by the founders at the narrowest level of specificity." FRIEDMAN, В.: The Turn to 
History, New York University Law Review, 1996. Vol. 72, 963. 
19 Cf. KRAMER, op. cit., 1640-1641 arguing that instead of applying the ideas of the framers 
as they were presented cannot substitute looking at history as the context of the founding. On the 
difficulties to accommodate a Framers' intent argument as a per se historical argument see 
BARBER, S.: On What the Constitution Means, Baltimore-London, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1984. 47-49. Barber argues that the Framers' cannot be discredited upon historical data 
as our comprehension of historical data would be based on our current standards of morals, good 
and bad. For an interesting US reference to tradition prevailing over the Framers' intent see 
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992) (the prohibition of prayers at 
graduation in public schools). Justice Scalia argued that the tradition of the graduation prayer 
takes precedence over the Framers' intent. 
20 For the argument see OGILVIE, M. H.: Evidence, Judicial Notice. Historical Documents and 
Historical Facts, Indian Treaty Rights, Note, Canadian Bar Review, 1986. Vol. 64, 183. 
Instances where historical evidence is invoked to establish the facts of the case are very rare. 
Most of those cases involve war crimes from World War II. See e.g. R. v. Finta (1994) 1 S.C.R. 
701, a case involving a mass murder committed by a former member of the Hungarian Royal 
Gendarme in 1944. Note however that such cases are usually not constitutional cases, or the 
constitutional question is not dependent upon the historical inquiry. The distinction between the 
facts of the case and argumentative references to the past is not relevant in abstract review cases 
and in preliminary review. 
21 In general a high court may reconsider the findings of fact of the trial court and may also 
request briefing. The most famous example of requesting supplementary briefing on history in 
the United States is Brown v. Board of Education ofTopeka 1,347 U.S. 483 ( 1954 ). Nonetheless, 
Chief Justice Warren writing for a unanimous Supreme Court did not develop a line of historical 
argument in the reasoning of the judgment. In Canada the Supreme Court formulates a 
constitutional question when it grants leave to appeal. It is the formal statement of the 
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parties, arguments in the past are often presented in the form of expert evi-
dence.22 References to the past used for constitutional or statutory interpretation 
on the other hand may be introduced by not only the parties but also the court. 
In the US the courts' extensive use of historical evidence is partly due to the 
originalist inclinations of the present Supreme Court. In Canada, however, 
extrinsic evidence such as legislative history was not admissible in courts until 
recently.21 Nonetheless, it was suggested that it is appropriate for judges to take 
judicial notice of historical facts.24 The entry into force of the Charter of Rights 
increased judicial creativity in constitutional reasoning and also in the admissi-
bility of references to the past. Thus one may find that, independent of whether 
rules of evidence apply to submissions made by the parties, contemporary courts 
are relatively free to introduce new historic evidence at their discretion. 
As for factual submissions, one may find that courts are free to determine the 
relevant facts of a case. This means that justices are free to select the submissions 
of the parties along the lines and for the purposes of their legal analysis. Also, as 
it was shown, courts interpret historical evidence. Thus the status of factual 
submissions made by the parties under strict rules of evidence and historical 
references introduced by the court becomes indistinguishable in the court's 
argument. More precisely the difference is distinguishable to the extent the court 
constitutional issue to be addressed by the Court. One of the purposes of phrasing the question 
is to invite the attorney generals of Canada and the provinces and the ministers of justice aware 
of the constitutional question to intervene pursuant to Rule 32(4). In its judgment the Court may 
nevertheless approach the constitutional issue in terms broader than signaled by the constitutional 
question, as long as such a change does not deprive the interveners to engage in substantive 
argument. Corbière v. Canada (1999) 2 S.C.R. 203 at para 49 per L'Heureux-Dubé, J. 
22 In the United States the originalist trend in the Supreme Court resulted in a boom of expert 
testimony on history. Some of the opinions lead to lively and harsh arguments among 
professionals long after the trial. See FARBER, D.: Adjudication of Things Past, Reflections on 
History as Evidence, Hastings Law Journal, 1998. Vol. 49, 1009. 
23 See HOGG, P.: Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd ed) Toronto, Carswell, 1985. 34. Hogg 
notes that legislative history is so recent that handling it does not require special skills in history. 
HOGG, op. cit., 344. 
24 "The Court may take judicial notice of the facts of history whether past or contemporaneous, 
and the Court is entitled to rely on its own historical knowledge and researches." Justice Hall, 
dissenting in Colder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973) S.C.R. 313 at 346 
(references omitted). Notwithstanding the views of J. Hall, the Court in Calder did not engage 
in independent research. See VAUGH AN, op. cit., 81. As Ogilvie suggests the legal basis for it 
might be a generous interpretation of judicial notice. OGILVIE, op. cit., 205. A less formalistic 
approach would find the normative basis of the development in theories of constitutional 
interpretation. 
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presents references to history in a manner which makes the difference 
apparent.25 
The distinction between history as facts of the case and history as an 
argument is relevant only to a rather limited, negative extent. The distinction 
might play a role in cases where a test to be applied by constitutional review fora 
or by ordinary courts calls for the examination of historical data. If in a case a 
high court cannot decide upon the facts as established in trial, the high court 
remands the case for retrial.26 Otherwise the highest judicial forum runs the risk 
of establishing its judgment on an incomplete or erroneous factual back-
ground.27 However, in such cases the courts tend to refuse to analyze historical 
evidence.28 
25 For a recent example where historical facts and arguments in history were treated 
distinctly in a constitutional case see Corbière v. Canada (1999) 2 S.C.R. 203. Corbière is a 
decision especially interesting as the Canadian Supreme Court's aboriginal rights 
jurisprudence and equality jurisprudence intersect in the case. S.35 of the Canadian 
Constitution invites historical narratives when it provides that the existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. The 
Supreme Court consults history and traditions in order to establish which aboriginal rights 
date back to days before European contact. On the other hand, in cases involving equality 
issues (s. 15, Charter) the effects of past discrimination became one of the major targets to be 
eliminated. See the opinion of Justice lacobucci in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration) (1999) I SCR 497. In Corbière the Supreme Court had to determine 
whether it was constitutional that the Indian Act deprived off-reserve band members from 
band council elections [s.77(l )]. The justices examined historical evidence on the historical 
background of the claim in the Batchewana Band. See Corbière, paras 27-30 per L'Heureux-
Dubé, J. (on changes of the territory of the reserve and status of band members). The justices 
agreed that the case should be decided in general and not restricted to the Batchewana Band. 
Id. at para 93. The analysis under s. 15(1 ) of the Charter determining the discriminative impact 
of the challenged provision [third trier of the equality analysis] relied on the all-Canadian 
history of treatment of aboriginal peoples. See Corbière, para 83, 86-89. 
26 See e.g. R. v. Sparrow (1990) I S.C.R. 1075. 
27 For a Canadian example where commentators argue inappropriate use of historical facts as 
opposed to arguments see BARSH, R. L.—HENDERSON, J. Y.: The Supreme Court's Van der 
Peet Trilogy, Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand, McGill Law Journal, 1997. Vol. 42, 1003, 
note 36 criticizing the Supreme Court for its reluctance to reconsider the trial court's findings 
of facts, a move which led to inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's application of its test in two 
cases announced the same day. 
28 Justices themselves do not always agree on the proper judicial attitude in supreme courts 
towards fact-related analysis performed by a trial court. To a large extent the attitude of a 
supreme court towards the findings of the trial court depends on the self-perception of the 
supreme court. For an excellent illustration see R. v. van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 para 
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Thus, one may see that references to the past as facts and as arguments are 
introduced under different standards of admissibility. Nonetheless, courts 
usually do not distinguish these submissions in their argument; historical 
evidence once admitted or introduced under different standards of scrutiny and 
other references to history are argued in similar narrative structures. Therefore, 
judicial consideration of historical data among the facts of the case as opposed 
to references to the past argument in support of a legal position shall be treated 
identically for the purposes of the present analysis. 
II Teleology, Normativeness and Continuity 
II. 1 Historical data: the myth of objectivity 
Constitutional review fora often engage in analyzing the historical background 
of the issue at hand, both the past of its constitutional side and also the events 
behind the contested norms. References to historical facts and data are attractive 
for a number of reasons. They suggest clear-cut, black-and-white answers that 
can be established on the basis of objective data.24 If viewed so, references to 
history are descriptive and historical evidence is a non-interpretive tool of 
reasoning (facts speak for themselves). Thus, historical evidence suggests that 
the constitutionality of the challenged norm is going to be determined on an 
objective basis.30 
207-208, per L'Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting. (Contrary to the generally accepted deferential 
stance of the Canadian Supreme Court towards the assessment of evidence by the trial court, 
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé argues that the Supreme Court as an appellate court is free to reconsider 
the evidence and substitute its own findings of fact.) 
29 GORDON (1997), op. cit., 1025 (lawyers want a single, authoritative meaning from a past 
act or practice). Crosby submits that in recent constitutional theory the main dividing line is 
between those who place interpretation on an objective foundation (originalism, based on 
historical facts) and those who find that undesirable. CROSBY, I.: Worlds in Stone: Gadamer, 
Heidegger, and Originalism, Texas Law Review, 1998. Vol. 76, 849. For an argument that 
objectivity is a component of the rule of law (along with stability and neutrality) see SCHLAG, 
P.: Authorizing Interpretation, Connecticut Law Review, 1998. Vol. 30, note 11 at 1069. 
Dictionary definitions also offer an air of objectivity. For a profound analysis see APRILL, E. 
P.: The Law of the Word, Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, Arizona State Law 
Journal, 1998. Vol. 60, 275. Aprill argues that lexiographic principles upon which dictionaries 
are created undermine the promise of objectivity. Id. at 314. 
30 In this sense the psychology of arguments in history is similar to the 'plain meaning' 
argument. Owen Fiss submits that the claim that the text of the constitution has numerous 
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Also, references to historical evidence imply that the interpreter is neutral 
(impartial) as the standard along which the issue was decided is an objective 
one.51 Historical arguments hint that every observer would have arrived at the 
same conclusion, thus they suggest the neutrality (impartiality) of the decision-
maker and the decision.52 In addition, arguments in history suggest that the 
decision lies on well-set, established grounds. In other words these decisions 
seem to preserve the status quo, they create an impression of stability and con-
tinuity.55 The record, however, does not seem to support the above findings. 
Constitutional review fora are often criticized for writing bad history. 
Numerous scholars argue that the justices misunderstood or misinterpreted 
historical data. The debate continues on the bench, justices often condemn each 
other for applying mistaken conclusions drawn on history. Sometimes one may 
have the impression that these disputes on proper or tainted use of historical 
sources and data go well beyond the legal issues that gave rise to the dispute.54 
Most of these disputes about history seem to be impossible and even 
unnecessary to resolve. The pragmatic consideration behind this deferential point 
of view is easy to see. In many cases arguments invoking the past are not the only 
arguments, they are supplementary to legal reasons.55 Cass Sunstein suggested 
another ground for reconsideration. He submitted that constitutional justices have 
meanings is a nihilist one (nihilist attempts tum the law's struggle for objectivity against it). 
FISS, O.: Objectivity and Interpretation, Stanford Law Review, 1982. Vol. 34, 742. 
31 "Objectivity in the law connotes standards. It implies that an interpretation can be measured 
against a set of nomrs that transcend the particular vantage-point of the person offering the 
interpretation. Objectivity implies that the interpretation can be judged by something other than 
one's own notions of correctness. It imparts a notion of impersonality. The idea of an objective 
interpretation does not require that the interpretation be wholly determined by some source 
external to the judge, but only that it be constrained." FISS, op. cit., 744. 
32 Neutrality in the judicial context may refer to the outcome of a judgment but also to a 
technique of decisions. Neutrality considerations are often raised in the context of racial and 
gender discrimination, free speech and freedom of religion. Classic texts on the requirement of 
neutrality in judicial decision-making are WECHSLER, H.: Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law Review, 1959. Vol. 73, 1 and BORK, R.: Neutral Principles 
and Some First Amendment Problems, Indiana Law Journal, 1971. Vol. 47, 1. 
33 Note that an argument in history creates discontinuity when the historical example refers to 
the "disliked past". GORDON (1997), op. cit., 1028. 
34 In the US see e.g. BROWN, op. cit., 210-211. Such concerns are voiced in a climate where 
justices tend to strongly disagree about the historical background of a given case. In Canada see 
VAUGHAN, op. cit., 61. 
35 TENBROEK, J.: Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic 
Aids of Constitutional Construction [Part 1], California Law Review, 1938. Vol. 26, 295-296. 
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an instrumental relationship to history: they refer to arguments in history with 
a specific outcome, or rather, with a variation of possible future outcomes in 
mind.36 Some may argue that this teleological (result oriented) approach is 
exactly what makes historical arguments so untrustworthy when raised by 
constitutional rev iew/ora ." 
Studies in historiography, however, seem to support the case of the relativist. 
It is argued that lawyers are not the only interpreters of historical data with a 
predetermined mindset.38 Historical components are chosen along pre-
determined patterns of interpretation.39 Historical explanations are based on 
metahistorical presuppositions, such as moral or value arguments, and one 
36 SUNSTEIN (1995), op. cit., 602-605 ["lawyers tend to look at the past to accomplish 
present purposes, and historians out of endless fascination for strange contexts". Id. at 602]. See 
also KRYGIER, op. cit., 249-250. Also: "It is the past put in the service of winning a case at 
bar." Words of John Reid on quote in GORDON (1997), op. cit., 1026. See also Rakove 
submitting that the search for history is a search for préfigurations, anticipations and 
precedents. RAKOVE, J.: The Origins of Judicial Review, a Plea for New Contexts, Stanford 
Law Review, 1997. Vol. 49,1038. [In the essay Rakove argues that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) is not so much about judicial review than about federalism.] 
37 Consider for instance that being "(e)ager to discover a viable libertarian heritage, narrative 
histories of the Bill of Rights have ignored the presence of alternative ideological traditions in 
American life". CORNELL, S.: Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional 
History, Anti-Federalists, The Bill of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 
Law and History Review, 1994. Vol. 12, 7 Cornell suggests that instead of seeking a single 
intellectual tradition it makes more sense to explore the plurality of competing discourses. 
38 "American legal argument from the Founding onward consistently relied upon a core 
narrative of liberal progress... To reconcile this dynamic narrative with the need to assert 
continuity with fundamental principles, the story was often told in a teleological mode, as the 
gradual fulfillment of perfection of principles already immanent at the Founding." GORDON 
(1996), op. cit., 130. 
39 RÜSEN, J.: Experience, Objectivity, Orientation, Three Dimensions of Historical Learning 
(in: RÜSEN, Metahistory..., 89) showing that patterns of interpretation structure the different 
types of knowledge and experience. Cornell submits that the current US canon of constitutional 
history includes the Federalists, the state ratification debates and the legislative debates during 
the First Congress, sporadic references to popular contemporary scholars believed to express 
Federalist ideas and to Anti-Federalist writing. It does not contain the Anti-Federalist writings 
and does not cover Anti-Federalist political action. Cornell argues that one shall always examine 
why certain sources were accepted to a canon without real scrutiny and what is the reason for 
excluding other potential authorities. CORNELL, op. cit., 3. See also Bruce Ackerman arguing 
that contemporary US constitutional history is mistaken because the interpreters rely on 
European theories, instead of the works of American authors. See ACKERMAN, В.: 
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, Yale Law Journal, 1989. Vol. 99, 453. 
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presupposition is not better than the other.40 Thus, not only lawyers but also 
professional historians select (pick and choose) historical data and they gather 
these pieces of information along the point which they intend to make.41 In 
addition, connecting and describing historical data are in themselves gestures of 
interpretation.42 Therefore the view which suggests the objective character of 
arguments in history seems to be mistaken. Due to methodological reasons, 
historical argument is teleological. Also, it implies choices that are not always 
possible to distinguish from the personal preferences of the observer (subjective 
element).43 
The other point concerning the objective character of arguments in history 
is even more bothersome. As of today there is no agreement on what qualifies 
as a specifically historical explanation of any set of historical phenomena.44 As 
Bobbitt remarked: "We do not have an original commitment to a particular form 
40 WHITE, H.: Metahistory, The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe, 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 13. This finding is not to be confused with 
the Conservative conception of time as a creator of value. See MANNHEIM, K.: Ideology and 
Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, London, Routledge, 1991.211. White's 
theory of historical narratives corresponds with the Heideggerian concept of human 
understanding ["interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something 
presented to us...One likes to appeal to what 'stands there ' , . . . [but] what 'stands there' in the 
first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption ... of the person who 
does the interpreting..." HEIDEGGER, M.: Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) (7th ed.), Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1962. 191-192. 
41 See Bickel finding that values do not come from metaphysics but from compromises with 
good and an evil—in the experience of the past. BICKEL, A.: Constitutional Government and 
Revolution (in: Edmund Burke, Appraisals and Applications, Ritchie, D. E. (ed.), New 
Brunswick-London, Transaction Publishers, 1990. 144. 
42 WHITE, H.: The Historical Text as Literary Artifact (in: White, H.: Tropics of Discourse, 
Essays in Cultured Criticism, Baltimore-London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 89. 
43 See Sunstein arguing that normative and positive choices injudicial decision-making can not 
always be separated. SUNSTEIN, C.: Problems with Rules, California Law Review, 1995. Vol. 
83, 1003. 
44 WHITE (1993), op. cit., 13. See an argument advanced by Chief Justice Burger. In 
explaining the relationship of citizens vis-à-vis their states he referred to the example of General 
Lee who refused the invitation of President Lincoln to become the commander of the US army. 
Instead, Lee went to Richmond and offered his services to Georgia shortly before the Civil War. 
According to Burger this was "not for the support of secession, not for the defence of slavery, 
not for the dissolution of the Union, but simply for the defence of his native state". BURGER, 
W. E.: The Origins of the United States Constitution, Law Society Gazette, 1985. Vol. 19, 
215-216. 
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of historical argument. To what source are we to refer to an authoritative 
understanding?"45 
Thus, the claim of objectivity submitted as one of the major virtues of 
arguments in history appears to be questionable. As Hayden White reveals, there 
is no such thing as objective history, instead there is a plurality of legitimate 
views but no exclusive objectivity.46 In fact, the objectivity of history cannot 
mean more than a skill to prove facts or sequences of facts.47 The writing of 
history, historical narrative, is a verbal fiction.48 Writing history is about 
interpreting facts.49 
The intellectual framework of such an interpretation of historical data is 
rather complex. On the one hand, some argue that the interpreter cannot distance 
herself from the historical continuity or tradition in which she is situated. 
Therefore the interpreter, being part of the flow of events, cannot have an 
external account of historical data. From the perspective of hermeneutics it 
means that history is part of the interpreter's mindset; therefore, historical 
prejudices influence the interpretation of historical data. For the interpreter it 
means that she has to discount her own prejudices when approaching the object 
of interpretation and, also, she has to take into account the potential prejudices 
of the author of the text that is interpreted.50 
45 В OB В ITT, op. cit., 10. 
46 WHITE, H.: The Burden of History (in: WHITE, Tropics..., 47). Cf. "The object of every 
interpretive controversy, when it really is an interpretive controversy, is always and only a 
particular historical fact, and there is no general way to determine what any particular historical 
fact might be." Steven Knapp on quote in CAMPOS, P.: That Obscure Object of Desire, 
Hermeneutics and the Autonomous Legal Text, Minnesota Law Review, 1993. Vol. 77, 1092. 
Promoters of the 'new constitutional history' in the US reject the idea that it is possible to 
reconstruct the single meaning of the law upon historical evidence; instead they submit that there 
are as many readings as many interpreters who construe them. CORNELL, op. cit., 20. 
47 GOTTSCHALK, L.: Understanding History, a Primer of Historical Method, New York, 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. 9. 
48 WHITE ( 1992), op. cit., 82 et seq. submitting that historical narrative is as much invented 
as found, events are made into a story, it is for the audience to decode ("re-emplot") the events 
and determine their significance. 
49 WHITE, H.: Interpretation in History (in: WHITE, Tropics ..., 51) holding that historical 
narrative is a mixture of adequately and inadequately explained events. 
50 For a summary of approaches related to traditions in constitutional argument see also 
MOORE, M. S.: The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, 1995. Vol. 19, 265. 
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II. 2 Traditions of the polity 
In constitutional reasoning there are numerous references to past events which, on 
their face, are different from plain references to historical data. The authority of 
the past is often claimed with reference to "a set of practices ... governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition".51 Moreover, such 
references automatically imply continuity with the past, with a suitable past.52 
These past events are usually referred to as traditions.53 
It is possible to identify a group of arguments in tradition that have much in 
common with arguments in history.54 One may find that certain arguments in 
tradition refer to the internal structure and established practices of a political 
community. These are usually references to the shared understanding of the 
features of democratic procedures, to notions of the republican form or federal 
structure of government, or to the architecture of the public discourse. Such 
arguments in tradition refer to established practices of a polity (political 
community). 
On the other hand, some references to tradition point to commitments of a 
community that are not related to political practices, but rather to commitments 
pertaining to other spheres of human life. These references might be conceived 
as references to shared moral understandings of a polity. It is submitted, that 
51 HOBSBAWM, E.: Introduction, Inventing Traditions [in: The Invention of Tradition. 
Hobsbawm, E.—Ranger, T. (eds.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983,1.] According 
to Shils traditions have a higher standing then mere historical facts "by virtue of the quality 
which they acquire" (due to their) "state of communion with past powers." SHILS, E. A.: 
Tradition and Liberty, Antimony and Interdependence [in: SHILS, E. A.: The Virtue of Civility, 
Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil Society, Grosby, S. (ed.) Indianapolis, 
Liberty Fund, 1997, 105]. 
52 HOBSBAWM, op. cit., 1. The "relevant past" is especially important in case of 
revolutionary regimes. Id. at 2. 
53 On tradition as a basis of legitimacy see WEBER, M.: Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft) Vol. 1, Roth, G.—Wittich, С. (eds.) 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978. 36. On traditional authority see id at 226-241. 
Hobsbawm distinguishes tradition from custom, custom being the driving force of traditional 
societies. HOBSBAWM, op. cit., 2 (the core of tradition is invariance while custom is flexible, 
a custom adapts to the needs of the society). 
54 Maclntyre argues that tradition is a historically extended, socially embodied argument. 
MACINTYRE, A.: After Virtue, a Study in Moral Theory (2nd ed.) London, Duckworth, 1992. 
206-207. Cf. BARBER, op. cit., 84 ("History can hardly count as tradition, then, for if it did, we 
could not criticize our historical conduct in the light of our traditions."). 
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when invoked by constitutional review fora, references to the long-held moral 
commitments of the community are similar to value arguments,55 while 
references to long-established (political) practices of a polity are in essence 
identical with arguments in history.56 
Like historical narratives, an argument based on the traditions of the polity is 
based on presupposition and préfiguration. Borrowing a term from Hobsbawm, 
traditions are "invented". They are construed as "responses to novel situations 
which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own 
past by quasi-obligatory repetition".57 Thus, one may find that a traditional 
narrative is teleological as well. In effect, arguments in tradition use history to 
situate the present in the social context of the community with the help of relevant 
past events.58 Traditional narrative asserts a very strong claim of legitimization 
with reference to history.54 
In response some may argue that traditional narratives are essentially different 
from references to history as their very existence presupposes a community: 
traditions are shared by a group of people, traditions are instrumental to the 
identity of a group. Very often arguments invoking traditions are legitimized by 
asserting that they are based on the well-established narratives of the community, 
or at least they are shared by the overwhelming majority of the actors. Many 
believe that the unarticulated premise of arguments in tradition is their pre-
55 References to values and shared moral understandings of the community are not going to be 
discussed here. 
56 Compare the above with Bobbin's distinction between moral arguments and ethical 
arguments, ethical arguments being as set of "constitutional argument whose force relies on a 
characterization of American institutions and the role within them of the American people. It is 
the characterization, or ethos, of the American polity...". BOBBITT, op. cit., 92. Cf. LUBAN, 
D.: Legal Traditionalism, Stanford Law Review, 1991. Vol. 43, 1046-1047. Luban makes an 
attempt to distinguish arguments in history and tradition in constitutional reasoning. He finds that 
"Tradition is a heavily edited anthology of the past, and much of the past fails to participate in 
it at all". LUBAN, op. cit., 1046. 
57 HOBSBAWM, op. cit., 2. 
58 It is important to see that invoking a tradition is not about giving factual information on a 
previous performance, instead invoking tradition is an assumption that previous performance 
as presented is operative. Thus, traditions are presumptive and prescriptive. POCOCK, J. G. A.: 
Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions and Their Understanding (in: POCOCK, 
J. G. A.: Politics, Language and Time, Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chicago-London: Chicago University Press, 1989. 237). 
59 HOBSBAWM, op. cit., 12. Inventing traditions is formalization and ritualization. For an 
argument that references to history in legal argument invoke long-standing traditions, see 
GORDON ( 1996), op. cit., 124 ("History supplies a set of basic ground rules"). 
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dominantly majoritarian character. For them the alleged majoritarian features of 
references to the past seem to be of major significance in establishing the high 
esteem of such references in constitutional reasoning.60 One shall however see 
that references to traditions are as much interpretive ( ' invented') as historical 
narratives. In a plural society, however, there is a multiplicity of actors and 
institutions that conceptualize the past.61 Like historical narratives, references 
to traditions of the polity are construed along the predispositions of their authors. 
Thus, the validity of references to traditions of the polity in constitutional 
reasoning primarily depends on the appropriateness of the underlying historical data 
and not on the size of the group supporting it.62 
In case one accepts that majoritarian character of traditional narratives, one 
may find that this feature undermines the legitimacy of references to tradition 
from the perspective of theories of democratic theories of government intending 
to accommodate judicial review. From the perspective of democratic theories of 
government this hint of majoritarianism makes references to the past legitimate 
when raised by judicial review fora. From the perspective of judicial review 
however, along the lines of an argument made by Ely, it makes little sense to 
invoke the value choices of the majority to protect a minority (a marginalized 
group of citizens) from rules established by the majority.63 
As has been shown, rhetorics based on history and traditions of the polity are 
construed along a predetermined framework. If perceived so, arguments in history 
are not more objective than references to tradition. The preferences of the 
interpreter are present not only when she invokes the traditions of the polity (set 
of highly valued historical references), but also when she selects historical data 
60 BROWN: op. cit., 205; WEST, R. L.: The Ideal of Liberty, a Comment on Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1991. Vol. 139, 1378. 
61 POCOCK ( 1989), op. cit., 240. Also, the time-consciousness of a heterogeneous society is 
complex. The concept of mulitplicity of social time was elaborated by Halbwachs in 1925 
[HALBWACHS, M.: Les cadres sociaux de la memoire (1925)]. See also Bobbitt finding: 
"Within a legal culture, legal rules operate to actualize many possible worlds, some of which are 
inconsistent with others." BOBBITT, op. cit., 179. 
62 In many cases constitutional review fora are petitioned to protect rights or liberties of 
minorities. Examples are numerous in the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
aboriginal cases. 
63 ELY, J. H.: Democracy and Distrust, a Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1980. 69. For an argument that courts are not immune to majoritarian 
influences see FRIEDMAN, В.: Dialogue and Judicial Review, Michigan Law Review, 1993. 
Vol. 91,586. 
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in support of a position. And as has been shown historical data are presented in 
an interpretive framework. 
Based upon the above, one may also find that references to traditions of the 
polity are normative arguments, they assert the normativeness of the past. This 
normativeness derives from non-instrumental notions of loyalty, sympathy, 
authority and honor.64 From this perspective it is easy to ascertain the similar 
characteristics of arguments in history and in traditions of the polity. Both 
arguments claim the normativeness of past events on a non-rational but 
reasonable basis.65 
II.3 References to the past in constitutional reasoning revisited 
The normativeness of narratives based on history and traditions is amplified when 
they are relied on in constitutional adjudication. They suggest or prescribe a 
standard of behavior the authoritative character of which is due to its past origins. 
If viewed so it is of secondary importance whether the past origins are traceable 
(as a concrete historical date), or immemorial (as in case of many traditions). The 
normativeness of arguments in history was established in opposition to the 
alleged objective and descriptive features of historical arguments. There is, 
however, a point where the normativeness of arguments in history and traditions 
of the polity is linked to objectivity.66 
64 A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought, Ashford, N.—Davies, S. (eds.) 
London—New York: Routledge, 1991. 264-265. See also Shils submitting that reception of 
tradition is a submission to an unknown authority. SHILS, op. cit., 112. 
65 In this context the distinction was made by Raymond Aron. ARON, R.: The Forms of 
Historical Intelligibility (in: ARON, R.: Politics and History, New Brunswick—London: 
Transaction Books, 1984. 60). 
66 There is a considerable disagreement among scholars whether and to what extent objectivity 
is possible in legal and constitutional argument. For denying the possibility of objectivity 
whatsoever see DWORKIN, R.: On Objectivity and Interpretation (in DWORKIN, R.: A Matter 
of Principle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985. 167-177). Dworkin argues that 
objectivity in legal argument and interpretation is impossible because it would suggest the 
existence of an external standard. Dworkin however suggest that when testing a proposition 
against an external standard legal argument internalizes that standard. In the essay Dworkin 
shows that it is impossible to show on an objective ground that slavery is wrong. Id. at 173-174. 
For a different view see Stavropoulos who suggest that in legal argument objectivity is a claim 
to establish whether a legal norm was applied correctly. STAVROPOULOS, N.: Objectivity in 
Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996. Stavropoulos' argument, however, does not seem to be able 
to respond to questions like how it is possible to determine whether vague clauses such as the 
due process clause was applied correctly. 
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It was suggested that the objectivity of historical narratives may not mean 
more than that the correctness of historical facts and data can be established.67 
It was also shown that writing (judicial opinions being a form of writing) turns 
traditions into facts.68 This is the point where objectivity in a very limited, 
highly technical sense may become a check on the normativeness of these 
arguments. Narratives based on historical assertions can be discredited by 
showing that they are based on inappropriate data,64 or if further data suggest a 
different interpretation. Thus, arguments in history and traditions may be tested 
against the correctness of the historical data on which they are based.70 Failing 
that test may have an adverse influence on the normativeness of arguments in 
history and traditions of the polity. 
As has been mentioned already, one of the major functions of arguments in 
history in constitutional reasoning is to reinforce continuity. As Pocock has 
shown, a written traditional narrative transmogrifies a social continuity 
represented by tradition into a multiplicity of institutional continuities.71 The 
promise of continuity is exhilarating. It suggests stability and predictability, and 
from the perspective of legal analysis it is appealing for various reasons.72 On 
the one hand it suggests that a judicial review forum acted within its long-
established powers. Thus, the claim of continuity has a considerable legitimating 
affect. On the other hand the observance of continuity suggests adherence to the 
67 Although the methodological limits of that enterprise were also shown. One shall consider 
Pocock's assertion claiming that if there is no factual support for the existence of past or present 
usages, it is a myth. For a tradition to be intelligible there shall be a factual background. 
POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 253-354. 
68 On the relationship of traditions and documents to which they are tied see POCOCK ( 1989), 
op. cit., 254-256. 
69 Cf. POCOCK, J. G. A.: Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of 
Ideas (in: POCOCK, Politics ..., 228). Pocock submits, that an immemorial constitution is not 
based on original principles, therefore it cannot be tested against them. 
70 If so viewed one may see that arguments in history and traditions of the polity are on the 
dividing line of factual and normative claims. It might be seen that when a review forum treats 
arguments in history as facts and not as normative claims, the cutting edge of such references is 
taken away. 
71 POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 254-256. 
72 Pritchard and Zy wicki assert that arguments in tradition are economically efficient, as these 
arguments trace those rules that are socially accepted and have been tested over time. 
PRITCHARD, А. С,—ZYWICKI, T. J.: Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of 
Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, North Carolina Law Review, 1999. Vol. 77, 
412-413. 
Does the Past Restrain Judicial Review? 65 
basic tenets of the rule of law, i.e. a reinforcement of the fundamentals of 
constitutional government and a claim for stability." 
One may also argue that the ideal of continuity is closely linked to preserving 
the status quo and neutral judicial decision-making, two claims which are often 
intertwined:74 "Historical interpretations that pretend to complete objectivity or 
neutrality inescapably conceal a political agenda, usually favorable to the status 
quo,"7S Neutrality and status quo are both very plausible terms used in scholarly 
literature and judicial opinions with multiple and somewhat indefinite meanings. 
It is beyond the ambitions of the present essay to explore the actual uses and 
possible meanings of these terms. 
An often concealed feature of references to status quo was revealed by Judge 
Posner. Posner showed that status quo may mean the status quo of today, as well 
as the status quo of yesterday. References to history and traditions of the polity 
are more likely to preserve the status quo of yesterday than to reinforce a 
contemporary consensus.76 Also, one may argue that a decision to maintain the 
present consensus implies a value choice per se, therefore it can be at best 
deferential in a sense, but not neutral. 
Furthermore, preserving the status quo as a societal consensus has at least two 
highly problematic aspects. From an empirical perspective one may argue that 
ascertaining the contemporary societal consensus is impossible in the course of 
judicial decision-making.77 Some may also add that it is not desirable for 
justices to engage in taking Gallup polls. And in any case, the notion of validity 
73 For an account of originalism which advocates stability as a major legitimating factor for 
established procedures in constitutional government see CLINTON, R. : Original Understanding, 
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 'This Constitution', Iowa Law Review, 1987. Vol. 72, 
1262. ("This instrumentalist value in constitutional stability is not a concern with preserving the 
status quo; rather, it ensures that contemporary society respects the legitimacy of the 
constitutionally provided procedures for resolving disputes about the meaning and enforcement 
of its fundamental charter.") 
74 See e.g. SUNSTEIN, C.: Lochner's Legacy, Columbia Law Review, 1987. Vol. 87,974,982. 
75 SPITZER, А. В.: Historical Truths and Lies about the Past, Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996. 4. Spitzer suggests that arguments in history leave behind a politically 
altered historical discourse constrained by "brute facts". 
76 POSNER, R.: The Problems of Jurisprudence, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1993. 444. Posner argues that new traditionalists want to preserve the status quo of yesterday. 
77 For an argument that justices should consult the present social consensus see BROWN, op. 
cit., 220 et seq. ("the interpreter will use judgment to gauge and evaluate the lessons of present 
tradition. Because different interpreters reflect different aspects of contemporary tradition, and 
thus bring different influences to the interpretative process, the political branches, representing 
the people, should consider these factors in selecting judges".) 
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of a historical narrative is independent of the consent of those 011 behalf of whom 
the interpretation is submitted. 
A further concern, which receives little attention in jurisprudence, was raised 
by historians. Ball and Pocock warn lawyers about a political consequence of the 
use of arguments in history and traditions of the polity. The authors submit that 
in a historical narrative the "former state of the law would retain authority even 
as it was being shown as obsolete. The presumptions would be in its favor, and 
good reasons would have to be given for changing received interpretation."78 As 
a consequence, the language of the law would be a language that the polity does 
not speak any longer.79 
One shall nonetheless note that many of the above-mentioned aspects of argu-
ments in history and traditions escape the attention of those who invoke them. As 
Miller noted, justices who argue tradition are aware of the fact that sometimes 
there is little meaningful continuity between the Framer's constitution and out-
present reality. Still, "the form of adherence to the past abides, perhaps because it 
helps fulfill some deep-seated psychic need".80 Also, as has been already 
indicated, the reasons for resorting to arguments in history are numerous, even the 
legitimacy of some of those considerations might be questioned. 
Il l Common Law Reasoning, Burke and Conservative/Liberal Ideals 
III.l Common law: the reason for repetition, if any 
The jurisprudence of constitutional review fora operating in common law regimes 
presents special challenges for an analysis of arguments in history and traditions 
of the polity. Constitutional review fora invoke «common law» when they act in 
their constitutional capacity. A reference to common law might have numerous 
different, although sometimes overlapping, connotations. In the US and Canada the 
term common law may refer to a distinct body of legal norms present and 
applicable in the respective legal systems.81 Some areas previously governed by 
78 BALL, T.—POCOCK, J. G. A.: Introduction [in: Conceptual Change and the Constitution, 
Ball, T.—Pocock, J. G. A. (eds.) Lawrence, Kan., University Press of Kansas, 1988]. 
79 BALL—POCOCK, op. cit., 11. 
80 MILLER, A. S.: Toward Increased Judicial Activism, the Political Role of the Supreme 
Court, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1982. 180. 
81 As to the relationship of the Constitution and common law in the US, and to the role of the 
federal courts in this matrix, the leading case is Erie Railroads v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938). 
Does the Past Restrain Judicial Review? 67 
judge-made law were constitutionalized82 or legislative enactments were passed 
to govern them, while other spheres still remain under judge-made norms.83 
In addition, references to "common law" as such may well stand for the 
common law of England. Thus, the phrase common law may refer to the legal 
system that had a strong influence on US and Canadian law and jurisprudence. 
The authoritative stature of the common law of England in these countries is not 
so obvious. On the one hand, the legal systems of the US and Canada are 
independent of the United Kingdom.84 On the other hand, these legal systems 
In Canada the extent to which the Charter is relevant to problems governed by common law, is 
discussed as a question of application. 
82 The constitutional stature of common law is governed by s.52 of the Canadian Constitution 
as refined by jurisprudence. In R.W.S.D.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1986) 2 S.C.R. 573 the 
Supreme Court per Justice Mclntyre held that common law rules are subject to constitutional 
scrutiny to the extent common law norms form the basis of government action. See R.W.S.D. U. 
v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. ( 1986) 2 S.C.R. 573,598-599. The government action shall be subject 
to s. 1 analysis under the Oakes test. The burden of proof is on the government. Constitutional 
scrutiny of common law rules was extended to private relationships in Hill v. Church of 
Scientology of Toronto ( 1995 ) 2 S.C.R. 1130. Private parties have to show that the common law 
rule violates Charter values (as opposed to Charter rights ). In these cases, however, the standard 
of judicial scrutiny is lower than the Oakes test. In cases involving private action judicial 
examination is performed by balancing Charter values against principles underlying the 
common law rule in question. The burden of proof is on the party alleging the violation. See 
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 2 S.C.R. 1130, paras 95-98 (Cory J.). 
83 It is especially so in the Canadian context where the Charter entered an operating, fully 
developed legal system, a legal system which was predominantly of common law origin. 
EVANS, J. M.: The Principles of Fundamental Justice, The Constitution and the Common Law, 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 1991. Vol. 29, 56. 
84 The independence of the US dates back to the eighteenth century. Thirteen former colonies 
of the British Empire signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Canada was distanced 
from the UK by the British North America Act, 1867 and the subsequent Statute of Westminster, 
1931. The Canadian Charter of Rights entered into force in 1982 in the framework of an overall 
constitutional reform scheme. The 1982 reform extinguished the power of the UK parliament to 
legislate for Canada, except in case of an express request from the Canadian federal government. 
For a concise account on the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Charter and their effect 
on Canadian national identity see WEINRIB, L.E.: Canada's Charter, Rights Protection in the 
Cultural Mosaic, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1996. Vol. 4, 
398—403. For a comprehensive argument on Canada's sovereignty on the basis of the 
constitutional amendment process, the British concept of parliamentary sovereignty, and legal 
and constitutional theory see also OLIVER, P.: The 1982 Patriation of the Canadian Constitution, 
Reflections on Continuity and Change, Revue Juridique Thémis, 1994. Vol. 28, 875 (1994). 
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have strong ties with English common law.85 Although US scholars tend to 
disagree concerning the extent to which the common law of England might be 
authoritative86—especially when concepts of common law are invoked to ex-
plore the Framers' probable intent—Bracton, Coke and Blackstone are often in-
voked in contemporary judicial opinions.87 The views of these authors stand for 
evidence on an old, historical or traditional point, but do not represent good law. 
Common law is often invoked in the US in cases concerning criminal due 
process, rules on search and evidence, despite the existence of constitutional and 
statutory provisions.88 The law of free speech also provides frequent references. 
The rules applied by courts in the US today originate in English common law, 
which was then developed by US courts. In such cases English common law rules 
are not considered as legal norms in effect, but are used as factual evidence on 
history or tradition of the field. 
85 For differences between the US and the Australian perception of common law see DIXON, 
O.: The Common Law and an Ultimate Constitutional Foundation, Australian Law Journal, 
1957. Vol. 31, 241. Dixon demonstrates that while for an Australian judge the common law is 
the corpus of decisions of all common law courts, for a US judge common law is comprised of 
the jurisprudence of US courts, and the decisions of courts in other common law jurisdictions 
are not considered to be law but facts. See also Justice Holmes in Black and White Taxicab and 
Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1927). 
86 "The framers believed that their concept of a constitution broke decisively with the prior 
understanding they inherited from Britain. Yet, in one sense that break was less radical than it 
seemed." Since 1789 Americans have always possessed two constitutions: a written document 
and the "working constitution" constituted by a body of precedents, habits, understandings and 
attitudes that has shaped the operations of the federal machinery ever since. RAKOVE, J. N.: 
Original Meanings, Politics and the Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, New York, Vintage 
Books, 1997. 339. 
87 For a complex account on Blackstone's influence in the United States see BADER, W. D.: 
Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, Vermont Law Review, 1994. Vol. 
19, 5. For a comprehensive study see also BERMAN, H. J. : The Origins of Historical 
Jurisprudence, Coke, Seiden, Hale, Yale Law Journal, 1994. Vol. 103, 1651. 
88 In this regard due process cases are especially interesting, as under the Due Process clause 
the US Supreme Court adopted an attitude protecting long-standing traditions; however, under 
the Equal Protection clause the Court tends to abolish long-standing forms of discrimination, 
even to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of the ratification and that were 
expected to endure. See SUNSTEIN, C.: Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, A Note on the 
Relationship between Due Process and Equal Protection, University of Chicago Law Review, 
1988. Vol. 55, 1161. 
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References to common law may also be encountered in a third, more theo-
retical sense, as a reference to basic features of common law reasoning or 
attitude.84 Such references and techniques however cannot be characterized as 
doctrinal arguments, as they go well beyond the limits of a theory of stare 
decisis f in this sense the common law method is more a frame of reasoning.41 
On the surface such arguments claim that common law is inherently conservative, 
a doctrine which lays on stability and predictability.42 The substance of such 
references is an appeal to common law reasoning conceived as reason tested on 
experience (repetition), the origins of which are ancient and immemorial.43 This 
ongoing repetition is the source of continuity and stability, the fundamental 
characteristics attributed to common law. Theories of common law differ in 
construing the role and relationship of the passage of time and of experience in 
the development of common law.44 
There is a strong line of argument originating in the works of Coke and 
Hale,45 and resulting in the 17th century concept of the "ancient constitution" 
which in effect identifies common law with a set of customs of immemorial 
89 Justice Scalia argues that the US constitution is being treated like common law today and 
he questions the appropriateness of a common law judicial attitude. In SCALIA, A.: A Matter 
of Interpretation, Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 13, 
40. 
90 A concept of stare decisis though is certainly hiding behind all these claims. 
91 As Horwitz remarked "(l)ike the effects of a common language on the structure of the 
thought, the common law tradition affects our sensibilities at almost pre-rational levels". 
HORWITZ. M. J.: The Changing Common Law, Dalhousie Law Journal, 1984. Vol. 9, 66. 
92 See e.g. MURPHY, W. F.: Elements of Judicial Strategy, Chicago—London, The University 
of Chicago Press, 1964. 204. 
93 See e.g. GIFFORD, D.: The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American Jurisprudence in 
Religion and Reason, Tennessee Law Review, 1995. Vol. 62,773 arguing that the institutions 
of Anglo-American law "are worthy of protection because the premises forming their 
foundations are true and timeless". 
94 Cf. "the force of precedent has nothing obviously to do with the claims of tradition; and 
those claims, whatever their source and strength, do not derive f rom the claims of the past as 
such". LUBAN, op. cit., 1047. See also Gordon arguing that while the New Right in the US 
represented by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia among others rejects the classic 
common law adaptation of traditions, the justices are relying on authoritative commands from 
the past which look like positive law. GORDON (1996), op. cit., 132. 
95 A classic example is Coke 's opinion in Calvin's case where he refers to the wisdom of 
forefathers. McConnell notes that Coke argue tradition against reason as a judge and favored 
reason against tradition as an MP. MCCONNELL, op. cit., 179-180. 
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origin.96 Pursuant to this understanding of common law the source of the 
substance of a legal norm shall not be examined, it is enough to adhere to the 
custom of application.97 If perceived so, common law is simply prescription of 
behavior via repetition (i.e. tradition).98 
The relationship of repetition and reason is complex and often debated. It is 
not to suggest that repetition confers action with the force of law, rather, the 
legitimacy of legal norms follows from the continuous application of these norms 
(empirical evidence of continuous application and social experience).99 Some 
96 For a comprehensive account see POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 213. Pocock argues that the 
concept of the ancient constitution is based on the identification of English law with custom. 
On the differences of the visions of government of the US Framers and the concept of ancient 
constitution see ROSE, C. M : The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire, Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on Monarchism to Modern Localism, Northwest University Law 
Review, 1989. Vol. 84, 74. 
97 Here it is sufficient to refer to MacCormick's remark: "there is a radical weakness in a 
doctrine of precedent according to which the binding authority of a decided case is entirely 
independent of the strength or validity of the justifying arguments employed in the case." 
MACCORMICK, N.: Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978. 
136-137. See also R. v. Gruenke (1991) 3 S.C.R. 263. Chief Justice Lamer of the Canadian 
Supreme Court wrote for the majority that "(w)hilc the appellant may well be correct in pointing 
out that English and Canadian courts have not, as a matter of practice, compelled members of 
the clergy to disclose confidential religious communications, this does not answer the question 
of whether there is a legal common law privilege for religious communications." (emphasis 
original). 
98 POCOCK ( 1989), op. cit., 228. This position is the one to which Edmund Burke converted. 
POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 225. On Burke's familiarity with law see STANLIS, P.: Edmund 
Burke, The Enlightenment and Revolution, New Brunswick—London, Transaction, 1991. 8-13. 
See POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 379 et seq. for the influence of Coke and Hale on Burke's concept 
of common law and tradition. 
99 Justice Cardozo notes that while some distinguish between common law and custom, 
Blackstone does not. CARDOZO, B. N.: The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) New 
Haven-London, Yale University Press, 1967. 59. BLACKSTONE, W.: Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, Vol. 1, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979. 17. В lackstone provides the 
following definition: "ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is called 
common law". For an interesting account on the relationship of common law and custom see 
WATSON, A.: The Future of the Common Law Tradition, Dalliousie Law Journal, 1984. Vol. 
9, 68. Watson demonstrates that as local customs were hard to ascertain, judges found it more 
reliable to read them in court record, no matter how that court discovered that custom. Note that 
Blackstone himself distinguishes general customs and particular customs, particular customs 
being the customs of specific regions. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., 67. In the opinion of Justice 
Cardozo justices should look into customs not for emerging new rules, but for tests and standards 
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see repetition as a highly rational behavior and argue that certain actions would 
not be repeated over and over if they were not beneficial.100 Others see 
repetition as an instance of evident compliance with the immemorial.101 The 
other end of the spectrum argues that following certain patterns of behavior and 
attributing special significance to them constitutes a profoundly irrational element 
of the common law.102 The dispute over the relation of repetition and reason 
however does not alter the fact that in a large number of cases references to 
common law do not rely on specific sources of legal authority, rather, they point 
to a long-existing trend or prevailing legal concept in self-contained terms.103 
III.2 Burke, conservatives, liberals and the dead hand of the past 
The basic features of common law reasoning were discovered and valued by 
Edmund Burke.104 Burke applied the main attributes of common law reasoning 
in a larger context, to social and political developments.105 In his Reflections he 
invoked the common law methodology to show how the observance of traditions 
contributed to stabile government in England, and how the rejection of traditions 
determining how established rules should be applied. CARDOZO, op. cit., 60. 
100 POCOCK (1989), op. cit., 220. 
101 Blackstone submits that "(t)o make a particular custom good, the following are 
necessary requisites. ( 1 ) That it have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth not 
to the contrary." Other criteria established are that the particular custom be continued, 
peaceable, reasonable, certain, compulsory and consistent. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., 76-78. 
102 See HOLMES, O. W.: The Common Law ( 1881 ) New York, Dover Publications, 1991, 35 
("precedents survive in law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason for 
them has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be failure and confusion from 
the merely logical point of view"). 
103 See HOLMES, op. cit., 190 showing that many customs of the realm were in essence rules 
of common law. Today criminal due process decisions in the US and Canada may be 
overwhelmed with such references. 
104 Burke learnt most from the commentaries of Blackstone. And he noted with appreciation: 
"I hear that they have sold nearly as many Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in 
England." Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America ( 1775). 
105 "All the reformations we have hitherto made, have proceeded upon the principle of 
reference to antiquity, and I hope, may I am persuaded, that all those which possible may be 
made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical reasoning, precedent, authority and 
example." BURKE, E.: Reflections of the Revolution in France (1790), O'Brien C. C. (ed.), 
London Penguin, 1986. 117. On analogy see also BURKE, op. cit., 120. 
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led to questionable consequences in France.106 Thus, his reasoning—a classic 
argument in tradition—is especially interesting for the present discussion. 
Some commentators assert that Burke denied reason and valued faithful 
(cowardly) repetition.107 If that is so, the Burkean concept of tradition and one 
even may say that the basic tenets of the common law method are severely 
undermined. Others however argue that Burke did not deny the role of reason in 
governments based on tradition; moreover, it is asserted that Burke believed that 
adherence to traditions is an instance of highly rational behavior.108 
In the Reflections, Burke does not deny the role of human reason in changing 
government. Also, Burke does not deny the need for adjustment in established 
governments; he believed that governments shall be changed in order to 
survive.109 In the process of change Burke attributes a central role to tradition. 
In the light of his anthropological presuppositions and his general concept of 
political affairs one may see that in his theory adherence to traditions does not 
presuppose or result in automated routines. Burke admits that there are a few men 
with exceptional talents and those people are capable of construing great theories 
of government. In his views politics is not a matter solely for abstract theories, 
but also for experiment, for testing theories in practice.110 However, Burke 
106 Kronman notes that Burke's oeuvre offers a concept of tradition in response to real-life 
problems. Also, he noted that Burke introduced his theory in an age when the idea of adherence 
to traditions was not that appealing anymore. KRONMAN, A.: Precedent and Tradition, Yale 
Law Journal, 1990. Vol. 99, 1046-1047. 
107 See e.g. BROWN, op. cit., 212. ("Translated into the language of constitutional 
interpretation, the argument is that current judgments about the role of government under the 
Constitution must be made in conformity with the traditions of society. It suggests blind 
obedience.") MACINTYRE, op. cit., 221. Maclntyre argues that Burke contrasted tradition with 
reason. In a similar vein Ackerman holds that the new Burkeans of US constitutionalism favor 
gradual development via precedents and ignore (wisdom in gradual evolution ) the achievements 
of contemporary constitutional theory. A prominent figure of new Burkeanism is Bickel. 
ACKERMAN, op. cit., 472-473. As for Bickel's position see BICKEL, A. M.: The Morality of 
Consent, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1975. 20. 
108 MOORE, op. cit., 269. (Moore assesses a number of arguments to show that Burke did not 
deny the role of reason in government.) 
109 BURKE, op. cit., 106. ("A state without the means of some change is without the means 
of its conservation. Without such means of change is might even risque the loss of that part 
of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve.") See also id. at 280. 
110 BURKE, op. cit., 152 and also 258. ("The means taught by experience may be better 
suited to political ends than those contrived in the original project." Id. at 285.) See BURKE, 
op. cit., 276 where he argues that a revolution can be accepted as an experiment, and tested 
by time. Although he despised revolution as a means of political change, he could accept 
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submits that aberrations of theory were corrected by experience in old 
establishments."1 He also argues that ordinary men are reasonable and they 
have their wants and passions. And they are not going to restrain themselves 
unless there is external means to control them."2 Burke believes that the best 
control on passions is the accumulated experience of many generations."3 This 
arrangement assures the stability and predictability that are essential to human 
and humane existence."4 
Burke's argument is based on reason tested on and constrained by experience 
over time and through many generations (tradition)."5 The common law 
method is apparent throughout his theory. He construes tradition as an effective 
and legitimate constraint on human passions on the one hand, and on 
imperfections of reason on the other. If so, it may be argued that Burke asserts an 
epistemic claim on behalf of tradition. According to Burke traditions shall be 
observed because the past knows better than the present generation what the 
truths of government are."6 If construed so, one may see that Burke did not 
advocate mindless repetition, he did not deprive the recipients of tradition from 
their discretion based upon their experience of practical application. 
revolution as an (even necessary) experiment to break from tyranny. BURKE, op. cit., 276. 
111 BURKE, op. cit., 285. 
112 BURKE, op. cit., 151. His anthropology is based on his perception of the French 
revolutionaries, who by Burke's great surprise were mostly lawyers. See id. at 129 et seq. (The 
behavior of the French revolutionaries may certainly be interpreted as a lesson tought by time.) 
He also refers to he arrogance of those who have never experienced wisdom greater than their 
own. Id. at 193. Cf. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., 44. "The only true and natural foundations of 
society are the wants and fears of individuals." 
113 BURKE, op. cit., 152, 285. ("The science of government being therefore so practical in 
itself, in intended for practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more 
experience than any person can gain in his whole life...." Id. 152.) His theory of accumulated 
wisdom is strongly tied to ideas about inheritance and the natural order of the world. See 
especially BURKE, op. cit., 119-120. 
114 BURKE, op. cit., 265-266. As a retrospective finding one may even say suggest along 
these lines that although arguments in tradition are majoritarian per se, they tend to protect 
the minority from the sudden changes of attitude the majority may have. 
115 Cf. Nagel arguing that the fundamental percepts of common law reasoning contradict the 
logic of the self-development of political tendencies. NAGEL, R. F.: Constitutional Cultures, 
the Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review, Berkeley—Los Angeles—London, University 
of California Press, 1989. 19. 
116 MOORE, op. cit., 268. 
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Burke's views are usually considered as the standard conservative under-
standing of tradition in conservative political theory."7 When it comes to 
authoritative references to history and traditions of the polity, liberals at the other 
end of the spectrum are likely to quote J. S. Mill on the dead hand of tradition. 
What conservatives view as stability, liberals are likely to name backwardness. 
What is the preservation of commonly shared values and experience for one, is 
the infringement of individual autonomy for the other. 
Still, there are forceful attempts which try to show that reliance of traditions 
is not backwardness perse. Edward Shils is one of the major liberal advocates of 
the observance of traditions. He argues that a non-critical approach towards 
traditions is hostile to traditions themselves."8 Instead, in a line of argument 
similar to that of Burke, he advocates knowing adherence to tradition and argues 
that in effect accepting traditions enhances rights, as it provides an a priori 
framework for safeguarding individual liberty."9 
Conclusion 
The above analysis suggests that arguments in history and traditions of the polity 
are normative claims, implying value judgments. Historical analysis provides a 
'history of today'. Thus, one may find that a historical narrative is not descriptive 
but it is in essence normative.12" In case one rejects the above positions, it is 
still the case that in a historical narrative the interpreter has a privileged position 
at the end of the past; the observer identifies herself with the problem and with 
the assertion that a solution to that problem is in sight.121 Thus, instead of 
providing an objective, neutral justification, references to history and traditions of 
the polity are about construing the past for the purposes of present and future 
legal and constitutional reasoning. Historical examples are invoked to reinforce 
117 See YOUNG, E.: Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, North Carolina Law Review, 1994. Vol. 72, 634. May that be so, one may still 
find that Burke himself used his argument in support of a liberal position in daily politics. 
118 SHILS, op. cit., 114 (traditionalism is hostile to tradition). 
119 Note that Shils advocates loose patterns of traditions. SHILS, op. cit., 105, 117. 
120 ARON, op. cit., 60. Aron notes that in the narrative history has a privileged position, but 
the approach is not rational only reasonable. 
121 Otherwise the study of history would undermine its own legitimacy. ARON, op. cit., 
59. 
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norms of behavior in accordance with past examples, or to deter from a certain 
conduct using past analogies to model possible (undesired) outcomes.122 
As references to history and traditions of the polity are forward looking, they 
might appear convenient to support future oriented reasoning which is insensitive 
to the outcome (to the decision in the case), exactly as neutral principles do. 
Historical narratives and references to traditions in particular offer themselves as 
suitable bases for principled judgment. This is one of the many reasons why they 
are so well-taken in legal and constitutional argument. However, one shall not be 
misguided: historical narratives are invented, thus, per se context-sensitive and 
result-oriented. This is why they cannot fulfill their initial promise of objectivity 
and neutrality. As historical narratives are teleological and normative they cannot 
give rise to principled legal and judicial decisions.121 These findings might form 
the framework of understanding arguments in history and traditions in 
constitutional adjudication. 
The analysis of the basic precepts of common law reasoning revealed how 
arguments referring to common law may mold with arguments in long-estab-
lished legal principles or practices.124 This technique of reasoning allows for 
reaffirming a rule without testing its substance even in the days of refined 
theories of precedent and stare decisis, a feature of common law reasoning that 
might be useful to keep in mind.125 That is not surprising since it is one of the 
122 For a typology of the functions of historical narrative see WHITE (1993), op. cit., 1 et seq. 
White distinguishes emplotnient, formal argument and ideological argument. 
123 On a different argument concerning the relationship of historical narratives and the need 
for stability and principled decision-making in constitutional law see DWORKIN ( 1986 ), op. cit., 
365-369. Dworkin argues that historical narratives serve stability. According to Dworkin 
stability is an argument of political normativity. He argues that in rights cases considerations of 
stability shall be secondary to claims of justice. 
124 Krygier argues that this is true for legal reasoning in general, whether or not operating by 
the common law method. As the essence of legal reasoning is to support a present position with 
examples and analogies drawn from sources of the institutionalized past. KRYGIER, op. cit., 
257-258. 
125 For an example see Jesse Choper's argument: it is not a question anymore if judicial review 
is a legitimate exercise of judicial power under the US constitution; the review power has been 
exercised for a long time, and today the issue is to delineate the proper scope of the judicial 
review power. See CHOPER, J.: Judicial Review and the National Political Process, a 
Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court, Chicago—London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1980. 63. For a summary on the origins of US judicial review in a common 
law context see CORWIN, E.: The Doctrine of Judicial Review, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1914. 28 er seq. analyzing the landmarks from Dr. Bonham's case via Hylton v. U S, 3 
U.S. 171 (1796). A recent US example is the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
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most intriguing tasks to establish a theory of stare decisis that allows departure 
from precedent while maintaining a sense of continuity.126 As has been revealed 
recently, the doctrine of stare decisis is "to accord an authoritative status to 
tradition in 'supplementing or derogating from' the constitutional text".127 It 
means that common law courts argue on the basis of established traditions and 
history when, while clearly departing from precedent, they intend to maintain the 
impression of continuity and fidelity to the text or structure of the constitution.128 
These findings are indeed supported by a review of the views of Burke on the 
nature of common law reasoning and on the role of tradition in shaping 
governments. 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) reaffirming the holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice 
O'Connor writing for a plurality refused to reexamine the central holding in Roe and upheld it 
for the reason that it has been applied for over 20 years. It is argued that the reason for such a 
facade stare decisis is the loss of faith of the judiciary. Hellman calls these attempts a prudential 
approach to stare decisis. See HELLMAN, D.:The Importance of Appearing Principled, Arizona 
Law Review, 1995. Vol. 37, 1116-1117. Such prudential considerations may also be interesting 
from the perspective of a study of judicial candor. See IDLEMAN, S. C.: A Prudential Theory 
of Judicial Candor, Texas Law Review, 1995. Vol. 73, 1307. Idleman submits that a doctrine of 
precedent is a sub-issue of judicial candor. Id. at 1311. 
126 Nonetheless, it is important to see that "(judicial) (l)aw-making is not restricted to 
overruling precedent. Law-making occurs when a precedent is distinguished and also when a 
precedent is followed... . Law-making can and does occur whether or not a court considers itself 
to be bound by its own prior decisions". BALE, G.: Casting off the Mooring Ropes of Binding 
Precedent, Canadian Bar Review, 1980. Vol. 18, 259. 
127 See MONAGHAN, H. P.: Our Prefect Constitution, New York University Law Review, 
1981. Vol. 56, 382, on quote in CAMPOS, P.: Against Constitutional Theory (in: Campos. P. 
F.—Schlag, P.—Smith, S. D.: Against the Law, Durham: Duke University Press, 1996. 124.) For 
a similar finding in the context of the jurisprudence of the Warren Court in the US see 
FRIEDMAN, В.—SMITH, S. В.: The Sedimentary Constitution, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 1998. Vol. 147, 24-26. Before Roe v. Wade,4\0 U.S. 113 (1973) the Warren Court used 
history and originalism in general as liberal tools of broad interpretation of a right: history was 
a device to preserve continuity but to depart from precedent. After Roe originalism became a 
conservative tool: it is more than an interpretive methodology, it is a political movement. For 
recent references to history and tradition as limitations on constitutional claims in the US see 
e.g., 478 U.S. 186(1986 ),Michael H. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110 ( 1989). As it was noted, these 
references to tradition narrow down the scope of non-textual liberties entitled to constitutional 
protection. BROWN, op. cit., 204. 
128 While most authors argue for a strict and principled reliance on the requirements of stare 
decisis, others argue that overruling precedents is an ordinary means of self-correction. For the 
later view see e.g. LEE, Th. R.: Stare decisis in Historical Perspective: from the Founding Era 
to the Rehnquist Court, Vanderbilt Law Review, 1999. Vol. 52, 647. 
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This essay was not intended to resolve the basic tensions and predispositions 
attached to arguments invoking the past. Rather, it attempted to show that 
arguments in history and traditions may be formulated to preserve a certain 
institutional arrangement and also to change it; that the very same references may 
foster as well as limit individual liberty; that the same set of references is capable 
to delineate as well as to increase the legitimate choices of the interpreter, thus 
the scope of judicial review. In the context of constitutional adjudication it means 
that arguments invoking the past may be devices for activism as well as for 
deferentialism. It is also suggested that legal reasoning, or at least common law 
reasoning, has methodological features which may call for references to the past. 
Thus, arguments invoking the past shall be analyzed in a more comprehensive 
framework that also responds to teleological aspirations, claims of normativeness 
and continuity raised or masked by these references. As one shall always keep in 
mind: the past does not bind the present unless the present chooses to be 
bound. 129 
129 WOFFORD, J. G.: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, University of 
Chicago Law Review, 1961. Vol. 31, 523. 
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Introduction 
Notwithstanding the fact that ever since the ancient times a number of authors 
have dealt with the problem of wars aimed at the enforcement of requirements of 
humanity, the question of humanitarian intervention gained legal character only 
around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries following the emergence of 
human rights as well as the actual birth of international law.1 
Obviously, due to the lack of a sufficient legal basis and background, in 
relation to centuries prior to those designated above it is inexpedient to discuss 
the issue of humanitarian intervention, although it has to be admitted that several 
historical events has showed startling similarities with this legal phenomenon. As 
a consequence, in an attempt to come across the first legal definitions and theories 
I "International Law as a law between sovereign and equal States based on the common 
consent of those States is a product of modern Christian civilisation, and may be said to be about 
four hundred years old." OPPENHEIM, L.: International Law: A Treatise. Vol. I. Peace. Eighth 
Edition, ed. by LAUTERPACHT, H. (hereinafter: Lauterpachfs OPPENHEIM). London: 
Longmans Green & Co., 1955. 72. 
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concerning humanitarian interventions it is enough to travel approximately three 
or four hundred years back in time. 
However, because of the significant changes in the system of international law 
that took place in the meantime, any research focusing on the specific topic of the 
present study has to be carried out within the framework of two or three 
appropriately set up historical and legal epochs. The first period had lasted from 
the "beginning" till 1945, when a new era began in international law highlighted 
by the United Nations (UN) and bringing in its wake fundamental legal changes, 
the effects of which are still dominant for the time being. To put it simply and 
briefly, according to the core provisions of contemporary international law, states 
are strictly forbidden to use or threat of force against one another as well as to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of any other state.2 Since such comprehensive 
legal prohibitions on forcible and arbitrary inter-state conducts and measures had 
never existed prior to 1945, and since every situation has to be judged on grounds 
of the law in force at the time when it took place, the setting up of the epochs 
referred to above seems to be not only advisable, but also inevitable. 
Furthermore, I also marked the line of time at March 1999, when NATO's 
Kosovo intervention—which, as commonly known, was commenced without a 
prior authorization obtained f rom the UN Security Council—started. This 
passionately debated event was, of course, far f rom being as significant as the 
adoption of the UN Charter and naturally did not mean the dawn of a new era, 
still—for the very topic of this study—it might have indicated further, forthcoming 
changes in international law, especially in the legal opinion concerning 
humanitarian intervention. 
It also has to be noted here in the introduction that the phrase "humanitarian 
intervention" was and is, in fact, used in different senses. Therefore it is necessary 
to throw light upon the relevant questions, especially when facing that some of 
these divergent concepts hide not absolutely false but at least somewhat debatable 
approaches. 
According to the dual or in other words broader definition, the phrase 
embraces both the actions of a state carried out outside the borders of its territory 
and aimed at the protection of its nationals whose fundamental human rights are 
gravely violated by another state and the interventions commenced in order to 
protect the rights and liberties of foreign nationals suffering from blatant ill-
treatment and extreme violations of human rights perpetrated by their own state. 
(This latter segment of the broader definition is the so-called classical notion of 
2 See inter cilia the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2(4) and 2(7), and UN General 
Assembly Resolutions 2131(XX), 2625(XXV) and 3314(XXIX). 
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humanitarian intervention.) However, only but a few scholars believe that state 
actions with beneficiaries who are actually the nationals of the intervening state 
itself and described above in the first half of the broader definition are genuine 
humanitarian interventions.3 Interventions of this kind can be seen as a result of 
the extraterritorial nature of a state's personal supremacy and the violation of this 
supremacy by another state—therefore—as a result of both the violation of 
sovereignty and flagrant non-observance of human rights rather than any action 
aimed at the enforcement of human rights and derived from the minimum 
standards of civilization as well as the basic principles of humanity. 
Consequently, interventions such as the Etebbe hostage rescue mission of the 
Israeli elite troops in 1976 (Operation Jonathan) or the unsuccessful Operation 
Eagle Claw carried out by the United States in Iran in 1980, can he seen as not 
humanitarian ones, but rather as special manifestations of self-protection or self-
defence on behalf of the intervening state. This concept stands much closer to 
legal reality, although it gives rise, in my view, to further concerns. Article 51 of 
the UN Charter governing self-defence contains the following provision: 
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member State of the 
United Nations..."4 
The wording of the cited provision reveals that the right of self-defence is 
reserved by the Charter, as an exception to the comprehensive ban on use of 
force, for cases of aggression, a condition which is certainly not met when 
another state gravely violates the fundamental human rights of a state's 
nationals. State sovereignty, of course, suffers damage in instances like this, 
however a military rescue operation cannot be carried out with reference to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter interpreted in a stricto sensu manner. "Therefore, 
this variant of humanitarian intervention is—contrary to a widespread view in the 
literature—neither compatible with the UN Charter provisions nor justified by 
today's customary international law."5 
3 See for instance HENKIN, L.-PUGH, R. C.-SCHACHTER, O. -SMIT, H.: International 
Law: Cases and Materials. American Casebook Series. St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing 
Co., 1980. 922-924. For an interesting, yet—in my opinion—far too broad view on collective 
humanitarian intervention which even embraces measures such as the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the UN Security Council, 
see BUERGENTHAL, T.: International Human Rights in a Nutshell. Second Edition. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1995. 5. 
4 Charter of the United Nations, Article 51. Italics mine. 
5 BEYERLIN, U.: "Humanitarian intervention," in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
edited by R. BERNHARDT (hereinafter: ENCYCLOPEDIA). Amsterdam-New York-Oxford: 
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It should be mentioned in a nutshell that there exists a concept—the broadest 
of all—according to which the category of humanitarian intervention, besides 
those actions discussed above, also involves various forms of state conducts of 
interventional or influential nature, but lacking the element of use of force. 
Nevertheless, this view is shared by only a few jurists.6 
As far as my opinion is concerned, I entirely share the view, represented by 
for example Manouchehr Ganji—an eminent author in the fields of political 
science and international law, particularly human rights law7—interpreting the 
notion of humanitarian intervention in the strictest manner. As I have already 
indicated, I am convinced that any intervention aimed at the protection of own 
nationals neither bears primarily humanitarian considerations nor does it show up 
the characteristics of self-defence. Interestingly enough, these actions can be 
derived from a domestic legal relation—which is not lacking in international 
significance, though—, namely f rom the obligations and responsibilities of states 
in relation to their own nationals. 
For the considerations and views expressed above, in the forthcoming 
substantial part of the present study I will focus only on the classical notion of 
humanitarian intervention that, once again, involves the key element of protection 
provided to foreign nationals. 
Humanitarian Intervention in the Era Prior to the Establishment of the 
United Nations 
For the purposes of this study, the relevant features of traditional, pre-Charter 
international law can be summarized in two major points: (i) in this period ins 
ad bellum was a generally recognized and consistently implemented right, so as 
a result, forcible interventions were not prohibited at all; (ii) fundamental human 
North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982. 214. 
6 There is an outstandingly apt remark used by Guggenheim to illustrate such actions: "plutôt 
platonique". See GUGGENHEIM, P.: Traité de Droit International Public. Tonte I. Genève: 
Librairie de l'Université, George & C'e S. A., 1953. 290. The group of those who take 
"humanitarian representations"—or in other words "humanitarian protests"—as instances of 
humanitarian intervention includes for example Antoine Rougier and Ellery C. Stowell. Cf. 
ROUGIER, A.: "La Théorie de l'Intervention Humanité." Revue Général de Droit International 
Public (1910) 475-^78; STOWELL, E. C.: Intervention in International Law. Washington D. 
C.: John Byrne & Co., 1921. 63-195. 
7 GANJI, M.: International Protection of Human Rights. Genève—Paris: Librairie E. 
Droz-Librairie Minard, 1962. 9^44. 
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rights and freedoms, especially the freedom of religion,8 slowly gained inter-
national acceptance and started to spread irresistably all over the civilized world. 
Due to the work of natural lawyers as well as to the need for and the 
emergence of human rights, a legal form was assumed by a number of ancient 
moral rules, such as the one which prescribed that in proportion to one ' s 
capabilitites, it was an acceptable, moreover an honourable deed to help the 
others, since for a human being nothing could be more important than another 
human being. The common bonds stretching between all human beings had made 
the requirement of providing help to those in need a general moral principle: a 
view carried into effect as early as in the time of antiquity and emphasized by 
several outstanding philosophers and authorities already in those centuries. 
Marcus Tullius Cicero said that interpersonal connections of men were by 
themselves a sufficient ground to provide help to someone else.9 It was affirmed 
by Lucius Annaeus Seneca who claimed that human beings had been created in 
order to mutually help one another.10 Also noteworthy is the opinion of 
Ambrosius that the force which protected the weak was "pure justice" itself." 
It would be false to believe, though, that it was exclusively the antique moral 
values that had a vigorous influence on the early theorists and theories of 
humanitarian intervention. One should not underestimate the significant effects 
of Christian values and Christianity in general transmitted towards the emerging 
law of nations at that time, mainly by the famous representatives of the so-called 
Spanish school such as Francisco de Vitoria.12 
8 See for instance: 1645 Treaty of Linz, Article I; 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, Articles XX VIIT, 
XLIX and CXXIII; 1699 Treaty ofCarlowitz, Article XIII; 1720 Treaty of Constantinople; 1739 
Treaty of Belgrade; 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, Articles VII, XIV, X V n and ХХ1П; 1815 
Eight Powers Declaration on the affairs of Helvetian Confederation, Article IV; 1815 Federal 
Constitution of Germany, Articles XVI and XVIII: 1856 General Treaty of Paris, Article IX; 
1878 Treaty of Berlin, Article LXII; 1885 Congo Act, Article VI. 
9 See CICERO: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. III. 19. 64; CICERO: De Officiis. И. 5. 16; 
Digesta, 1. 1.3. 
10 SENECA: De Ira. I. 5. 
11 AMBROSIUS: De Officiis. I. 13. 
12 Cf. GAJZAGO, L.: A nemzetközi jog eredete, annak római és keresztény összefüggései, 
különösebben a spanyol nemzetközi jogi iskola [The Origins of International Law, its Roman and 
Christian Relations, Especially the Spanish School of International Law] Budapest: Stephaneum 
Nyomda, 1942. Vitoria, a Spanish Dominican monk, was allegedly the first to use the phrase 
"intervention on grounds of humanity" in his lecture at the University of Salamanca in 1539. Ch. 
MEIER: "Koszovó és a Pax Americana: Kérdések és töprengések egy helyzetről" [Kosovo and 
Pax Americana: Questions and Thoughts Concerning a Situation] Európai Szemle Vol. X. No. 
3(1999), 94. 
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Briefly speaking, as a result of the development of international law that took 
place during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the above-mentioned 
moral and religious norms were incorporated into its system, providing f rom the 
very beginning explicit, but sometimes abusive, legal grounds for starting wars. 
However, despite the mentality beamed from morality and religion towards 
international law and because of the absolute notion of sovereignty as well as the 
dominant character of ius ad bellum, it used to be somewhat irrelevant what the 
casus belli of a particular armed conflict was. This statement can be accepted 
with a reservation, though. Since international law, as well as law in general, has 
always been inseparable f rom certain elements of morality and religion, f rom a 
certain point of view it had significant importance whether or not a war had been 
started for justifiable reasons and purposes. 
Without going into detailed discussion of the traditional "just war" 
theories,13 but based upon the above-mentioned mentality of the historical 
period in question, it can be stated that humanitarian interventions were typically 
looked upon as instances of just wars, although the thorough examination of 
their particular occurrences in history may raise questions regarding the noble 
and purely altruistic motivations of the "armed samaritans". Naturally, an 
equality sign cannot be put between the notions of just war and humanitarian 
13 On the theory of just war see for instance AUGUSTINE: The City of God Against the 
Pagans (Cambridge Texts in History of Political Thought). Edited by R. W. DYSON. 
Cambridge: University Press, 1998; GROTIUS, H.: De lure Belli ac Pacis [On the Rights of War 
and Peace]. English translation by F. W. KELSEY. Classics of International Law, Vol. 2. No. 
3, 1925. Liv. I. Ch. II, Liv. II. Ch. XXII-XXVI, Liv. Ill; JOHNSON, J. T.: Ideology, Reason and 
the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-1740. Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1975; JOHNSON, J. T.: The Quest for Peace: Three Moral Traditions in 
Western Cultural Histoiy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987; JOHNSON J. T.: "Just 
War," in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought, edited by D. MILLER, J. 
COLEMAN, W. CONNOLY, A. RYAN. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987; LOCKE, J.: Second 
Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980. Ch. XVI; OPPENHEIM. 
L.: International Law: A Treatise, (hereinafter: OPPENHEIM) Vol. II. War and Neutrality. 
London-New York-Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906. 70; PHILLIPS, R. L —CADY, 
D. L.: Just War vs. Pacifism (Point/Counterpoint). Rowman & Littlefield, 1995; ROUSSEAU, 
J.-J.: The Social Contract. English translation by M. CRANSTON. Penguin Classics, Penguin 
USA, 1987. Ch. IV; VATTEL, E., de: Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle. 
Appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains [The Law of Nations or 
Principles of the Law of Nature. Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns]. 
Vols I—III, Vol. III. Translation of the edition of 1758 by C. G. FENWICK. Washington: 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916. Liv. III. Ch. III-IV; WALZER, M.: Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Second Edition. Basic Books, 1992. 
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intervention. In my view, the relationship that existed between these two 
categories was a relation of a part to a whole: every humanitarian intervention 
was a just war, but not every just war was started and waged on grounds of 
humanity. 
Hugo Grotius, the "father of international law", also made an attempt to tinge 
the category of wars. In the theory thus set up, in the form of a just war started 
in the interest of foreign nationals, one can come across humanitarian inter-
vention, as well. Although Grotius did not offer a definition of this phrase, some 
conclusions can still be drawn from what he did say about it. Naturally, his 
starting-point was the principle of sovereignty, a general rule with a few 
exceptions thereto, such as excesses committed by a state against its nationals 
which amounting to a certain level of gravity might cry out for a foreign, 
external intervention. 
In the case when a breach of a fundamental right is undoubted, said Grotius, 
no-one can approve of it on the basis of equity, and in such cases the "rights of 
human society" cannot be ruled out. Moreover, even if the doctrine that citizens 
are not allowed to take arms against their sovereign was recognized, it would not 
mean that no-one else could do that for them. It is, he explained with an apt 
comparison, as if a trustee acted for his ward.14 
The dominant position that had been enjoyed by morality and religion in law 
was cut short by the spread of positivism, which introduced a new way of legal 
thinking with the legal norm in its centre. Positivism certainly had a tremendous 
impact on international law—and within its realm—on the doctrine of humani-
tarian intervention, too. In the process of changing approaches from natural law 
theories to positivism the works of Enteric de Vattel represented some sort of 
transition. The views expressed by this outstanding jurist, whose influence on 
the subsequent writers can only be compared to Grotius' , excellently illustrated 
the changes that had occurred in the general legal opinion concerning 
humanitarian intervention as well as the striking duplication of its assessment 
(i.e. morality and religion contra law). In his work of fundamental importance 
entitled Le Droit des Gens he laid down the following principle: "The laws of the 
natural society of Nations are so important to the welfare to every State that if 
the habit should prevail of treating them under foot no Nation could hope to 
protect its existence or its domestic peace, whatever wise and just and temperate 
measures it might take. [.. .] Hence all nations may put down by force the open 
violation of the laws of the society which nature has established among them, or 
14 See GROTIUS, op. cit., Liv. II. Ch. XXV. Pt. VIII. § 3. 
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any direct attacks upon its welfare. But care must be taken not to extend these 
rights so as to prejudice the liberty of Nations."15 
It appears that Vattel "considers it permissible to succour a people oppressed 
by its sovereign, but does not appear to sanction any of the analogous grounds 
of intervention",16 although this legal and theoretical ground was somewhat 
weak. Furthermore, the fact that Vattel did not recognize any other similar forms 
of intervention clearly indicates the influence of positivism and the sovereignty-
centred approach of the time.17 
At the end of the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, presumably 
due to its freqent occurrences, the issue of humanitarian interventions burst into 
the centre of the attention of international lawyers and the related questions 
gained rather considerable importance. I venture to say that this period was the 
"golden age" of humanitarian intervention, both in theory and in practice. During 
these decades, the legal category in question was mentioned and dealt with in 
almost every significant work and textbook on international law,18 and authors 
in general made positive comments in connection, having not forgotten to give 
voice to the relevant concerns, though. One can notice, however, that the "in 
15 VATTEL, op. cit., Introd.. §§ 22-23. 
16 HALL, W. E.: A Treatise on International Law. Eighth Edition, ed. by A. P. HIGGINS. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. 344. (Footnote No. 2.) 
17 See VATTEL, op. cit., Liv. II. Ch. IV. § 54. 
18 See inter alia FENWICK, C. G.: International Law. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 
1924. 154-155: HALL, op. cit., 341-345; LISZT, F., von: Das Völkerrecht systematisch 
dargestellt. Zwölfte Auflage. Bearbeitet von M. FLEISCHMANN. Berlin: Verlag von Julius 
Springer, 1925. 119, 122; OPPENHEIM, op. cit., Vol. I. Peace, 1905. 186-188; PRADIER-
FODERE, P.: Traité de Droit International Public Européen et Américain. Suivant les Progrès 
de la Science et de la Pratique Contemporaines. Tome I. A. DURAND et G. PEDONE-
LAURIEL (éditeurs). Paris, 1887. 560, 651-664; ROUGIER, op. cit.; STOWELL, op. cit.; 
STRUPP, K.: Theorie und PIXLXÍS des Völkerrechts. Ein Grundriß zum akademischen Gebrauch 
und zum Selbststudium. Berlin: Verlag von Otto Liebmann, 1925. 29, 31. In the Hungarian 
literature of the period concerned, see APÁTHY, I.: Tételes európai nemzetközi jog [Positive 
European International Law], Budapest: Franklin-társulat, Magyar írod. Intézet és 
Könyvnyomda, 1878. 112; IRK, A.: Bevezetés az új nemzetközi jogba [Introduction to New 
International Law]. Második kiadás. Danubia Kiadás, 1929. I l l ; KISS, I.; Európai nemzetközi 
jog [European International Law]. Eger: Érsek-Lyceumi Kő- és Könyvnyomda, 1876. 95, 
228-229; TASSY, P.: Az európai nemzetközi jog vezérfonala [The Main Trend of European 
International Law], Kecskemét: Scheiber József könyvkereskedő, 1887. 46; WERNER, R.: A 
természetjog vagy bölcseleti jogtudomány kézikönyve. Összehasonlító tekintettel a tételes jog 
intézkedéseire [Natural Law or a Textbook of Theoretical Legal Sciences. With Comparative 
Regard to the Measures of Positive Law], II. kötet. Pest: Heckenast Gusztáv, 1869. 336-338. 
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favour" attitude showed a constantly decreasing tendency: the initial years 
highlighted by noble enthusiasm had been first replaced by a period of more 
considerate opinion-forming, whereas by 1945 the relevant legal concerns almost 
completely faded the positive features of interventions on grounds of humanity. 
T. C. Lawrence of England, for instance, spoke about humanitarian 
intervention with outstanding passion and with little respect to the principle of 
rule of law in those early days: "[A]n intervention to put a stop to barbarous and 
abominable cruelty is a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law. 
[...] Should the cruelty be so long continued and so revolting that the best 
instincts of human nature are outraged by it, and should an opportunity arise for 
bringing it to an end and removing its cause without adding fuel to the flame of 
the conflict, there is nothing in the law of nations which will brand as wrongdoer 
a group of states which might undertake to intervene."19 
One of the most illustrious personalities of the French literature, Antoine 
Rougier, in a bit of a contrast to other authors of his time, tried to enumerate the 
legal grounds and preconditions of humanitarian interventions. According to him 
such actions could only be seen as lawful if the conditions below were met:20 
(i) The violations of human rights which, in fact, serve as a ground for the 
intervention must be committed by state authorities. Nevertheless, atrocities 
perpetrated by individuals or groups of individuals (i.e. non-state agents) may 
also provide a justifiable cause to intervene providing that the state itself is 
unable or unwilling to put an end to the violance. 
(ii) It is the fundamental human rights (droit humain) which are gravely 
violated, not the positive domestic law. The catalogue of these rights, in 
Rougier's view, is as follows: the right to life, the right to liberty and the 
principle of legality. 
(iii) Finally—a rather uncertain condition—, "the intervention must unify 
certain conditions of expediency". 
The initial "enthusiasm" in relation to humanitarian intervention decreased 
in the largest extent during the 1920s. The date is not at all surprising and the 
causes seem to be evident. The common and—let us add—somewhat suspicious 
casus belli of all nineteenth century humanitarian interventions was the 
protection of Christian minorities living and suffering under Ottoman 
19 LAWRENCE, T. C.: The Principles of International Law. Fourth Edition. London: 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1910. 129. 
20 Cf. ROUGIER, op. cit., 468-526. 
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domination, however, because the Ottoman Empire had almost entirely been 
driven out of the Balkans, no further wars could have been started with such 
motivations. Furthermore, the international community, apparently having seen 
the never before experienced scale of destruction caused by World War I, 
loathingly abandoned—at least for a while—the use of force and also made an 
attempt to outlaw ius ad bellum. These factors and circumstances led to more 
low-key and realistic writings in the legal literature concerning humanitarian 
intervention. 
Significant is the cautiousness with which L. Oppenheim, who was of 
German descent, nevertheless regarded as an anglophone scholar, wrote about 
humanitarian intervention in 1905. "That the Powers have in the past exercised 
intervention on these grounds there is no doubt. [ . . . ] But whether there is really 
a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such interventions may well be 
doubted. Yet on the other hand, it cannot be denied that public opinion and the 
attitude of Powers are in favour of such interventions, and it may perhaps be said 
that in time the Law of Nations will recognize the rule that interventions in the 
interest of humanity are admissible, provided they are exercised in the form of 
a collective intervention of the Powers."21 As for the aim of these interventions, 
he noted that it was about compelling a state which was gravely violating human 
rights to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries in order to 
guarantee to its citizens "an existence more adequate to the ideas of modern 
civilization". 
What else could reflect more illustratively the theoretical fog surrounding 
humanitarian intervention than the striking differences between the opinions of 
Oppenheim and Gerhardt von Glahn? Glahn, a professor emeritus at the 
University of Minnesota-Duluth, worded it in such way: "Humanitarian inter-
vention has been traditionally a part of customary international law and almost 
all writers as well as governments believed that the coming of the League of 
Nations had not affected this type of intervention."22 
Like most of those dealing with international law, I myself also doubt that 
humanitarian intervention has ever formed a part of customary international law. 
The essential opinio iuris has never been established and in the face of sporadic 
and highly selective occurrences, no-one can state that such interventions have 
ever become a general practice within the domain of relations among the 
21 OPPENHEIM, op. cit., Vol. I. Peace. 186. 
22 GLAHN, G., von: Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law. Fifth 
Edition. New York—London: Macmillan Publishing Company—Collier Macmillan Publishers, 
1986. 160. 
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members of the international community. Notwithstanding this, Glahn's 
statement was adequate from a certain point of view: for humanitarian inter-
vention to become a part of customary international law most of the necessary 
legal and historical requirements were indeed given at the turn of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, however this opportunity of a lifetime was never seized. 
A number of international lawyers made tremendous efforts at the beginning 
of the twentieth century to find some kind of positive legal basis in order to 
legitimize humanitarian intervention and to replace the increasingly less 
acceptable moral and religious grounds provided by natural law theories. As a 
consequence of the change of emphasis pointing towards legal positivism and 
parallel to the quest for possible purely legal grounds, attempts were made to 
derive the right of intervention in the interest of humanity from a modified 
notion of sovereignty. According to this new concept, sovereignty was not 
absolute anymore, but relative—restricted by a number of factors such as human 
rights. This aspect of sovereignty is still bearing considerable importance for 
those forwarding arguments in favour of humanitarian intervention nowadays. 
It was the American Edwin M. Borchard who said "where a state under 
exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own citizens over 
whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family of 
nations are authorized by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity. 
When these 'human' rights are habitually violated, one or more states may 
intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take such measures as 
to substitute, at least temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for 
that of the state thus controlled."21 What had been expressed by Borchard, in 
my view, was way ahead of its time and is still applicable for the time being. The 
latter part of this outstanding definition can easily be applied to describe certain 
contemporary peace-keeping and peace-building operations as consequences of 
humanitarian catastrophes such as the activities and joint efforts of the 
international community in Kosovo via UNMIK and KFOR. 
In the view of Ellery C. Stowell, Borchard's fellow-countryman, "[h]u-
manitarian intervention may be defined as the reliance upon force for the 
justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another State f rom treatment 
which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of authority 
within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice".24 
Concerning the grounds of intervention, he expressed the following: "Although 
23 BORCHARD, E. M.: The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad. New York: The Banks 
Law Publishing Co., 1922. 14. 
24 STOWELL, op. cit., 53. 
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an occasional instance of intervention in the case of an extraordinary crime or 
transgression may properly be classed as humanitarian and justified in law, 
ordinary intervention to prevent injustice is in practice restricted to instances in 
which a government has been guilty of persistent misconduct or a prolonged 
neglect to remedy unjust conditions within its jurisdiction."25 
I think a consistent and careful consideration of Stowell's approach 
involving the elements "crime" and "transgression" would lead to an idea of a 
humanitarian intervention of quasi reprisal or punishment nature. 
International punishability of blatant violations of human rights also showed 
up—although not as spectacularly as in Stowell's theory—in the works of 
William E. Hall of England. The most unique feature of his approach was, 
however, that in an implicit way, without mentioning the category by its name 
he wrote about the admissibility of humanitarian intervention—a state action "in 
restraint of wrongdoing", notably to battle immoral acts which are "so in-
consistent with the moral character of a human being as to constitute a public 
scandal, which the body of states, or one or more states, are competent to 
suppress".26 
Nevertheless, due to the relative nature of morality, this statement is valid 
only with certain restrictions. As Hall pointed it out: "To some minds the 
excesses of a revolution would seem more scandalous than the tyranny of a 
sovereign. [...] While however... [an] intervention to put down a popular 
movement or an uprising of a subject race is wholly forbidden, intervention for 
the purpose of checking gross tyranny or of helping the efforts of a people to free 
itself is very commonly regarded without disfavour. Again, religious oppression, 
short of a cruelty which would rank as tyranny, has ceased to be recognized as 
an independent ground of intervention..."27 
It is worth mentioning at this point that the international recognition of 
humanitarian interventions based upon religious considerations (i.e. to ensure 
free exercise of religion for religious minorities) decreased in direct proportion 
to the losing of territories by the Sublime Porte on the Balkans. It is a barely 
questionable fact that the European Great Powers acting in Concert and taking 
advantage of the shortcomings and uncertainties of international law, made the 
25 Ibid., 145. 
26 HALL, op. cit., 342. 
27 Ibid., 343. 
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doctrine serve their own purposes and ambitions, and after they had exploited 
and abused it, abandoned it.28 
A particularly famous character of the Anglo-Saxon literature on inter-
national law, Charles G. Fenwick, who believed that religion-based interventions 
were still legitimate even in the early twentieth century, made the following 
comments on humanitarian intervention: "The phrase is not a scientific one, and 
it refers, it would seem, to those general principles of conduct which are held 
particularly sacred by all nations. The question is presented, what international 
right on the part of third states can arise in the consequence of the brutal and 
inhuman conduct of a state toward its own citizens?"24 Since the answer would 
be "intervention on grounds of humanity"—as humanitarian intervention used to 
be called—one may derive the conclusion that Fenwick handled this legal 
category as a right, as a "summary punishment inflicted upon a state which has 
disgraced the society of nations by its misconduct".30 (It may be observed that, 
besides Hall's approach, the findings of Fenwick corresponded to Stowell 's 
approach to some extent, as well.) 
Uses of force for humanitarian purposes can (could) also be justified by 
further theories, such as the one declaring the right of states to protect the moral 
values and emotions and/or properties of their nationals should these be subject 
to violations by another state. I respectfully disagree with this approach, 
especially with its first segment, as in practice it would imply that particular 
conducts of states are decisively dependent on domestic public opinion and 
public demands, a totally unacceptable cause for action under international law, 
not only nowadays, but also in the past. In order to offer yet another example for 
possible grounds of intervention, I would like to add that states can (could) be 
urged to use force when facing a humanitarian crisis by virtue of the common 
bonds or—as already referred to—common religion of the peoples concerned. 
The above enumeration of facts, situations and acts which may open a way 
for a humanitarian intervention, containing only a few legal specifics, once again 
throws light on the extreme vagueness surrounding the discussed category. It 
28 In contrast it is interesting to recall what Lord Phillimore said at the end of the nineteenth 
century concerning religion-based interventions: "The practice (if it can be called such) of 
Intervention of one Christian State on behalf of the subjects of another Christian State upon the 
ground of religion, dates from the period of Reformation...". Lord PHILLIMORE, R.: 
Commentaries Upon Intenational Law. Vol. I. Third Edition. London: Butterworths, 1879. 
621-622. See also: HALL, op. cit., 344-345. (Footnote No. 2.) 
29 FENWICK, op. cit., 154. 
30 Ibid. 
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was Hall, for instance, who forwarded concerns that one of the weakest points 
of the doctrine was that "sentiment has been allowed to influence the more 
deliberately formed opinions of jurists".31 Fenwick also wrote about the relevant 
problems: "Obviously this right of intervention is particularly susceptible to 
abuse, and is in urgent need of more specific definition by international statutory 
legislation."32 The most serious misgivings were—and still are—related to the so-
called unilateral interventions, though. "The true criticism of intervention is not 
that it has been in every case without justification... For action is always arbitrary 
where the intervening state is the judge of its own case. Even where the results 
are good, the use of force by the individual state must inevitably weaken the 
general structure of order and justice in the community" of nations.33 
As a summary of the pre-Charter period of humanitarian intervention, it is 
advisable to go through its characteristics derived from the factual and legal 
circumstances of those one-time actions:34 
(i) Notwithstanding the fact that the actions of the intervening Powers were 
overwhelmingly motivated by humanitarian considerations, those were justified 
in all cases by treaty stipulations, such as Article IX of the 1856 Treaty of Paris 
or Articles XXIII and LXII of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. 
(ii) All actions were commenced with the aim of providing protection to 
persecuted religious minorities living under foreign occupation and carried out 
by the European Powers acting in Concert. 
(iii) The religious beliefs and institutions of the intervening states were 
identical to those of the protected minorities (i.e. Christianity). 
(iv) Resorts to the use of force were always preceded by peremptory demands 
addressed to the "target state" in a hope of reaching a peaceful way of 
settlement. 
(v) These peremptory demands were in all cases rejected, mostly with referral 
to the notion of sovereignty as well as to the exclusive jurisdiction of states over 
their own nationals. (This is in accordance with the position that "prior to the UN 
31 HALL, op. cit., 343. 
32 FENWICK, op. cit., 154. Grotius also dealt with the issue of abuses. He readily disclaimed 
any charges by saying that a right does not cease to exist just because villains abuse it: pirates 
also sail, bandits also use weapons. See GROTIUS, op. cit., Liv. II. Ch. XXV. Pt. VIII. § 4. 
33 FENWICK, C. G.: "Intervention: Individual and Collective." American Journal of 
International Law (hereinafter: AJIL), Vol. 39 (1945), 658. 
34 Cf. GANJI, op. cit., 37-38. Ganji drew his conclusions after having examined a few 
occurrences of humanitarian intervention, namely the following crises: Greece (1830), Syria 
(1860), Crete (1866/8), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1877/8) and Macedonia ( 1903/8). 
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Charter most human rights violations were regarded as falling within the 
exclusive jurisdictional domain of the State where the violation occurred, rather 
than within the sphere of international law".15) However, at this point, I would 
like to draw the attention to the first paragraph of this enumeration. What is 
contained under paragraph (i) indicates that certain human rights, partially due 
to the international treaties mentioned therein, gained international recognition 
and became of international concern for the first time in the very same historical 
period. 
Following the 1920s, in the threatening shadow of World War II, one could 
not come across major writings on humanitarian interventions, but such works 
re-emerged after 1945 from pens of a new generation of authors and reflecting 
the mentality of a completely new era. 
Humanitarian Intervention in the UN-era 
As I have already indicated, the establishment of the UN hallmarked 
fundamental changes in international law. The prohibition of the use of force 
enshrined by the UN Charter is of absolute, comprehensive and erga omnes 
character, and as such, naturally apply to humanitarian intervention as well. 
"Under the rubric of 'humanitarian intervention' the military power of single 
nations, or of several acting jointly once was considered by some authorities as 
proper for succoring groups oppressed by their own government. Since the 
coming of the UN Charter, Articles 2, 42 and 51 of which forbid the use of force 
except in self-defence or on orders of the Security Council, far less can be said 
for the validity of humanitarian intervention."16 
As a result of these changes in its legal environment the unsteady structure 
of this category—which had been hotly debated even prior to the adoption of the 
UN Charter—immediately collapsed, its more or less accepted position in the 
system of international law vanished. Nevertheless, the need for such actions in 
practice, rather than decreasing, started to become increasingly urging, 
especially in the face of the so-called revolution of human rights and the flagrant 
35 SUNGA, L. S.: Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights 
Violations. International Studies in Human Rights, Vol. 21. Dordrecht—Boston—London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992. 66. 
36 CAREY, J.: UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights. Procedural Aspects of International 
Law Series, Vol. 8. Syracuse University Press, 1970. 22. 
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and systematic violations of these rights often resulting in unspeakable suffering 
and an incredibly high death-toll. Under such ambiguous conditions international 
lawyers have made efforts to (re-)define humanitarian intervention after 1945. 
At the time of writing (Summer 2000), exactly 55 years—slightly more than 
half a century—have passed since the UN was established. As far as this period 
is concerned one may state in general that in its beginning, right after World War 
II, the academic interest towards humanitarian intervention proved to be 
negligible. Due to the crises which have been and still are flaring up all over the 
world without end as well as the shocking pictures of never before seen atrocities 
broadcast by mass media to every home, however, around the 1960s and 1970s 
humanitarian intervention, the ancient category which almost sank into oblivion 
reincarnated. It got back into the centre of attention only in the 1990s though, 
when several consecutive international humanitarian actions took place leading 
to equivocal consequences. The "renaissance" of interest was further strengthened 
by the adoption of a series of legally binding human rights documents (e.g. the 
two International Covenants of 1966), the developing process of globalization 
and the emergence of new theories emphasizing the restricted, relative nature of 
sovereignty. 
In my opinion an additional tendency can be observed with respect to the tone 
of writings in connection with humanitarian intervention. This tendency is 
somewhat parallel to those outlined above. As it will appear in the following, at 
first most of the authors—for understandable reasons, standing on the firm ground 
of positivism—judged these interventions with extreme criticism. This reluctant 
approach lasted until the world witnessed violations of human rights only 
comparable to those that had been perpetrated during World War II and beheld 
the inability of existing human rights protection mechanisms to cope with these 
outrageous acts. At this stage—approximately in the late 1990s—the critical and 
rejecting viewpoints started to make the way for a new policy underlining the 
need for the defining and legal regulation of humanitarian intervention. This 
phenomenon might mark the dawn of a very new, third period in the history of 
military actions in the protection of human rights. 
In 1946 Hersch Lauterpacht, the famous native of Galicia—in line with what 
Oppenheim had said some decades earlier—put his views into words in the 
following manner: "The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has never become 
a fully acknowledged part of positive international law. But it has provided a 
signpost and a warning. It has been occasionally acted upon, and it was one of the 
factors which paved the way for the provisions of the Charter of the United 
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Nations relating to fundamental human rights and freedoms."37 Interestingly 
enough, it was nearly ten years later that Oppenheim's treatise on international 
law edited and partially re-written by Lauterpacht contained this approach: 
"There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial 
supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But there 
is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there 
are limits to that discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties 
against and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental 
human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest 
of humanity is legally permissible."™ 
In the light of the two definitions above, one may raise the embarrassing 
question: Did Lauterpacht revise his opinion in the meantime in such a way that 
it turned almost to the opposite extreme? Charging him with inconsistency would 
be a mistake. If one examines the latter statement thoroughly, one may observe 
that the authority did not, in fact, speak about the legality of humanitarian 
intervention, but rather about its legal permissibility, which is a phrase not 
completely synonymous to "legality". Such wording, especially in legal literature 
where every word can bear fundamental importance and may change the meaning 
of a sentence, cannot be taken no account of. Consequently, it would not be 
adequate to state for good that Lauterpacht was unquestionably in favour of 
humanitarian interventions, although his above (latter) definition can be found 
among the ad autoritatem arguments in nearly all writings on this particular topic 
in contemporary legal literature. 
A further virtue of Lauterpacht's approach was that it provided some sort of 
a scale to measure the lower limit of permissibility of an intervention. According 
to this scale the intensity of atrocities must elevate to a degree that "shocks the 
conscience of mankind" in order to open a way for an external intervention. 
Despite all of its uncertainties, this precondition has also been admitted by several 
international documents, such as the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).39 
It is noteworthy that the 1992 edition of Oppenheim's works—this time edited 
by Sir Jennings and Sir Watts—the part dealing with humanitarian intervention 
shrank further, while new and substantial remarks can be read only in the 
37 LAUTERPACHT, H.: "The Grotian Tradition in International Law." The British Yearbook 
of International Law (1946), 46. 
38 Lauterpacht's OPPENHEIM, op. cit., 312. Italics mine. 
39 See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Adopted by the UN Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries in Rome on 17 July 1998. Preamble, para. 2. 
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footnotes. This phenomenon, by the way, is not unique and surprising at all, but 
is a general feature of the relevant literature for the time being. The comments 
contained by the above-mentioned volume represent a return to Oppenheim's 
original approach, but of course clearly indicate the present circumstances, as 
well. "If humanitarian intervention is ever to be justified, it will only be in 
extreme and very particular circumstances."40 The list of these circumstances, 
according to the authors, are as follows:4 ' 
(i) Compelling and urgent situation of extreme and large-scale humanitarian 
distress. 
(ii) The territorial state is unable or unwilling (since it caused it) to cope with 
the situation. 
(iii) The competent organs of the international community cannot provide a 
fast and effective response to the needs brought along by the situation. 
(iv) The intervention has no practicable alternatives. 
(v) The question whether active resistance on behalf of the territorial state 
is likely to be expected. 
(vi) The action must be proportional, both with respect to its duration and to 
the aims pursued, to the needs raised by the humanitarian emergency. 
"In short, it would have to be peaceful action (which need not exclude it being 
carried out by military personnel) in a compelling emergency, where the 
transgression upon a state's territory is demonstrably outweighed by over-
whelming and immediate considerations of humanity and has the general support 
of the international community."42 The question is how the international 
community can express its approval. Through resolutions of the UN Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter? Through resolutions of the 
UN General Assembly desirably adopted by the overwhelming majority of 
member states of the UN? By resorting to the hotly-debated resolution entitled 
"Uniting for Peace"? Or by other means of expressing will? UN Security Council 
authorization is undeniably the only way for a lawful action, but the Security 
Council 's position in certain cases may not truly represent the opinion of the 
international community. Nevertheless, in the light of the current system of 
international law based upon the UN Charter, the rest of the possible answers 
40 Sir JENNINGS, R— Sir WATTS, A. (eds.): Oppenheim 's InternationaI Law. Vol. 1. Peace, 
Introduction and Part 1. Ninth Edition. Longman, 1992. 443. (Footnote 18.) 
41 Cf. ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
Humanitarian Intervention: A Historical and Theoretical Overview 97 
does not seem to be legally admissible. At this point, however, I would not go 
into further discussion of this issue for it will be dealt with later on. 
As already referred to, due to its practical occurrences, such as e.g. India's 
intervention in Pakistan in 1971, the academic interest towards humanitarian 
intervention livened up in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in heated debates. The 
motto of these debates might as well have been the eminent English expert, Ian 
Brownlie's following remark: "[It is] extremely doubtful whether a right of 
humanitarian intervention still survives".41 
Other scholars opposed Brownlie's categorical statement, but they did not go 
as far as to accept the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. Richard B. Lillich, 
the frequently-quoted American scholar's train of thought threw light on the 
dilemma experienced by academics: "If, as Falk has remarked, the 'renunciation 
of intervention does not substitute a policy of non-intervention; it involves the 
development of some form of collective intervention', then concomitantly the 
failure to develop effective international machinery to facilitate humanitarian 
interventions arguably permits a state to intervene unilaterally in appropriate 
situations. Writing a decade ago, Roning wisely observed that 'it is as useless to 
outlaw intervention without providing a satisfactory substitute as it was to outlaw 
war when no satisfactory substitute was available'. He also posed the difficult 
question, which becomes more relevant every year, 'whether refusal to 
compromise on the principle of absolute non-intervention will not threaten the 
very principle i t s e l f . [...] Although Brownlie does not consider this question, 
events during the past decade reveal a widening 'credibility gap' between the 
absolute non-intervention approach to the Charter which he espouses and the 
actual practice of states."44 
Ganji, swimming against the main stream in a certain sense, explicitly agreed 
with those who argued in favour of the permissibility of humanitarian 
intervention. "The theory of humanitarian intervention is based on the assumption 
that States in their relation with their own nationals have the international 
obligation to guarantee to them certain basic fundamental rights... these rights are 
so essential and of such high value to the human person that violations by any 
State cannot be ignored by other States. This assumption would authorize 
intervention by other States, in case of flagrant denial of these rights by any State 
to her own citizens."45 
43 See BROWNLIE, I.: International Law and the Use of Force by States. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963. 338-342. 
44 HENKIN—PUGH—SCHACHTER—SMIT, op. cit., 924. 
45 GANJI, op. cit., 9. 
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Although an increasing number of experts has made the theory of 
humanitarian intervention their own, in the second half of the 1980s there 
was—using the words of Glahn—still "a sharp difference of opinion among both 
scholars and governments". Glahn believed that in case practices or actions 
labelled as revolting by morality and decency went on in a state despite the 
protests by the neigbouring states, considerations of humanity outweighed the 
principle of non-intervention. He also added that it seemed, humanitarian 
intervention was yet again justified if official atrocities occurred (such as the 
Cambodian genocide) along with the inability of the UN to intervene by use of 
force.46 
The most special feature of his viewpoint was that it veered back to some 
extent to theories of natural law, since it—retiring from the purely positivist 
approaches—did not mention rights and obligations, but rather resorted to the 
notions of morality and decency which has been seldom used since the tum of the 
century. 
Kosovo: Debates Reborn 
As I have already mentioned, the debates regarding to humanitarian intervention 
were given a new stimulus by humanitarian crises and the international responses 
thereto which took place in the 1990s. However, it was NATO's 1999 Kosovo 
military action called Operation Allied Force, commenced without a prior UN 
Security Council authorization and seen by many as an instance of humanitarian 
interventions, that gave a boost to these disputes. 
Besides the fact that the legal literature was flooded with relevant writings and 
the category which had been handled harshly suddenly got in the glare of 
publicity, NATO's intervention and the way it happened, at the same time, 
further increased the concerns of sceptics and representatives of the so-called 
non-interventionist views. Issues with reference to the UN Security Council were 
46 GLAHN, op. cit., 160. As it is enshrined in Glahn's approach, genocide is only one—but 
perhaps the most blatant one—of the causes of a humanitarian intervention. It is noteworthy that 
the Open Society Institute coupled with the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
organized a seminar entitled "Kosovo: Is Peace Possible?" 3-4 April 2000 in Budapest, Hungary. 
On this event the author of the present study had the honour to take part in the activities of the 
workshop chaired by Richard A. Falk, professor of Princeton University, dealing inter alia with 
the task of defining humanitarian intervention. When the issue of possible grounds came on the 
agenda, a consensus was reached on that it would not be advisable to link humanitarian 
intervention exclusively to genocide. The set of causes should be broader than that. 
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given a special emphasis, pro and contra arguments were and still are clashed in 
the course of the international debate. In this last chapter those general remarks 
which have been made in connection with humanitarian intervention during the 
above-mentioned discussions will be introduced (it falls outside the scope of the 
present study to deal with the NATO action itself). While reading the forthcoming 
comments, let us not forget that they, in fact, reflect the current attitude towards 
humanitarian intervention within the circles of international law. 
Bruno Simma, a well-known German professor, was one of the first inter-
national lawyers to put pen to paper after the commencement of airstrikes against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Representing a clearly positivist approach, 
he was on the opinion that "if the Security Council determines that massive 
violations of human rights occurring within a country constitute a threat to the 
peace, and then calls for or authorizes an enforcement action to put an end to 
these violations, a 'humanitarian intervention' by military means is permissible. 
In the absence of such authorization, military coercion employed to have the 
target state return to a respect for human rights constitutes a breach of Article 2(4) 
of the Charter".47 
From what Simma said, at least in my view, the following chain of 
conclusions can be drawn. For the time being humanitarian intervention, as a 
general rule, is unlawful.48 More precisely, it is unlawful if it is not authorized 
by the UN Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN 
Charter. (As for Article 51, it would be difficult to imagine an inter-
vention—especially one of humanitarian nature—carried out as a reply to an 
aggression, in a state of self-defence.) If these actions are lawful only within the 
framework provided by Article 42—as the case indeed stands nowadays—then I 
think it is irrelevant what an intervention of such nature is called: "enforcement 
action" or "humanitarian intervention". As a consequence, the category of 
humanitarian intervention is, so to say, wiped up and dissolved in the "melting 
pot" of the absolute ban on use of force. It seems that the principal aim of the 
non-interventionist school has been achieved: humanitarian intervention exists 
no more. 
47 SIMMA, В.: "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects." European Journal of 
International Law (hereinafter: EJIL) Vol. 10. No. 1 (1999), 5. 
48 It should be added that Simma also admitted the importance of moral considerations: "Could 
it not be that 'humanitarian interventions', now undertaken in the spirit of ensuring that 
Srebrenica does not happen again, as it were, deserve a friendlier reaction also on the part of 
international lawyers?" Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding, with regard to the frequent paralysed states of the exclusive 
depositary of legitimate use of force, the UN Security Council, which usually 
occurs in the worst possible moments—as it is well illustrated by the example of 
Kosovo—, a reaffirming solution to the problem has not been thus reached. All 
what the international community can gain by adopting such an approach is the 
mummification of the present system of international law as a seemingly 
satisfactory implementation of the principle of the rule of law. I am not question-
ing that it is the only practicable plan nowadays, h o w e v e H n the face of the 
present conditions—I would not risk to make the same statement with respect to 
the future. Could it not be that the lessons of Kosovo are that the preservation of 
existing international mechanisms of questionable efficiency would undermine 
the rule of law, rather than strengthen it? Summum ins summa iniuria. 
I believe, the below conclusion of the United Kingdom Foreign Office 
confirms my doubts in connection with the relationship between the UN Security 
Council—of which the United Kingdom is a permament membei^and humani-
tarian intervention: "In essence, therefore, the case against making humanitarian 
intervention an exception to the principle of non-intervention is that its doubtful 
benefits would be heavily outweighed by its costs in terms of respect for 
international law."49 
The above position of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office was formulated 
in 1986 when the world had not yet witnessed the horrors of Bosnia, Somalia, 
Rwanda or Kosovo, just to mention a few examples of humanitarian crises in the 
1990s. Simma did not mention it, but the attitude of the United Kingdom—judging 
from its actions at least—might have changed in the meantime. In support of this 
I would like to quote what Prime Minister Tony Blair said on 23 March 1999, one 
day before the starting of the Kosovo air operation: "We must act: to save 
thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe, 
from death, from barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship..."5" To 
put it in an overly simplified and provocative way: as governments' opinions 
change, so changes international law. Of course a change in international law 
cannot be achieved overnight. We will see until when the commitment of the 
most powerful states to ensure respect for human rights—an obligation also 
49 United Kingdom Foreign Policy Document No. 148, reprinted in British Yearbook of 
International Law (1986)614. 
50 Statement by Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House of Commons, Tuesday, 23 March 
1999. In: WELLER, M.: The Crisis of Kosovo 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities. International Documents & Analysis, Vol. 1, 
Cambridge: Documents & Analysis Publishing Ltd., 1999. 495. 
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provided for in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter—will last. If long enough, 
it may result in changes in the attitude towards humanitarian intervention, as well. 
The Kingdom of Belgium, for instance, seems to explicitly favour the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention. The only weak point of the following Belgian 
opinion having been presented in the course of the so-called Yugoslavia cases 
before the ICJ is that it involves a rather challengable, restrictive interpretation 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: "The purpose of NATO's intervention is to 
rescue a people in peril, in deep distress. For this reason the Kingdom of Belgium 
takes the view that this is an armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which covers only intervention against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a State."51 
Responding to Simma's article, Antonio Cassese, one-time president of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), made these 
observations on humanitarian intervention: "In the current framework of the 
international community, three sets of values underpin the overarching system of 
inter-state relations: peace, human rights and self-determination. However, any 
time that conflict or tension arises between two or more of these values, peace 
must always constitute the ultimate prevailing factor."52 Although, later on in 
his writing, he made these findings—which apparently opposed any forms and 
occurrences of the use of force—relative by saying that "positive peace" (i.e. the 
fulfillment of the requirements of justice) ought to prevail over "negative peace" 
(i.e. absence of armend conflicts). 
In addition, Cassese formulated a number of criteria, which in his view, would 
justify a humanitarian intervention even if carried out in the absence of a UN 
Security Council authorization. These criteria are as follows:53 
(i) Grave breaches of human rights taking the form of crimes against 
humanity resulting in deaths of hundreds or thousands taking place on the 
territory of a state committed or permitted by the central governmental 
51 ICJ: Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium). "Facts and Past History", presented 
by the Representative of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium (CR 99/15 
(translation)—uncorrected; at 3 p.m., Monday, 10 May 1999). 
52 CASSESE, A.: "Ex iniuria ius non oritur: Are We Moving towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?" EJIL, Vol. 
10. No. 1 (1999), 24. In conjunction with Cassese's cited study, see also CASSESE, A.: "A 
Follow-up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis." EJIL, Vol. 10. 
No.4(1999) , 791-795. 
53 See ibid.,27. 
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authorities, or because the legitimate government is no more in control of the 
situation and thus cannot halt the perpetrations of these crimes. 
(ii) In the latter case it must be proved that the state is unable to put an end 
to atrocities. However, if human rights violations are committed by govern-
mental authorities, it is an essential requirement that these authorities have 
constantly refused any kind of co-operation with the UN or any other inter-
national organization, or has not observed and complied with various appeals, 
recommendations or decisions thereof. 
(iii) The UN Security Council, due to lack of unanimity among its permanent 
members, is not able to give a proper response to the crisis (but perhaps declares 
the situation a threat to international peace and security). 
(iv) All peaceful measures have been resorted to and proved ineffective prior 
to the use of force. 
(v) A group of states, but never one "hegemonic Power", decides to take over 
and stop the ongoing acts of violence outlined above. Their action is desirably 
supported, or at least not opposed by the overwhelming majority of the member 
states of the UN. 
(vi) The use of military force must be proportional to, both with respect to its 
duration and the means resorted to, the violations to be halted. The goals of the 
intervention are limited and cannot go beyond the mere aim of restoring respect 
for human rights. The more blatant the atrocities are, the more intensive and 
immediate may be the military response thereto. 
I am convinced that the above system of criteria formulated by Cassese is one 
of the most precise and adequate in the line of similar enumerations. For this 
reason I would like to devote special attention to and deal with it in detail. 
A special value of the enumeration is that it handles the exhaustion of 
peaceful remedies and the rejection of co-operation with (humanitarian) inter-
national organizations as two separate issues. Without further comments on the 
activities of international organizations (humanitarian assistance), I wish to note 
that I think there exists some sort of a symbiosis, a partial causality link between 
these actions and humanitarian intervention itself. The application of military 
coercion usually takes place after the initial attempts to provide humanitarian aid 
having failed for lack of consent on behalf of the territorial state, but as soon as 
the use of force ends, humanitarian organizations take the floor.54 It is, in fact, 
54 Let us not forget that humanitarian assistance cannot bring along the violation of 
sovereignty—which is a necessary element of humanitarian intervention—, thus it requires a 
consent of the state concerned. See: MILLS, K.: "Sovereignty Eclipsed? The Legitimacy of 
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one of the goals of humanitarian interventions to create the circumstances under 
which these organizations can exercise their functions. Briefly speaking, the 
peaceful and military measures applied in the interest of humanity are not at all 
far from one another, moreover in certain cases they are interdependent. 
It is among the most fundamental rules of international law that the UN 
Security Council bears primary responsibility in the field of international peace 
and security.55 However, as already discussed above, this principal organ cannot 
fulfil its duties if one or more permanent members exercise the veto power. 
According to Cassese, in extreme cases involving atrocities outlined under the 
first point of the list, the UN Security Council can be by-passed and a group of 
states may take the initiative and stop the violations by use of force, should the 
majority of member states be not opposed to such an action. In this respect, in my 
view, the states willing to undertake a humanitarian intervention should first 
resort to the famous UN General Assembly Resolution "Uniting for Peace".56 
Despite the fact that it is a controversial instrument any recommendation passed 
in accordance with it would provide considerable legitimacy to a military 
intervention. Moreover, the spirit enshrined by Resolution "Uniting for Peace" 
is also reflected in and backed up by the ICJ's Advisory Opinion of 20 June 
1962 concerning Certain Expenses of the United Nations.57 An indirect use of 
Article 2 of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314(XXIX) on the Definition 
of Aggression can also be made, in case the Security Council later on decides in 
favour of the humanitarian intervention.58 
Humanitarian Access and Intervention." Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (http://www-
jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/aO 12.htm reposted on 4 July 1997). 
55 See Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
56 ".. . if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails 
to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in 
any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the 
peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security". UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V) adopted on 3 
November 1950, para. 1. 
57 "Under Article 24 the responsibility of the Security Council in the matter was 'primary', 
not exclusive. The Charter made it abundantly clear that the General Assembly was also to be 
concerned with international peace and security." See ICJ: Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962. 
58 "The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity 
with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed 
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In the relevant—but unfortunately somewhat limited—Hungarian literature, 
László Valki writing about the Kosovo crisis questioned the usefulness of the 
Resolution "Uniting for Peace": "It is thus questionable whether the Alliance's 
airstrikes would have had a higher legitimacy, if the General Assembly would had 
agreed to them by two-thirds majority. Why should, let us say, Vanuatu, Saint 
Lucia or Lesotho, or maybe Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Belarus 
have been asked what their opinions on Milosevic's policy were?"59 
Bearing in mind Professor Valki's approach, I would respectfully like to raise 
a few questions, but—for lack of space—leave the task of answering them to every 
distinguished reader. Would, for instance, Lesotho's opinion have mattered more 
if she had been a member of the UN Security Council at that time? If yes, is not 
it a bit awkward, a bit contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of states? 
As for another aspect of the issue: Is not any use of force and blatant violations 
of human rights a matter of international concern? Then why should the members 
of the international community not be asked about their opinions? In the specific 
case of Kosovo and a hypothetical application of the Resolution "Uniting for 
Peace" with respect thereto, would an asking for opinion have concerned only 
Milosevic's policy or also its international consequences as well as the form an 
appropriate international response should have taken? And finally: Is not it better 
not to rule out for the international community, in such cases, the possibility of 
saying "no"? 
Following this brief train of thoughts and returning to Cassese's enumeration, 
it would be advisable to add a sixth requirement to the list, according to which the 
a humanitarian intervention should result in an actual and significant 
improvement in the conditions of life of the formerly persecuted population. 
Furthermore, this outcome should be guaranteed and maintained, if necessary, by 
an effective international presence to prevent inter alia a vendetta-like retaliation. 
The adding of such a requirement—which, I admit, would be a less welcomed one, 
especially on the side of the intervening states—would bring along two further 
benefits: on the one hand, in addition to the relevant provisions of humanitarian 
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts 
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity." UN General Assembly Resolution 
3314(XXIX) adopted on 14 December 1974, Article 2. Italics mine. 
59 JUHÁSZ, J . -MAGYAR, I,—TÁLAS, P.-VALKI, L.: Koszovó: Egy válság anatómiája 
[Kosovo: Anatomy of a Crisis]. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2000. 274. On the contrary Boldizsár 
Nagy was of the opinion that, at first, the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" should have been 
resorted to by NATO. See NAGY. В.: "Hadban állunk?" [Are We at War?] Élet és Irodalom 
Vol. 43. No. 15 ( 16 April 1999), 3. 
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law,60 it would provide yet another scale to judge proportionality and on the 
other hand, it would prevent that the intervening states, having faced the first 
signs of a possible failure, abort the mission and abandon the noble aims pursued. 
Finally, Cassese wisely did not rule out the possibility of having other goals 
besides the primary humanitarian ones in an intervention. Such inevitable, but 
never hegemonic and selfish goals may include the restauration or maintenance 
of a region's stability, the restoring of economic relations, etc. 
Jonathan I. Charney, professor at the Vanderbilt University School of Law, 
also made a summary of those criteria which are necessary for a humanitarian 
intervention to qualify as a lawful one:61 
(i) Proof (large-scale and grave violations of human rights, similar to those 
embodied in the Rome Statute of the ICC, committed in a state with the help of 
the state authorities or because of the inability thereof to control the situation). 
(ii) Notice (from a regional international organization to the state concerned, 
with no success). 
(iii) Exhaustion of other available remedies (such as economic sanctions). 
(iv) The role of the UN (is also seen as a remedy which should be exhausted 
on an emergency basis by the regional organization prior to the use of force. It is 
considered to be done if neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly 
take steps to counter the crimes). 
(v) Regional action (fulfilling the following requirements: warning in 
advance; consent of the intervening states to the jurisdiction of the ICJ—and, once 
60 It should be added that on 6 August 1999 Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, issued a Bulletin entitled Observance by the United Nations Forces of InternationaI 
Humanitarian Law applicable to "United Nations forces conducting operations under United 
Nations command and control" (UN Document ST/SGB/1999/13, Preamble). The rules 
contained in this Bulletin provide for a strict observance of international humanitarian law by UN 
forces when engaged in an armed conflict (i.e. both in enforcement actions and in peace-keeping 
operations). Thus, after the entry into force (12 August 1999) of this instrument all UN 
forces—naturally including those empowered to handle humanitarian crises—have to carry out 
their activities in accordance with it. 
61 See CHARNEY, J. I.: "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo." AJIL, Vol. 93. 
No. 4 (October 1999), 838-839. Charney is not the only one to refuse the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. Further authorities of the so-called non-interventionist school have 
been: Halleck, Angelins, Werdenhagen, Kant, Despagnet, Mamiani, Schachter, Sunga, Chomsky, 
etc. Furthermore, the ICJ itself has been passionately opposing any forms of intervention as it 
is enshrined, for example, in the judgements in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) or in the 
Nicaragua Case (1986). 
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established, to the ICC's jurisdiction, as well—to settle disputes rising from the 
action; appropriate purpose and means; withdrawal once the goals are achieved). 
It is noteworthy that Charney used the phrase "emergency basis" when writing 
about the role of the UN. Was he referring to an emergency session or an 
emergency special session, in accordance with the above discussed Resolution 
"Uniting for Peace" of the UN General Assembly? Since he did not give any 
further details, the question cannot be answered in the light of his writing. He, by 
the way, approached the doctrine of humanitarian intervention with disfavour. 
"As now conceived—he wrote—the so-called doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
can lead to an escalation of international violence, discord and disorder, and 
diminish protections of human rights worldwide."62 
Ruth Wedge wood (Yale Law School) was of a radically different opinion: 
"The war over Kosovo may mark an end of Security Council classicism... It may 
also mark the emergence of a limited and conditional right of humanitarian 
intervention permitting the use of force to protect the lives of a threatened 
population when the decision is taken by what most of the world recognize as a 
responsible multilateral organization and the Security Council does not oppose 
the action."63 
Finally, standing somewhere between two opposite extremes, the above-
mentioned Richard A. Falk's viewpoint that he elaborated in connection with the 
Kosovo crisis, should be introduced briefly. It is based upon the theory of "double 
condemnation" and says that "genocidal behaviour cannot be shielded by claims 
of sovereignty, but neither can these claims be overridden by unauthorized uses 
of force delivered in an excessive and inappropriate manner".64 He also 
expressed that if the international community drew the proper conclusions from 
the lessons of the "badly flawed" Kosovo intervention, then the view that war was 
a last resort could be strengthened and the humanitarian character of humanitarian 
intervention could be preserved and maintained. 
In order to summarize the second period of humanitarian intervention and in 
the light of the second and third chapters of this study, it can be stated that an 
explicit authorization for intervention in the interest of humanity cannot be 
62 Ibid.. 835. 
63 WEDGEWOOD, R.: "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia." AJIL, Vol. 93. No. 4 (October 
1999), 828. 
64 FALK, R. A.: "Kosovo, World Order and the Future of International Law." AJIL, Vol. 93. 
No. 4 (October 1999), 848. 
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derived from international law, however, the consensus as well as the opinio iuris 
are missing in order to declare a comprehensive prohibition.65 
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of the present study was to discuss the various theories on humanitarian 
intervention that have risen throughout the history of international law. 
Humanitarian intervention is frequently talked about, but much less is known 
about it. No wonder. The relevant features, requirements, conditions, concerns 
and uncertainties could be discussed and debated without end. Just to mention a 
few of the shocking characteristics of humanitarian intervention: It is 
undoubtedly a sub-category of intervention, however seems to have been—and 
might as well become once again—an exception to the principle of non-inter-
vention. It is not only a phenomenon within the domain of law, but also of serious 
moral concern. 
With a bit of cynicism, one can state that the international community has to 
and has had to overcome only two problems with respect to this category: 
definition and application. Furthermore, any consensus reached in these two 
fields would start a chain reaction in the re-evaluation of fundamental principles 
of contemporary international law (i.e. respect for human rights versus the 
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention). 
Nevertheless, I believe that in the future these problems can and have to be 
solved and—by a careful legal regulation—the relevant concerns can be dispelled. 
Of course this depends on the direction international law, and more specifically 
human rights law, will take. A fast and effective human rights protection 
mechanism to combat grave and massive violations of human rights is definitely 
badly needed. Once established, it would also bring along the advantage of being 
in possession of a powerful deterrent vis-á-vis governments about to commit 
outrageous violations of human rights. Prevention is always better than a cure. 
Large obstacles stand in the way of desired changes, though, such as the 
clarification of the legal character of human rights as well as their relation to 
65 Cf. NGUYEN, Q. D.-DAILLIER, P.-PELLET, A.: Droit International Public. 4' Édition. 
Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1992. 872. In the French literature see also 
Ch. ROUSSEAU: Droit International Public. Tome IV. Les Relations Internationales. Paris: 
Sirey, 1980. 49. For one of the most recent publications on this issue see the brilliant report 
entitled "Humanitarian Intervention. Legal and Political Aspects" prepared by the Danish 
Institute of International Affairs in 1999. 
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other, "traditional" erga omnes norms of international law; the "erosion" of the 
UN Charter and the reform of the organization, just to mention a few.66 
Considering all factors relating to the "international law enforcement 
mechanism of human rights", it is quite understandable why many tend to share 
a pessimistic view as to whether humanitarian intervention will ever be justified, 
for instance as a third exception to the prohibiton of use of force. For the time 
being, only the following cautious, but less legalistic answer can be given: 
"perhaps". 
66 As Louis Henkin (Columbia University School of Law) put it: "Kosovo demonstrates yet 
again a compelling need to address deficiencies in the law and practice of the UN Charter. ( . . . ) 
The NATO action in Kosovo... may reflect a step taken towards a change in the law... This may 
be a desirable change, perhaps even an inevitable change. (...) That might be the lesson of 
Kosovo." HENKIN, L.: "Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention'." AJIL, Vol. 93. 
No. 4 (October 1999), 828. See also ANNAN, K. A.: "We the Peoples": The Role of the United 
Nations in the 21s' Century. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2000. As for 
the "erosion" of the UN Charter see BLUM, Y. Z.: Eroding the UN Charter. Dord-
recht—Boston—London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment in the Republic of Croatia 
I. Introduction 
Since the moment of his coming into existence man has influenced the formation 
of his natural environment whose original state has been completely transformed 
in the course of thousands of years. The ecological drama of civilisation, particularly 
prominent in the marine environment, requires the introduction of concrete 
ecological standards. Although environmental law is by its nature interdisciplinary, 
legal regulation fulfils one of the most important tasks in the achievement of this 
aim.1 The international law of protection and preservation of the marine 
environment is a branch of international law which has only recently begun to be 
developed systematically.2 The legal regulation of protecting the marine 
environment from vessels-source pollution (vessels being the main source of 
pollution) contains elaborate safety standards of preventive significance as well 
as a corresponding civil law component. In this field, the international system of 
regulations is not uniform because it depends on the type of pollution, namely 
1 OMEJEC, J.: Uvodna i osnovna pitanja prava okoliSa (Introductory and basic questions of 
environmental law). In: Olivera LonCaric-Horvat et al. (ed.): Osnove prava okolisa (The 
Fundamentals of Environmental Law). Zagreb, 1997, 15-20. 
2 SERSIC, M.: Okolis s meöunarosnog stajaliSta (Environment from the viewpoint of 
international law). In: LONCARIC-HORVAT: op. cit., 193 ff. 
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whether it is pollution by the discharge of oil, pollution caused by the maritime 
carriage of hazardous and noxious substances or pollution damage by nuclear 
materials.5 
II. International Regulations Relating to Marine Pollution from Vessels 
1. Pollution by oil 
a ) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage ( Brussels, 
1969). This Convention establishes a system of the shipowner's strict liability 
for damage by the discharge of oil carried as bulk cargo.4 The provisions of 
this Convention were amended by the Protocol of 1976 (which introduced a new 
Unit of Account—the Special Drawing Right—instead of the gold franc)5 and 
the Protocol of 1984 (which expanded the application of the Convention and 
increased liability amounts).6 The Protocol of 1992 adopted the entire text of 
the 1984 Protocol except its term of entering into force.7 
b) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage ( 1992). 
According to Article 11 of the 1992 Protocol, the text of this Protocol and the 
text of the 1969 Convention are to be interpreted as a single instrument under 
this title.8 
3 h l a C a . v .—STANKOVIC, G.: Pravo zastite morskog okolisa (Law of protection of the marine 
environment). Rijeka, 1997, 9. 
4 Sluibeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements ), 
No. 2/77. The Republic of Croatia ratified this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 1/92], hut subsequently 
called it off, so that it has not been effective since 30 July 1999 [Narodne novine—Medunarodni 
ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 6/98]. 
5 The Republic of Croatia did not ratify this Protocol which came into force in April 1981. 
6 This Protocol did not enter into force. 
7 The Protocol of 1992 entered into force on 30 May 1996. As to its significance, see FILIPOVIC, 
V.: Hrvatska bi trebala sto prije ratificirati nove Protokole 1992. о naknadi Stete uzrokovane 
oneCiScenjem naftom (Croatia should as soon as possible ratify the new Protocols of 1992 relating 
to oil pollution damage), Uporednopomorskopravo (Comparative Maritime Law), Zagreb, No. 
1-4, 1993,33-41. 
8 The Republic of Croatia ratified the Protocol of 1992 on 12 January 1998 [Narodne 
novine—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International 
Agreements), No. 2/97]. It became effective on 12 January 1999 [Narodne novine—Medunarodni 
ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 3/99]. For 
the text of the Convention in both English and Croatian, see Glasnik, Zagreb, No. 2,1999,7-37. 
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c) International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 1971 ). This Convention 
supplements the previous Convention of 1969 in such a way that the injured 
persons can obtain full compensation where this was not possible according 
to the text of 1969, and that shipowners as perpetrators of damage are released 
from the additional financial burden imposed under the 1969 Convention.4 
Later on, the provisions of this Convention were also modified by the Protocols 
of 1976,10 1984," and 1992.'2 
d) International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage ( 1992). According to Article 27 of the 
1992 Protocol to amend the Convention of 1971, both texts are to be interpreted 
together as a unique instrument under the title International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (1992) 
e) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of OH Pollution Casualties (Brussels. 1969). This Convention entitles signatory 
States to undertake necessary measures on the high seas in order to prevent, 
control and reduce serious or unavoidable hazards to their coast or coast-related 
interests in cases of oil pollution caused by maritime casualties or by activities 
connected with such accidents. Since the Convention refers only to oil (crude 
oil, fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricating oil), the Protocol of 1973 extends State 
powers to cases of marine pollution by substances other than oil that are noxious 
to human health and life on the sea.14 
f ) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
amended by the Protocol of 1978 ( M A R P O L Convention 1973/1978). The 
Protocol of 1978 contains the provisions of the Convention of 1973 with 
amendments so that the coming into force of the Protocol in 1983 meant the 
coming into force of an amended Convention. As a single unified international 
instrument, it is so far the most thorough international treaty on the prevention 
of marine pollution by oil. Its aim is to prevent any (intentional or accidental) 
9 See note 4. 
10 The Republic of Croatia did not ratify this Protocol which came into force in November 1994. 
11 See note 6. 
12 See note 7. 
13 As to its becoming effective in the Republic of Croatia, see note 8. 
14 Shizbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements), 
No. 2/77. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 1/92]. 
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pollution of the marine environment from ships by any substances harmful to 
people and to the living and mineral resources of the sea. Therefore, the pollution 
from vessels includes dumping, discharge, emptying, spilling and leakage.15 
g) Convention on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea from Pollution 
(Barcelona, 1976). This Convention provides that it is a general obligation of 
all States, parties to the Convention, to undertake all appropriate measures to 
prevent and control pollution in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, namely 
pollution by the dumping of waste and other substances or by discharge f rom 
vessels, pollution caused by activities in the submarine areas (sea-bed and 
subsoil), and pollution f rom land-based sources. The 1976 Protocol to the 
Convention further specifies the agreed-upon measures, procedures and 
standards to ensure the proper application of the Convention.16 
h) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982). This Convention 
is a unified system of regulations relating to the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including 
the coastline. An important novelty is the right of States, pursuant to 
international law, both customary and conventional, to take and enforce 
measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened 
damage to protect their interests from pollution following upon a maritime 
casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected 
to result in major harmful consequences.17 
i) International Convention on Salvage (London, 1989). Better ecological 
protection of the sea and greater stimulation of salvors are the main features 
of this Convention. The duty of care in preventing or reducing damage to the 
environment pertains to both the salvor and the salvaged. The criteria for 
determining salvage remuneration include a new element (the salvor's skill and 
efforts at preventing or reducing damage to the environment), while the basic 
stimulus is a special award for protecting the environment.18 
15 Sluzbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements), 
No. 2/85. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 1/92]. 
16 Sluzbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements ), 
No. 12/77. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni 
ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 12/93]. 
17 The Republic of Croatia ratified this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 1/92]. 
18 This Convention (which came into force on 14 July 1996) was ratified by the Republic of 
Croatia [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—Inter-
national Agreements), No. 9/98]. For its novelties see GR ABOVAC, I.: Za§tita morskog okoliSa 
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j) International Convention on Alertness, Action and Collaboration in Cases of 
Marine Pollution by Oil (London, 1990). The Convention mentioned under 
g) obliged the Republic of Croatia to ratify the Convention of 1996. It is specific 
in nature and its object is to prevent and control marine pollution.19 
2. Pollution by hazardous and noxious substances 
a) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea—SOLAS Convention 
(London, 1974). The eight provisions of Chapter VII are the basic regulation 
relating to the carriage of dangerous and harmful substances (classification, 
packing, marking, stowage). Since its enforcement the Convention has been 
amended several times (1978, 1981, 1983, 1986).20 
b) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and 
Other Matter (London, 1972). This is the first general international treaty on 
the prevention of dumping of waste in the sea. It forbids the dumping of waste 
that is defined as pollutant. Waste is categorised and listed, and a specific 
treatment is provided for each list. Moreover, the dumping of any waste is to 
be under strict control.21 
c) MARPOL Convention 1973/1978 is the basic instrument for controlling pollution 
by hazardous and noxious substances which are classified into liquid substances 
in bulk, harmful substances in packages, faecal discharge and waste from ships 
(cf. supra II 1 f). 
i odredbe nove Konvencije о spaSavanju (Protection of the marine environment and provisions 
of the new Convention on Salvage), Uporednopomorsko pravo (Comparative Maritime Law). 
Zagreb, No. 1-2, 1990, 13-22. 
19 The Republic of Croatia ratified this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 2/97]. 
20 Sluzjbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements ), 
No. 2/81. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni ugovori 
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 1/92]. 
21 Sluzbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International Agreements), 
No. 13/77. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [Narodne novine—Medunarodni 
ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 3/95]. See 
GRABOVAC. I— BOLANCA, D.: ZaStita morskog okoliäa u teri torijai no m morn uzobalu otoka 
Palagru2e u sluőaju pomorske nezgode (Protection of the marine environment in the territorial 
sea along the Island of PalagruZa in cases of incidents of navigation), Zbornik radova 
"Palagruza—jadranski drágulj" (Collected Papers—"Palagruza—an Adriatic Jewel"). Split—KaStela, 
1996, 160. 
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d) International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 
(London, 1996) introduces the shipowner's causal liability for loss of life or 
bodily injuries inflicted by hazardous and noxious substances on board or off 
board a ship carrying these substances, and for any loss of or damage to property 
not on board a ship carrying substances that have caused the loss or damage 
in question." 
e) In cases of this type of pollution, mutatis mutandis, the international Conventions 
mentioned supra, II 1 g, h, i, and j, are applicable. 
3. Pollution by nuclear substances 
a) Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships (Brussels, 1962). 
The operator of a nuclear ship has strict liability for nuclear damage to people 
or things (i.e. peculiar damage brought about under the circumstances of typical 
hazards involving processes of fission or ionisation of radioactive materials).23 
b) Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy ( Paris, 1960). 
Under this Convention the operator of nuclear installations is exclusively liable 
for any damage on the basis of stricter causal liability provisions, but under 
certain conditions liability can be transferred to the specialised carrier (thus 
to the ship operator as well).24 
c) Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna, 1963) contains 
the basic principles of the Convention mentioned under II 3 b.25 
d) International Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime 
Carriage of Nuclear Materials (Brussels, 1971 ). According to this Convention, 
where ship operators are liable for nuclear pollution damage under international 
or domestic law, they may be exempted from such liability if the operator of 
nuclear installations is liable for that damage under the Paris or Vienna 
22 This Convention has not entered into force yet, so the Republic of Croatia has not ratified 
it. 
23 The Republic of Croatia has not ratified this Convention. 
24 The Republic of Croatia has not ratified this Convention. 
25 Sluzbeni list SFRJ—Medunarodni ugovori (Official Gazette of SFRY—International 
Agreements ), No. 5/77. The Republic of Croatia adopted this Convention [.Narodne novine—Меди-
па rodni ugovori (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia—International Agreements), No. 
12/93]. 
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Conventions (supra I I3 b and c) or under national legislation that has adopted 
the provisions of these Conventions.26 
III. Croatian Regulations Relating to Marine Pollution from Vessels 
1. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia27 
The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia is the basic source of environmental 
law since it deals with this matter in a number of its provisions and lends special 
ecological significance to the sea (Art. 52).28 
2. Conservation of the Environment Act19 
As the basic Act in the field of protection and preservation of the environment, 
this law formalises constitutional principles. Inter alia, it defines the environment 
as the natural environment which includes the sea (Art. 5, par. 1,1), introduces 
the principle of paying expenses incurred by pollution (Art. 16) and regulates the 
question of civil liability for pollution damage (Art. 50). Namely, under the general 
rules of the Croatian law of obligations (which covers both contract and tort law), 
the responsible person (the one that caused pollution or, by some unlawful or 
incorrect action, allowed it to take place) is liable for pollution damage.10 
3. Maritime Code1 ' 
With respect to marine pollution, this Code, as a modern codified law, is based 
on the relevant international conventional solutions. With respect to pollution by 
oil that is earned as cargo (Part IX, Ch. V 4, Art. 839-849), it adopts the text of 
the Convention of 1969 and the Protocols 1976 and 1984 (supra II 1 a and c). 
However, since January 1999, the Republic of Croatia has become involved in a 
26 The Republic of Croatia has not ratified this Convention. 
27 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 56/90. 
28 OMEJEC: op. cit., 45-53. 
29 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 82/94. 
30 KLARIC, P.: Graöanskopravna zaStita okoliSa prema hrvatskom pravu (Conservation of 
the environment under Croatian civil law), Zbomik radova 'Pravne moznosti varovanja skupinskih 
interesov za zdravo okolje' (Legal Protection of Collective Interests Relating to the Healthy 
Environment—Collected Papers). University of Maribor, Faculty of Law, 1996,74-76; GLIHA, 
I.—JOSIPOVIC, T.: Zaätita okoliSa s graöanskopravnog stajaliSta (Conservation of the 
environment from the civil law viewpoint), in: LONCARIC-HORVAT: op. cit., 15-20. 
31 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 17/94,74/94, and 43/96. 
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new, modernised regime of liability (supra II 1 b and d).32 Part IX, Ch. VI, Articles 
850-866 adopt the International Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear 
Ships (supra II 3 a). The Maritime Code (Part IX, Ch. II, Art. 774-800) also follows 
new solutions in the field of salvage (supra II 1 i). It also adopts many solutions 
from the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (supra II 1 f). 
4. Seaports Ac/33 
This Act regulates a specific case of liability for damage to the environment. 
Namely, it provides that the port authority or the company that has a concession 
for using a port for specific purposes is liable for marine pollution in the port or 
for dumping waste that settles on the sea bottom in the port (Art. 51, par. 1 ). 
5. Carriage of Dangerous Substances Act34 
This Act does not deal directly with the question of civil liability for damage caused 
by the carriage of hazardous substances, but prescribes compulsory third-party 
insurance against damage incurred by such carriage (Art. 9). 
6. Liability for Nuclear Damage Acf5 
This Act is in accordance with the Vienna Convention of 1963 (supra II 3 c). It 
provides stricter rules on the absolute liability of the operator (the person that has 
obtained a permission from a competent state body to build or use nuclear 
installations), while in some cases liability can be transferred to specialised ship 
operators (Art. 2, 5 and 7).36 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper is a short survey of international regulations governing the prevention 
of marine pollution and civil liability as an efficient mechanism of compensation 
for pollution damage. The most important international Conventions relating to 
32 CORIC, D.: Meöunarodni sustav odgovornosti za Stetu zbog oneőiScenja uljem iz 1992. 
( International system of liability for oil pollution damage), Uporedno pomorsko pravo (Comparative 
Maritime Law). Zagreb, No. 1-2, 1997, 53-55. 
33 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 108/95. 
34 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 97/93. 
35 Narodne novine (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia), No. 143/98. 
36 As to the essential features of this Act, seeGRABOVAC, I.: Odgovomost zanuklearnu stetu 
u Republici Hrvatskoj (Liability for nuclear damage in the Republic of Croatia), Zbomik radova 
(Collected Papers), Law Faculty of Mostar, No. XII, 1999, 11-17. 
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pollution by oil, by hazardous and noxious substances and by nuclear materials 
are described. It is argued that the Republic of Croatia should consistently ratify 
and apply these Conventions. In its maritime legislation, our country has always 
to a large extent recognised provisions and principles of different international 
Conventions and has also followed modern unified solutions in the field of marine 
pollution. Croatian legislation contains special laws for some types of pollution 
(Maritime Code, Carriage of Dangerous Substances Act, Liability for Nuclear 
Damage Act). However, where there are no specific regulations, in questions of 
civil liability for marine pollution, general regulations (such as the Conservation 
of the Environment Act) are applicable. In the future, the Republic of Croatia should 
continue to apply the existing positive law, ratify new international Conventions 
relating to the protection of the marine environment from pollution (e.g., London 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996), and make an effort 
to harmonise domestic regulations with relevant legal solutions from international 
sources. 
Dragan Bolanca 
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STUDIES 
András SAJÓ The Limited Impact of Communist and 
Democratic Socio-Legal Experiences 
One of the Cold War's more lasting effects is that the East-West divide continues 
to pervade the mentality of social scientists. Communism's enduring effects may 
be of considerable explanatory value for political scientists (transitology 
requiescat in pacem), but it is quite disappointing to see them coming from 
sociologists. The transition to democracy seems to easily lend itself to East-West 
continuum explanations where the communist past creates a post-totalitarian 
mental state which creates and explains differences between these two parts of the 
world. This article intends to show that those differences exist primarily in the 
minds of legal sociologists (among many others who deal with the former 
Ostblock). To do so, I will use data and interpretation of a comparative legal 
socialization survey completed in 1995.' The first summary of this survey, 
"Legal Socialization Effects on Democratization," was published by Ellen S. 
Cohn and Susan O. White in the International Social Science Journal 152 (June 
1997) (hereinafter Cohn and White). In their article, Cohn and White state that 
the survey was a collaborative project of a number of American scholars and 
1 Funding for the survey was provided by (US) National Science Foundation (SE 13237 and 
SIR 11403). Additional support for planning conferences was granted by the French CNRS and 
by Central European University, Budapest. 
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Europeans (including the present author) who were their "collaborators." Yet the 
Europeans had no control whatsoever on the questionnaire's final wording which 
originally covered Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, France, Spain, and the United 
States, and was partially repeated in Russia. 
It would require another article to discuss the psychological and political (as 
well as economic) issues which necessitate keeping the Eastern European 
countries in a zoo of inferior (but developing) animals. More specifically, in line 
with transitology jargon, Cohn and White found "particularly striking" that people 
who "took to the revolutionary streets ... still have the capacity to believe that 
power can be limited." As a matter of fact, the streets in 1989 in Eastern Europe 
were not revolutionary just not very elegant or well lit. Following again tran-
sitology jargon, Colin and White developed a hypothesis that democratization in 
Eastern Europe is a process of rapprochement to Western legal values. This thesis, 
they believed, was at least partly corroborated by the survey's data. Legal attitudes 
come from democratization, consequently Eastern Europeans will score lower on 
value scales which indicate ripe democracy. To me, it is not only the paternalism 
evident in this statement that is troubling but the fact that the contempt behind it 
results in highly problematic data handling and, in particular, in declaring 
statistically insignificant differences as signs of developments in the happy 
democratization scenario. According to this thesis, the pro-liberty, rule of law, 
"intellectual openness" values are situated 011 a continuum where one end is 
Bulgaria (or Russia) and the other is the US. As the data will show, the empirical 
data regarding not only Eastern Europe but Europe in general cannot be shown to 
illustrate democratization. Legal consciousness is not in linear correlation with 
social and political democratization. 
The attitude toward law and the use of law in Eastern Europe cannot be 
conceived as a process of getting rid of the imposed authoritarian straightjacket of 
communist concepts, arbitrariness, and dependency. Both during and after 
communism, legal attitudes were shaped by learned patterns of anti-communism 
and traditional inherited values and customs which helped people live under 
communism and in the complicated conditions which emerged after 1989. The 
various East European populations are quite different, and these differences cannot 
be explained by the citizens being better or worse students in the great school of 
democracy. Indeed, if one looks at the West in regard to the rule of law and 
attitudes toward law, differences among attitudes are enonnous because of social 
and cultural differences among the various nations. Yet this is not to say that, in 
certain regards, the democratization thesis does not work with the rule of law, 
liberalism, and dogmatism. Moreover, a population's perception of the authorities 
also illustrates that the actual components of the rule of law differ between the East 
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and West. More Americans and French believe that police take their complaints 
seriously than do those in Eastern Europe. Russians, in particular, have very 
negative attitudes regarding the police.2 
This article will deal primarily with Hungarian legal attitudes as a case study 
of supposed changes in attitudes. My hypothesis is that in post-communism as 
in the West long term social and cultural factors make the difference in attitudes 
toward law. These differences cannot be placed on an easily understood 
continuum where the American affirmation of democracy is on the spectrum's 
positive end. There may be a divide between Europe and the US, but there is 
much less of a divide between democratizing and democratized countries. 
Sociologists, contrary to politicians, should always remember that politics and 
ideology can shape only to a limited extent what is created by cultural patterns 
and historical conditions. A society, as the survey data illustrates, is not simply 
a function of the legal system. Even where the legal system has the features of 
a democracy, people may have good (i.e. social) reasons to disobey—at least in 
some instances the law. (And, likewise, the fact that a high percentage of 
respondents answer questions on obedience to law in a positive way reveals 
little about that society's level of normalized unlawfulness.) It is therefore not 
surprising that "clear country differences ... are not always related to (Cohn 
and White's) democratization scale." Likewise individualism, interest in 
rights, and political freedoms can be explained outside the democratization 
straightjacket. 
Most of the differences in legal attitudes in the various countries (which are 
probably attributed to culture and different levels of democratization) disappear 
if one compares those with comparable levels of education. Indeed, one of the 
great differences among the national samples is that the level of education differs 
according to that country's previous regime. (Correspondingly, age and 
education and the two are interrelated easily explain different attitudes whereas 
religion and gender fail to explain differences.) The difference among attitudes 
is further increased by the survey method: in the US, a telephone interview was 
conducted. It follows that the lowest social and education groups are under-
2 The difference in regard to encounters with the police is not necessarily a function of police 
behaviour (nile of law and service oriented, non-authoritarian role perception) but that of the size 
of the middle class. Police tend to have a different attitude toward middle class. If the middle 
class is bigger the likelihood of positive personal encounter is higher. France and the US where 
the two typical middle class countries in the sample. 
1 2 2 András Sajó 
represented. ' Once education is controlled, many of the country (and level of 
democratization) differences disappear. According to Cohn and White's Table 
1, Bulgarians score the lowest in lawfulness, rights, individualism, and liberty 
(sometimes in the company of other East European respondents). Bulgarians 
with a university education score 20 percent higher on the dogmatism scale 
than Americans. But once controlled for education, the other nations are not 
significantly more dogmatic than Americans. If one looks at those with the 
lowest education level, the myth of Americans being less dogmatic simply does 
not work. Here the Spanish score significantly lower on the dogmatism scale, 
while for example, there is no difference among Americans, French, and 
Hungarians.4 
Similarly, the score on the liberty scale depends on the education level. 
French with the highest level of education are the most pro-liberty oriented. 
In the case of attitudes toward liberty, the East-West contrast is applicable, 
although, with the exception of Bulgaria, education considerably increases 
liberty's importance. What is perhaps more surprising is that, even with the 
enormous difference in the intensity of political oppression under com-
munism between Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland, attitudes toward political 
liberty among citizens of those countries with a low level of education do not 
differ significantly. Perhaps oppression of the lower classes was the same every-
where. 
In principle, the affirmation of liberty and political rights are inter-
related. Unfortunately Cohn and White use a single indicator for rights con-
sciousness.3 In this indicator, first, second, and third generation rights are 
included. This is surprising not only from the perspective of legal theory, 
but it is also methodologically incorrect as the factor analysis divided the 
3 One of the problems the European "collaborators" had was that the education data was 
practically incomparable. One could only compare those with university education with the rest, 
and, with less certainty, the lowest education groups (below high school but often with 
vocational education) with the rest of the respondents. 
4 Cohn and White found that Bulgaria is the most dogmatic, followed by Poland, Hungary, 
adn France. Spain and the US were the least dogmatic with no significant difference. Cohn and 
White the above are based on Scheffe post hoc tests. 
5 It is surprising how little respect is shown to elementary methodology in the quest for 
support of the democratization thesis. Gibson and Gouws use a single question, or two at best, 
to indicate a country's attitude towards the rule of law. Where two answers are contradictory, 
this is disregarded as is the case in Poland. GIBSON, J. GOUWS, A.: Support for the rule of law 
in the Emerging South African Democracy. International Social Science Journal 1997 June 
(152) 181. Table 2. 
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rights items into two factors (in some of the countries into three). Additionally, 
in the different countries, the composition of the factors seems to differ at 
times. Environmental rights and the right to settle in the given country scored 
above .5 on a third factor in Russia and the US but did not result in a separate 
factor in the other countries. Abortion rights neatly separates from political 
rights. What makes comparison even more difficult is that, in some of the 
cases, social and political rights figure very high in the same factor (Spain) 
while, in Hungary, for example, notwithstanding their interrelations, the 
relation is not so close. 
A second set of questions was used to determine legalism (readiness to 
observe law). The factor analysis resulted in two factors. This indicates that an 
observance of law based on social consensus differs in the public mind from the 
instrumentalist attitude toward law (law is followed only to the extent that it is 
reasonable in view of consequences).6 Questions dealing with breaking the law 
(FACLEGS2) tend to build a separate factor from items regarding law 
observance (FACLEGSO). 
In terms of law observance (FACLEGSO), Americans score the highest, and 
there are considerable country differences. 
O N E W A Y  
Variable FACLEGSO REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
By Variable COUNTRY COUNTRY 
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05 
The difference between two means is significant if 
MEAN(J)-MEAN(I) >= .6475 
* RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J)) 
with the following value(s) for RANGE: 5.02 
(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle 
6 In some questions the respondents had to express agreement with statements regarding the 
fairness of law. The whole concept of fairness is of limited use once translated into Hungarian 
where the concept has limited applicability and the primary meaning of the word is different. 
This is probably true of other languages and cultures. 
124 András Sajó 
Mean COUNTRY* 
1 4 5 2 6 3 7 
-.3631 Grp 1 
-.3527 Grp 4 
-.2054 Grp 5 * 
-.0951 Grp 2 * * 
.1011 Grp 6 * * * * 
.2650 Grp 3 * * * * 
.8496 Grp 7 * * * * * * * 
(*) Here and elsewhere: Group (Grp) = Country 
1 = Bulgaria 5 = Russia 
2 = France 6 = Spain 
3 = Hungary 7 = United States 
4 = Poland 
If the sample is controlled for education, there is no difference when one compares 
Americans with a university degree with Hungarians with a university degree. 
Dependent variable FACLEGSO by COUNTRY 
(University degree holders) 
Mean Cases 
Bulgaria .14 89 
France .42 172 
Hungary .98 79 
Poland .46 55 
Spain .44 115 
United States 1.01 283 
Based on the second factor (breaking the law), a completely different structure 
emerges with Spain and Poland representing the two extreme points: Spaniards 
have little difficulty with breaking the law while Poles are particularly rigid about 
observance of the law. 
Variable FACLEGS2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
By Variable COUNTRY COUNTRY 
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05 
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The difference between two means is significant if 
MEAN(J)-MEAN(I) >= .6572 
* RANGE * SQRT(1/N(I) + 1/N(J)) 
with the following value(s) for RANGE: 5.02 
(*) Indicates significant differences which are shown in the lower triangle 
Mean COUNTRY 
6 5 3 7 1 2 4 
-.7052 Grp 6 
-.3170 Grp 5 * 
-.0344 Grp 3 * * 
.1169 Grp 7 * * 
.1489 Grp 1 * * * 
.1853 Gip 2 * * * 
.5310 Grp 4 * * * * * * 
Based on a cluster analysis, a formalistic respect of law is most common among 
Americans (40%) and, to a lesser extent, Hungarians (28%). The democratization 
theory certainly does not explain the high occurrence among Hungarians of such 
legal formalism—rather, traditional formal respect for authority is a good 
explanation (although this never made it difficult for Hungarians to disregard the 
law in practice). French, Bulgarian, and Russian respondents tend to a consensual 
acceptance of law. One of the emerging clusters indicates that, to many 
respondents, the law loses its binding force if there is no consensual legitimation. 
(This was the most numerous cluster at -21 .5% and the most common in France 
at 30%.) The relative majority of Poles (38%) accept all reasons for law 
observance. (Law is followed to avoid punishment and for consensual reasons; 
moreover there is no justification for breaking it.) The largest group among the 
Spaniards (34%) shows a cluster view which is characterized by a different type 
of consensualism. Here breaking the law is a matter of consensus, but, generally, 
respondents tend to accept most of the positions regarding law observance with 
reservations. 
Considering political rights alone, the East-West difference among the groups 
with the highest level of education disappears, except for Spain and the US. The 
table below (table 1.) illustrates the importance of political rights for the total 
population. 
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COUNTRY COUNTRY by R1GHT1 
HOW IMPORTANT-FREEDOM OF POLITICAL VIEWS 
RIGHT1 
Row Pet NOT VERY IMPORTANT VERY IMPORTANT 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 % 
BULGARIA 3.8 4.8 13.1 21.8 56.5 19.7 
FRANCE 4.3 3.7 10.6 18.1 63.3 13.1 
HUNGARY 9.9 7.2 20.9 17.3 44.6 13.4 
POLAND 4.4 4.6 11.3 20.1 59.6 14.0 
RUSSIA 12.7 10.5 20.8 19.5 36.6 12.7 
SPAIN 1.0 .8 4.7 17.5 75.9 13.2 
UNITED STATES 2.1 .7 3.6 6.8 86.8 13.9 
Column 307 265 702 1015 3507 5796 
Total 5.3 4.6 12.1 17.5 60.5 100.0 
Table 1. 
While different attitudes correspond to the East-West continuum hypothesis 
(with a Hungarian enigma) for the total population, if one compares only those 
with the highest level of education, there are no significant differences, except 
that in this group, Americans and Spaniards score higher than the rest. The 
differences remain more pronounced regarding the less educated.7 
As to social (welfare) rights (using a factor score based indicator), there are 
significant differences between Hungarians with a low level of education 
(strong supporters of these rights) and comparably uneducated Americans and 
Spaniards (low support). Once again, among those with a university education, 
Hungarians and Bulgarians were significantly more supportive of welfare 
rights than Americans but less supportive than the educated French. Here, 
again, Americans differ from the rest of the sample. (When further discussing 
Hungarian views toward welfare rights, it will become clearer that the 
underlying structures are different even where there are no noticeable differences 
in attitudes.) Americans differ further because of the importance they attribute 
to environmental rights. 
7 The American implemeniers of the research kindly provided certain comparable data on 
Russia, except the data on education. I expect that the above trends apply for Russia as well. 
Once again, there was a strong correlation between classes attended and age. 
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The final example illustrating that the East-West democratization continuum 
is blurred and influenced by culture (where culture functions through education) 
concerns attitudes toward the rights of marginal, minority, and radical groups. 
Regarding what Cohn and White call "excluded groups", Spaniards are the most 
permissive while Americans and Poles figure at the spectrum's other end. Among 
those with a low level of education, Bulgarians are the least likely to restrict the 
rights of radical groups. Americans differ from the other Western nations in this 
matter. Among the better educated, the East-West continuum prevails. 
It follows that whenever legal attitudes correspond to the society's level of 
democratization, this pattern has more to do with education than with political 
learning and institutional maturity. While education easily explains these diffe-
rences, one cannot say that there is simply no difference among national cultures 
(although not necessarily along the lines of the democratization hypothesis.) In 
the case of dogmatism, the multiple classification analysis adjusted dev'n beta 
= 0.26. If a classification by countries is added, this increases slightly (beta = 
0.31). 
National differences are often the function of social stratification; however, 
this is not a linear influence. In a number of legal consciousness indicators, 
Americans scored higher regarding rule of law and liberalism because they are 
better educated. In the case of Bulgaria at least, the national difference contradicts 
the stereotype "satellite heritage" thesis. The stereotype suggests that countries 
which had similar experiences under their previous political regimes will score 
similarly. Bulgarians differ considerably from Hungarians and Poles. This can be 
partly explained by their very different experiences under communism, but it 
seems that traditional differences (which, in turn, resulted in differences in 
communist oppression) are the most important. The high- and low-level education 
groups react differently in several countries. For example, when it comes to social 
(welfare) rights, the respective American social strata react in an opposite manner 
from other nations. In the US, lower classes are less enthusiastic about the right to 
work. A country's democratic maturity is also not a decisive factor of its legal 
culture. In a number of indicators, Spain, which has a relatively short democratic 
history (at least according to Cohn and White's textbook criteria) outperforms the 
US in liberalism. And France, which, in many regards, seems closer to Eastern 
Europe than to the US, seems to show a "dual nation pattern": the different 
education groups seem to have opposite views of dogmatism and their perception 
of what constitutes an "important social problem" (deviance). Given this divide, 
it is perhaps less surprising (also taking into account the long standing impact of 
leftist politics and values going back to the French Revolution) that France is often 
closer to Eastern Europe than to the other Western countries. 
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The alternative to the democratic maturity explanation of legal con-
sciousness is a model based on social realities where long term social factors 
have a greater explanatory power. Knowing Hungary the best among the 
countries in the project, I will discuss Hungarian legal representations and, in 
particular, social-welfare expectations in Hungary. The legal representation 
approach is based on the assumption that the structuring of concepts and 
attitudes toward law is the function of a logic which does not follow the law. 
Rather, the legal representations fol low the logic of everyday life. Hence, they 
are often contradictory and inconsistent. For example, a respondent may favor 
political rights including freedom of expression but would restrict these rights 
for extremists and radicals. This can be explained by the way social order and 
normality is construed. Here the respondent is not applying free-speech values 
but is construing the problem in terms of controlling disorder in society. Of 
course, to the extent that legal ideology penetrates everyday life, the 
construction of problems and their solutions might be more legalistic, as is the 
case in the US. 
The Hungarian sample did show some peculiar contradictions. In all of the 
questions, Hungarians are very pessimistic both as to the national situation and 
their own situation. 
COUNTRY by "COMPARED TO 1994 HOW THE FAMILY LIVES" 
Row Pet MUCH WORSE MUCH BETTER 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
BULGARIA 21.0 34.6 33.6 9.4 1.3 20.2 
FRANCE 6.7 26.6 53.7 11.1 1.9 12.8 
HUNGARY 28.5 41.6 27.2 2.7 13.3 
POLAND 18.4 29.0 38.0 12.9 1.6 13.9 
RUSSIA 27.3 29.1 30.4 11.4 1.8 13.0 
SPAIN 3.4 21.4 64.3 9.9 1.0 13.1 
UNITED STATES 2.4 15.3 57.2 21.2 4.0 13.6 
Column 929 1687 2517 656 97 5886 
Total 15.8 28.7 42.8 11.1 1.6 100.0 
Table 7. 
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COUNTRY by "CHANGE OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1994" 
Row Pet A LOT WORSE A LOT BETTER 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
BULGARIA 34.1 36.3 21.8 7.4 .3 20.3 
FRANCE 15.6 26.2 36.6 19.9 1.6 13.0 
HUNGARY 57.8 31.6 8.3 2.3 13.4 
POLAND 18.8 28.2 32.1 20.1 .9 13.7 
RUSSIA 43.9 27.6 18.1 9.3 1.1 12.8 
SPAIN 30.1 32.1 23.6 12.8 1.3 13.2 
UNITED STATES 8.8 34.0 34.4 20.6 2.3 13.6 
Column 1727 1796 1427 738 59 5747 
Total 30.1 31.3 24.8 12.8 1.0 100.0 
Table 3. 
COUNTRY by "SATISFACTION WITH THE DEMOCRACY" 
Row Pet NOT AT ALL VERY SATISFIED 
COUNTRY 1 2 3 4 % 
BULGARIA 39.5 41.3 18.2 1.0 20.0 
FRANCE 21.7 39.0 35.1 4.2 13.4 
HUNGARY 34.6 44.5 19.3 1.6 13.6 
POLAND 25.9 51.4 20.6 2.2 13.4 
RUSSIA 52.2 33.2 14.2 .5 11.8 
SPAIN 27.3 37.5 30.7 4.5 13.4 
UNITED STATES 12.7 26.4 51.6 9.3 14.4 
Column 1687 2159 1487 180 5513 
Total 30.6 39.2 27.0 3.3 100.0 
Table 4. 
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In the survey, 90% of Hungarians responded that the economic situation 
worsened in 1994; only 12% expected improvements. Moreover, 59% believed 
that their family would be worse off in the preceding year and 73% feared that 
there would be unemployment in their family. (Hungary's unemployment rate 
was higher than Russia's- above 11% although those employed at least receive 
their salary. Spain's unemployment was much higher.) One would expect 
anxiety (extremism) and, following it, aggression or cynicism toward public 
institutions, including law. Indeed, Hungarians are not particularly satisfied with 
democracy. Only about 20% are satisfied although this share is similar to other 
post-communist countries, irrespective of pessimism. Only in Russia does one 
find considerably more dissatisfaction or even extreme negation. The general 
dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe does not explain the variations in law 
observance. More Poles are satisfied with democracy perhaps because this was 
the only communist country were large masses of people fought for democracy. 
People tend to identify with what they struggled for. Only 21% of Hungarians 
perceive the situation as better than it was in 1989 (compared to 56% in 
Bulgaria and 40% in Poland). This is the lowest in the whole sample. As 
discussed below, in Hungary, the smallest number of people fear political 
destabilization. 
Hungarians' extreme pessimism may not influence considerably their 
attitudes (although it certainly has an impact on life strategies and the way they 
perceive authorities and cope with them). The perception of social problems is a 
major factor influencing legal attitudes.8 Compared to the total sample, a smaller 
amount of Hungarians find certain problems important, notwithstanding a high 
level of personal concern. (Personal concern generally did not result in changes 
in legal views; personal concern about a possible loss of job in the family did not 
result in attitudes favoring the restriction of employment opportunities for 
foreigners.) 
Among the important social problems, unemployment was mentioned by 60% 
of Hungarians compared to 66% of Poles and 89% of French. As mentioned 
above, more Hungarians feared that a lack of job threatened their family than any 
other sample. 
8 The American colleague or colleagues responsible for the project used a very unfortunate 
method to determine social problems. The respondents were asked wether they find a number 
of social problems important. This is clearly an invitation to acquiescence. It is very difficult to 
tell which problem is more important and to what extent, and the only basis for comparison is 
how often one or the other problem was mentioned as "important". 
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COUNTRY by "HOW IMPORTANT CORRUPTION-
COUNTRY 
Row Pet 
NOT VERY 
I M P O R T A N T 
BULGARIA 4.9 31.6 63.5 19.6 
FRANCE 3.2 32.7 64.1 13.1 
HUNGARY 17.0 36.1 46.9 13.0 
POLAND 6.6 32.4 61.0 14.0 
RUSSIA 12.6 43.2 44.2 12.5 
SPAIN 1.3 11.2 87.5 13.6 
UNITED STATES 6.6 31.0 62.3 14.2 
Column 407 1753 3485 5645 
Total 7.2 31.1 61.7 100.0 
Table 5. 
Corruption is seen as less of a problem in Hungary and Russia than 
elsewhere. Likewise, favoritism was mentioned as important by 38% of 
Hungarians and just 32% in Russia.9 This indicates a process of normalization 
(it is unclear why such normalization is not taking place in Poland or Bulgaria) 
while there is alarmism when it comes to new phenomena like crime.10 (Crime 
increased considerably after the collapse of communism, and East Europeans are 
more concerned about it than Americans and Russians although the crime rate in 
those two countries is probably more of a problem in everyday life.) 
The differences become more marked when building clusters. Hungarians are 
above the average where an increase in crime and environmental issues are 
perceived as important and unemployment is not a serious problem -13% in the 
cluster compared to 7% in the total occurrence. Here, as in some other areas (see 
infra), there are similarities with the US sample. 
9 This can be explained partly by a mistranslation that occurred notwithstanding my insistence 
on the contrary. The survey takers allowed that favoritism be translated as protekcio which 
means patronage. 
10 An alternative explanation for this attitude is that, for large segments of society, corruption 
is an elite activity and is not important for the masses. 
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COUNTRY by THREATC COMMUNISTS ARE THREATENING TO OUR LIFE 
COUNTRY Row Pet NOT AT ALL EXTREMELY 
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Total 
BULGARIA 43.0 24.4 24.0 8.6 17.9 
FRANCE 33.5 48.9 13.6 4.0 13.5 
HUNGARY 33.8 33.1 24.0 9.1 13.7 
POLAND 28.8 38.0 20.1 13.2 14.1 
RUSSIA 51.2 33.2 11.2 4.4 13.5 
SPAIN 24.4 21.9 29.5 24.2 12.2 
UNITED STATES 13.4 33.9 35.1 17.6 15.1 
Column 1665 1681 1151 577 5074 
Total 32.8 33.1 22.7 11.4 100.0 
Table 6. 
COUNTRY by FASCISTS ARE THREATENING TO OUR LIFE 
Row Pet NOT AT ALL EXTREMELY 
COUNTRY 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 Total 
BULGARIA 24.8 26.0 34.6 14.5 16.4 
FRANCE 7.8 24.5 41.6 26.1 13.6 
HUNGARY 30.1 34.2 28.2 7.6 13.6 
POLAND 7.8 27.4 30.3 34.5 14.1 
RUSSIA 3.1 7.4 28.0 61.5 14.6 
SPAIN 24.3 16.3 30.6 28.8 12.4 
UNITED STATES 10.4 21.4 44.5 23.6 15.3 
Column 773 1130 1715 1406 5024 
Total 15.4 22.5 34.1 28.0 100.0 
Table 7. 
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The construction of social problems seems unrelated to the problem of 
political extremism." The perception of a fascist threat and the suggested legal 
measures to address this threat, for example, do not seem to be related to the 
components of the legal consciousness. A multiple regression with the legal 
consciousness components resulted in multiple R=.39 but, in the analysis of 
variance F, was not significant. 
The perception of a fascist threat was often unrelated to a country's actual 
social problems. Americans and Spaniards scored the highest regarding the fear 
of a communist threat while the post-communist countries scored low in this 
respect. In a number of cases, the threat is the result of long term impacts and 
indoctrination. (Communists in the US and fascists in Russia. Although fascist 
parties in Russia are considerably strong, fascism is an agreed common enemy 
probably because of the lasting effects of communist indoctrination and memories 
of World War Two. Indeed, in Russia, even fascist parties are offended by 
comparisons to fascism.) The majority of post-communist citizens did not 
consider the communist threat a reality at a time when popularly elected former 
communists were ruling all these countries. Moreover, only few Hungarians see 
a fascist threat. 
These threats are not only not related to other social problems (in light of 
factor analysis), but the threat's impact on the tolerance of dangerous groups 
varies greatly. In Hungary, where there is generally a low level of perceived 
threat, the impact is minimal although significant. The sense of a radical menace 
negatively influences tolerance (expressed in terms of rights restrictions) only 
slightly (more in the case of communists than in the case of fascists: r = -.26 and 
r = -0.1 respectively). In other countries, however, the perception of a threat has 
a more significant impact on rights restrictions. In Bulgaria, Russia, and Poland, 
for example, the ban on communists in politics correlates strongly with the 
perceived threat (r = -.5). In France, where fascists are viewed as a threat by many 
more people, the perceived threat correlates with the restrictions of fascists' 
rights (r = -37) more strongly than with the right to assembly (r = -.42) In Spain 
and the US, the perceived threat diminishes the political acceptance of both 
communists and fascists (r > -.3 and r > -.38) but only to a lesser extent the 
extremists' right of assembly. In these two countries, the threats are closely 
related (in Spain r = .76 and in the US r = .59). The other extreme is France 
11 Unfortunately, the American colleagues responsible for the administering the questionnaire 
introduced here a different technique of asking questions. Respondents were asked to choose 
"how threatening to YOUR COUNTRY'S way of life would you say communists/fascists are?" 
The lack of relationships might be an artifact of the interview technique. 
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where there is no significant correlation between the public's perceptions of 
these two threats. 
The position on rights issues seems to be of little influence when it comes to 
the actual restriction of rights in situations which some may perceive as 
endangering public order. (The alternative explanation, especially in the case of 
fascists, did not work. The restriction was not particularly related to the 
perceived threat.) The democratization theory would suggest that rights 
consciousness is underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and, therefore, of lower 
predictive power. It would also suggest that if actual rights restriction is a 
function of liberalism or anti-dogmatism, Eastern Europeans would score low 
in these indicators. In regard to banning communists from official positions, 
none of these grand hypotheses work. Based on a regression analysis, each 
country has its own explanatory model depending on the different restrictions 
and groups perceived as threatening and the variables produce varying R 
squares. 
In the case of banning communists from political life, the model works best 
in the US (R square = .28) and the R square exceeds . 18 in all other countries, 
except in France and Hungary where it is less than .11. Based on Beta, the most 
significant variable is the perceived threat in all the countries and in regard to all 
threats and restrictions. Liberalism was significant in Spain, Bulgaria, and the 
US, while dogmatism was significant in Poland and the US. The US is the only 
truly legalistic population as it was only the country where rights perception 
matters. Interestingly, in France, general attitudes do not have an isolated 
impact. 
The model explains less regarding the ban on the right to assembly for both 
extremist groups in all the countries. France is the exception where, in the case 
of those who want to ban rights for fascists, there is a strong tendency toward 
militant democracy. In France, age, a higher level education, and anti-welfarism 
increases the tendency toward militant democracy. Legal consciousness seems 
to have regular independent explanatory power only in the case of Americans. 
In regard to rights restrictions, dogmatism, liberty, and rights consciousness had 
independent explanatory power (beyond the perceived threat) of the variance of the 
restriction of rights while no such regular influence was observed elsewhere (and 
in Hungary, for example, there was no independent impact at all). It follows that 
either legal consciousness is less developed (measured in these indicators) among 
Europeans or the legal consciousness indicators were developed using an American 
sample and therefore have little or lower predictive power in Europe. In this second 
case, American legal values are imposed on Europe in the form of the tools of 
measurement. 
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Welfare expectations 
One would expect that a lasting legacy of communism on legal consciousness 
would be the level of expectations of state-provided services, in particular in the 
area of job security and the related institutional mechanism (state ownership as 
a guarantee for employment). 
Social welfarism was measured only in one dimension: the state's role in 
providing the right to work. The relative questions (three) scored in the same 
factor. I use values computed through regression. 
As the data illustrates, the differences are striking between the US (rejecting 
such services), Russia (still in the welfare expectation world), and the rest of the 
sample. There are no significant differences among the European countries, 
except in France and Poland. It is remarkable that, contrary to the democratization 
hypothesis, Bulgaria did not score higher for welfare. 
Summaries of FACI-4 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
By levels of COUNTRY C O U N T R Y 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev 
For Entire Population .0020953 1.0006759 
COUNTRY 1.00 BULGARIA -.1872713 .9703391 
COUNTRY 2.00 FRANCE -.1060531 .9038568 
COUNTRY 3.00 HUNGARY -.1827291 .9195413 
COUNTRY 4.00 POLAND -.2638038 .8662509 
COUNTRY 5.00 RUSSIA -.3515400 .5794449 
COUNTRY 6.00 SPAIN -.2013035 .6960003 
COUNTRY 7.00 UNITED STATES 1.3516282 .7999414 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
By Variable COUNTRY COUNTRY 
Multiple Range Tests: Scheffe test with significance level .05 
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The difference between two means is significant if 
MEAN(J)-MEAN(I) >= .5942 
* RANGE * SQRT( 1/N(I) 1/N(J)) 
Mean COUNTRY 
5 4 6 1 3 2 7 
-.3515 Grp 5 
-.2638 Gm 4 
-.2013 Gm 6 
-.1873 Grp 1 * 
-.1827 Grp 3 * 
-.1061 Grp 2 * * 
1.3516 Grp 7 * * * * * * 
Within Groups Total 
5853 
Source 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Eta = .5436 
Eta Squared = .2955 
Sum of 
Squares 
1731.6543 
4128.2590 
.0020953 
d.f. 
6 
5846 
.8403381 
M e a n 
Square 
4 0 8 . 6 9 7 3 
F 
2 8 8 . 6 0 9 0 
.0000 
4128 .25899 
Sig 
.7062 
Are legal attitudes and, specifically the concept of rights, important in 
determining one ' s expectation of the state's provision of welfare? The res-
pondents were asked about the importance of the right to a job, and this right 
was considered generally important, with Americans scoring lower. Among 
Russians, the importance of the right to a job was also mentioned with lesser 
frequency. This result contradicts all expectations (given the very high 
Russian expectation of government provided employment). This can be 
explained by Russian rights nihilism. Indeed, among Russians, there was no 
correlation between the two answers. (Other inter-country differences were 
not significant.) 
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HOW IMPOROTANT-RIGHT TO A JOB 
By levels of C O U N T R Y C O U N T R Y 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev 
For Entire Population 4.7492 .7313 
COUNTRY 1.00 BULGARIA 4.8476 .4824 
COUNTRY 2.00 FRANCE 4.8817 .4521 
COUNTRY 3.00 HUNGARY 4.7808 .6582 
COUNTRY 4.00 POLAND 4.7785 .6832 
COUNTRY 5.00 RUSSIA 4.6938 .7977 
COUNTRY 6.00 SPAIN 4.8892 .3951 
COUNTRY 7.00 UNITED STATES 4.3291 1.2334 
Total Cases = 5935 
Missing Cases = 81 or 1.4 Pet 
Within Groups 
Total 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
Between 
Groups 182.5326 
Within Groups 
2 9 4 7 . 3 3 8 9 
Eta = .2415 
Eta Squared = .0583 
4 .7492 
d.f. 
6 
5847 
.7100 
Mean 
Square 
30.4221 
.5041 
2947 .3389 
F 
60.3521 
5 8 5 4 
S ig 
.0000 
. 7062 
Scheffe's post analysis 
Mean COUNTRY 
6 5 3 7 1 2 4 
4.3291 Grp 7 
4.6938 Grp 5 * 
4.7785 Grp 4 * 
4.7808 Grp 3 * 
4.8476 Grp 1 * * 
4.8817 Gm 2 * * 
4.8892 Grp 6 * * 
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The issue is only loosely perceived in terms of rights. With more insistence 
on the right to a job, there is a somewhat stronger correlation between the 
attitude that the state should provide services (R = .23) with the importance of 
the right to have a job. If one controls both for country and education, it turns 
out that in some countries (Bulgaria, France, Russia, and Spain), there is no 
significant correlation between the expectation of the service and rights. In 
Hungary, only in the case of those with higher education is there a correlation, 
while in Poland and in the US at all education levels, rights seem to have an 
impact on expectations (up to r = .34 among American high school degree 
holders). 
As the appendix indicates, in the regression analysis, in certain countries 
a considerable amount of variance of the expectation of state services was 
explained by legal consciousness indicators and social status indicators. 
Indeed the percentage did not considerably increase with the addition into the 
model of social status related indicators. On the other hand, age, gender, 
education, and church attendance combined have a strong explanatory power 
per se on the variance in some countries (Multiple R = 0.35 to 0.40 in France, 
US, and Hungary). Once again, the democratization thesis does not help. In 
every model, the level of education is of considerable explanatory power but, 
regarding other legal consciousness or status related indicators, the models are 
different in each country. For example, dogmatism was related to welfarism 
in Hungary and Poland while it had no significant impact in the US. Liber-
alism was important (except in the US) and, in some countries, normalization 
of everyday deviance (small scale bribery) also played a role. (For the 
influence of rights see above.) As to indicators of individualism, a strong 
communal sense is significantly correlated in Hungary (r = .2) as well as in 
Poland and Bulgaria. In Spain and France, however, this factor did not show 
significant correlation. A different factor of societal orientation (a har-
monization of individualism and societal goals) seemed to be significantly 
related. 
In each country, there was rather strong relationship between concepts of 
state ownership and the state's responsibility for their citizenry's lives 
In most countries, education correlated negatively with welfare ex-
pectations. In other words, the higher the level of education, the less the 
reliance on state provided job security. The explanatory power is particularly 
strong (based on regression analysis) in Hungary (eta squared = .17 and in the 
US eta squared = .10) while it was not significant in Spain where the indicator 
seems to be less related to any of the factors (indicators) analyzed. 
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The perception of socio/political changes in most countries has an impact 
on legal attitudes. In Hungary, France, Poland and Bulgaria the correlations 
print in the expected direction, ie. the satisfaction with political change is 
related with less welfare expectancy (winners do not need that) and the 
satisfaction with democracy slightly but significantly correlates with the 
rejection of welfarism. The correlation is stronger among the university 
educated (in Hungary r=0.46). 
Correlation Coefficients 
COUNTRY FAC1-4 AGE ATTEND CHG89 DEGREE4 
1.00 BULGARIA 1.000 -.0805 -.0419 -.1358 .1604 
(1194) (1188) (1162) (939) (1191) 
P= . P= .006 P= .153 P= .000 P= .000 
2.00 FRANCE 1.000 .1966 .0772 -.1578 .1486 
(752) (746) (738) (644) (752) 
P= . P= .000 P= .036 P= .000 P= .000 
3.00 HUNGARY 1.000 -.0728 -.0884 - .3791 .3914 
(753) (753) (750) (703) (752) 
P= . P= .046 P= .015 P= .000 P= .000 
4.00 POLAND 1.000 .0546 -.1050 -.2267 .1924 
(817) (815) (816) (714) (805) 
P= . "0
 
H VO
 
P= .003 P= .000 P= .000 
5.00 RUSSIA 1.000 -.1226 .0342 NA. NA. 
(759) (758) (738) (0) (0) 
P= . P= .001 P= .353 P= . P= . 
6.00 SPAIN 1.000 -.0995 -.0429 -.0848 .0751 
(771) (771) (756) (515) (769) 
P= . P= .006 P= .239 P= .054 P= .037 
7.00 UNITED 1.000 .1336 .0010 .NA .3193 
STATES (807) (791) (783) (0) (797) 
P= . P= .000 P= .977 P= . P= .000 
Table 4. 
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Conclusion 
Contrary to prevailing political-science stereotypes the differences in legal 
representation in seven countries with different conditions of socio-legal 
socialization do not d i f fer fundamentally in terms of post political regime. 
There seems to be less difference between countries with democratic 
traditions and those with communist traditions the between the US and the 
rest of the countries involves in the survey, if controlled for age, education 
and sex. 
The Limited Impact of Communist and Democratic Socio-Legal Experiences 141 
APPENDIX 
COUNTRY: 1.00 BULGARIA 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * * 
Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FAC1-4 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACLIB1 FACRIGH1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2.. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
3.. FACRIGH 1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
4.. AGE 
5.. FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
6.. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
7.. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
8.. FACIMP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
9.. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
10.. FACLIB1 Factor score LIBERAL 
11.. FACJUST1 Factor score JUSTIFY 
12.. FACRIGH2 Factor score RIGHT2 
13.. DEGREE4 
Multiple R .31475 
R Square .09906 
Adjusted R Square .08554 
Standard Error .92791 
Analysis of Variance 
Regression 
Residual 
DF 
13 
866 
Sum of Squares 
81.98887 
745.64055 
Mean Square 
6.30684 
.86102 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
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COUNTRY: 1.00 BULGARIA 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Pairwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variable В SE В Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.103545 .035653 -.102079 -2.904 .0038 
FACIMP1 -.082341 .035316 -.079166 -2.332 .0200 
FACJUST1 .016144 .085781 .006443 .188 .8508 
FACLIB1 .223952 .040156 .190576 5.577 .0000 
FACRIGH1 -.023108 .037170 -.021462 -.622 .5343 
FACRL1 .007159 .029701 .008168 .241 .8096 
FACRL2 .037813 .029442 .043820 1.284 .1994 
FACRIGH2 -.030893 .036061 -.029785 -.857 .3919 
FACTOL1 -.017965 .041251 -.014545 -.435 .6633 
AGE -.001280 .001913 -.022954 -.669 .5037 
ATTEND -.019691 .017340 -.037931 -1.136 .2564 
DEGREE4 .159709 .034582 .161273 4.618 .0000 
GENDER -.039644 .063847 -.020419 -.621 .5348 
(Constant) -.146133 .167502 -.872 .3832 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 2.00 FRANCE 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FAC1-4 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACLIB1 FACRIGH1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2. FACL1B1 Factor score LIBERAL 
3. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
4. FACJUST1 Factor score JUSTIFY 
5. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
6. FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
7. FAC.IMP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
8. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
9. FACRIGH 1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
10. FACRIGH2 Factor score RIGHT2 
11. AGE 
12. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
13. DEGREE4 
Multiple R .43411 
R Square .18845 
Adjusted R Square .17212 
Standard Error .82240 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 13 101.45526 7.80425 
Residual 646 436.91950 .67635 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
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COUNTRY: 2.00 FRANCE 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SEB Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.039522 .036537 -.045963 -1.082 .2798 
FACIMP1 -.071443 .038823 -.069581 -1.840 .0662 
FACJUST1 .322226 .068299 .181446 4.718 .0000 
FACLIB1 -.060821 .035913 -.074822 -1.694 .0908 
FACRIGH1 .046615 .035715 .049619 1.305 .1923 
FACRL1 .025740 .030261 .032219 .851 .3953 
FACRL2 -.082256 .031578 -.093244 -2.605 .0094 
FACRIGH2 -.064956 .038947 -.063300 -1.668 .0958 
FACTOL1 .090615 .036276 .091541 2.498 .0127 
AGE .014336 .002567 .249867 5.584 .0000 
ATTEND .016193 .018534 .032436 .874 .3826 
DEGREE4 .221707 .037579 .264900 5.900 .0000 
GENDER -.095235 .066080 -.052715 -1.441 .1500 
Constant) -1.427300 .198571 -7.188 .0000 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 3.00 HUNGARY 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACL1B1 FACRIGH1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2.. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
3.. FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
4.. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
5.. FACIMP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
6.. FACJUST1 Factor score JUSTIFY 
!.. FACRIGH2 Factor score RIGHT2 
8.. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
9.. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
10.. FACRIGH 1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
IL. FACLIB1 Factor score LIBERAL 
12.. DEGREE4 
13.. AGE 
Multiple R .51625 
R Square .26651 
Adjusted R Square .25038 
Standard Error .79615 
Analysis of Variance 
DF 
Regression 13 
Residual 591 
Sum of Squares 
136.11193 
374.60407 
Mean Square 
10.47015 
.63385 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
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COUNTRY: 3.00 HUNGARY 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SE В Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.186604 .037280 -.203178 -5.005 .0000 
FACIMP1 -.055147 .034081 -.062333 -1.618 .1062 
FACJUST1 .058346 .096508 .023100 .605 .5457 
FACLIB1 .065449 .037000 .069476 1.769 .0774 
FACRIGH1 .093286 .036362 .100039 2.565 .0105 
FACRL1 .081718 .038460 .080350 2.125 .0340 
FACRL2 -.011894 .037731 -.011315 -.315 .7527 
FACRIGH2 -.117921 .041133 -.109972 -2.867 .0043 
FACTOL1 -.001035 .041920 -8.835E-04 -.025 .9803 
AGE .002631 .002132 .051280 1.234 .2177 
ATTEND -.019997 .015095 -.049436 -1.325 .1858 
DEGREE4 .246330 .036182 .274376 6.808 .0000 
GENDER -.086341 .067191 -.046831 -1.285 .1993 
(Constant) -.507812 .187520 -2.708 .0070 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 4.00 POLAND 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * * 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACL1B1 FACRIGH1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2.. FAC1MP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
3.. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
4.. FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
5.. AGE 
6.. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
!.. FACRIGH2 Factor score R1GHT2 
8.. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS 
9.. FACJUST1 Factor score JUSTIFY 
10.. FACLIB1 Factor score LIBERAL 
11.. DEGREE4 
12.. FACRIGH1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
13.. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
Multiple R .45113 
R Square .20352 
Adjusted R Square . 18821 
Standard Error .78049 
Analysis of Variance 
Regression 
Residual 
DF 
13 
676 
Sum of Squares 
105.22493 
411.79420 
Mean Square 
8.09423 
.60916 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
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COUNTRY: 4.00 POLAND 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FAC1-A 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SE В Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.133371 .036671 -.138274 -3.637 .0003 
FACIMP1 -.024656 .031558 -.028322 -.781 .4349 
FACJUST1 .226824 .089432 .092691 2.536 .0114 
FACL1B1 .180928 .037921 .180941 4.771 .0000 
FACRIGH1 .043915 .032366 .050448 1.357 .1753 
FACRL1 .071163 .028389 .091685 2.507 .0124 
FACRL2 -.015986 .032735 -.017212 -.488 .6255 
FACRIGH2 -.120372 .038139 -.114365 -3.156 .0017 
FACTOL1 .039914 .036292 .038902 1.100 .2718 
AGE .006064 .001884 .120114 3.218 .0014 
ATTEND -.017402 .012890 -.047976 -1.350 .1775 
DEGREE4 .126432 .029104 .158620 4.344 .0000 
GENDER -.183465 .062298 -.104463 -2.945 .0033 
(Constant) -.472450 .174241 -2.711 .0069 
End Block Number I 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 5.00 RUSSIA 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FAC1 4 REGR factor score 1 for a 
The following variables are constants or have missing correlations: FACJUST1 DEGREE4 
They will be deleted from the analysis. 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACLIB1 FACRIGH 1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER 
2.. FACRL2 
3.. FACTOL1 
4.. FACDOG1 
5.. FACRIGH2 
6.. FACRL1 
!.. ATTEND 
8.. FACIMP1 
9.. AGE 
10.. FACLIB1 
11.. FACRIGH 1 
GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
Factor score TOLERANC 
Factor score DOGMATISM 
Factor score RIGHT2 
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
Factor score IMPORTANT 
Factor score LIBERAL 
Factor score RIGHT 1 
Multiple R .32906 
R Square .10828 
Adjusted R Square .08862 
Standard Error .55317 
Analysis of Variance 
Regression 
Residual 
DF 
499 
Sum of Squares 
18.54155 
152.69419 
Mean Square 
1.68560 
.30600 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
150 András Sajó 
COUNTRY: 5.00 RUSSIA 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SE В Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.151327 .035630 -.190336 -4.247 .0000 
FACIMP1 -.052918 .023808 -.100431 -2.223 .0267 
FACLIB1 .094831 .039095 .111785 2.426 .0156 
FACRIGH1 .026736 .022366 .055148 1.195 .2325 
FACRL1 -.015664 .031039 -.022055 -.505 .6140 
FACRL2 -.049042 .032163 -.065365 -1.525 .1279 
FACRIGH2 .025795 .025142 .044941 1.026 .3054 
FACTOL1 -.099848 .042153 -.100769 -2.369 .0182 
AGE -.002467 .001538 -.072029 -1.605 .1092 
ATTEND .021968 .017524 .054578 1.254 .2106 
GENDER -.091141 .051112 -.077771 -1.783 .0752 
(Constant) -.138217 .105941 -1.305 .1926 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 6.00 SPAIN 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * s 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... 
FACIEI REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUST1 FACLIB1 FACRIGH 1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2.. FACJUST1 Factor score JUSTIFY 
3.. FACLIB1 Factor score LIBERAL 
4.. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
5.. FACRIGH2 Factor score RIGHT2 
6.. FACIMP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
! . . FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
8.. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
9.. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
10.. DEGREE4 
11.. FACRIGH 1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
12.. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
13.. AGE 
Multiple R .16169 
R Square .02614 
Adjusted R Square .00664 
Standard Error .69369 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 13 8.38363 .64489 
Residual 649 312.30007 .48120 
F = 1.34017 
Signif F = .1843 
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COUNTRY: 6.00 SPAIN 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SE В Beta T SigT 
FACDOG1 -.023399 .034765 -.030604 -.673 .5011 
FACIMP1 -.051421 .041192 -.049538 -1.248 .2124 
FACJUST1 -.012530 .072134 -.007273 -.174 .8622 
FACLIB1 -.031667 .033508 -.043232 -.945 .3450 
FACRIGH1 -.014966 .036906 -.017685 -.406 .6852 
FACRL1 .052608 .034203 .064872 1.538 .1245 
FACRL2 -.018384 .027423 -.026730 -.670 .5029 
FACRIGH2 .009571 .047926 .008180 .200 .8418 
FACTOL1 -.016766 .029071 -.023376 -.577 .5643 
AGE -.003645 .001983 -.085733 -1.838 .0665 
ATTEND -.001745 .011363 -.006763 -.154 .8780 
DEGREE4 .022981 .027259 .038120 .843 .3995 
GENDER -.078902 .056433 -.056424 -1.398 .1625 
(Constant) .058942 .147876 .399 .6903 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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COUNTRY: 7.00 UNITED STATES 
* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * " 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FAC1-4 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter 
FACDOG1 FACIMP1 FACJUSTI FACLIB1 FACRIGH 1 FACRL1 FACRL2 FACRIGH2 
FACTOL1 AGE ATTEND DEGREE4 GENDER 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1.. GENDER GENDER OF RESPONDENT 
2.. FACJUSTI Factor score JUSTIFY 
3.. DEGREE4 
4.. FACRL2 REGR factor score 2 for analysis 1 
5.. FACRIGH 1 Factor score RIGHT 1 
6.. AGE 
!.. FACIMP1 Factor score IMPORTANT 
8.. ATTEND FREQUENCY OF ATTENDING RELIGIOUS SERVICE 
9.. FACRL1 REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 
10.. FACLIB1 Factor score LIBERAL 
11.. FACTOL1 Factor score TOLERANC 
12.. FACDOG1 Factor score DOGMATISM 
13.. FACRIGH2 Factor score RIGHT2 
Multiple R .53300 R Square .28409 
Adjusted R Square .27022 
Standard Error .68337 
Analysis of Variance 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 13 124.34477 9.56498 
Residual 671 313.35115 .46699 
F = 11.53884 
Signif F = .0000 
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COUNTRY: 7.00 UNITED STATES 
M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... FACIEI 
REGR factor score 1 for a 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable В SE В Beta T S igT 
FACDOG1 -.012321 .032355 -.014952 -.381 .7035 
FACIMP1 -.059706 .028566 -.071193 -2.090 .0370 
FACJUST1 -.360057 .076451 -.165295 -4.710 .0000 
FACLIB 1 .034304 .036666 .037036 .936 .3498 
FACRIGH1 -.002626 .038462 -.002815 -.068 .9456 
FACRL1 .143397 .037340 .134241 3.840 .0001 
FACRL2 .023965 .028584 .027642 .838 .4021 
FACRIGH2 -.146542 .028730 -.212532 -5.101 .0000 
FACTOL1 .107155 .032251 .130647 3.323 .0009 
AGE .005998 .001574 .129418 3.811 .0002 
ATTEND -.006910 .009048 -.026014 -.764 .4453 
DEGREE4 .174982 .030298 .215898 5.775 .0000 
GENDER -.109153 .053670 -.068263 -2.034 .0424 
(Constant) .121151 .153050 .792 .4289 
End Block Number 1 
All requested variables entered. 
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Csaba VARGA Validity 
Validity is the qualifying label of the norms in law and the acts executed in the 
name of the law, according to and by the force of which the norms and acts in 
question are recognized as the norms and the acts, respectively, of the existing 
legal system. This concept of validity, defining membership within the system,1 is 
simultaneously completed by a concept of validity that selects and identifies the 
system itself. Accordingly, validity is also the qualifying label of the system 
itself, according to and by the force of which the system in question is recognized 
by the law and order of the international community as one of the national legal 
systems. 
The concept of validity is only postulated analytically for the sake and within 
the frame of examination, but this does not have any reference in the outside 
world. In this sense, one can state that validity is an a priori idea not reducible to 
empirical terms determined by observable facts.2 The very fact that talking about 
"invalid law" would actually involve a contradictio in adjectu (oxymoron) clearly 
1 For LIPPOLD, R.: "Geltung, Wirksamkeit und Verbindlichkeit von Rechtsnormen" 
Rechtstheorie 19 (1988) 4,465, for instance, the meaning of Geltung is simply "Zugehörigkeit 
einer bestimmten Norm zu einer bestimmten Normenordnung." 
2 CASTBERG, F.: Problems of Legal Philosophy 2nd ed., Oslo-London, 1957. 
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shows this point.' Accordingly, validity ascribes legal quality to the norm from 
the outset, and its defect or eventual withdrawal will ensue in the negation of legal 
quality as well.4 The neo-kantian methodology, however, which conceives reality 
in terms of a rigid (and mutually impenetrable) duality between the domains of 
"is" and "ought", treated validity as the property of ought projections. Therefore, 
it dedicated particular theories to it which should only be devoted to genuine 
problems of legal philosophy. 
Validity can be both substantive and formal. Substantive validity is an early 
form of the concept of validity. When law was not yet formalized, not yet 
embodied in forms, anything that manifested itself as part of the enforced order 
could become valid. For instance, in arrangements based on open reasoning, 
and not yet using the selective criterion of formal relevance—like the clikaion 
(justness) type of Graeco-Roman jurisprudence, the cadi (Umayyad courts) 
jurisdiction in Islamic law, the rabbinic justice in Jewish law, the domain of the 
li (as opposed to the/a) forming the main layer of Confucian law in China, or 
the giri (rites) in Japan—, any consideration, argument, or reference could gain 
substantive validity, and could thereby become a component of law, inasmuch 
as it proved useful to be used as a reference in the process of searching for the 
just solution. In the middle ages it was accepted that only the "good, old" law 
could get the legitimizing stamp of validity. Consequently, legal actors tried 
to measure against customs the dispositions of newly enthroned monarchs, and 
even the statutory products of reforming legislation, so that correspondence 
might be established between them.5 Thus, the time-honoured practice proves 
its validity by itself; and, vice versa, ignoring the acceptance of a custom or 
breaking the application of it can grow into a force depriving it of validity 
(desuetude). 
The formal concept of validity is the product of the ius (right) reduced to the 
lex (statute). Its development can be traced down from the Roman imperial era 
3 FUCHS, A.: Die Rechtsgeltung, Vienna, 1933, 10, and PECZENIK, A.: "The Concept 
Valid Law'", Scandinavian Studies in Law 18 (1972), 213 et seq. at 214. 
4 According to Fuchs, the proposition of "Dieser Rechtssatz gilt nicht mehr" is self-
contradictory (or at least redundant) as the act of enacting involves already the positing of 
validity. Accordingly, the criticism of EKELÖF, P. O.: "The Expression Valid Rule': A Study 
in Legal Terminology" Scandinavian Studies in Law XV (1971), 61, namely that the validity of 
a legal rule is always limited in time, has no relevance here, as the proposition of "Dieser 
Rechtssatz gilt nicht mehr" is just on the transmutation of both validity and—with it—the legal 
quality. 
5 KERN, F.: Law' in his Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages (1919), trans. S. B. Chrimes, 
Oxford, 1968, 149ff. 
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to the institutionalization of the modern formal law. Modern law provides that, 
independent of substantive criteria, any enactment can gain legal validity if 
issued (promulgated) by a certain authority through a certain procedure in a 
certain form; the enactment keeps its validity until the competent authority puts 
an end to it either expressly (for instance, through the repealing act of 
derogation) or implicitly (for instance, by counterregulation) through a formal 
procedure.6 Accordingly, validity is on the final analysis the satisfaction of 
criteria needed for gaining membership in law which may be done through 
appropriate enactment.7 Theoretical reconstruction names this as validity 
transfer and validity derivation within the system; it is ideal-typical, but is the 
only one acceptable in any normative justification or reference. In the conti-
nental law of Europe, Hans Kelsen's vision, described in his so-called theory 
of gradation, derives the origin of the legal order from the so-called basic 
norm, and this legal order has a hierarchical and pyramidal construction 
through its consistent derivation.8 In Anglo-American law, H. L. A. Hart dis-
tinguishes between primary and secondary rules, the former providing the 
6 "According to the concept of systemic validity a rule R is valid in legal system LS if the 
following conditions are fulfilled: (a) R is enacted according to the rules valid in LS and thus has 
come into force; or (b) R is an acknowledged consequence of the rules valid in LS; (с) R has not 
been formally repealed (»derogated«); (d) R is not inconsistent with the rules valid in LS; (e) if 
R is inconsistent with any rule valid in LS then (ea) R is not treated as invalid according to the 
rules about conflict between legal rules or (eb) R is interpreted in such a way as to eliminate the 
inconsistency in question." WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Validity of Law and Decision of Validity" in 
his The Judicial Application of Law, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1992, 77. [Law and Philosophy 
Library], 
7 This may be phrased as "exclusivement une référence à la régularité du mode de production 
de la norme" [PERRIN, J. F.: Pour une théorie de la connaissance juridique Paris—Genève, 
1979, 95 et seq.], meaning that "cette norme satisfait aux normes qui règlent l'appartenance 
des normes au système" [SCARPELLI, U.: Qu'est-ce que le positivisme juridique? {Cos'è 
il positivismo giuridico (Milano: Communità 1965)} trans.: Colette Clavreul, Paris Bruxelles, 
1996, 39 [La pensée juridique}], as "it has been duly promulgated" [MÁYNEZ, E. G.: "The 
Philosophical-juridical Problem of Validity of Law" in Latin-American Legal Philosophy, 
Cambridge, 1948. {The 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series III)], that is, "it has been issued 
by a competent organ in accordance with the appropriate procedure" [VALDES, E. G.: 
"Algunos modelos de validez normatíva" Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía III (Mars 1977) 
1,41-68, shortened as "Two Models of Legal Validity: Hans Kelsen and Francisco Suárez" in 
Normativity and Norms Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed.: Stanley L. Paulson & 
Bonnie Litschewski-Paulson, Oxford, 1998, 265]. 
8 KELSEN, H.: Reine Rechtslehre, Vienna, 1934, ch. V. 
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genuine regulation, and the latter making and amending the former, that is, 
disposing of the conditions of their validity-granting and validity-ending.4 
Leaving behind the substantive understanding of validity in the modern age, 
its formal new concept introduces a criterion of validity easy to prove even 
amidst circumstances of bureaucratic mass application, not recoursing any 
longer to a jurisprudence based on generations' experience of "good, old" 
custom, which is hard to ascertain injudicial practice. By the act that (1) any 
product issued by the competent agent (2) through the appropriate pro-
cedure—the fulfilment of which is (for the ease of practical identification) 
usually (3) manifested by its textual promulgation in the official gazette—will 
be accepted as a valid part of the law independently of any (further) substantive 
consideration, processual criteria will on the final analysis appear as formal 
ones.10 Well, Hart is unambiguous in what Kelsen's theory of gradation is 
ambivalent about, namely whether the final criteria of formal validity are 
purely (and doubly) formal in the sense that a formal (i.e., procedural) aspect 
is defined formally in them, or they are (simply) formal in the sense that a 
substantive aspect (i.e., derivability) is defined formally in them. For the 
question of whether or not an individual norm is "issued in accordance with 
[the constitution]"" can be interpreted in the sense of formal procedurality 
(identified by agents and processes) and of substantive derivability (identified 
by contents of superior norms, or, at least, by the exclusion of the logical 
exclusion of derivability) equally. The latter interpretation is shared explicitly 
by scholars who propose "conclusion" and "freedom from contradictions" to 
add as complementary criteria to validity.12 (In some Germanic cultures, 
9 "While primary rules are concerned with actions that individuals must or must not do, the 
secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. Secondary rules [...] specify 
the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, 
varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined." HART, H. L. A.: The Concept 
of Law, Oxford, 1960, 92. 
10 In the same way as—once the lex has replaced the ius—justice in law will also be 
reduced to the notion of "justice of the law", that is, to what can be procedurally achieved 
through considerations based upon the available norms of law. Cf. VARGA, Cs.: Lectures 
on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Budapest, 1999. vii + 279, passim [Philosophiae Iuris]. 
11 KELSEN, h.: Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. Bonnie Litschewski-
Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 62, or, "verfassungsmäßig 
zustandegekommene Normen" in his original Reine Rechtslehre Einleitung in die rechts-
wissenschaftliche Problematik, Vienna, Deuticke 1934, § 30 (d). 
12 Providing that validity can be derived this way indeed, what is lost on the swings would 
be made up on the roundabouts, for we shall arrive necessarily at a paradox, self-
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ambivalence is also expressed by the duplication of meaning of the word 
'validity', moreover, by the analytical distinction drawn within the range of 
a single concept ['Geltung'] while forming corresponding adjectives. "The 
words 'valid' and 'validity' , when applied to a norm, sometimes refer to the 
existence, as such, of the norm and sometimes to the legality of the act as a 
result of which this norm came to be."13 In the notional construction of the 
German gültig', the Swedish 'giltig' and the Danish ' gyldig', on the one hand, 
and 'geltend', as well as 'gällende' and 'gœldende', on the other,14 both am-
bivalence and analytical distinction are expressed by differentiating what is valid 
itself from what can at most gain validity as an act performed.) 
What this concept suggests is immobility, orderliness, reliability, and 
foreseeability: objectivity independent of any subject, that is, something 
preestablished and pre-settled as given in things themselves from the very 
beginning, something internal that may sometimes be revealed to the outside 
observer-analyst at the most. Then, what is validity after all, and what its 
apparent similarity to truth can suggest? "Although legal norms cannot be said 
to be true or false, statements that a particular norm is valid can be either true of 
contradicting within and thereby also destroying the entire Kelsenian construction. For this 
would negate the basic message of Kelsen's claim that there is no quality in law except if 
posited by an act valid in the law. Accordingly, validity as a normative precondition of the 
legal quality of regulatory and declaratory acts could equally be posited by any act without 
such a precondition, too. Or, this is to say that we could exclusively step from one zero point, 
only to arrive at another zero point, when deriving legal quality. 
On the other hand, considering that Kelsen's validity is the "existence", and not a 
"property", of law and of its individual norms, then, as contrasted to the understanding of 
truth in epistemology, this "existence" of the norm cannot also be its substance or aspect 
simultaneously. Consequently, what is ambivalent is not of Kelsen but is our interpretation 
at the most. Wróblewski's definition (note 6) both reproduces and misunderstands this 
ambivalence when he catalogues logical consequences in the extension of positive law [paras 
(b), (d), and (e)]. Valdés (note 7), for instance, contradicts this position (261-265): 
"Kelsen's basic postulates: (1) The validity of a norm cannot be inferred from, or based on, 
facts. (2) The validity of a norm is its specific form of existence. (3) When a norm is valid 
(that is, exists), it ought to be obeyed; and if it is disobeyed, the competent organs ought to 
impose a sanction. (4) A norm is valid if it has been issued by a competent organ in 
accordance with the appropriate procedure." 
13 WRIGHT, G. H. von: Norm and Action, London, 1963. 
14 Cf. EKELÖF: 62, and ROSS, A.: "Validity and the Conflict between Legal Positivism and 
Natural Law" Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires, 1961, 4, reprinted in Normativity and Norms, 
158-159, respectively. 
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false."15 Well, such a recognition can substantiate a similarity in conception 
and methodology indeed,16 however, it makes it clear that truth and validity are 
different categories covering differing issues. For—as Kelsen summarizes it in 
his posthumous summation—there is "no parallel: (1) validity of a norm [is] 
conditional upon the act of will of which it is the meaning, [and] truth of a 
statement [is] not conditional upon the act of thought of which it is the meaning; 
(2) the validity of a norm is its existence, [and] the truth of a statement is a 
property of the statement; (3) the validity of a norm is relative to time, [and] the 
truth of a statement is not relative to time."17 
* 
Actually, law is a system which is both dynamic and open and, as opposed to any 
view suggesting a static closure,18 shows various possibilities of feedback for 
its internal mechanisms of validation.19 The vertical view of how validity 
originates hierarchically from the apex norm is complemented or eventually 
replaced by the practice of confirming validity horizontally, or upwardly, in a 
mutual and circular path between normative sources at similar and differing 
levels.2" As compared with Kelsen's and Hart 's pyramidal conception based 
15 CHRISTIE, G. C.: "The Notion of Validity in Modern Jurisprudence" Minnesota Law 
Review 48(1964), 1050. 
16 Considering (1) compatibility within the system, (2) empirical experience and (3) 
fecondity with explicative force, parallelity is seen between validity and truth (prescriptio and 
descriptio) by WOLENSKI, J.: "Truth and Legal Validity" Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie (1985) Beiheft 25, 205-210, and NHNILUOTO, I.: "Truth and Legal 
Norms" idem, 168-190. Cf. also NHNILUOTO, I.: "On the Truth and Norm-propositions" 
Rechtstheorie (1981) Beiheft 3. FARRELL, M. D.: Hacia un criterio empirico de validez, 
Buenos Aires, 1972. concludes even to the laws' verifiability upon the basis of Moritz 
Schlick's so-called logical empirism. See also HOERSTER, N.: " 'Wirksamkeit ' , Geltung' 
und Gültigkeit' von Normen: Ein empiristischer Definitionsvorschlag" in Gedächtnisschrift 
für René Marcic, Berlin, 1983, 585 et seq. 
17 KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Nonns [Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Vienna, 1979] 
trans.: Michael Hartney, Oxford, 1991, 170-174. 
18 Legal positivism in its dogmatic (extreme) understanding is predisposed to suggest absolute 
validity with binding force taken as a "Kadavergehorsam". VERDROSS, A.: Abendländische 
Rechtsphilosophie, Vienna, 1958, 252-254. 
19 ECKHOFF, T.: "Feedback in Legal Reasoning and Rule Systems" Scandinavian Studies in 
Law 22 (1976), 39ff. 
20 KRAWIETZ, W.: "Die Lehre von Stufenbau des Rechts — eine säkularisierte politische 
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upon the idea of an unidirectional (vertical) derivaton, circularity presupposes 
from the very beginning the idea of total validity, on the one hand, and a gapless 
series of part validities, on the other, each and all of them made up by acts of 
mutual confirmation through the entire process of legal practice by reference 
also to "rules of smaller scope".21 According to Jerzy Wróblewski, the possi-
bility that discrepancies or contradictions result from the dynamism of law in 
practice justifies the differentiation of formal validity into systemic validity 
reflecting the extension of the "law in books",22 and validity in force covering 
the domain of the "law in action".23 
Membership of a norm in the legal system and its actual enforceability are 
increasingly taken as a unity. According to Joseph Raz, the criterion of this unity 
must be expressed in the recognition that "the rules recognised and enforced in 
5 are legally valid in accordance with s but are not thereby themselves part of the 
legal system s". This has regard to the foreign laws invoked by private inter-
national law, to the law of religious and ethnic groups, or the rules of voluntary 
associations. These show that "validity according to law is broader than 
membership of the legal system".24 
Evidently, the legal quality of the system, that is, its validity, cannot be 
measured by a criterion from within the system. First the validity of the basic 
norm has to be posited so that further norms can then be derived from it.25 
Validity requires completion by another standard, as well. Hans Kelsen stated:26 
Theologie?" Rechtstheorie Beiheft 5: Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, 
Berlin, 1984, 255ff. 
21 MUNZER, S.: Legal Validity, The Hague, 1972, vii + 74, noting that there is "no single rule 
at the apex of a legal system which serves as the touchstone of validity". 
22 Termed as "legal validity" [von WRIGHT, G. H.: Norm and Action, London, 1963, ch. X, 
§§ 5-6], "intra-systemic validity" [Scarpelli, ch. VII], "constitutional validity" [SCHREIBER, 
R.: Die Geltung von Rechtsnormen, Berlin Heidelberg- New York, 1966, ch. III § 2], "formal 
conception of validity" [NOWAK, L.: "Cztery koncepcje obowiazywania" RPES, 1965, 2, 97 
et seq.], and—last but not least—"systemic validity' [RAZ, J.: The Authority of Law, Oxford, 
1979, 150 et seq.], 
23 WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Three Concepts of Validity of Law" Tidskrift utgiven av juridiska 
föreningen in Finland, 118 (1982), 406 et seq. at 41 Off. 
24 RAZ, J.: "Legal Validity" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie LXIII (1977), 339. et 
seq. at 342. 
25 BULYGIN, E.: "Sobre el fundamento de validez" Notas de füosofia de! derecho [Buenos 
Aires] I (1964), 23-33 and VALDÉS: 263-271. 
26 KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge, 1945, 41f. And Kelsen con-
tinues: "The efficacy of the entire legal order is a necessary condition for the validity of every 
single norm of the order. A conditio sine qua non, but not a conditio per quam. The efficacy of 
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"Although validity and efficacy are two entirely different concepts, there 
is nevertheless a very important relationship between the two. A norm is 
considered to be valid only on the condition that it belongs to a system of 
norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious. Thus, efficacy is a 
condition of validity; a condition, not the reason of validity. A norm is 
valid because it is efficacious; it is valid if the order to which it belongs is, 
on the whole, efficacious."27 
In this double understanding of the concept of validity, the legal and the 
sociological,28 the normative and the real,29 the systemic and the factual finally 
meet, despite Kelsen's strict distinction between the domains of "is" and "ought". 
This means that the feasibility of any normative expectation can only be grounded 
by the prevailing factuality. Recognizing Ludwig Wittgenstein's fundamental 
ontological fact of language use, Hart writes: "No such question can arise as to 
the validity of the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it can 
neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this 
way."30 As Joseph Raz formulated it: "Those ultimate rules of recognition are 
binding which are actually practiced and followed by the courts."31 Thereby the 
"is" evidently grounds the "ought" by unfolding its ontological priority.32 
the total legal order is a condition, not the reason for the valididty of its constituent norms. [...] 
The principle of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of effectiveness." 119. 
27 Cf. also NINO, C.: "Some Confusions around Kelsen's Concept of Validity" Archiv für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie LXIV (1978) 3, 57-89, and GUEST, S.: "Two Problems in 
Kelsen's Theory of Validity" The Liverpool Law Review II (1980) [Jurisprudence Issue], 
101-108. 
28 E.g., EKELÖF: op. cit. 63. 
29 Or, legal and real, in KLUG, U.: "Rechtslücke und Rechtsgeltung" in Festschrift für Hans 
Carl Nipperdey, ed.: R. Dietz and H. Hübner, I, München Berlin, 1965, 71-94. 
30 HART: op. cit. 105f. 
31 RAZ: op. cit. 344. 
32 E.g. GARRN, H.: "Rechtswirksamkeit und faktische Rechtsgeltung: Ein Beitrag zur 
Rechtssoziologie" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 55 (1969), 161-181, treats the 
relationship as a re-transformation from "ought" to "is". A predictive function concerning the 
future behaviour of judges is attributed to the notion of validity as an "ought" re-reflected upon 
"is"—"taken as a complex of social facts"—by ROSS, A.: "Validity and the Conflict between 
Legal Positivism and Natural Law" Revista Juridica de Buenos Aires ( 1961) 4, 46-93, reprint 
in Nonnativity and Norms, 159-160. Cf. also MENEGHELLI, R.: II probléma dell ' ejfettività 
nella teorie délia validità giuridica, Padua, 1964. 
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There is a number of other formulations as well. Following Wróblewski's 
pattern," for instance, Aulis Aarnio differentiates systemic, factual, and 
axiological concepts of validity to emphasize acceptability in addition to validity 
and efficacy.34 Ralf Dreier offers also a tripartite definition according to which 
"A legal norm is valid sociologically when both its followance and non-
followance is sanctioned; legally, when it is worded so by the competent organ 
in the procedural way; and morally, when it can be seen as ethically 
justified."35 On his turn, among others,36 François Ost distinguishes formal, 
empirical and axiological concepts of validity for that legality, effectivity and 
legitimity can be shown in inter-secting circles as potentialities and stages of 
development of both the static construction and the dynamic formation of law.37 
According to a further, personalist trend, validity lies in the law's idea and the 
latter's communal recognition.38 Some approaches offer a rather complex pers-
pective. Karl Larenz enumerates normative, sociological, psychological and 
ontological understandings of validity.34 This is re-echoed by Stephen Munzer's 
distinction in questioning "whether something is able to produce or accomplish 
what is appropriate or intended" (standing for validity and efficacy), and 
"whether or not something is in being" (standing for existence).40 
All these variations at conceptualisation are on the final account mere 
attempts at delimiting the bordering line that can be drawn between the realms 
of "is" and "ought" through defining the latter's boundaries, quality, sources 
and powers, as well as the mechanism of its working. This is an impossible yet 
33 WRÓBLEWSKI: "Three Concepts", op. cit. 409-A17. 
34 AARNIO, A.: "On the Validity, Efficacy and Acceptability of Legal Norms" in his 
Philosophical Perspectives in Jurisprudence, Helsinki, 1983, 152-163 [Acta Philosophica 
Fennica 36] and in Objektivierung des Rechtsdenkens Gedächtnisschrift für Ilmar Tammelo, ed.: 
Werner Krawietz, Theo Mayer-Maly, Ota Weinberger, Berlin, 1984, 427-437. For a similar 
tripartite division, see BOUCKAERT, В.: "Gelding en bindende kracht van de rechtsnorm in 
rechtsdogmatiek, rechtssociologie en rechtsfilosofie" R. W. (1975) 20, 1217 et seq. 
35 DREIER, R.: "Recht und Moral" [1980] in his Recht—Moral—Ideologie Studien zur Rechts-
theorie, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, 194 [Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 344]. 
36 With "obligatoriness" [LIPPOLD: op. cit. 463-489] or a "de lege ferenda ideality" 
[SCHREIBER: op. cit. 58 et seq.] as the third element. 
37 OST, F.: "Validité" in Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit 2e 
éd. corrigée et augmentée, dir.: Anré-Jean Arnaud, Paris, 1993, 635 and 638. 
38 TAKESHITA, K.: "Der Geltungsgrund des Rechts" Kansai University Review of Law and 
Politics, (March 1981) No 2, 1-14. 
39 LARENZ, K.: Das Problem der Rechtsgeltung, Berlin, 1929, (reprint 1967), 9ff. 
40 MUNZER: op. cit. passim. 
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unavoidable task notwithstanding. According to one of Kelsen's earliest 
realisations, entering—by making—the law is "a great mystery"41 that can at 
most be hypothesised but not derived. For we are either within or without the 
law; we can only enter it by the previous declaration of having already been 
within; paradoxically—as with any cleus ex machina solution—this declaration 
presupposes (by having advanced ideally and posited as a logical premise) 
exactly that what we cannot derive in an analytically consequential way from. 
For the stepping stones of derivation are either premises already presumed 
implicitly from the beginning or they are ones argued actually (and arguable at 
all in principle) circularly all around, based upon that what should have been 
proved. 
* 
Kinds of legal realism—based upon the everyday professional experience in 
English-American and Nordic law—are characterised by a more differentiated 
conceptual representation, solving the doctrinally oriented understanding of 
validity in the actual practice of power-conferring. "Validity is a concept special 
to institutional normative orders, since it is the conceptual tool for distinguishing 
between that which is operative within the system and that which is not.'"12 This 
rather pragmatic approach suggests from the beginning that validity is not a 
property inherent in any way in se and/or per se in the norm itself. Validity can 
only be revealed, ascertained and confirmed through an act of interpretation 
taking place in a linguistic game,4 3 and this is to say thay both law and 
procedure, theory of games and linguistic use are also in a position to afford 
relevant aspects.44 All this concludes to stating that systemic validity is self-
41 KELSEN, H.: Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom 
Rechtssatze, Tübingen, Mohr, 1911,411. 
42 MacCORMICK, N.: "Powers and Power-conferring Norms" in Normativity and Norms, 
500-501. 
43 VANQU1CKENBORNE, M.: "Quelques réflexions sur la notion de validité" Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit 1968, 185 et seq. For a criticism, see SCHREIBER: op. cit. 159. It is to be 
noted that Wróblewski ["Three Concepts", 409] considers the "formal and interpretative 
consequences" of the enacted valid norms the natural components of systemic validity. 
44 "[L]es usagers de la langue en sont à la fois les auteurs et les juges." OST, F.: "Le code et 
le dictionnaire: Acceptabilité linguistique et validité juridique" Sociologie et sociétés XVIII (avril 
1986) 1, 59-75, and "Essai de définition et de caractérisation de la validité juridique" in OST, 
F. van de KERCHOVE, M.: Jalons pour une théorie critique du droit, Bruxelles, 1987, 309 et 
seq. and, as to the application of the point of view of the theory of games, pp. 312 et seq. 
[Travaux et recherches 9]. 
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related and auto-referential, moreover, the practice of validity confirmation 
is eventually self-closing: it draws its own boundaries incessantly and consequently 
whilst it makes the expectations addressed to its own operation fulfilled.46 This 
autopoiesis in practice explains why validity is seen by some authors more as a 
priority list of expectations to be met preferentially in a complex of practical setting 
than a simple catalogue enumerating exhaustively all criteria that are of a sine qua 
non character and are to be fulfilled absolutely.47 
Within the framework and intellectual horizon of contemporary pragmatism, 
Scandinavian legal realism is the trend that has transformed value as an axiological 
element into a social psychological phenomenon which results, stepping from acts 
of social identification and action, in the common acceptance of the law's 
obligatoriness. "An order is created once partners to it are agreed upon excepting 
it together."48 This is the background that justifies Alf Ross concluding that 
"Validity in the normative sense has no function in describing and 
explaining reality. Its function is to reinforce the legal system by 
proclaiming that the legal obligations of the system are not merely legal 
obligations backed up by sanctions, but also moral duties. The normative 
notion of validity is an ideological instrument supporting the authority of the 
state."49 
This self-destruction of the very idea of validity has served as a pattern for the 
discursive theory of law with the claim of optimum consensus at its background 
within the conceptualisation of the State as a democratic Rechtsstaatlichkeit,50 
which, once accepted, has ascribed a consensus-dependent context to the ideal of 
45 LUHMANN, N.: A Sociological Theory of Law, London-Boston—Melbourne- Henley, 1985, 
285, and "Die Geltung des Rechts" Rechtstheorie 22 (1991) 3, 273-286. 
46 Cf. VARGA: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, passim. 
47 "[I]n comparison with the speech act theory, rather then requiring that all conditions be 
positively satisfied, the proposed schema [of validity] requires only that a given condition not 
be shown not to have been satisfied". PAULSON, S. L.: "Neue Grundlagen für einen Begriff der 
Rcchtsgeltung" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 65 (1979), 1-19. 
48 HEINZ, E. K.: "'Geltung' und Verbindlichkeit' im Bereich normativer Ordnungen" Archiv 
für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 55 (1969), 355-366. For an earlier advance, see ROSS, A.: 
On Law and Justice, Copenhagen, 1958, 36-38. 
49 ROSS: "Validity and the Conflict", 147-163. 
50 HABERMAS, J.: Faktizität und Geltung Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats ( 1992). 
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validity,51 moreover, it has even elevated it to serve as its mere critérium52 in 
the long and open-chanced process of the apparent dissolution and transitory 
transformation of the very core element of the concept.53 
51 Cf., e.g., Rechtsgeltung und Konsens ed.: G. Jakobs, 1976. 
52 Cf., e.g., LÜDERSSEN К.: Juristische Topik und konsensorientierte Rechtsgeltung" in 
Festschrift für Helmuth Coing 1 (1982), 549. 
53 For funher issues in quest for validity, cf. ALEXY, R.: Begriff und Geltung des Rechts 2nd 
ed., 1994; BARROS, E.: Rechtsgeltung und Rechtsordnung, 1984; CONTE, A. G.: "Studio per 
une teória délia validità" Rivista internazionale di Filosofîa del diritto XLVII (1970), 31 et seq. 
and "Validità" in Novissimo Digesto Italiano XX (Torino 1974); Farinas DULCE, M. J. F.: El 
probléma de la validezjuridica, Madrid, 1991; HUSSERL, G.: Rechtskraft und Rechtsgeltung, 
1925; KAUFMANN, A.: Das Gewissen und das Problem der Rechtsgeltung, 1990; NEUMANN, 
U.: "Theorien der Rechtsgeltung" in W. Hassemer—Volkmar Gessner (ed.) Gegenkultur und 
Rechts (1985), 21 et seq.; OPALEK, K.: "The Problem of the Validity of Law" Archívum 
Iuridicum Cracoviense III (1970); TAKESHITA, K.: "Recht und Geltung" Kansai University 
Review of Law and Politics (March 1980) No. 1, 1 -19 ; SUMMERS, R. S.: "Toward a Better 
General Theory of Legal Validity" Rechtstheorie (1984) 4, 65-83; VARGA, Cs.: "Geltung des 
Rechts Wirksamkeit des Rechts" in Die gesellschaftliche Wirksamkeit des sozialistischen 
Rechts ed. K. A. Mollnau, Berlin[East], 1978, 138-145 and "Heterogeneity and Validity of 
Law: Outlines of an Ontological Reconstruction" in Rechtsgeltung ed. Csaba Varga-Ota 
Weinberger, Stuttgart, 1986, 88-100 [Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 27], 
both reprinted in VARGA, Cs.: Law and Philosophy Selected Papers in Legal Theory, 
Budapest, 1994, 35-42 and 20-218 [Philosophiae Iuris], as well as The Place of Law in Lukács' 
World Concept, Budapest, 1985 (reprint 1998) 193, passim; WELZEL, H.: An den Grenzen des 
Rechts Die Frage nach der Rechtsgeltung, 1966, and "Macht und Recht, Rechtspflicht und 
Rechtsgeltung" in Festschrift für K. G. Hugelmann 2 (1959), 833 et seq.; WOLF, E.: "II 
probléma délia validità nella prospettiva di une ontologia del diritto" Rivista internazionale di 
filosofîa del diritto XXVI (1959) IV; WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Problems of Objective Validity of 
Norms" Rechtstheorie 14(1983), 19-28. 
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Eight Finnish-Hungarian Seminar 
on Criminal Law 
The eight Finnish-Hungarian seminar on criminal law (devoted to the topic 
"Internationalization and Europeanization of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice") 
took place in Helsinki and Turku, from 25th to 30th September 2000. The 
occurrences, arranged by turns in Finland and in Hungary, are founded upon the 
bilateral agreement between the Finnish and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
Notwithstanding the cooperation never was limited to academician researchers, 
but representatives of other institutions (e.g. universities, courts) also participated 
at the seminars.' Actually the sixth event was completed to a trilateral one, 
because, besides the Finnish and Hungarian scholars, it was attended by two 
university lecturers from Estonia as well.2 Since the previous seminar, which was 
arranged in Budapest and Miskolc, the sessions took place not only in the capital 
of the hosting country, but in an other significant university town. 
The Hungarian reports are published in this number of this periodical, so I 
limit myself to review the presentations of the Finnish participants: 
1 See, FEHÉR, L.: "Hungarian-Finnish seminary in Budapest on criminal law". Acta Juridica 
Tomus 23/1-2. (1981) 225-230. 
2 See, MOHÁCSI, P.: "Finn-magyar—észt büntetőjogi szeminárium (Finnish-Hungarian-Es-
tonian Seminar on Criminal Law)", Állam és Jogtudomány, XXXVI/1-2. (1994) 180-192. 
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The seminar was opened by Professor Raimo Lahti, who commemorated the 
history of such seminars. In his introductory remarks he outlined the main 
tendencies concerning the internationalization and europeanization of criminal 
law. He examined the role of the United Nations in the global criminal policy 
especially in the establishment the ICTY3 and ICTR4 by the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council, the adoption of the Statute for the International Criminal 
Court by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 
Rome on July 1998, and the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme. Professor Lahti refers to the opinion of Professor Mireille Delmas-
Marty concerning the main tendencies in European Criminal policy: the 
harmonization (common guiding principles, obligation of compatibility) or 
unification (identical rules, obligation of conformity). He shared the Scandinavian 
criticism against the unification of the European criminal policy, and also 
against the "Corpus Juris" proposal, because this tendencies can endanger the 
basic values of the "Nordic model" (e.g. the relatively low level of the repression 
in criminal sanctions).5 
Mr. Tuomas Pöysti gave his lecture on the "European Union and the Develop-
ments towards European Criminal, Financial and Administrative Penal Law". He 
pointed out that the growing importance of the instruments and activities of the 
EU in this spheres of law should not endanger the values of the enlightenment, 
the humanistic traditions of Europe. He deem necessary the strengthening of the 
authority of the European Court of Justice in controlling the EU instruments and 
provide more protection for human rights and freedoms. He emphasizes that the 
EU does not query the legitimacy of its own activities, so it is the task of the 
scientific sphere. 
Ms. Katariina Jahkola held forth on "Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters from the European Point of View". As she ascertained, in spite of the 
strong international political pressure, the ratification and the implementation of 
the international instruments is slow. It can be attributed mainly to the traditional 
and constitutional obstacles. She examined the new forms and tools of co-
3 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. 
4 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide 
and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed 
in the territory of neighbouring States, between January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
5 See more, LAHTI, R.: "Toward an International and European Criminal Policy?" in Liber 
Amicorum Bengt Broms. (Ed. Tupamäki Matti) Finnish Branch of the International Law 
Association , Helsinki, 1999. 222-240. 
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operation, e.g. direct contact between the authorities, video hearings, the 
application of the law of the requesting states in the requested one, if this does not 
run counter to the basic principles of legal order of the latter. She also dealt with 
the problem, that according to the new European instruments the cooperation is 
independent from the traditional preconditions (e.g. the double criminality) and 
prohibitions (e.g. the extradition of nationals). According to her, the pro-
portionality in the national criminal law systems can be interfered if the 
international instruments not only contain the duty to criminalize (and the 
definition of the given type of crime), but also the minimum of the penalty. 
The presentation of Mr. Ari Hirvonen "Law and Justice in the Regions' 
Europe" dealt with one of the basic questions of the European philosophy of law 
the relation among act ("Gesetz"), law ("Recht") and justice ("Gerechtigkeit"). As 
he emphasised, the recognition of the difference and the connection between this 
trial of concepts can be useful to understand better the traditions and the 
developments of the European legal culture. 
Professor Ari-Matti Nuutila held forth on "The New Finnish General Part of 
Criminal Law in European Comparison". From his lecture we can form a sketchy 
review of the procedure of the codification and the main goals of it (e.g. the 
neutrality in relation to criminal law theories, comprehensive common and at the 
same time exact legal language, flexibility for new legal development). He 
thoroughly examined the requirements of the nullum crimen / nulla poena sine 
lege towards the legislation, with special regards to the rules of the EU legislation 
(e.g. directives), the governmental regulations authorised by an act of the 
Parliament, the open or closed list of qualifying circumstances, etc. He also dealt 
with some questions regarding the elements (preconditions) of the criminal 
liability (e.g. liability for omissions, intention, scope and excess of self-defence, 
age limit of the responsibility). 
Ms. Vilja Hahto in her presentation "The Position of the Victim in the Settle-
ment of Violent Crimes" emphasised that the crime should not be illustrated and 
conceived as a linear connection between the victim and the state, because it is a 
tree-square relation, in which the victim is also participated. She analysed the 
scientific theories on the role of the victim in the criminal justice system and their 
realisation in Finnland, especially the concept of compensation among the 
criminal sanctions, the role of the victim in the criminal procedure, the state 
sponsored reparation of the victims of violent crimes. 
Mr. Heikki Jaatinen in his presentation "Corporate Criminal Liability in 
Finland and in the European Union" analysed the special triangular connection 
among the crime, the criminal and the legal person. He dealt with the necessity 
of the private, the corporate-criminal and personal-criminal responsibility in 
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relation to each other. He does not propose the application of the corporate 
criminal liability concerning any crime, but only in relation to special categories, 
e.g. environmental or economical criminality. According to him the corporate 
criminal liability is unsuitable answer to the challenges of organised crime, 
because the organised criminal simply leave the concerned firm to its fate and 
does not care about its punishing. 
Besides the work in the sessions we were informed by Ms. Katalin Ligeti at 
the Open Meeting of the Finnish Section of the International Association of Penal 
Law (IAPL6) on the "Recent and Future Activities of the AIDP and Its Young 
Penalist".7 In recognition of the efforts towards the establishment and 
development of the relations between Finnish and Hungarian criminal lawyers 
and researchers the medal "Helsingiensis Universitas" was awarded to Professor 
Imre A. Wiener. 
All the participants of the Seminar hope that the co-operation between the 
Finnish and the Hungarian criminal lawyers will be remained fruitful and the 
tradition of such seminars will be followed by similar occasion. 
M. H. 
6 Association Internationale de Droit Penal (AIDP). 
7 See more, Ligeti К.: "Young Penalist in the Association" 127-130. in: Csemegi Károly 
emlékkönyv (ed.: Wiener A. Imre, Budapest, MTA Jogtudományi Intézet). 
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Imre A. WIENER New Elements of International 
Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
Professor Lahti refers to the new UN programme of crime prevention and 
criminal justice.1 The reorganisation of the activities of the United Nations in 
1991 resulted in the creation of a special programme on the basis of which the 
UN General Assembly adopted the following resolution: 
a. the prevention of crime within and among States, 
b. the control of crime both nationally and internationally, 
c. the strengthening of regional and international co-operation in crime 
prevention, criminal justice and the combating of transnational crime, 
d. the integration and consolidation of the efforts of Member States in 
prevention and combating transnational crime, 
e. more efficient and effective administration of justice, with due respect 
for the human rights of all those affected by crime and all those involved 
in the criminal justice system, 
f. the promotion of the highest standards of fairness, humanity, justice and 
professional conduct.2 
1 LAHTI, R.: Towards an International and European Criminal Policy? In: Liber Amicorum 
Bengt Broms. (Ed. Tupamäki Matti) Finnish Branch of the International Law Association, 
Helsinki, 1999. 225-226. 
2 46/152 ( 19 December 1991). 
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In this report I intend to point out some new elements of the international 
co-operation in criminal matters on the basis of the Lockerbie and Pinochet 
cases. I am of the opinion that this General Assembly Resolution served as a 
background of the UN activities in the Lockerbie case. The decision of the 
House of Lords in the Pinochet case was influenced by the preparation of the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court. ' 
I. New forms of UN activities and their ICJ support 
As it is well known, the bombing of the Pan Am airliner over Lockerbie happened 
in Scotland on 21 December 1988. 4 years later, in 1992, the Security Council of 
the United Nations demanded in its Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) that 
Libya submit the two accused Libyan nationals for trial before a Scottish court. 
The Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Libya as well. 
Neither the United Kingdom, nor the United States negotiated directly with 
Libya. There were suspicions both in the United Kingdom and in the United 
States that there could be connections between the accused and the Libyan 
Government. Consequently, the Libyan authorities could not be trusted as far as 
impartial and independent criminal proceedings are concerned. The United States 
and the United Kingdom did not respond to Libyan requests for mutual legal 
assistance as required under the Montreal Convention. 
Lybia refused the extradition of the two suspects referring to its domestic law 
that prohibited the extradition of Libyan nationals. In the meantime Libya had 
begun proceedings before the International Court of Justice against both the US 
and the UK because they had failed to meet their obligations under the 1971 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation. Libya claimed its willingness to prosecute those accused of the 
bombing. By the prosecution Lybia can fulfill its own obligations under the 
Montreal Convention. 
Libya reasoned on one hand that a fair trial could not be expected in either of 
the two countries, since any jury would be biased and on the other hand, it was 
not willing to surrender the suspects to the United Kingdom or the United States, 
referring to its own domestic law. 
In a provisional order of 14 April 1992, the International Court of Justice 
decided that a Security Council Resolution, based on Article 103 of the UN 
3 The Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Documentary History. Compiled by M. 
Cherif Bassiouni. Transnational Publishers, Inc. Ardsley, New York, 1998. 
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Charter, prevails over the obligations of the Parties under any other international 
agreement, including those under the Montreal Convention. 
Some years went on until the United Kingdom accepted a proposal for a 
Scottish court trial in a third country. The United States concurred. At the request 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, the Netherlands expressed its 
willingness to host such a court on their territory. 
This initiative was welcomed by the Security Council in its Resolution 1192 
(1998) of 27 August 1998. The Resolution called all states to co-operate to ensure 
the presence of the two before a Scottish Court in the Netherlands. The above 
Resolution says that on the arrival of the two accused in the Netherlands, the 
Government of the Netherlands shall detain the two accused pending their 
transfer for the purpose of trial before the Scottish court. In accordance with 
paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998) the measures imposing 
economic sanctions on Libya have been suspended. 
The help of the Secretary-General of the United Nations was decisive for the 
transfer. It was planned that the two accused persons should be transported on 
board of a United Nations aircraft from Libya to the Netherlands. On the 5th 
April 1999, the two accused were surrendered to a United Nations official at 
Tripoli airport in Libya. They were surrendered to the Scottish authorities in the 
Netherlands the same day. 
On the day of the arrival of the two accused in the Netherlands, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan expressed his wish that the outcome of the trial will lead to 
a full and permanent resumption of normal relations between Libya and the rest 
of the international community. 
II. Trial on a foreign territory 
Scottish courts have criminal jurisdiction over the accused, but this jurisdiction 
only means a trial court sitting at any place in Scotland. In order to meet the 
requirements of the Security Council Resolution to establish a Scottish court in 
the Netherlands further legal basis was needed, and an Agreement between the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands was necessary, too. 
The High Court of Justiciary Order provided the legal basis for the trial of this 
particular case in the Netherlands.4 On the 18th September 1998 the United 
Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concluded a bilateral agreement. 
4 Statutory Instruments, 1998, No. 2251. 
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The Scottish Court has the power to make regulations for the purpose of fully 
executing its full functions. Under the Agreement: no law or regulation of the 
host country, which is inconsistent with a regulation of the Scottish Court, shall 
be applicable within the premises of the Scottish Court. Disputes concerning this 
and all provisions of the Agreement shall be resolved by consultation and 
negotiation between the parties. 
The jurisdiction of the Scottish Court is limited to this trial which includes 
preparations for the trial, any determination of law or fact and the imposition of 
penal sanctions, and any appeal following conviction, all in accordance with 
Scottish law and practice. As the Agreement is bilateral instrument, the United 
States will not be formally bound by the outcome of the trial. Nevertheless, in 
view of the enormity of the horror in the Lockerbie case, the US Congress also 
passed a special law allowing those who are victims of acts of international 
terrorism to sue the Government of any state that sponsors terrorism. Presumably 
this is why the charges contain the words "while the accused were acting as 
members of the Libyan security services".5 Moreover armed guards escorted the 
accused, who have been held at the former US airforce base for more than a 
year.6 
The Lockerbie case will not be trialed with a jury but by a panel of three 
judges. Before the International Court of Justice, Libya opposed the possibility 
of a jury trial, stated that the two could not receive a fair trial in the United 
States or in the United Kingdom. In this case, the panel of three judges instead 
of a jury was a concession to the Libyan arguments against a biased jury. Under 
the special provisions for the Lockerbie trial, the verdict will be taken by 
majority. 
The Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands regulates 
the sitting of the Scottish Court in the Netherlands, and the matters arising out 
of the trial and the proper functioning of the Scottish Court. This Agreement is 
similar to other examples. 
The status of the Scottish Court can be compared with the military courts 
of the NATO. The military courts may hold trials in the foreign state, and 
detain persons belonging to its own forces. The domestic authorities shall give 
any assistance sought by the foreign authorities. The position of the Scottish 
Court deviates from that of NATO military courts which jurisdiction is limited 
to their own forces, and may even relate to crimes committed in the host 
country. 
5 The Times, May 9, 2000. 
6 The Times, May 4, 2000. 
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The position of the Scottish court is similar to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. The creation of the 
ad hoc tribunals for the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia opens the 
way for trial beyond state level and under certain circumstances, states must 
defer to these supranational institutions. In the Lockerbie case a foreign court 
has special legal position in another souvereign territory. 
I agree with A. Klip and M. Mackarel that the establishment of a domestic 
criminal court sitting on an extraterritorial basis in this manner is unprecedented 
and can be viewed as another step in the pragmatic approach being adopted by 
the international legal community towards international and trans-national 
criminality. This bilateral treaty between the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom is a new step in international co-operation in criminal matters. It must 
be considered as an ad hoc solution for a complicated political problem and 
should be welcomed in that respect. Like the transfer of proceedings and the 
transfer of the executions of judgments, it forms an alternative to the more 
traditional forms of co-operation, such as extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.7 
III. Legal problems of the Lockerbie case 
A. Klip and M. Mackarel assume that on a formal basis the two accused left 
Libya voluntarily. This is relevant in order to determine whether Libyan law was 
violated or not. Since Libyan law prohibits the extradition of nationals, only a 
voluntary decision by the accused to leave the country can circumvent that . 81 
do not think that one of the major questions is whether the two voluntarily 
boarded the plane. The suspects deny three charges of murder, conspiracy 
to murder and breaching a 1982 Civil Aviation Act. The defence lawyers 
announced that they would seek to exonerate their clients by incriminating 
others. They specifically named two terrorist organisations and also named ten 
individuals.9 
Since the Judgement of the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie 
case, it is clear that Security Council Resolutions shall prevail over other 
obligations. This means that the actual transfer should not have been dependent 
7 KLIP, A. and MACKAREL, M.: The Lockerbie t r ia l -A Scottish Court in the Netherlands. 
Revue International de Droit Pénal У et 4' trimestres 1999. 817. 
8 KLIP- MACKAREL: op. cit. 792. 
9 The Times, May 4, 2000. 
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on a voluntary decision of the accused persons. Accordingly, in my opinion the 
Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) prevails over Libyan domestic law. In 
line with this reasoning Article 29 point 2 says that: States shall comply without 
undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial 
Chamber, including, but not limited to (e) the surrender or the transfer of the 
accused to the International Tribunal.10 
I do not see any real legal problem of the next questions put forward by A. 
Klip and M. Mackarel: What was their status on board the United Nations 
aircraft? Must this also be considered as voluntary? Since the United Nations 
itself does not have any power to detain or to extradite persons, we must also 
assume that their presence aboard the aircraft was also voluntary.11 
In my approach to these questions: if the ICJ stated that the Security 
Counsil Resolution shall prevail over other international obligations, the 
resolutions should have self-executive power. The UN Secretary General did 
not do anything else than to execute the resolution of the Security Council, 
when providing the UN aircraft for the transfer of accused persons. The UN 
participation in a given case is also a new element of the international co-
operation in criminal matters. 
It is a question whether the establishment of a Scottish Court in The 
Netherlands is the constitution of a special court for a single crime and for the 
two accused only. I agree with A. Klip and M. Mackarel that the Court cannot 
be regarded as a special one. The only thing which is special is the seat of the 
court and I do not think that the opposition of the Libyan Government against 
a jury trial should be relevant here. 
It is a domestic legal problem whether a provision would be necessary as 
it already existed in Article 15 YTAA in connection with the Yugoslavian 
court: "The transit of persons who have been convicted by the Tribunal and in 
respect of whom a custodial sentence is to be enforced in a foreign State shall 
be conducted on the instructions of Our Minister by Dutch officials and under 
their guard. The said officials shall be empowered to take all appropriate 
measures for the security of the persons in question and to prevent their 
escape."12 
10 Annex of the Security Council Resolution 827/1993: International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. 
11 KLIP-MACKAREL: op. cit. 792. 
12 KLIP MACKAREL: op. cit. 816. 
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IV. Crimes under international law trialed by national courts 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility under international law—either 
customary or treaty is not any longer disputed.13 On the contrary, that is a 
debated issue whether national courts can be a proper forum for prosecuting 
crimes of international law. More generally: whether a national court is well 
qualified to enforce international law. 
In Hungary the war crimes and the crimes against humanity committed 
during the World War II were punished by a provision with retroactive effect 
of national law. Such crime was punished by a foreign court as well. The 
Canadian High Court of Justice convicted a Hungarian national for deporting 
Jews during the war. This case shows that any state may exercise its juris-
diction over an individual found in its territory, irrespective of the place where 
the crime was committed when such offences can be categorized as crimes 
against humanity. 
In Hungary we can see some unsuccessful attempts to investigate, prosecute 
and punish individuals for crimes against humanity, committed under past 
regimes. Some states enacted amnesty laws which have barred proceedings 
against the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Customary international law 
neither prohibits such laws nor obligates other states to recognize their effects. 
Only international treaties lay down the obligation either to prosecute or 
extradite individuals who have committed certain offences of universal 
concern.14 
The Pinochet case cannot be regarded as the prosecution of crimes committed 
during World War II or characterized as the new political regime wants to 
prosecute the offences committed during the past regime. The Pinochet case 
shows that it is possible to enforce the contemporary standards of international 
law by the interpretation of domestic statutes. 
As it is well known, General Pinochet was arrested on the basis of two 
provisional arrest warrants issued by United Kingdom magistrates, at the request 
of Spanish courts, pursuant to the European Convention on Extradition. 
One of the interpretations of the principle of double criminality in English 
law says that an extradition crime is an act that is criminal in both the requesting 
and the requested state. Since the murder of a British citizen by a non-British 
citizen outside the United Kingdom would not constitute an offence in respect 
13 BIANCHI, A.: Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case. European Journal of 
International Law, 1999. Vol. 10. No. 2.) 238. 
14 E.g. the Montreal Convention. 
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of which the UK could claim extraterritorial jurisdiction, the murder of Spanish 
citizens by non-Spanish citizens in Chile cannot be qualified as an extradition 
crime. 
After clashing decisions of lower courts, a panel of seven Law Lords on 24 
March 1999 rendered its decision on the case. By a majority of six to one, the 
House of Lords in the judgment held that General Pinochet was not immune for 
torture and conspiracy if these acts were committed after 8 December 1988 
when the section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 implements the Torture 
Convention. 
The question of which critical date is relevant for the double criminality 
principle was solved by requiring that the alleged conduct constituted an 
offence in both the requesting and the requested state at the date of the actual 
conduct.15 Since torture only became an extraterritorial offence after the entry 
into force of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, alleged acts of 
torture and conspiracies to commit torture outside the United Kingdom before 
that time did not constitute an offence under English law. Therefore, they 
could not be qualified as extradition crimes under the principles of double 
criminality. 
Only Lord M illett maintained that English courts would have jurisdiction 
at common law over acts of torture from a much earlier date, when international 
law recognised that such acts could be prosecuted by any state on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction. He pointed out that the English courts have and always 
have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in respect of crimes of universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law including the systematic use of 
torture on a large scale and as an instrument of state policy which had already 
attained the status of an international crime of universal jurisdiction. 
Eventually, Lord Millett yielded to the view of the majority and proceeded 
on the basis that Pinochet could not be extradited for acts of torture committed 
prior to the coming into force of section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act.16 
In this part of the judgement the viewpoint of the majority of Lords was that 
statutory international law prevails both over customary international law and 
common law. I think Lord Millett's opinion harmonized with the conception of 
the next issue. 
15 For the purpose of double criminality US and Swiss law do not require that the relevant 
conduct be criminal in both the requesting and the requested state at the time the alleged crime 
was committed. 
16 BIANCHI: op. cit. 244. 
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V. Immunity of the head of state 
Most of the Law Lords formed the opinion that immunity of the head of state 
would simply be incompatible with the provisions of the Torture Convention, 
which clearly indicates the official or governmental character of torture as a 
constituent element of the crime. 
Under customary international law there can be no immunity for crimes of 
international law. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain grave 
offences is permitted on the basis of the universality principle. However, if one 
characterizes the prohibition of torture as norms of ius cogens, that immunity 
can not co-exist with them. Since ius cogens norms enjoy the highest status 
within international law they prevail and invalidate other rules of international 
law.17 
The human rights atrocities cannot be qualified as sovereign acts: inter-
national law cannot regard as sovereign those acts which are not merely a violation 
of it, but constitute an attack against its very foundation and predominant 
values.18 
John Hopkins wrote: "The cases show remarkable and, as it appears, un-
precedented willingness to rely upon provisions of international law, both 
conventional and customary, in domestic proceedings. The relationship between 
international and municipal law will be viewed very differently henceforth. In 
particular, the apparently ready acceptance by the majorities of the notion of ius 
cogens and of the provisions of the Torture Convention (and of certain other 
treaties) as instances of the ius cogens is perhaps surprising."19 
However the decision in Pinochet case referred to the norms of ius cogens, 
it is disputed what norms qualify for the category of ius cogens. Genocide, 
apartheid, torture committed as a matter of state policy, murder, arbitrary 
detention and enforced disappearance of individuals can be included in the list. 
The category of ius cogens shows the values and interests which are regarded as 
fundamental by the international community as a whole. After the Pinochet case 
not only the world public opinion demands that violations of fundamental 
international obligations must be treated seriously. I think the legal inter-
pretation of Law Lords is similar to the above mentioned ICJ decision when 
making hierarchy in international obligations. 
17 Ibid. 262. 
18 Ibid. 265. 
19 HOPKINS, j.: Case and Comment-Former head of foreign state—extradition-immunity. The 
Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 58 Part 3 November 1999, 465. 
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Many principles, rules and doctrines of both international and domestic law 
are reminiscent of an old-fashioned and no longer viable approach to inter-
national law, which regards respect for the sovereignty of states as the funda-
mental value of the international system. Opposite this the "notion of individual 
accountability for crimes against humanity, the active role of municipal courts 
in the enforcement of international criminal law as well as the steady process of 
erosion of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine are all elements which are 
hardly amenable within the traditional representation of the international legal 
system as a horizontally-organised community of sovereign and independent 
states."20 
As a summary it can be stated that the two cases show a new development in 
the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. The international co-operation 
in criminal matters generally will be based on the joint activities of sovereign 
and independent states in the future as well. Nevertheless, the new methods of 
this development might work against the national legal system of a given state, 
referring to the hierarchy that exists in the international legal order. 
2« BIANCHI: op. cit. 271. 
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Lenke FEHÉR International Efforts Against 
Trafficking in Human Beings 
1. Introduction 
Following the changing mentality, the efforts to find a common definition, 
concerning trafficking in human beings, focusing on the issue to harmonise the 
national and international legal measures, legal instruments aiming at combat-
ing traffic in human beings, we are witnessing an important segment of the 
process towards internationalisation and europeanization of criminal law and 
criminal justice. 
During the last decade, the scope of the trafficking in human beings (mostly 
women and girl-children) as a phenomenon has increased world-wide. Since the 
last 10-15 years, there is a greater attention in the post-communist countries 
directed to combat organised crime in general, including trafficking in human 
beings. These countries have become mostly countries of origins or transit, or 
to a less extent country of destination of trafficking activities. 
Disregarding here and now the causes and conditions in sending, as in well 
as receiving countries and focusing on the developments and weaknesses of 
national and international law and the shortcomings of established institutions 
in this field, we are still facing with a difficult task, as there is a great deal of 
materials to analyse and to conclude its different levels and aspects. There are 
a whole series of legally binding and legally not binding however very impor-
tan tdocuments in european and international level. Some of them are focusing 
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on human rights, some on migration, on labour, on combat organised crime 
and/or specifically on trafficking issues. To evaluate, whether or not trafficking 
is addressed adequately, it is necessary to combine and use all of these 
approaches. 
Trafficking is a serious and multipled human rights violation, infringing a 
person's human dignity, personal liberty, freedom of movement, privacy, and 
self-determination. It furthermore violates the prohibition of slavery, slavery-like 
practices and compulsory work as well as trafficking in human beings is to be 
equated with cruel and inhuman treatment. All mentioned areas are basic 
principles of the most important human rights documents, like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966). It would be very long even to mention the list of all 
relevant international documents. Here and now, I would only focus on, that 
"women and children are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of the 
crime of illegal trafficking in and transporting of migrants".1 
All States should take all appropriate measures on national, bilateral and 
multilateral level, to prevent the abduction of, the sale of, or traffic in children 
for any purpose and in any form of sexual exploitation, or abuse of children, 
including within the family, or for commercial purposes, child pornography and 
child prostitution, and through child sex tourism, taking into account the 
particular problems, posed by the use of Internet, in this regard, and to protect 
children from these practices, in accordance with the provisions of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child and taking into account the concrete measures 
outlined in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and in the Pro-
gramme of Action adopted by the Commission in 1992, 1993 and 1996.: 
It is very hard to find an exact and equally accepted definition of trafficking 
in women, as there are various perspectives. Besides the element of exploitation, 
some definitions place the emphasis on the element of border-crossing, some on 
the element of forced prostitution, on debt bondage, or slavery-like practices, 
etc. Recently, definitions given by NGOs are not any more limited to trans-
border trafficking, nor to trafficking of women for the purpose of prostitution. 
These definitions are also involving labour in slavery-like conditions, domestic-
labour, forced marriages etc. and focus on the isolation and exploitation of the 
victims, experiencing multiple violations of their rights. 
1 ECOSOC Res. 1998/19 Action against illegal trafficking in migrants, including by sea. 
2 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/80 on Right of the Child. Prevention and 
eradication of the sale of children and of their sexual exploitation and abuse, including child 
prostitution and child pornography. 
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The world-wide phenomenon of trafficking in women for prostitution 
between European countries is going on, in several way. Whereas some women 
are openly and explicitly recruited as prostitutes and decide voluntarily to work 
in the sex sector, others are forced into prostitution by use of violence, or 
mislead by false promises, hired as waitresses or baby-sitters. Trafficking 
happens occasionally as well as in organised forms. Criminal networks involved 
in this business have different levels of organization (large-scale, medium-scale 
and small-scale network), realising huge profits, while facing only low risks. 
This phenomenon's form, organization, structure is continuously and dy-
namically changing and its extension is increasing dramatically. In spite of 
efforts been taken to discover its scope, there are only fragmentary data and 
estimations on the number of women -especially foreign women involved in 
prostitution. 
Relevant changes have occurred, including the origin and destination of 
women involved. In general, labour migration is directed towards Europe, 
towards development and better living conditions. Besides changes in ways and 
routes, there have also occurred structural changes over the recent years. These 
structural changes are influenced by increasing sex-tourism, economically-
motivated migration, new technologies, the concentration of soldiers in conflict-
zones, etc. 
The sex-industry is continously moving into new territories, where economic 
and social circumstances have created favourable conditions for its business 
activities. The recruitment of women for the purpose of prostitution usually 
happens under the facade of legal, or semi-legal activities. Its attractiveness lies 
in the expectancy of promised large income. The real income of a commercial 
sex worker, however, is trivial, compared with the profit realised by those 
organizations, involved in this business (travel agencies, hotels, bars, airlines, 
pimps, etc.). 
The money, originating from the exploitation of prostitution, gets into the 
business life, laundered in different ways. In those systems, where prostitution 
and its management are legalised professions, this phenomenon is also true 
inversely, namely, that the money, originating from drug-dealing or weapon-
trade can be laundered by getting into the sex-business. 
Foreign women involved in forced prostitution belong to a desperately 
isolated and manipulated group in society, suffering from several psychical and 
physical diseases. Being threatened and ill-treated by their traffickers in 
various manners, their human rights are permanently and seriously violated. 
Nearly all of these women are held in debt-bondage; as soon as they sign a 
contract amounting to high debts (for travelling cost, lodging etc.), they are 
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very dependent on their "protectors", in social as well as in economic meaning. 
Sometimes they are staying illegally in the foreign destination country, without 
valid travel documents or even no documents at all. As a consequence, they do 
not seek the assistance of the authorities, but they avoid any contact with them. 
As they have no residence permit, they are facing the risk to be expelled from the 
country. The very strict control practised by the traffickers over the women and 
their illegal status or the involvement of other illegal activity, constitute an 
obstacle in approaching and helping the foreign victims of trafficking. 
Women involved in voluntary3 or forced prostitution are more or less 
stigmatized in every system (prohibitionist, abolitionist or reglementary). The 
licensing system of voluntary prostitution sometimes subjects sex-workers to the 
state's taxation system, but does not always include them into the system of 
labour law standards, or social security. Moreover, it does not eliminate the 
stigmatization experienced by prostitutes. 
Among the most important factors of prevention of forced prostitution, I 
would like to stress the necessity of better information for potential migrants, of 
promoting women's economic independence, of co-operation between European 
countries to combat forced prostitution and to support the reintegration of victims 
into society. 
2. International Legal Framework 
2.7. International Documents Against Trafficking 
A) There was a long time and procedure—started in 1904, resulted in several 
international conventions while the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others4 was 
adopted. This was "the first international agreement, to conceive of trafficking 
in gender-neutral terms, and to consider the problem of exploitative prosti-
tution as a matter of international law, rather than strictly an issue of domestic 
jurisdiction".5 
3 According to some authors there is not voluntary prostitution as such, while some kind of 
force, including the economic one, is always existing. 
4 1949. New York, UN Res. 317 (IV) 2 of Dec. 1949. 
5 KNAUS, K.-KARTUSCH, A. REITER, G.: Combat of Trafficking in Women for the 
Purpose of Forced Prostitution. International Standards Published by the Ludwig Boltzmann 
Institute of Human Rights, Vienna, 2000. 19. 
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According to the Convention the State parties "agree to punish any person 
who, to gratify the passion of another: (1.) Procures, entices or leads away, for 
purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person; 
(2.) Exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that 
person.6 Furthermore the states agree to punish any person who: (1.) Keeps 
or manages, or knowingly finances, or takes part in the financing of a brothel; 
(2.) Knowingly lets or rents a building or other place, or any part thereof, for 
the purpose of the prostitution of others.7 
The Convention prohibits the exploitation of prostitution by others, however 
does not ban prostitution itself, in spite of the fact, that in its preamble declares: 
"prostitution and the accompanying evil, of traffic in persons for the purpose 
of prostitution, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human 
person, and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family and the 
community". 
The Convention does not give a precise definition of trafficking, but it is clear, 
that it does not cover the trafficking activities for purpose, other than prostitution 
(like forced domestic or industrial labour, forced marriage etc). It does not 
differentiate—expresses verbis—between voluntary and forced prostitution, but its 
language and philosophy expressing the view, that prostitutes are regarded as 
victims. This is evident in particular from the content of the Article 6.8 
The offences, referred to in article 1. and 2. of the Convention, shall be 
regarded as extraditable offences. Extradition shall be granted, according to the 
law of the State, to which the request is made. In States, where the extradition 
of nationals is not permitted by law, nationals who have returned to their own 
states, after committing the referred crime, shall be prosecuted in and punished 
by the courts of their own State.9 
The enforcement and monitoring mechanism of the Convention is elaborated, 
but not functioning adequately in the practice. Since 1974, the State parties are 
required to submit reports regarding slavery and trafficking to the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.10 
6 Art. 1. 
7 Art 2. 
8 Each Party to the present Convention agrees to take all the necessary measures to repeal or 
abolish any existing law, regulation or administrative provision by virtue of which persons, who 
engage in, or are suspected of engaging in prostitution, are subject either to special registration 
or to the possession of a special document or to any exceptional requirements, for supervision 
or notification. 
9 Article 6, 8. 
10 See KNAUS KARTUSCH REITER: op. cit. 21. 
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It is missing however an independent body to supervise and monitor the 
implementation of the Convention. 
B) Besides the Trafficking Convention (which was ratified by 72 states), the 
CEDAW and the CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990) also 
address, in an explicit manner the issue of trafficking. 
The CEDAW is an international convention on non-discrimination, obliging 
State parties to provide conditions and remove obstacles, making possible for 
women to exercise their human rights. It is implicitly obliging the governments 
to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of 
traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. 
The wording is mirroring a broader concept of trafficking; including 
trafficking in women, not only for the purpose of forced prostitution, but other 
slavery-like practices, too. This content is more precisely enlightened by the 
General Recommendation No. 19. of the CEDAW Committee," on Violence 
Against Women explicitly enlisting domestic labour and organised marriages 
in addition to established forms of trafficking. 
The reason of applying for a the broader definition, in depth interpretation 
of trafficking is, that these kinds of practices are not only preventing women in 
equal enjoyment of their rights, but denying their human rights and dignity, 
moreover running the risk of practicing abuse and violence against them. 
According to Art. 18. of the CEDAW, the State parties are required to submit 
reports on measures taken by them, in the interest, to implement the provisions 
laid down in the Convention. Most of the countries are regularly fulfilling their 
reporting obligation, even if there are some overdue reports. 
Universal ratification of the Convention had not been achieved till now, 
(there are 165 State parties). A significant achievement in implementation of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention (adopted by the General Assembly at its 
fifty-fourth session in 1999) however can be seen. Forty-three State parties to the 
Convention have signed the Optional Protocol, and five have submitted 
instruments of ratification and accession. A further five ratifications are requred 
before the Optional Protocol enters into force.12 The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention is granting individuals and groups of women who have exhausted 
domestic remedies—the right to submit petitions alleging violations of the 
Convention, to the CEDAW Committee. "The Committee can perform the 
inquiry procedure, if it has reliable information on grave systematic violations 
11 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
12 Statement at the 11 th Meeting of the State parties to the CEDAW, New York, 31. Aug. 2000. 
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of the provisions of CEDAW committed by a state party. The application of both 
procedures requires, that the state concerned, is a party to both CEDAW and its 
optional protocol".13 
C) The Convention on the Right of the Child14 in several articles contains 
provisions on protection of the children, among others from abuse, violence, 
maltreatment, exploitation, including sexual violence, too. 
In Article 34. of the Convention, protection of child, f rom all forms of sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse is declared. State parties in particular shall take all 
appropriate measures on national, bilateral and multilateral level to prevent: 
inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity, 
exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual 
practices, 
exploitative use of children in pornographic performances or materials. 
The provision of Article 35. is binding the State parties to prevent the 
abduction of, the sale, traffic in children for any purpose or in any form. 
The monitoring mechanism of this, the implementation of the rights, 
according to the Convention—similarly to the CEDAW is the regular state-
reporting procedure (periodic reports). 
2.2. Documents Against Slavery 
Besides the above mentioned specific conventions on trafficking, there are 
documents, approaching the problem from human rights aspects. 
A) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,13 is categorically stating in its 
Art. 4. : "no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, slavery and slave trade 
shall be prohibited in all their forms." 
B) The UN Slavery Convention,16 in its Art. 6. obliges State parties, to 
completely abolish slavery and slavery-like conditions in all its forms. Slavery 
means the status or condition of a person, over whom any or all of the powers, 
13 The State however may declare not to recognise the competence of the Committee in 
carrying on an inquiry procedure ("opting out"). 
14 UN GA Res. 44/25 of 20 Nov. 1989 (entry into force on 2 Sept. 1990). 
15 UN G A Res 217 A (III) of 10 Dec. 1948. 
16 25 Sept. 1926 entry into force 9 March, 1927; amended by Protocol UN GA Res 794 (VIII) 
of 23 Oct. 1953. 
188 Lenke Fehér 
attaching to right of ownership are exercised (Art. 1. § 1). This definition of 
slavery is very limited, very narrow and does not cover all kinds of violations. 
In 1956, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Slave 
Trade, and Intitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery17 was adopted, which 
aims to eliminate slavery-like conditions and abolition, abandonment of debt 
bondage. 
C) The Resolution of the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery18 in 1974, was expressing the view, that the trade of women is a new 
way of slavery. Trafficking in women and children is recognised as a form of 
slavery, which means, that anti-slavery treaties also cover efforts against 
trafficking. 
D) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, 
according the Art. 8 is declaring: "no one shall be held in slavery: slavery and 
slave trade, in all their forms shall be prohibited". The State parties are obliged, 
to submit reports to the UN Human Rights Committee on the implementation of 
the Covenant. The Optional Protocol at the same time enables individuals (from 
the State parties) to submit complains, concerning their human rights violations 
to the Committee, if domestic remedies are already exhausted. 
2.3. Documents Against Forced Labour 
The third field which is providing some remedies in the case of non-voluntary 
work, exploitation of children in labour sector- is the regulation of the world of 
labour. These Conventions are providing protection of human rights in case of 
trafficking in women, too. 
I should mention among others the ILO Conventions: Convention concerning 
Forced Labour (1930), Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour 
(1957), as well as Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999). According to the 
Art. 34 of the Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor, the State Parties in 
particular shall take all appropriate measures on national, bilateral and 
multilateral level, to prevent: 
17 7 of Sept. 1956, entry into force on 30 April 1957. 
18 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. 
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inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual 
activity, 
exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual 
practices, 
exploitative use of children in pornographic performances or materials. 
The provision of Article 35. is binding the state parties, to prevent abduction 
of, the sale, traffic in children for any purpose or in any form. The monitoring 
mechanism of the implementation of the rights according to the Convention -is 
the regular state-reporting procedure, the so-called periodic reports. 
2.4. Other Human Rights Documents 
There are several further human rights documents, which are addressing traffick-
ing in women and forced prostitution, as human rights violations, violence 
against women as gender-based violence. These declarations, platform for 
actions are not-binding documents, however expressing basic values, consensus 
of the international community in certain fields, and in such a way, contributing 
to the chrystallisation of the main principles, emerging common policies and 
measures. I would mention and refer here, as an example, to the World 
Conference on Human Rights (1993, Vienna), the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (1993) and the Fourth UN World 
Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). 
3. Trafficking in persons, as crimes against humanity (and as war crime) 
According to the Geneva Conventions concerning protection of civilians, victims 
etc. in the time of war and armed conflicts, acts of torture or inhuman treatment, 
as well as willfully causing great suffering, serious injury of body or health, is 
constituting a grave violation of the provisions laid down in these Conventions. 
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War19 in Art. 27, para 4. requires protection of women against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. 
in the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) "rape sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.20 
19 12 Aug. 1949, entry into force 21 Oct 1960. 
20 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July, 1998. Art. 7. 
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Trafficking in persons, in particular women and children (as enslavement), 
included to the list of crimes against humanity.21 In periods of armed conflict, 
acts of forced prostitution and trafficking in persons can be prosecuted as war 
crimes. (Art. 8 para 2, subpara XXII.) The Court shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of war crimes, in particular when it is committed as a part of plan, or 
policy or as a large-scale commission of such crimes. 
4. Efforts of the Council of Europe, European Parliament, European Union 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings 
4. 1. Council of Europe 
The most important human rights document in Europe is the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights (EC HR), which was ratified by all the member states of the 
Council of Europe. 
The Convention does not contain provision, concerning prohibition of 
trafficking in persons, however the provisions against slavery, servitude, 
compulsory labour22 as well as banning torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment23 is regarded as applicable, in case of trafficking in 
women and forced prostitution. 
In 1991, a group of specialists was formed by the Steering Committee for 
Equality between Women and Men (CDEG), with the task to draw up proposals 
for action to combat trafficking. I had the honour to work in this group during 
its two years activity. On the basis of the final document, produced by this 
group, 1993, a Plan of Action Against Traffic in Women and Forced Prostitution 
was elaborated by Michele Hirsch, (in 1996) among others giving a definition 
of trafficking in women as follows: " when a women is exploited in a country 
other than her own, by another person (natural or legal) for financial gain; the 
traffic consisting of organising (the stay or) the legal or illegal emigration of 
women, even with her consent, f rom her country of origin to the country of 
destination and luring her by whatever means into prostitution or any form of 
sexual exploitation." 
The Action Plan and the definition, arised great discussions and remained as 
a continous debate on the agenda of public discussions, up until today. 
21 Art. 7. para 2. 
22 Art. 4. 
23 Art. 3. 
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The Council of Europe had several other initiatives in this field, like drafting 
different recommendations to the Council of Ministers, or organising various 
international seminars for experts and NGOs. The recent event was, the 
elaboration of regional action plan in South Eastern Europe on the basis of an 
international seminar, held in Athen, 29 June-1 of July, 2000. 
4.2. European Union 
The European Union also has several documents and efforts to deal with the 
problem of trafficking. The Treaty of Amsterdam requires cooperation in police 
and judicial matters in criminal cases, to combat organised crime more effective-
ly. The Europol (European Police Office) has a significant role in prevention and 
fight against internationally organised crime, in particular concerning illicit drug 
trafficking, radioactive and nuclear substances, crimes involving clandestine 
immigration networks, illegal vehicle trafficking, trafficking in human beings, 
illegal money-laundering activities, connected these crimes. 
The Europol is facilitating the exchange of information and data, promoting 
awareness of analysis on crime and harmonisation of analytical methods. It 
keeps contact between the national police forces in an informal, quick and non-
bureaucratic basis. 
4.3. European Parliament 
There are several, very important European Parlament resolutions - like the 
Resolution on the Exploitation of Prostitution and the Traffic in Human Beings 
(1989) or the Resolution on Trade in Women ( 1993)~addressing adequately the 
problem of trafficking. The lattest is calling for international cooperation and 
improvement of the victims' position. 
The European Conference on Trafficking in Women for the Purpose of Sexual 
Exploitation, was held in Vienna In 1996. It resulted in a Communication of the 
European Commission on Trafficking in Women for the Purpose of Sexual 
Exploitation. 
In 1997, an EU Ministerial Conference was held in The Hague, on the 
question of trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and the 
Basic Principle for the Code of Conduct were drafted. 
It would be possible to continue the long list of these initiatives, I would only 
refer however to the Report of the European Parliament on the Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "For further 
actions in the fight against trafficking in women (Rapporteur: Patsy Sörensen). 
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This is a very important report, from which I would stress here and now only the 
next (point 9.): 
"Calls on the Commission, (further to the poor implementation of the 1997 
Joint Action and in line with the conclusions of Tampere), to make specific 
proposals towards the harmonisation of national laws and methods of detection 
and prosecution, with a view to ensuring 
crime is categorised in the same way in all Member States, 
effective, proportional and dissuasive sanctions against traffickers, 
extraterritoriality jurisdiction and extradition for the crime of trafficking 
in human beings, 
seizure of the proceeds of criminal activities and legal scope for 
compensation and reparations for victims for the financial, physical and 
psychological harm they have suffered, 
non-criminalisation of trafficked persons, including non-criminalisation 
for the use of forged visas or documents, made as a result of their ordeal, 
together with a ban on any form of internment of victims in detention 
centres, 
measures to protect victims and witnesses, and the families of witnesses, 
not least in the country of origin and guaranteed safety for women, 
acting as witnesses or wishing to testify, 
the possibility for NGOs, to bring court actions on behalf of the victim, 
the reversal of the burden of proof in court actions on trafficking 
charges, so, that it rests with the alleged trafficker, in a way that 
complies with national constitutions; 
that the circumstances of victims of trafficking should not constitute 
grounds for an investigation of their background or of public or private 
documents, and can, in no event be used against them, their families or their 
close relations, particularly when they freely exercise their rights, as regards 
freedom of movement, 
— establishment and seeking gainful employment; 
strict confidentiality in medical and psychological tests, which may be 
conducted only at the request of the person concerned, and must be 
preceeded and followed by proper counselling; 
an analysis of trafficking and the existing instruments for combating 
it, including specific data and estimates-number, origin, age and sex of 
persons involved, comparison of criminal law; 
a detailed examination of the difficulties, encountered in identifying 
and dismantling networks and detecting any links between different mafia 
organisations; 
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a specific evaluation of police cooperation and cooperation with non-
member countries, in particular candidate countries, and an overview of 
arrangements for victim support; 
an estimate of the budgetary resources required to implement the 
support measures required at European Union level." 
5. Counter-trafficking legislation in Hungary 
In 1999, an amendment24 has been introduced into the Hungarian Criminal 
Code, penalising trafficking in human beings, as new form of crimes against 
personal freedom and human dignity. Relevant provisions within this new 
chapter are the nexts: Sect. 175 (Violation of personal freedom), Sect. 175/A 
(Kidnapping) and Sect. 175/B (Trafficking in human beings). 
Under Sect. 175 para 1, it is penalised up to 3 years loss of liberty, if 
someone violates the personal freedom of another person. According to para. 2, 
that behaviour is penalised from 2 to 8 years loss of liberty, if someone acquires 
another person in connection with trafficking, keeping the victim in deprivation 
of liberty and forced labour. Para. 3, is penalising the act, regulated in para. 1. 
with 5 years and in para 2. from 5 to 10 years loss of liberty, when it is 
committed a) for a malicious motive or purpose, b) by feigning official action, 
c) by tormenting the aggrieved party, d) causing a significant injury of interest, 
or e) against a person under the age of eighteen. 
Trafficking in human beings: Sect. 175/B25 
(1) Any person who sells, purchases, conveys or receives another person or 
exchanges a person for another person, or appropriates one for such purpose 
for another party, commits a felony and shall be punishable with imprison-
ment of up to three years. 
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment from one to five years if the 
criminal act is committed 
a) against a person, deprived of personal freedom, 
b) against a person under the age of eighteen, 
c) for the purpose of forced labour, 
d) for the purpose of fornication or sexual intercourse, or to involun-
tarily engage in such with another person. 
24 Act. LXXXVII. of 1998, entered into force on the 1 of March, 1999. 
25 Non-official translation. 
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(3) The punishment shall be imprisonment from two to eight years if the 
criminal act 
a) involves two of the aggravating circumstances described in Sub-
section (2), 
b) is committed, as part of a criminal organisation, 
c) is committed against a person under the education, guardianship, 
supervision or medical treatment of the perpetrator. 
(4) The punishment shall be imprisonment from five to ten years if the 
criminal act 
a) involves three of the aggravated circumstances described in Sub-
section (2), 
b) is committed against a person deprived of personal freedom, as part 
of a criminal organisation, 
c) is committed against a person under the education, guardianship, 
supervision or medical treatment of the perpetrator, and deprived of 
personal freedom. 
(5) The punishment shall be imprisonment from ten to fifteen years or for 
life, if the criminal act is committed for the purpose of forced labour and 
fornication or sexual intercourse, or to involuntarily engage in such with 
another person, 
a) against a person deprived of personal freedom, as part of a criminal 
organisation, 
b) against a person under the education, guardianship, supervision or 
medical treatment of the perpetrator, and deprived of personal 
freedom. 
(6) Any person making preparations to engage in trafficking in human 
beings commits a misdemeanour and shall punishable with imprisonment of 
up to two years. 
The prohibition of trafficking in persons is a very modern regulation, 
containing all forms of trafficking activity: for purposes of forced labouras well 
as for sexual exploitation. It is a very progressive step, that Hungary regulated 
trafficking in persons as a special crime in a detailed manner, sanctioning more 
severely among others the victimization of minors or the deprivation of freedom 
of victims. 
The legislator doesn't differentiate explicitly between trans-border and 
inland trafficking activities. On the one hand, this is a very positive and 
important decision, based on a broad definition of trafficking, expressing the 
view that the legislator doesn't tolerate any kind of slavery or slavery-like 
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practices. On the other hand, in my opinion the element of trans-border 
trafficking is of great relevance for the victim, who is more vulnerable in a 
foreign country, where she doesn't speak the language, doesn't know the 
customs, the culture, the administrative system, etc. Consequently, the trans-
border element should be included into the qualifying circumstances of the 
crime, during the pending re-codification process. 
The amendment of the Criminal Code on trafficking in persons entered into 
force on 1 March 1999. 
Prostitution, prostitution-related crimes 
Since 1993 prostitution does not constitute a crime, as according to an 
amendment of the Hungarian Criminal Code, the Sect. 204 on prohibiting 
prostitution, has ceased to have effect from 15 May 1993. After that, prostitution 
itself has not constituted a crime any more, it is only contravention, sanctioned 
with a fine. 
Exploitation of the prostitution of others however is a criminal offence and 
severely penalised in the Hungarian Criminal Code: promotion of prostitution 
(Sect. 205), living on earnings of a prostitute (Sect. 206) and pandering (Sect. 
207). 
Promotion of Prostitution Sect. 205. 
(1) The person who makes available a building or any other place for 
prostitution to another person, commits a felony and shall be punishable with 
imprisonment of up to three years. 
(2) The person who maintains, heads a brothel, or makes available financial 
means to the functioning thereof, commits a felony and shall be punishable with 
imprisonment of up to five years. 
(3) The punishment shall be imprisonment from two years to eight years, if 
a.) any person who has not yet completed his eighteenth year, engages in 
prostitution in the brothel, 
b.) prostitution is promoted as part of a criminal organisation. 
(4) The person who persuades another person to engage in prostitution, shall 
be punishable in accordance with subsection (1). 
Living on Earnings of Prostitution Sect. 206. 
The person who lives wholly or in part on the earnings of a person engaging 
in prostitution, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment of 
up to three years. Banishment may also take place as a supplementary 
punishment. 
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Pandering Sect. 207. 
(1) The person who solicits another person for sexual intercourse or 
fornication for somebody else in order to make profit, commits a felony, and 
shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to three years. 
(2) The punishment shall be imprisonment form one year to five years, if the 
procuring is business-like. 
(3) The punishment shall be imprisonment from two years to eight years, if 
the procuring is committed 
a) to the injury of a relative of the perpetrator or of a person under his 
education, supervision or care or who has not yet completed his/her 
eighteenth year of age, 
b) with deceit, violence or direct menace against life or limbs, 
c) as part of a criminal organisation. 
(4) The person, who agrees on the perpetration of pandering defined in 
subsection (2) commits a felony and shall be punishable with imprisonment of 
up to three years. 
As mentioned before, Sect. 204 of the Criminal Code penalising prostitution 
was abrogated in 1993. The exploitation of prostitution of others, however, 
remained a crime. Therefore it was necessary to give a definition of prostitution, 
as follows. 
Prostitution Sect. 210/A: 
"(1) Prostitution is pursued by the person who has sexual intercourse or 
fornicates striving to make regular profit. 
(2) For the purposes of this title, fornication is: any gravely indecent act, with 
the exception of sexual intercourse, which serves the stimulation or satisfaction 
of sexual desire." 
In the last years, continous efforts have been made to elaborate a system, 
which is able to prevent and control prostitution without violating the rules of 
the 1949 Convention on the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the 
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. The result was a new law based on a 
so-called limited abolitionist concept. According to this, there are protected 
zones (zones of prohibition), where prostitution is not allowed, and zones of 
tolerance to be created by the local governments, in cases, when prostitution 
massively appears. The assignment of such locations cannot be neglected, if 
prostitution dominantly appears in public places and the settlement has more 
than 50.000 inhabitants. 
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Prostitutes as well as clients are prohibited from offering or accepting sexual 
services in the protected zones. Furthermore, the offering of sexual services to 
persons under 18 years, the accepting of offers of such person and the offering 
services in a way offending other people is forbidden. The advertisement of 
sexual services (and taking part therein) by written form, audio-visual or other 
means in protected zones is forbidden, too. All of the above mentioned 
violations of law are contraventions, belonging to police competence. 
Health control of prostitutes is regulated in the order No.41/1999 (IX. 8.) of 
the Minister of Health Affairs. According to this, a prostitute can offer sexual 
services only, if she is possessing the prescribed medical certificate, which is 
valid together with her identity card. The medical examination should be 
initiated by the prostitute herself. It is not free of charge and should be repeated 
every month, or once in three months, depending on the kind of examination. 
From September, until the end of November 1999, only 12 prostitutes have 
initiated the medical examination. 
Concerning prostitution, there are still not existing the so-called "zones of 
tolerance" as most of the local governments are reluctant to create such zones 
on their own territory. It is also not elaborated, by whom and how it is possible 
to built the infrastructure of such zones. 
These uncertainties contributed to the fact, that on the one hand, the former 
structure of the street-prostitution changed and on the other hand, some of the 
prostitutes were trafficked for foreign countries. 
6. Conclusions 
Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation is becoming a more and more 
grave problem in Europe, exceeding national borders. Besides women, trafficked 
to Europe from South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa, there has been an 
increase in trafficking inside Europe since 1990. There is a flow of women from 
CEECs to EU countries ("East to West trafficking"), mostly following the 
regulatory system of prostitution, where a permanent need for exotic beauties, 
working in the sex-sector exists. Traffickers seek to meet this demand in the 
cheapest way- the recruitment of women from CEECs is less expensive and less 
risky, than importing women from other continents (minimal travel expenses, 
missing or mild visa requirements). 
Other trafficking activities are taking place within CEECs ("East to East 
trafficking"): countries with better economies (mainly Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland) have become countries of destination for others with less 
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favourable conditions. The above mentioned countries are also transit countries, 
serving as "entrance halls" to Western Europe. Increasing trafficking in persons 
from Romania, Russia, Ukraine to Hungary and from Hungary to Western 
Europe (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria) and outside Europe 
has to be noticed. Hungary is regarded as a country of origin, of transit and of 
destination for trafficking in women. 
Trafficking happens occasionally, as well as in organised forms. Organised 
criminal networks realise huge profits from trafficking in women, while these 
activities face only low risks. Highly organised international criminal networks 
are the most difficult to combat. Therefore, initiatives should be developed in 
Europe to be able to effectively combat this type of organised crime. 
The Hungarian legislation has adequately recognised the situation, and very 
recently, considerable steps have been taken. The regulation of prostitution in 
a "limited abolitionist" manner, aimed to combat organised crime and 
deliberation of prostitution f rom exploitation, didn't proove fully successful. 
The regulation of trafficking in persons as a crime, with severe punishment as 
well as the violations of personal freedom, in connection with trafficking in 
human beings, however are to be regarded as very important tools of criminal 
law in the fight against sexual exploitation and slavery—like practices. 
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Katalin LIGETI European Criminal Law: 
Administrative and Criminal 
Sanctions as Means 
of Enforcing Community Law 
Professor Lahti concludes his article by pointing to the limits and weaknesses of 
a European criminal policy, especially measured by the criteria of coherence and 
rationality. European criminal policy is incoherent, indeed, as it is not based on 
a sound concept of criminal law, but is rather the result of an ad hoc evolution 
guided by the strive for effectiveness of Community law. 
After several decades of system building and formulation of regulatory 
programs, the implementation and enforcement of Community law has become 
a priority on the political agenda of the European Union.1 Since sanctions and 
particularly penal sanctions—are essential instruments to attain effectiveness of 
law, European criminal policy emerged in the context of the enforcement debate. 
I. The interaction of Community law and national criminal law 
Criminal law and criminal procedure are regarded as parts of the Member States' 
national sovereignty. Hence, the relationship between Community law and 
national criminal law has been characterised throughout several decades by 
1 VERVAELE, J. A. E.: Transnational Cooperation of Enforcement Authorities in the 
Community Area, in: Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law (ed.: J. A. E. 
Vervaele), The Hague—London-Boston, 1999, 361. 
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mutual disinterest. The general opinion was that since Member States did not 
transfer expressly sovereign rights in the field of criminal justice on the 
institutions of the Community, the latter cannot have its own system of criminal 
law.2 
The era of disinterest ended with the establishment of the internal market 
and the opening of the Eastern European countries. The latter resulted in 
changed developments of crime. New main focuses of economic crime marked 
a tendency that with the facilitation of mobility and the lack of border controls 
in the internal market, more and more affected the European citizens. In some 
fields organised transborder crime can already be clearly perceived, in 
particular in drug trafficking, terrorism, subsidy fraud, car theft, large scale 
prostitution. Criminal law and policy and criminal prosecution had to, there-
fore, increase their efforts to take this development into account. 
As a result, Community law ventured into areas such as insider dealing, 
money laundering, the manufacture of drugs, the acquisition and possession of 
weapons and the export of cultural goods, that used to belong to the exclusive 
competence of the Member States. Expanding the scope of the Community's 
activities, of course, increased the need for effective law enforcement. 
The interaction between European Community law and national criminal 
law intensified during the last decades based on a functional spill over? 
According to the latter, Community law encroached upon national criminal law 
only to the extent as the supremacy of Community law required it. In the spirit 
of supremacy, the ECJ used the fundamental rights enshrined in the EC Treaty 
to put domestic criminal law provisions out of effect as inproportional (i.e. too 
severe) or declared them inapplicable (i.e. violating e.g. the right to free 
movement of persons).4 This primarily neutralisation effect was supplemented 
at the end of the 1980's by a positive obligation upon the Member States to 
ensure that infringements of Community law are penalised under conditions 
which are analogous to the conditions under which similar infringements of 
2 TIEDEMANN, K.: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Strafrecht, New Juristische 
Wochenschrift, 1993, 23, 25. 
3 See details on the concept of functional spill-over by TONRA: The Politics of Justice, in: 
Justice Cooperation in the European Union (ed.: Barett), Dublin, 1997, 50. 
4 See details on the neutralising effect of Community law on national criminal law in: 
HEISE, F. N.: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationales Strafrecht, Bielefeld, 
1998. 
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national law are punished.5 This is also known as the assimilation principle 
which has been codified in Article 209A of the Treaty.6 
The evolution of European criminal policy has not yet come to an end. Due 
to the limited scope of the present seminar, the author choose to reflect upon 
only the sanctioning aspect of European criminal policy, in particularly on the 
shifting boundaries between administrative and penal sanctions. 
II. The enforcement deficit of the Community 
The necessity to strengthen law enforcement in the Member States by the help 
of criminal law was impeded by the Communities' lack of competence in this 
field. It is generally accepted that the Community does not have the competence 
to set supranational criminal law since no such transfer of sovereign rights had 
taken place.7 This is the result of the will of the contracting Member State and 
it is reflected in the interpretation of the Treaty.8 From the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ it has become evident that it was 
[t]he intention of the drafters of the Community treaties that European 
Community law is a community of law without a criminal law9 [and that] 
5 Case C-68/88 Commission v. Greece [ 1989] ECR 2965, see also case C-7/90 Vandevenne 
[1991] ECR 1-4371; case C-36/94 Siesse [1995] ECR 1-3573. 
6 Art. 280 in the new consolidated version. 
7 SIEBER, U.: Europäische Einigung und Europäisches Strafrecht, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 103, 1991, 970; TIEDEMANN, K.: Reform des 
Sanktionswesens auf dem Gebiete des Agrarmarktes der Europäischen Wirtschaftgemein-
schaft, in: Festschrift für Pfeiffer, 1988, 113; WINKLER, R.: Die Rechtsnatur der Geldbuße 
in Wettbewerbsrecht der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Tübingen, 1971, 84; 
DANNECKER, G.: Strafrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: ESER, A.—HUBER. В.: 
Strafrechtsentwicklung in Europa, Freiburg in Breisgau, 1995; BRIDGE, J. W.: The European 
Communities and the Criminal Law, Criminal Law Review, 1976, 88; OEHLER, D.: Fragen 
zum Strafrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Festschrift für H. Jescheck zum 70. 
Geburtstag (ed. T. Vogler), 1985, 1403, ZULEEG, M.: Der Beitrag des Strafrechts zur 
Europäischen Integration, in: SIEBER, U.: Europäische Einigung und Europäisches Straf-
recht, 1993,41. 
8 DEN BOER, M.: Europe and the Art of International Police Co-operation: Free Fall or 
Measured Scenario?, in: Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (ed. D. O'Keeffe and P. M. 
Twomey), Oxford, 1994, 285. 
9 Case C-203/80 Casati (Guerrino), (Criminal Proceedings Against) [1981] ECR 2595, [1982] 
1 CMLR 365,2618. 
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the enforcement of law through the criminal law, has been left exclusively 
to the member states.10 
This constraint inheres in the constitutional foundations of the Community. 
The latter may exercise only those powers that can be derived from the Treaties 
creating it. Thus, the Community is not empowered to issue rules binding upon 
the Member States without an express legal basis in the constitutive treaties. 
This lead to a sharp institutional division within the European framework 
between administrative law and criminal law as tools of enforcement." 
Administrative sanctions are seen as quite different f rom criminal sanctions, 
and administrative cooperation as an activity quite different from cooperation 
in criminal matters. In institutional terms, the imposition of administrative 
sanctions for infringements of Community law is seen as a matter in which the 
Community has legislative and other powers. Consequently, administrative 
cooperation between Member States in enforcing Community rules is also a 
matter for the Community to regulate. On the other hand, the imposition of 
criminal sanctions and cooperation in criminal matters with a view to enforcing 
Community rules are considered to be matters for which the Members States 
are solely competent. This dividing line corresponds to the separation of the 
First and Third Pillar of the Union and has now received explicit constitutional 
underpinning in two provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Both Art. 135 and 
Art. 280 of the consolidated version of the EC Treaty forbid the Community 
institutions to take measures concerning the application of national criminal 
law and the national administration of justice where customs cooperation and 
fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community are concerned.12 
III. Administrative sanctions in disguise 
Given the lack of power of the Community institutions to set penal sanctions, 
it is hardly surprising that administrative sanctions gained increased importance 
at European level. The emphasis on administrative law enforcement generated 
two questions in relation to the Community's competence to impose sanctions. 
10 Case C-186/87 Cowan (Jan William) v Trésor Public [1989] ECR 195, [1990] 2 CMLR 613. 
11 SWART, В.: The Shifting Boundaries of European and National Enforcement; Some 
Comments on the National Dimension, in: Compliance and Enforcement of European 
Community Law (ed.: Vervaele, J. A.), The Hague—London-Boston, 1999, 361. 
12 Also Art. 51 of Council Regulation No. 515/97. 
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The first concerns whether and to what extent the Community may oblige 
Member States to impose sanctions for non-compliance with Community law. 
The second relates to the Community's competence to impose punitive rather 
than purely administrative sanctions.11 As Sieber asked provocatively: can the 
Community circumvent its lack of competence in the domain of criminal law 
by labelling the imposition of sanctions amounting to several millions of ECU 
as administrative sanctions. 
III. 1. The scope of the Commission's competence in the administrative-penal 
field 
Although enforcing Community law is primarily a responsibility of the 
Member States, gradually the opinion has prevailed that the Community has 
competence to regulate these enforcement activities, for instance by laying 
down rules with respect to sanctions that should be imposed, or investigations 
that should be carried out. Especially in the areas that directly affect the 
Community's financial interests like agricultural policies or fisheries, a serious 
effort has been made to harmonise the imposition of sanctions by the Member 
States. 
Originally the only provisions of the Treaty which prescribed the imposition 
of financial penalties on persons who have violated certain obligations of 
Community law14 were contained in Art. 87 (in connection with the rules on 
competition); in Art. 9 of Commission Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS (in connec-
tion with establishing a system of steel production quotas)15 and in Art. 58(4) 
13 WHITE, S.: Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities: the Fight 
against Fraud and Corruption, Kluwer, 1998, 36. 
14 The Council Regulation on Harmonisation of Controls and Sanctions in the Framework of 
the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policy laid down specific penalties which apply in the 
event of infringements by the beneficiary of the conditions of the aids regime. The sanctions 
typically provided are reduction in, or total loss of, the aid of which the beneficiary would have 
been entitled to, the exclusion of the beneficiary from the aid scheme for subsequent marketing 
years, or the withdrawal of the licence necessary for an operator or processor. The Commission 
has maintained that these are administrative penalties which the Community has the competence 
to lay down by virtue of Art. 43 of the EC Treaty. Germany initiated proceedings before the 
Court concerning the legal nature of such sanctions. Germany insisted that the sanctions in 
question are of a criminal character, but the Court supported the view of the Commission and 
rejected the German application. 
15 Commission Decision No. 2794/80/ESCS of 31 October 1980 Establishing a System of Steel 
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of the ECSC Treaty (in connection with steel production). The Commission, 
however, held the view that its general competence to execute decisions of the 
Council implies the right to apply sanctions, on condition that such a right has 
to be made explicit in a Regulation. The Commission especially arrogated to 
itself authority to lay down rules on controls (by officials of the Commission) 
and to impose sanctions (by the Commission).16 Although this position was 
contested by several Member States17 at present the recent Regulation on the 
Protection of the Financial Interests of the Communities resolves any doubts 
about the Community's competence in the administrative-penal sphere. 
The Regulation is a general framewoiic for investigating and repressing acts 
and omissions that by violating Community rules, cause financial harm to the 
Community, or could do so. It lays down minimum standards for punishing EC 
fraud. Because it covers the entire field of Community finances, this Regulation 
is also referred to as a horizontal regulation. The Regulation distinguishes 
between reparative measures and repressive sanctions. The so-called admi-
nistrative measures aim at recovering benefits unduly received, whereas admi-
nistrative sanctions seek to punish and deter rather than to confiscate proceeds. 
The Regulation itself draws three different consequences from the distinction. 
Administrative measures must, as a general rule, always be imposed while 
Member States have more freedom in deciding whether or not they will impose 
administrative sanctions. Moreover administrative sanctions may only be imposed 
for intentional or negligent acts or omissions. Finally, the principle of non-
retroactivity applies only to administrative sanctions. By making this differen-
tiation in the consequences, the Regulation acknowledges that administrative 
sanctions, not being different in nature form criminal penalties, require stricter 
rules than administrative measures as to their application out of respect for 
fundamental individual rights as well as basic principles of criminal justice. 
Although the Regulation only codifies the minimum obligations of Member 
States in the area of enforcement and offers few surprises, it is worth noting the 
apparent need for a regulation that states the obvious, due to the reluctance of 
Member States to enforce Community law effectively.18 
Production Quotas for Undertakings in the Iron and Steel Industry, OJ L 291 of 31 October 1980, 
1. 
16 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Checks and Penalties Applicable 
under the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, OJ 1990, С 137, 10. 
17 KAPTEYN / VERLOREN van THEMAAT: Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, 2nd ed., 1990; OEHLER: op. cit. 1403; ZULEEG: op. cit. 45. 
18 SWART, В.: From Rome to Maastricht and beyond: The Problem of Enforcing European 
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III. 2. The legal character of sanctions applied: the emergence of a functional 
approach 
It is not always easy to decide whether a sanction is a truly penal sanction or 
rather an administrative one. The movement towards individualisation within 
penal law leading to diversification of sanctions makes it more difficult to 
demarcate each of the systems of sanctions, for the penal sanction can no longer 
be identified with the deprivation of liberty. The philosophical foundations of 
the penal sanction vis-a-vis those of the administrative sanction became equally 
difficult to identify.19 Is the difference qualitative or quantitative? The legal 
terminology of the Community draws a clear distinction between penal and 
administrative sanctions so as to create the impression that these constitute two 
completely distinct areas of law, the first of which is wholly separate of 
Community law whereas the second, at least to some extent, is not. 
Problems especially arose from administrative wrong (Verwaltungsunrecht) 
or regulatory offences.20 In European Community law, fines are the typical 
sanctions for such offences. Like in genuine criminal law, these sanctions are 
applied irrespective of the reestablishment of lawful circumstances. Fines 
presuppose also a fault on behalf of the responsible person as criminal law does. 
E.g. as regards Art. 87, the Community has power to impose pecuniary sanctions 
for violations of the rules on competition and of obligations to provide 
information needed to enforce these rules.21 Art. 87 of the EC Treaty authorises 
the making of Regulations to give effect to those rules and expressly includes 
provisions for fines and periodic penalty payments. This power has been 
exercised by Regulation No. 17 on the basis of which the Commission can fine 
companies or association of companies that deliberately or negligently violate 
the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 regarding cartels and the abuse of economic 
powers, deliberately or negligently false or distort information, fail to produce 
requested information in a timely manner, or refuse inspection of their business 
records. Even though the penalties may be quite substantial, the applicable 
Community Rules, in: Enforcing European Community Rules, (Ch. Harding—В. Swart eds.), 
Dartmouth, 1996, 14. 
19 DELMAS-MARTY, M.: The legal and practical problems posed by the difference between 
criminal law and administrative criminal law, Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 1988, 21. 
20 ZULEEG, M.: Enforcement of Community law: Administrative and Criminal Sanctions in 
a European Setting, in: Compliance and Enforcement of European Community Law (ed.: 
Vervaele, J. A.), 1999, 351. 
21 This sanctioning power is elaborated in Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 February 1962 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-1962 OJ Special Edition 87. 
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regulation states explicitly that the decisions by which fines are imposed are not 
of a penal character.22 Indeed, these measures do not entail a moral reproach as 
penal sanctions do. They are imposed by administrative bodies and not by the 
judiciary. On the other hand, safeguards similar to those of criminal law are 
necessary because of the severity of these sanctions. In this respect, fines are 
assimilated to criminal law. 
With regard to the Community's competence to impose punitive sanctions, 
the Court has consistently declined to be drawn into the distinction between 
penal sanctions and administrative sanctions. It held in Chemiefarma that the 
imposition of fines is not limited to the repetition of an offence; such an 
interpretation of Art. 15 would considerably lessen the deterrent effect of the 
fine. Furthermore, the Court made clear that the imposition of fines serves both 
the punishment of offences committed in the past and ensures the obedience to 
Community law for the future.23 Accordingly, the Court expressly recognised 
that fines under Art. 15 fulfil the two of the constitutive elements of a penal 
sanction, i.e. suppression and prevention. The Commission follows a practice 
similar to that of the Court. The current sanctioning policy of the Commission 
shows that it attaches great importance to the deterrent object of the fine. For the 
first time in the Pioneer proceedings the Commission has considerably increased 
the fine and thereby marked the start of a stricter policy as regards gross 
violations of competition law.24 The Court justified the shocking amount of the 
fine by saying that one of the tasks of the Commission is the obligation to 
investigate and suppress illicit conduct. This includes the exercise of a general 
policy the objective of which is to ensure the application of fundamental 
principles of Community law and to co-ordinate the conduct of companies in the 
light thereof. Hence, the amount of the fine must be adjusted to the requirements 
of that policy.25 Both, Court and Commission, take into consideration the same 
criteria when imposing the fine. These are the followings: the gravity and 
duration of the violation, the relationship between the type of the violation and 
the economic strength of the company and the delays in the Commission's own 
reaction.-'' The Commission delivers its decision in a way that it compares the 
22 Currently the maximum possible fine is 1.000.000 ECU or 10% of the undertaking's 
previous year's turnover. 
23 Case C-41/69 of 15 February 1970, AC F Chemiefarma v Commission [1970], ECR 661. 
24 OJ L 60 of 5 March 1980, 21. 
25 Case C-100-103/80 of 7 June 1983, Musique Difusion Francais, Pionner, Melchers, [1983] 
ECR 1825; [1983] 2 CMLR 221. 
26 See Case C-86/82 Hasselblad (G.B.) Ltd. v Commission [1984] ECR 883, [1984] 1 CMLR 
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decision to the earlier ones with the aim of preventing the company from 
committing similar violations.27 
It has to be mentioned here that Ag Roemer made an attempt to classify fines 
according to the legal systems of the Member States. He came to the result that 
fines bear the same legal character as " f inancial penalties" [Geldbuße] which 
under the German law belong to the scope of regulatory offences, i.e. to criminal 
law.28 While, Ag Mayras described the fines in Boeringer II as "administrative 
sanction of a non-penal character"29 which, however,—due to their substantive 
criminal nature—cannot be separated from all the principles of criminal law. The 
opinion of Ag Mayras clearly mirrors the very fine line which is to balance, 
between on the one hand, the requirement that the rule of law is upheld, i.e. 
substantially criminal sanctions are subject to the guarantees of criminal law, and 
on the other, that the Community does not interfere with the discretion of 
Member States as regards criminal law. 
In 1992 the ECJ gave a ruling in Germany v. Commission30 which clarified 
the power of the Commission to introduce sanctions with a punitive, rather than 
a purely remedial or compensatory character. The ECJ recalled its ruling in 
K o s t e t to the effect that the impositions of penalties came within the 
Commission's powers if the Council had not reserved such powers to itself. 
The penalties laid down by Community law are meant to be enforced by the 
national authorities and not (as in the area of competition) by the Community 
institutions themselves. This, in turn, raised the question as to the nature of the 
sanctions to be applied in the Member States. The Court confirmed that in 
general terms the Community has competence to prescribe sanctions that go 
further than forfeiture of benefits unduly received. It also denied that some of 
these sanctions amount to criminal penalties. In other words, in the opinion of 
the ECJ the Community is competent to prescribe sanctions that have a 
punitive character without being criminal. 
559; Case C-19/77 Miller Int'l v Commission [1978] ECR 131, [1978] 2 CMLR 334. 
27 TSOLKA, O.: Der Allgemeine Teil des europäischen supranationalen Strafrechts i.w.S., 
Europäsche Hochschulschriften, vol. 1655, 46. 
28 Case С-14/68 Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, 1969 ECR 1, [1969] 1 CMLR 100. 
29 Case C-7/72 Boeringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission [1972] ECR 1281. 
30 Case C-240/90 , Germany v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-5383. 
31 Case C-25/70, Einfuhr und Voratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v. Köster, Bertold & 
Co., preliminary ruling ECR [1970] 1161. 
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All aspects of the Court 's judgement cannot be discussed here. What is 
most striking, however, is the narrow concept of what constitutes a criminal 
sanction within the framework of Community law. Moreover, this narrow app-
roach obviously differs from that of the European Court of Human Rights. 
According to the latter if the purpose of the sanction is punitive, if the class of 
persons to whom the norm applies indeterminate, and if the magnitude of the 
sanction is considerable, then the proceedings will be regarded as procedures 
for the determination of criminal charges within the meaning of Art. 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the terms of that article has to be 
met.32 
These consideration lead part of legal scholarship to argue in favour of a 
functional definition of penal sanctions, which does not depend on insti-
tutional criteria (i.e. who imposes the sanction), but rather on human rights 
criteria.33 Accordingly, the distinction should not be drawn between criminal 
law and administrative penal law, but rather between administrative penal law 
and the rest of administrative law. In this approach administrative penal law 
sanctions underlie the same fundamental guarantees as penal law sanctions. 
This approach is also supported by the case law of the ECJ, according to 
which 
[a] penalty, even of a non-criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it 
rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis.34 
32 Notwithstanding that the Court has upheld certain administrative proceedings in a limited 
class of cases involving petty offences, the proceedings leading to the imposition of cartel 
fines by the Commission do not fall within this exception, given the magnitude of the maximum 
sanction available. The European Court of Human Rights took the position in Öztiirk that the 
cited Art. 6 requirements need not be observed at all trials of the first instance provided that an 
appeal may be lodged to a higher tribunal complying fully with Art. 6. Accordingly, the Court 
upheld summary administrative proceedings in Germany for traffic and other property offences. 
The fact that such proceedings are designated as administrative is irrelevant since parties to the 
ECHR are not allowed to circumvent their obligation undertaken in Art. 6 simply by labelling 
certain procedures administrative. 
33 HEITZER, A.: Punitive Sanktionen im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, Heidelberg, 
1997, 18. 
34 Case С-117/83, Könecke v. BALM, [1984] ECR 3291 ; Case С-137/85, Maizena v. BALM, 
[1987] ECR 4587. 
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Furthermore, a penalty must not be retroactive.35 It must be appropriate and 
necessary and proportionate to the objectives to be attained,36 and must only be 
applied after the person concerned has had an opportunity to make know his/her 
views. The requirement of judicial control also applies to administrative 
decisions.37 
The fact that Court applies criminal law guarantees to so called ad-
ministrative penalties clearly demonstrates the Community's tendency to use 
the term administrative in disguise. Such a tendency exists not only with regard 
to substantive law, but also in the field of procedural law. The most recent 
example is provided by Regulation 515/97 on mutual assistance between the 
administrative authorities of the Member States in customs and agricultural 
matters. Various provisions of that Regulation make it clear that the purpose of 
administrative cooperation will often be to investigate criminal offences and to 
collect evidence against persons who are suspected of having committed them. 
In so far this is the case, one could say that administrative cooperation amounts 
to cooperation in criminal matters, albeit in disguise again. One could go even 
further by saying that to a large extent administrative cooperation has come to 
replace cooperation in criminal matters.38 
Due to the institutional approach of the Community to administrative 
sanctions and administrative cooperation, the scope of the latter has been 
expanded to include types of sanctions and forms of cooperation which, in a 
functional approach, would be considered penal sanctions or cooperation in 
criminal matters. It may very well be the case that this development will 
contribute to more efficient enforcement of Community rules, but there is also 
a definite danger that a price will have to be paid in terms of the rights of the 
individual person. 
35 Case C-63/83, R. v. Kirk, [ 1984] ECR 2689, at 22. "[T]he principle that penal provisions 
may not have retroactive effect is one which is common to all the legal orders of the Member 
States and is enshrined in Art. 7 of the ECHR as fundamental right; it takes its place among 
the general principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court of Justice." 
36 Cases C-319/90, Pressler v. Germany, [1992] ECR 1-203, at 12; C-326/88, Anklage-
myndigheden v. Hansen, [1990] ECR 1-2911; C-15/83, Denkavit, [ 1984] ECR 2171; C-122/78, 
Buitoni v. Forma, [1979] ECR 677. 
37 Johnston v. Chief Constable of the RUC, [1986] ECR 1651 at. 18. 
38 SWART: The Shifting Boundaries of European... op. cit. 327. 
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III. 3. The protection of individual rights 
The European Union has been strongly criticised over the last decade for its over-
emphasis on crime suppression and for its lack of attention to human rights 
protection.39 Unfortunately, this criticism seems to be true, especially by looking 
into recent Community instruments concerned with administrative penalties and 
administrative cooperation. They are entirely silent on individual rights. 
The Regulation on the Protection of the Financial Interests of the Com-
munities does not attempt to lay down a comprehensive set of procedural rights 
for the benefit of the individual where the imposition of administrative measures 
and sanctions pursuant to its provisions are concerned. The protection of 
individual rights is left entirely to the discretion of the Member States. The 
Community legislator missed to incorporate the above cited case law of the 
ECJ concerning human rights safeguards by the application of administrative 
penalties. Apparently, legal protection is not seen as the primary concern of the 
Community institutions themselves. The only exception is contained in Art. 2 on 
the principle of legality and Art. 3 laying down time periods for proceedings. 
Similarly, Regulation 515/97 makes no mention to any individual right 
within the framework of requesting and granting administrative assistance, e.g. 
the right to be informed of a request for assistance, or the right to present one 's 
views. Again, the matter is entirely left to the discretion of the Member States. 
If it is true, that in Regulation 515/97 administrative cooperation largely 
replaces cooperation in criminal matters, then there is an immediate danger that 
the rights of the individual in its capacity as suspect or accused will be 
jeopardised, his right to the presumption of innocence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination in particular. Moreover, administrative cooperation may also 
deliberately be used to circumvent those rights. 
IV. Corpus Juris: the evolution of a European enforcement level? 
The above described adverse effects of European integration result from the fact 
that the socio-economic integration in the Union was not paralleled by justice 
integration.40 Justice integration is impeded mainly by the political attitude of 
39 WYNGAERT, C. VAN DEN: General Report, Revue International de Droit Pénal, vol. 70., 
1999, 149. 
40 On the tensions between socio-economic integration and justice integration see 
VERVAELE: op. cit. 363. 
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the Member States which protect this area as their last domain of sovereignty. 
It had been pointed out by several scholars that the lack of the Community's 
competence in the field of criminal law is more a political dogma than a legal 
necessity. 
The consequence of this rather prudent and conservative attitude of the 
Member States towards a Community competence in the penal field is that 
although e.g. rules on customs tariffs, customs procedures, etc. are harmonised 
to a large extent, even to the point that there is a common Community Customs 
Code in force, the enforcement of these rules is a domestic issue. The actus 
reus is pre-defined by Community norms, but the procedural elements, the 
mens rea, and the sanctions are defined by 15 domestic criminal laws. There 
is no Community incrimination or Community judicial competence in this 
sense. 
This obviously undesirable situation could be resolved by the development 
of a European-level of enforcement system. The Corpus Juris proposal, 
mentioned in Professor Lahti 's article represents one step in this direction. 
Such a proposal, of course, commands both enthusiasm and criticism. There is 
no possibility here to address the pro and contra arguments with regard to the 
Corpus Juris. The author only wishes to recall the opinion of the group of 
experts that drafted the proposal, according to which effectiveness is not per 
se incompatible with human rights guarantees.41 On the contrary, by re-
inforcing the six guiding principles, ensuring the independence of the European 
Public Prosecutor and by the creation of a pre-trial chamber the legitimacy of 
the Corpus Juris can be strengthened. Furthermore, one should not forget that 
the Corpus Juris is not meant to be a criminal code, in the traditional sense of 
the term. 
The requirement that freedoms must remain paramount in Europe does 
not eliminate the intolerable situation that frontiers are wide open to 
criminals whilst being shut to criminal prosecution. The feasibility study on 
the Corpus Juris showed that harmonisation, assimilation and cooperation are 
not enough to protect the financial and other interests of the European Union. 
In this context, the Corpus Juris should be welcomed as an innovative 
proposal. 
On the other hand a European legal space cannot be constituted only by 
criminal law. Criminalisation must be conceived as a solution of last resort, 
41 DELMAS-MARTY, M.: Necessity, legitimacy and feasibility of the Corpus Juris, in: The 
implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, Penal provisions for the protection 
of the European Finances (2000), (eds.: Delmas, M.-Marty J. A. Vervaele), 103. 
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and the emergence of certain eurocrimes should be paralleled by the elabo-
ration of an anti-crime policy. It is necessary to maintain in Europe a fair 
balance between effective law enforcement and the protection of individual 
rights.42 
42 In the same sense SCHUTTE, J. J. E.: Police cooperation, in: International Criminal Law 
in the Netherlands (eds: Swart, B. and Klip, A.), 1977, 169-172. 
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Réka VÉGVÁRI Towards the Real Cross-examination 
Criminal Procedure in Hungary 
Act of XIX/1998 on Criminal Procedure that had become known in the eyes of 
the public and the legal sciences as "The New Code on Criminal Procedure" was 
promulgated by the Hungarian Parliament on its session of 10th of March 1998. 
The reason for the creation of such an Act was the eagerness to finally get rid of 
the criminal procedure act of the socialist era, e.g. to get rid of its principle of 
equality of two main phases: the investigation and the procedure in front of the 
court. Also it was among the purposes of the new act to adjust our rules of 
procedure to the regulations of the Western European Countries. The legislator 
was took into consideration the general principles and institutions of Act XXXIII 
of 1896 on Criminal Procedure, without reviving its surpassed parts. The 
practices of the Strasbourg institutes were considered as well. 
According to the original intention of the legislator the new Act would have 
been in force as of 1st of January 2000 at the same time when the previous act 
was about being lapsed, but the Parliament, by the Act CX of 1999, postponed 
its force until 1st of January 2003. 
Since the new Act promulgated but has not been in force, a special situation 
arose, as more of its regulations, word by word, went through via modifications 
of the old Act and adapted via its existing institutions, so the new Act became 
applicable one or the other way. Due to the changes of the substantial criminal 
law and due to the decisions of the Constitutional Court, also to the above men-
tioned modifications derived from the new Act, the old Act had been modified 
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ten times between the time of promulgation of the new Act. i.e. between the 23rd 
of March 1998 and September 2000. 
Throughout the last few years it was visible that persons under criminal 
procedure, their accessories and/or their relatives tried to frighten the witnesses, 
therefore it is an obviously important and urgent task to protect the witnesses. 
One of the most important change touched that field by transferring this 
regulations to the old Act with Act LXXXVIII of 1998, due to the fact that it did 
not bear delay, as well as the regulations of attachments, protection of persons 
participating in criminal procedure, undercover agents, and postponing the 
charge against an adult offender. 
This Act, in accordance with the decision of the Constitutional Court, 
converted the delivery and acknowledgment of the state confidential files, 
official files, and added the regulations about the copying rules of such files. 
Going into more details regarding these changes, the rules of protection of 
witnesses should be in the focus, as this is one of the token of the successful 
procedure. 
According to both Acts, a witness may be pronounced as a specially 
protected witness, whose testimony has a specific importance about the very 
serious case, whose deposition brings a proof that cannot be derived from other 
sources, whose personality and living address is not known by the defense and 
by the offender, and his/her life, bodily safety or personal f reedom would be in 
danger in case of disclosure. These conditions shall exist aggregately for being 
specially protected. In case such a witness participates in the procedure, the rules 
of misdemeanor procedure is not to be applied. The minutes of the deposition 
shall be attached to the court copy of the indictment. The President of the Court 
Council informs to the offender and the defense, at the same time of the delivery 
of the indictment, if the prosecutor wants to use the deposition of a specially 
protected witness as a proof, warns them that they are allowed to look up the 
files including the deposition and to ask questions in writing regarding to it. This 
is all necessary as the specially protected witness shall not be questioned at the 
Court trial. The main difference between the two procedural acts can be found 
in the person who decides about being specially protected witness, and who 
process the questioning. According to the new Act, the investigating judge 
decides about declaring someone being specially protected witness, he is 
questioning the witness and only the prosecutor and the advocate of the witness 
shall be in present. In case the defense or the offender submitted questions 
against the witness under protection, and therefore a repeated questioning is 
necessary, it shall be done also in front of the investigating judge. The Act in 
force does not know the institution of the investigating judge, therefore this 
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questioning procedure is under the Section of the Special Procedures, and is led 
by the local judge appointed by the President of the County Court. He is to 
decide about the prosecutor's proposal of appointing someone to be under 
special protection, he is to question the witness, and he is to order the visit of the 
scene with the participation of the witness, also the presentation of identification. 
We know—as on the XVI Congress on Penal Law was also stated—that "re-
sources to anonymous witnesses, is not normally possible without violating the 
rights of defense."1 Resources to anonymous witness also would infringe the 
principle of directness. The Hungarian laws are mostly in compliance with the 
Resolutions, with the exception of the hearing of the anonymous witness where 
the defense could not participate. We should find the appropriate technical 
solution to have the defense in present at the hearing. 
The regulations of the undercover agent is new in the old Act as well. 
According to both laws the investigating authority, with the prosecutor's 
approval, may apply for an investigating agent who is undercover. The pro-
secutor may deny to proceed against the undercover agent who is charged with 
criminal offense, or, according to the new Act, that is using this tecnicus 
terminus, may refuse the criminal report, or may terminate the investigation, if 
the offense was committed during the investigation in order to disclose another 
crime and this purpose is important than the committed crime. These decisions 
however shall not be made if the undercover agent is being charged with 
homicide. 
Act CX of 1999 introduced essential changes in the Criminal Procedure Act. 
These are about namely the witness-protection, about coercive measures limiting 
personal freedom, about attachment, and about the data acquisition activity of 
the authority. At the same time this act introduced avowry and remedy for 
legality, the disclaim trial, and the procedure against the absent offender. 
The means of admission was being expanded as well, with the possibility of 
written form. The authority may allow the witness, after or instead of the oral 
questioning, to give his/her admission in a written form, write and sign it 
personally, or have the typed text signed by him/herself and by witnesses, or 
certified by a notary or a judge. The written admission shall include that the 
witness gave it knowing the consequences of false witnessing. The witness shall 
be warned about these consequences while allowing the written form. 
The system of the coercive measures became more combined. The modifi-
cation introduced home custody. This coercive measure limiting personal 
freedom may be ordered by the court, not like the prohibition of leaving home, 
1 XVIth International Congress on Penal Law, Resolutions. 
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which may be ordered by the prosecutor before submitting the indictment. I have 
to add here, that the new Act authorizes the court to decide about this question 
while transferring into the investigating judge ' s competence. Coming back to 
home custody, the police controls, with means like permanent guarding or, in 
case the offender is in concurrence, with moving detectors, if the regulations 
were kept. Dispossession of passport or personal ID card, which became part of 
the Act, is also limiting the personal freedom. Right before that change, the Act 
on Passport used to include these regulations. 
The obligatory cases of dispossession of passport and ID card is where the 
offender is in custody, is prohibited leaving home, or is under temporary 
compulsory medical treatment. The prosecutor, before the submission of the 
indictment or the judge after the submission may order the dispossession if the 
criminal procedure is on due to an offense where the punishment may be three 
years or more imprisonment and the dispossession is a reasonable mean to 
ensure the presence of the offender on the procedural acts. At the same time, the 
prosecutor, before the submission of the indictment, and after it the judge may 
approve, upon the offender's reasonable request, that the passport authority 
make the offender able to travel abroad for a defined period of time. Where the 
offender is in custody, his passport or ID card shall be dispossessed, and the 
repossession is be dependent on what measures took place against him. 
Considering the procedural changes on the investigating authorities, the 
eligibility for other data acquisition activity is now included in the Act, which 
used to be part of the Police Law before. According to the Criminal Procedure 
Act the investigating authority, after initiating the investigation, may commence 
nosing around to determine if there are efficient proving tools and if so, where 
those can be found. For this purpose the authority may collect information, ask 
for enlightenment, may look up files, investigate the scene of the offense, may 
ask for experts, and may check the available data. During this activity, the 
authority may choose a person or a subject using photos or other data providing 
tools, and may put questions about them. A report shall be made about these 
activities. 
The modification that introduced the procedure in case of the absence of the 
offender, which may speed up the procedure, provides a breakthrough change. 
Where the offender stays in an unknown place, besides the measures to find him, 
the authorities have to locate the proving tools and have to secure those. In case 
they do not succeed to find the offender, the prosecutor, in the indictment, may 
propose to hold the trial in the absence of the offender, and before the sub-
mission of the indictment, he appoints a defense attorney for the offender who 
has no retained attorney and at the same time ensure that the attorney may look 
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up the files. In case of a charge, the court issues a warrant if it did not do so 
before. In case the offender is found before the commencement of the trial, the 
court informs the prosecutor and at the same time orders the necessary coercive 
measure limiting personal freedom. In case the offender disappears after the 
submission of the charge, and the trial may be held in his/her absence, the judge 
asks the prosecutor if he wants to propose it, and at the same time issues a 
warrant. If the prosecutor wants to hold the trial, he proposes it in fifteen days 
and where there was no defense attorney before, the prosecutor proposes the 
appointment of one. The judge suspends the procedure if the prosecutor does not 
submit the above mentioned proposal. The prosecutor and the defense attorney 
participation is obligatory in case of a trial in the absence of the offender. 
Where the measures to find the offender succeed, the court continues the trial 
by reviewing the material f rom the former trial. In case the offender is found 
after the first sentence has been made, the offender may ask for a new trial, 
instead of an appeal. During the new trial the minutes of the former admissions 
and expert's opinion shall be read instead of new hearings. Depending on the 
results of the new trial, the court keeps the former sentence, or decides on new 
sentence. In case the offender is found in the appeal phase, the higher court may, 
upon the offender 's request, decides to annul the first level court decision and 
order a new first level trial. 
In case the offender's stay becomes known after the first level absolute 
sentence made, a case retrial may be requested by him, or may be proposed by 
the prosecutor. If the offender stays abroad and there is no possibility of 
extradition or it had been refused, and there is no way to transfer the criminal 
procedure either, the prosecutor may propose in his indictment that the trial to 
be held while the offender is absent. In case the court states in the trial phase that 
the offender cantle extradited or it had been refused and the court do not see the 
reason for transferring the criminal procedure, the judge asks the prosecutor if 
he/she wants to have the trial held in the offender 's absence. Where »he above 
mentioned becomes known after the commencement of the trial in case of the 
offender absence, the court continuos the trial without asking the prosecutor. 
The procedure against an offender abroad is the same as said before about the 
offender staying an unknown place. 
The disclamation of the trial, which was again taken f rom the new Act and 
incorporated into the old Act, also aims to speed up the procedure. The court, 
upon the prosecutor's proposal, where the punishment of the offense under 
procedure does not exceed eight years imprisonment, may determine the 
guiltiness of the offender and may inflict punishment without holding a trial (but 
in the presence of the offender) (word by word translation is: public assembly), 
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if the offender disclaims his right of having a trial and pleads guilty. The 
presence of a defense attorney is obligatory from the time the prosecutor 
submitted the indictment. The inflicted punishment shall not exceed three years 
imprisonment in case of an offense punishable with more than five years and less 
than eight years, and it shall not exceed two years in case of a possible 
imprisonment more than three years but less than five years imprisonment, and 
the inflicted punishment shall not be more than six months in case of an offense 
with possible punishment of imprisonment for less than three years. 
The prosecutor, having examined all the circumstances of the case, may 
propose to decide about the case without holding a trial. The condition of this 
process is that the offender shall plead guilty during the investigation and he 
shall initiate to have a decision during a public assembly of the court. The 
prosecutor informs the offender about the possibility of the disclamation of the 
trial and about its consequences, and a minutes is taken about it, including the 
offender's admission. This minutes may be attached to the indictment, as a part 
of the investigation files, only if the offender initiated the proceedings without 
having a trial. Where the offender did not plead guilty, he has a chance, after the 
completion of the investigation, but not later than the fifteenth day of the 
delivery of the indictment, to ask the prosecutor to propose deciding about the 
case in front of the court but without holding the trial. In case of a concurrence 
the prosecutor questions the offender and tell him that he accept the initiation, 
and then proposes to go on with the procedure but without the trial. The 
prosecutor assigns a defense attorney for the offender in case he/she has not had 
one before, and let the attorney look up the files. The prosecutor shall not take 
his proposal back, but if it is obvious for him from the results of the procedure 
that the offender should be punished for a more serious crime or should be 
punished for another crime, he may propose to have a trial instead. In case the 
prosecutor did not propose the procedure without holding the trial, he shall not 
inform the court about the offender's such initiative, and shall not submit any 
file to the court in this respect. 
In case of disclamation of the trial only one judge proceeds. The presence of 
the prosecutor and the defense attorney is obligatory in this case too. After 
opening the courts procedure, the prosecutor introduce the charge and the 
proposal for the procedure which is followed by the judge ' s guidance to the 
offender about the consequences of the pleading and of the disclamation of the 
trial. The offender here has to state that he agrees with this process, then the 
judge asks questions from both the offender and the prosecutor to find out if 
there is any obstacle to decide about the case without the trial, and then he 
commences the case. 
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The judge questions the offender about the circumstances of the charged 
case. The guiltiness is based on the offenders pleading and on the files of the 
investigation. The judge transfers the case to a trial if 
— there is an obstacle to go on with the procedure without the trial, 
— the offender refuses to plead, 
during the questioning the judge verifies that the offender is non compos, 
or there are doubts about the offender 's voluntarity on the pleading, or the 
offender's admission is essentially different than before, 
it seems that a more serious qualification of the offense shall be verified. 
With the exception of the last but one above, there is no place for appeal. 
If the prosecutor, upon the offender's request, proposed to take proceedings 
after the submission of the indictment and the court proceeds in a trial, the trial 
shall be held immediately, if all the parties are in presence and there is no other 
obstacle. 
Possibilities of appeal, by nature, is limited. One may not appeal in case the 
confession and the investigation files contains the same. In case of the 
prosecutor appeal for aggravation the higher court may inflict a punishment 
within the punishment frames mentioned above. The higher court, annulling the 
sentence, orders the first degree court to proceed again, if the procedure was set 
in the absence of the legal prerequisites. 
Though the regulations of the new Act detailed above shall be applied 
directly, it does not mean that the old Act is not superseded partially and is not 
wearing the old regime's signs. The new Act intends to innovate the old one, to 
annul its less productive processes, and, at the same time to keep its well 
working practices and processes. 
The new Act on Criminal Procedure differs from the old one in its structure, 
and in its content as well. In consistent with the Article 6. of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the right of access to court became part of the 
general principles, which says that everyone has the right to a fair trial, and the 
court, only the court can establish someone's guiltiness or inflict a punishment. 
This general principle has been extended to the measures too. A punishment, of 
course, could have been inflicted only by the court formerly too, but the 
admonition, that is among the measurements in the Criminal Code, could have 
been inflicted by the prosecutor too. This measure was applied in many cases, 
where the offense was of slight dangerousness, most especially in juvenile 
offenses, in front of the prosecutor. This meant that the majority of the 
mentioned offenses did not go through the court and trial process, only that 
minority of those cases, where the convicted person complained against the 
measure. Having proceeded this way, the workload of the courts had not been 
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increased. The new Act however, with its new regulation, transferred the 
infliction of admonition to the court. 
The right for defense has also been extended with the declaration of the right 
for defense while unarrested. 
The prohibition of the obligatory self-charge became part of the general prin-
ciples. The old but still valid Act states, under the Article of the presumption 
of innocence, that the offender is not obliged to prove his innocence, while the 
Article of questioning the offender contained the right of silence. The new Act 
principally contains the same regulations, but summed up the two in one under 
the title "prohibition of obligatory self-charge," meaning that nobody can be 
obliged to provide evidence against himself/herself, nor to give a confession 
against himself/herself. 
The use of native language has been expanded with the rule saying everyone 
has the right to use another language known by him/she, also with the rule 
saying that the language of the process in front of the court may be the language 
of a minority ethnic group. 
The present Act, under its chapter of "Authorities in Criminal Cases", sorts, 
in the following order, the essential tasks of the investigating authorities, the 
prosecution and of the court, also the composition of the court, which is 
followed by the competence and the jurisdiction, then the articles of the 
dismemberment of the authority. The new Criminal Code changed this structure 
totally, included the regulations of the court, the prosecution and the inves-
tigating authorities in different. Having done so, the new Act became well-
arranged, as all the rules of a titled authority are included in one chapter. Also 
the interest of the legislator is emphasized in this new structure to state the 
importance of the trialing phase by changing the order of the authorities (court, 
prosecution, investigating authority). 
An essentially new role is the investigating judge, who has to deal with the 
tasks of the court in certain cases before the submission of the indictment. He is 
to decide about the coercive measure limiting personal freedom, about caution, 
about searching the notary's office, the attorney's office, the health care 
institutes, in certain cases about confiscation, about the sale of the confiscated 
property, about arrest, about ordering mental observation, about the disquali-
fication of the defense, about permitting secret data collection, about ordering 
the continuity of the process in case there is nobody complaining about the 
measure taken and the prosecutor did not order to continue the investigation 
either. It is also among the tasks of the investigating judge to decide on 
appointing a specially protected witness, and about police's or prosecution's 
decisions about searching, also about the decisions on non-delivered deliveries, 
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and about decisions on confiscation the files of an editorial. The investigating 
judge questions the protected witness, also that witness whose life is in danger, 
the witness under fourteen if the questioning in front of the court would affect 
his/her ability to grow up. He also may order evidence process upon request if 
the evidence would not be available during the court phase, or would be changed 
in its essentials, or would loose its evidence matter. 
The new Act implemented the two degree appeal system. In reality that was 
the reason to postpone the entry ito force of the new Act, as the construction of 
this structure cannot be done in a short t ime frame. On the first instance, as it 
used to be, the local or the county court proceeds, on the second instance, the 
county court for those cases where the local court has jurisdiction, while on 
cases where the first instance court is the county court, the Court of Appeal 
proceeds on the appeals. On the third instance the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court proceeds depending on who proceeded on the second instance: 
the county court or the Court of Appeal. 
The structure of the two instances appeal creates changes. The reformatory 
power of the second instance expands. It becomes a general rule that this forum 
may order evidence process if the case is not explored, or if there is a chance to 
establish a different fact. It seems that with this regulation the number of those 
cases will decrease where the first degree court 's sentence is annulled due to the 
reason of unsubstantiation. Cassation may take place if only a tremendous new 
evidence process would help to cease unsubstantiation. 
The third instance appeal is called re-examinatory procedure in the Act. The 
facts are not under supervision here, decisions are made only in respect of legal 
questions. Formal—the court was not established legally and substantial the 
illegal qualification of the offense annulling reasons may be considered in the re-
examinatory request. The punishment may be changed in the third instance appeal 
only if the court modifies the qualification of the crime, or if the court states that 
the punishment shall be inflicted in a different legal frames. This limitation may 
be disengaged if the guiltiness was stated by the second instance court and based 
on different fact. There is no trial at the third instance appeal, as only legal 
questions are decided here. The sentence is made on a council-board. 
The regulations considering the prosecution also changed in the Act, the 
obvious fact is declared that the prosecutor is a public prosecutor. Crimes 
belonging to the exclusive investigating power of the prosecution now are part 
of the Criminal Procedure Act, while they used to be part of a different law. The 
investigation leading role of the prosecution has been emphasized, namely the 
chapter on the investigating authority states that the investigation is based on the 
prosecutor's order. 
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The pool of the participating persons also has been expanded with the sub-
private accuser and with the helpers. The victim, in certain cases, may act as a 
sub-private accuser, if the prosecutor ceased the charge, or the criminal report 
had been declined. If the sub-private accuser died, his/her relative, spouse or 
legal representative may act on behalf. According to the law, the legal repre-
sentation of the sub-private accuser is obligatory. 
The helpers may act for the witness and the offender. Where there are more 
victims, or an unknown groups of people shall be considered as victims, a 
registered social body may submit its opinion on the case to the court. 
The Chapter of "General Regulations of the Procedural Acts of the Court, the 
Prosecution and of the Investigating Authorities", disposes that the court and the 
prosecutor may encharge the notary of the local government with the necessary 
procedural acts to perform for the interest of the criminal procedure. The 
personal data recorded during the criminal procedure may not be deleted, unless 
the law states differently. 
The new Act authorize the court to inform the superior prosecutor, if the 
prosecutor has not participated in a procedural act where it should have been 
obligatory. 
The issue of the warrant of arrest is obligatory against the offender staying 
in an unknown place, where the suspected offense is punishable with imprison-
ment. According to the present Act the issue of the warrant of arrest is optional 
and may be done by the police as well. Once the offender is found, he shall be 
arrested and within 72 hours (according to the new Act within 24 hours) shall be 
presented in front of the issuer or in front of another authority. According to the 
new Act the arrested shall be presented in front of the issuing court or 
prosecution. 
There are essential changes for the procedure of the first degree courts as 
well. The feature of the cross-examinatory procedure in the continental law 
comes to the surface in the trialing phase. The new Act approaches the evidence 
techniques of the first instance trial from an accusatorial model point of view. 
According to the present Act the offender, the witnesses and the experts are 
questioned by the judge, which is followed by the questions from the prosecutor, 
the defense, the offender, etc., so it is visible that the judge has a leading role in 
the evidence process. 
The new Act introduces the cross-examinatory method in certain cases. "To 
strengthen the cross-examinatory elements is possible primarily in the trialing 
system... In a formal meaning we can come to the conclusion that the Anglo-
Saxon passive role of the judge is ideal, but then the client process is a 
necessary ingredient. This solution, however, does not comply with the prin-
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ciple of the substantial truth, so the active role of the judge shall not be 
withdrawn."2 
In accrodance with the new Act, the offender is first questioned by the 
prosecutor, that is followed by the defense, and finally the judge may ask 
questions, however, any answer may be followed by questions from the judges. 
The new Act ergo does not degrade the court from its active role and this is 
understandable as considering the mixed procedural systems, this is still the 
court's task to search for the substantial truth, just as an opposit compared to the 
formal search for the truth—the forentic truth—in the Anglo-Saxon type. So in the 
Hungarian system we cannot give "the classic advice to a newly appointed judge 
that he should take a sup of holy water in his mouth at the beginning of a case 
and not swallow it until the evidence on both sides has been heard."3 
So this is not to do with the transfer of the classic Anglo-Saxon cross-
examinatory process, but with its variation with the continental type. The party 
cited the witness has the right to ask questions first. The order of the questioning 
is predetermined. If the witness was cited by the prosecutor, his questions are 
followed by the offender's questions and than the defense 's . The order is just 
the opposite if the witness was cited by the defense. There are no different rules 
of questioning considering the citer or the cross-examinator, and the offender 
still shall not be questioned as a witness. 
The interim passive role of the judge, in certain circumstances, as seen 
before, may become active, and even in some cases the client is forced to be 
passive. The president of the council may take over the questioning where the 
question is repeatedly on the same subject and the warning concerning this has 
no result. The questioning of a witness less than eighteen may also be taken over 
by the president of the council. 
Adopting the new Act, the legislator was about to pay attention to external 
examples, as the cooperation between the nations is inescapable due to the 
increasing number of criminality. "The globalization of crime and criminal 
justice is a noteworthy trend"4 and it is pretty much known that the international 
cooperation on criminal matters may be productive only if the legal systems of 
the different nations are close to each other. 
2 ERDEI, Á.: Az inkvizíciós és a kontradiktórius vonások a büntető eljárási jogrendszerekben 
(Incquisitory and Contradictory Elements in Criminal Procedure), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
4/1998, 129. 
3 WILLIAMS, G.: The Proof of Guilt, London, 1963, 28. 
4 LAHTI, R.: Towards an International and European Criminal Policy, Liber Amicorum Bengt 
Broms, Helsinki, 1999, 223. 
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Introductory Remarks 
Professor Wiener mentions that "[w]hile an agreement has evolved in the juris-
prudence concerning the meaning of criminal law' and public international 
law', the opinions [...] regarding what international criminal law is still diverge 
to a great extent".1 The task of this report is "[...] to clear up what we mean by 
international criminal law", because it is "not an exact expression."2 
1 WIENER, A. I.: "Nemzetközi büntetőjog nemzetközi bűncselekmények" (International 
criminal law- international crimes) in: M. Cherif Bassiouni Nemzetközi Büntetőkódex tervezete 
(ed.: Szük László), Igazságügyi Minisztérium Tudományos és Tájékoztatási Főosztály, Budapest, 
1986, 159. 
2 WISE, E. M.: "Perspectives and Approaches" in: International Criminal Law. Vol. I Crimes 
(ed. Ch. M. Bassiouni), 2nd ed., New York, 1999, 284. See also SCHWARZENBERGER, G.: 
"The Problem of an International Criminal Law" in: International Criminal Law (ed.: G. О. W. 
Mueller—E. M. Wise), New York, 1965, 4., OEHLER, D.: Internationales Strafrecht. 2., 
Neubearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Köln -Berlin-Bonn-München, 1983,1., OEHLER, D.: 
"Criminal Law, International" in Encyclopedia of Public International Law (ed. R. Bernhardt), 
Vol. I. Amsterdam-London-New York-Tokyo, 1992. 877., GARDOCKI, L.: "Über den Begriff 
des internationalen Strafrechts" (aus dem Polnischen übersetzt von Georg Ziegler) ZStW Band 98. 
1986, Heft 3. 703., WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 159. 
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This report does not aim to provide a comprehensive history of theories in 
this field of law because it would be impossible regarding the character of this 
report and unnecessary concerning the purpose of the examination which is to 
provide the necessary terminological and conceptual framework for the further 
research on the related topics. 
I. The Historical Evolution of the Notion 
In this part I shall examine what impact the developments3 of the legal material 
in the borderland of public international law and criminal law had on the creation 
of the concept(s). 
1. The traditional notion 
The term "international criminal law" traditionally (in the 19th century and in the 
beginning of the 20lh century) included those rules of the domestic criminal law 
which regulate the application of the national criminal code concerning cases 
including foreign elements. The questions of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance and the crimes which (should be) penalised in accordance with multi-
lateral conventions were also touched upon by the authors who followed this 
conceptualization.4 
According to e.g. Welzel the rules of national jurisdiction deceptively named 
as international criminal law (internationales Strafrecht), because they do not 
belong to public international, but to the national law.5 
2. The strict terminological distinction 
Already at the end of the 19th century (Beling) but rather in the 1920's and 
1930's (Pella, Donnedieu de Vabres) there were several abortive scientific 
attempts to elaborate a form of direct criminal liability under public international 
3 Recently, as Professor Lahti points out, "[...] we can see the strong development of 
international criminal law and the increase of importance of the UN's activities in global 
criminal policy taking place at the same time as the regional strengthening of similar tendencies, 
e.g. on the European level." LAHTI, R.: "Toward an International and European Criminal 
Policy" in: Liber Amicorum Bengt Broms. Celebrating His 70lh Birthday 16 October 1999. (ed. 
Tupamäki Matti), Helsinki, 1999. 223. 
4 GARDOCKI: op. cit. 704-705. 
5 WELZEL, H.: Das Deutsche Straf recht. Elfte neubearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, 
Berlin, 26. 
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law and to establish an international criminal court. To emphasise the novelty of 
the proposed rules of public international law, the authors did not use the old 
term ("international criminal law"), but created several new ones to designate 
this futuristic field of law (e.g. Beling: Völkerstrafrecht, in the French-speaking 
literature Donnedieu de Vabres: droit international pénal).6 After the second 
world war the above mentioned proposals were partly realised [see the judge-
ments of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment 
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (hereinafter: IMT)] and this 
movement strengthened the tendency to separate the newly emerged rules from 
the traditional scope of international criminal law. This approach is marked by 
the name of Jescheck and his monograph published in 1952.7 I will review his 
conceptualisation as set forth in the last edition of his famous text-book written 
together with Weigend.8 
Jescheck and Weigend use a restricted (traditional) notion of (1) "inter-
national criminal law" (internationales Strafrecht) [they also designate it as "the 
international applicability" (der internationale Geltungsbereich) of criminal 
law].9 This notion regulates two questions, (a) The first one is whether a 
statement of facts (Sachverhalt), which contains an international element 
concerning the nationality of the perpetrator or of the injured person or the 
foreign place of perpetration, is situated under domestic jurisdiction (Straf-
gewalt). (b) The second question is whether this statement of facts will be judged 
by the court of this state in accordance with its own or an other national criminal 
law. [With respect to the second the international criminal law is regarded as 
"law of conflicts" (Kollisionsrecht), like private international law.]10 ( l a ) 
Although they treat "European criminal law" (Europäisches Strafrecht) under 
the heading of "international applicability", this constitutes a rather independent 
part and possibly this is why it is treated as an "Excursus".11 Regarding this 
field of law they discuss (a) the scope of activities in the Council of Europe from 
the impact of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
6 GARDOCKI : op. cit. 705-710. 
7 Ibid. 713. note 38. 
8 Jescheck in his later publications from 1972 used usually the wide concept of international 
criminal law, but in the mentioned textbook he maintain to use the traditional distinctions. Cf. 
GARDOCKI: op. cit. 713-714. especially 713. note 38. 
9 Cf. JESCHECK, H.-H. WEIGEND, Th.: Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. 5., vollständig neu-
bearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Berlin, 1996, 160., 161., 163. 
10 Ibid. 163-164. See ibid. 164. (with several example of the application of foreign criminal and 
non-criminal law in criminal cases). Cf. note 70. 
11 JESCHECK WEIGEND: op. cit. 182. 
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fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 (hereinafter: ECHR) and its protocols to 
the treaties concerning various forms of international cooperation in criminal 
matters concluded under the auspices of this organization, (b) the norms of the 
European Union which oblige Member States to protect its interests by their 
penal law, administrative penal law or mere administrative law or authorise the 
Union to impose administrative (penal) sanctions.12 (2) They discuss the 
privileges based on public international law (völkerrechtlichen Privilegen)13 
under the heading "personal applicability" of the German criminal law (together 
with those which stem from the constitutional law) and separated from the 
notion of international criminal law (international applicability).14 (3) Jescheck 
and Weigend distinguish between and treat separately the notion of international 
criminal law and the concept of "Penal law of the nations" ( Völkerstrafrecht),15 
whose existence presume: (a) "direct criminal responsibility of individuals 
under public international law" (b) "supremacy of public international law over 
domestic law" (c) "exclusion of the doctrine act of state '" (Ausschluß der 
"Theorie der Hohe its akt e' ').16 (4) The text-book also deals with the "limits of 
domestic jurisdiction set by public international law" (völkerrechtliche Schranke 
der staatlichen Strafgewalt) in connection with the general notion of domestic 
jurisdiction (Strafgewalt). Within this complex of problems the authors 
distinguish between (a) rules which are recognised in the great majority of the 
states (e.g. the prohibition of inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the 
requirement to provide an interpreter if the accused does not speak the language 
of the court to a sufficient extent, the principle of speciality as a condition of 
extradition), and (b) norms which come from treaties [e.g. the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966. (hereinafter: ICPR)] and 
shall be transformed into the domestic law.17 (5) Jescheck and Weigend use 
term "supranational jurisdiction" and in their opinion only the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
12 Ibid. 182-186. 
13 Ibid. 189-190. 
14 Ibid. 186-190. 
15 Ibid. 116-125. 
16 Ibid. 123-124. 
17 Ibid. 10-13. We should mention that the norms of public international law which recognised 
in the great majority of the states [Cf. (4/a)] are also incorporated in treaties [Cf. (4/b)] (e.g. 1949 
Geneva Convention I., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms). 
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Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter: ICTY) can be deemed to have such 
I О 
competence. 
I should point out that they not only strictly distinguish between "inter-
national criminal law" and "penal law of the nations" but also treat separately 
those other questions of criminal law which are connected with foreign legal or 
factual elements. This text-book deals with the problem of extradition only to 
necessary extent [e.g. concerning the principle of the vicarious administration 
of justice (stellvertretende Strafrechtspflege)],19 but this approach can be 
attributed to the nature of the book, namely that it only concerns substantive 
criminal law. 
The use of separate notions is also recognised and followed in the Hungarian 
literature by Professor Wiener. In his early works he does not detach himself 
from the traditional notion20 of (1) "international criminal law" which relates 
to the international legal aspects of the domestic (whether substantive or 
procedural) law and constitute by chance a separate part of it. Its purpose is 
the facilitation of cooperation between states in the fight against crime.21 This 
notion contains (a) obligations assumed by the state in international 
conventions—to penalise certain types of conduct,22 (b) the substantial and 
procedural rules regarding the implementation of the principle of aut dedere aut 
punire (jurisdiction, extradition, transfer of criminal proceedings, execution of 
a foreign judgement),23 and (c) other types of cooperation in criminal matters 
(e.g. procedural actions, judicial assistance) which are not included in the former 
point.24 Professor Wiener distinguishes quite sharply this notion from the 
18 ibid. 12. According to them neither the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg [ibid., 
12.] nor the institutions of the EU [ibid., 184.] have supranational jurisdiction. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory 
of neighbouring States, between January 1994 and 31 December 1994. (hereinafter: ICTR) has 
similar authority as the ICTY. 
19 Ibid. 168. note 32., 175. 
20 Cf. WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 165. 
21 Ibid. 169. 
22 Ibid. 169. 
23 Ibid. 169-170. This is the ancient expression to the principle, which is called "aut dedere aut 
judicare" according to Bassiouni's terminology [Cf. BASSIOUNI, Ch. M.: "The Sources and 
Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Framework" in: International Criminal 
Law, op. cit. 114.]. 
24 WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 169-170. 
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concept of (2) "Penal International Law" ("Penal law of the nations"), which is 
similar to public international law25 and contains the substantive and procedural 
rules concerning the notion of international crimes,26 i.e. types of acts which 
are penalised by a resolution of an international organ, and judged by an 
international body, if such an institution exists.27 
3. The united concepts 
Other authors include the latest developments (direct responsibility under 
public international law, even European examinai law) in the notion of inter-
national criminal law. 
According to Makarov "under international criminal law can refer to two 
groups of legal norms: the provisions of public international law (take up a place 
above the states) with penal content [also named as "Penal law of the nations" 
(' Völkerstrafrecht')] on the one hand and the norms of the domestic law 
establishing the enforcing range ( Anwendungsbereich') of the domestic 
criminal law or—under certain preliminary condition, the foreign criminal law 
on the other. These latter rules also regulate the conflicts of laws and are tieated 
as a counterpart of the international private law".28 
According to Professor Nagy the present concept of international ciiminal 
law comprises two groups of rules. (1) The first one (the so called transnational 
penal law) is identical with the traditional concept of international criminal law 
(as viewed in the first half of the 20lh century) and encompasses the provisions 
of the domestic criminal law on e.g. jurisdiction, recognition of foreign 
judgements inland, cooperation in the fight against crime connected with the 
ascertaining of individual criminal responsibility by national courts. These rules 
can be regarded as the general part of international criminal law. The second part 
(consisting of provisions included in the notion of international criminal law 
only after the Second World War) is related to the rules of public international 
law concerning those international crimes (e.g. war crimes) whose perpetration 
25 However, he does not want to take a stand on which field of law international criminal law 
belongs to. Ibid. 172. 
26 Ibid. 169. 
27 Ibid. 170-172. See also BÁN T. WIENER A. I.: "Hungary. National report" International 
Review of Penal Law Vol. 60. 1989, N',s 1-2. 336., 337., 338., 339. 
28 MAKAROV, A.N.: "Betrachtungen zum internationalen Strafrecht" in: Tübinger Festschrift 
für Eduard Kern (Herausgegeben unter rechtswissenschaftlichen Abteilung der Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät Universität Tübingen), Tübingen, 1986, 253. 
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imposes direct criminal liability on the individual (without any reference to the 
domestic law). This criminal responsibility is established by international 
criminal courts or by states. Professor Nagy considers these rules as to be the 
special part of international criminal law.29 The problem and the disputed 
existence of "European criminal law" is treated separately (under a separate 
heading), but following the notion of international criminal law.30 
I strongly disagree with the use of the terms "general and special part" in 
this context. ( 1 ) The different character of these two fields of law hinder such 
a conceptualisation. The questions which are regulated by the norms of the so 
called general part mainly concern the criminal procedure (e.g. the transfer of 
proceedings) and the execution of sentences (e.g. transfer of prisoners), 
whereas the rules of the so called special part are substantive ones. If we 
project Professor Nagy's conceptualisation to the level of domestic law, we 
get a surprising result: the Code of Criminal Procedure and the law on the 
execution of sentences constitute the general part of the national criminal law 
whose special part is the (substantive) Penal Code. This result becomes more 
absurd if we notice that our so called special part as any other substantive 
criminal law from the middle of the XVIII. century31 also has its traditional 
and recognised general and special part. (2) Some of the so called general part 
norms of this concept (e.g. those which regulate the national jurisdiction) are 
never applied in connection with any of the special part norms. It becomes 
obvious if an international court (e.g. the ICTY/ICTR) judges a case in 
accordance with the customary public international law within the competence 
provided by its Statute (ICTY/ICTR Art 1-8/1-7.) . The situation is the same 
if the national court brings directly the public international law into operation 
to ascertain someone's criminal responsibility, because the jurisdiction is also 
based on the international law.32 The setting is different, however, if the 
national court brings a decision in accordance with those rules of its domestic 
substantive criminal law those penalise crimes for which the perpetrator is 
29 TOKAJI G. NAGY F.: "Jogszabálytan" (Theory of Statutes) in: A magyar büntetőjog 
általános része (ed. Nagy Ferenc), Budapest, 1998, 83-84. 
30 Ibid. 94. 
31 Concerning the general and special part in the national criminal law: JESCHECK 
WEIGEND: op. cit. 18-19. 
32 Cf. WIENER A. I.: "Biintetőpolitika — büntetőjog (jogszabálytan)" in: Biintetendőség, 
büntethetőség [Criminal policy—criminal law (Theoroy of Statutes)]. Büntetőjogi tanulmányok 
(ed.: Wiener A. Imre), Budapest, 1999, 61. 
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otherwise directly responsible under public international law,33 because in 
this case the applied rules of jurisdiction are also national ones, even if they 
are based on the universality principle.34 (3) Some rules of the so-called 
general part (e.g. those regulating international cooperation in criminal 
matters) are applied not only to the crimes defined in the so-called general 
part, but also to any actual violation of an internal provison when the case has 
an international element (e.g. the perpetrator escaped to another country, and 
his extradition is requested). The general part is an abstraction f rom the special 
part, its application cannot transcend the range of its special part. (Inversely 
it is possible that some rules of the general part concern not all, but only most 
of these rules of the special part.) It is absurd that these so called general part 
norms can be applied without their special part. 
Professor Oehler uses a quite broad notion of international criminal law 
(internationales Strafrecht). According to his monograph this comprises "all 
norms which establish, enforce or hinder the penal claim of the state (Strafans-
pruch) and which result from or are connected with conditions among or above 
the states",35 namely (a) "regulations which determine the field of application 
of national criminal law" (Strafanwendungsrecht)3 6 (including the "law of 
application of criminal law to soldiers abroad");37 (b) "substantive international 
criminal law" (Materielles internationales Strafrecht)38 that "provide protection 
for the interest (Rechtsgüter) that belong to several States together or to the whole 
humankind."39 This concept is wider than the notion of (Völkerstrafrecht), 
because the former does not only include "piracy, war crimes, the crimes 
emerging after the first and the second World War", but also "the crimes defined 
in treaties between the prevailing treaty-partners". Moreover in his opinion the 
term of "Völkerstrafrecht" is deceptive, because it gives the false impression that 
a unified and all-embracing operative criminal law exists in the framework of 
33 Cf. point (5) of Gardocki's classification. See also Hungarian Penal Code (hereinafter: PC) 
Chapter XI. 
34 See Hugarian PC § 4. paragraph ( 1 ) point c) phrase I. 
35 OEHLER: Internationales Strafrecht, op. eit. 6. 
36 Ibid. 1-2. For the translation of the terminology in his monograph concerning the 
denomination of the part of international criminal law we have taken over the expressions of his 
later article [OEHLER: Criminal Law, International, op. cit.]. Cf., note 42. 
37 OEHLER: Internationales Strafrecht, op. cit. 2. 
38 Ibid. 2-4. 
39 Ibid. 2. 
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public international law.40 (c) "Supranational criminal law" {supranationales 
Strafrecht)4X; (d) The "law of mutual assistance in criminal matters" (Rechts-
hilf erecht).42 
In our opinion Oehler's term "substantive international criminal law" is not 
the appropriate phrase. On the one hand it fallaciously suggests that the other 
part of Oehler's concept of international criminal law does not contain sub-
stantive rules, although it is manifest and recognised that the rules concerning 
national jurisdiction partly belong to substantive criminal law.43 On the other 
hand there are several special procedural and organisational questions (e.g. the 
efforts concerning the establishment of international criminal institutions) 
which cannot be separated from the really substantive ones. It can lead to 
misunderstandings, if somebody (like Oehler44) deals with the former (non-
substantive) questions under the heading "substantive international criminal 
law". He probably noticed this problem, and in the later parts of his monograph 
tried to surmount it by using very laboured headings: e.g. "Substantive inter-
national criminal law and its administration of justice" (Materielles inter-
40 Ibid. 4. "Oehler [...] rejects the concepts 'Völkerstrafrecht' as misleading and prefers 
the exclusive use of the term '(Materielles) Internationales Strafrecht ' ." WILKITZKI, P.: 
"Federal Republic of Germany. National Report." International Review of Penal Law Vol. 60. 
1989, № s 1-2. , 263. However it can result in misunderstandings that Oehler use the term 
"Penal law of the nations" (Völkerstrafrecht) as the synonym with "substantive international 
criminal law" (Materielles internationales Strafrecht), e.g. he put the former expression into 
parentheses behind the latter one in the headings of his monograph. [OEHLER: Inter-
nationales Strafrecht, op. cit. 2. and 605.] This can be why Wiener alleges that Oehler uses 
these two concept synonymous. [WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 166.] 
41 OEHLER: Internationales Strafrecht, op. cit. 4. 
42 Ibid. 4-6. According to his article in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law the notion 
of international criminal law comprises the same range of rules, but these were dissected to five 
part, the "law of application of criminal law to soldiers abroad" was separated from the 
"regulations which determine the field of application of national criminal law" OEHLER: 
Criminal Law, International, op. cit. 877-878. 
43 See JESCHECK WEIGEND: op. cit. 165. ES ER, A.—LAGODNY, О.: "Preface" in: Prin-
ciples and Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law (eds.: A. Eser and O. 
Lagodny), Freiburg im Breisgau, 1992. v. The substantive or procedural nature of this rules 
can be important from the scope of the principle nullum crimen sine lege. See Van den 
WYNGAERT, Ch.: "Belgium. National Report" International Review of Penal Law Vol. 60. 
1989, Ncs 1 -2 . 153-154., 157-158. This question has arisen in the quite famous Finta-case 
(R. v. Finta [1994] http://www.lexum.unmontreal.ca/csccc/en/pub/11994/voll/html/1994scrl 
0701.html) which regrettably has Hungarian connections. 
44 Cf. OEHLER: Internationales Strafrecht, op. cit. 9. 
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nationales Strafrecht (Völkerstrafrecht) und dessen Gerichtsbarkeit).45 This 
expression, however, suggests that the procedural and organisational questions 
do not belong to the notion of (substantial) international criminal law. This 
second approach shows that Oehler's notion cannot provide the necessary 
framework for the examination of connected problems and questions. It is not 
accidental that several notion of other authors which are more or less parallel 
with Oehler's "substantive international criminal law" do not only contain 
substantial rules, but also procedural ones, cf. Bassiouni's "penal aspect of 
international law",46 Naucke's "Penal law of the nations" [Völkerstrafrecht],47 
Wiener's "Penal International Law"48 or Eser's Lagodny' s and Scholiens "Supra-
national criminal law".49 It is worth mentioning, that the use of these two 
inconsistent approaches in one monograph leave finally in obscurity whether 
the procedural and organisational norms (proposals) constitute a part of the 
international criminal law or they are just connected with a (substantial) part 
of it. 
Bassiouni uses a very broad concept of international criminal law, which 
has two parts: (1) "The penal and procedural aspects of international law", 
which (a) establish, through conventions, custom and general principles, inter-
national crimes, and identify elements of criminal responsibility", (b) "have 
also increasingly dealt with procedural and enforcement modalities", and "also 
cover theories of criminal jurisdiction and their ranking".50 (2) "The inter-
national procedural aspects of national criminal law", which include (a) "extra-
territorial jurisdiction" and (b) "modalities of inter state cooperation in penal 
matters".51 
45 Ibid. 605. (indies added M. H.) "Substantive international criminal law (of the nations) and 
the International Criminal Court" [Materielles internationales (Völker-) Strafrecht und Inter-
nationales Strafgericht)], ibid. 26. (italics added M. H.). 
46 "The penal aspect of international law have also increasingly dealt with procedural and 
enforcement modalities", BASSIOUNI: op. cit. 9. 
47 NAUCKE, W.: Strafrecht. Eine Einführung, Neunte, überarbeitete Auflage, Neuwied und 
Kriftel, 2000, 145. 
48 Cf. WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 169. 
49 ESER- LAGODNY: op. cit. vi., SCHÖLTEN, H.-J.: Das Erfordernis der Tatortstrafbarkeit 
in § 7 StGB. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1995, 14-15. 
50 BASSIOUNI: op. cit. 8-9. 
51 Ibid. 9. 
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4. The latest developments 
Recently most authors have tried (a) to leave the strict use of concepts or (b) to 
create new notions (and include the old expression partly changed or restricted 
content into a new one) to react to the changes in the legal material or possibly 
to cope with the confusion which is connected with the term international 
criminal law and requires permanent explanation. 
a. The relativisation of the old notion and the lack of a new one (Naucke's 
internationalisation of criminal law) 
Under the heading "internationalisation of criminal law: basic notions" (Inter-
nationalisierung des Strafrechts: Grundbegriffe) Naucke deals with:52 (a) The 
"so-called international criminal law" (sog. internationales Strafrecht), i.e. 
the range of the criminal law of the Federal Republic of Germany (§§ 3 -7 . 
of the German PC).53 (b) The international and regional (European) minimal 
standards of criminal law (e.g. ICPR; ECHR; U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners E.S.C. Res. 663 (XXIV), 31 July 1957.), which set 
the limits of the national criminal law.54 (c) The rules concerning "international 
fight against crime" (Internationale Verbrechenbekämpfung, related to (ca) the 
Interpol, the Europol, the system of Schengen, and (cb) the procedure con-
cerning the execution of sentences and the transfer of sentenced persons 
(stellvertretende Strafvollstreckung).55 (d) The "European law of Crimes and 
Regulatory Offences" (Europäisches Straf- und Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht).56  
(e) The "Penal law of the nations" ( Völkerstrafrecht), which is partly substantive 
criminal law whose commands and prohibitions are valid all over the world; 
procedural criminal law which could be accepted throughout the world ; and the 
organization of a Criminal Court, which everywhere is recognised.57 
b. The birth of the new comprehensive notion: Eser's and Lagodny's trans-
national criminal law 
Eser and Lagodny use the notion of "transnational criminal law [...], as criminal 
law (either substantive or procedural criminal law) that is not completely 
52 NAUCKE: op. cit. 138. 
53 Ibid. 138-139. 
54 Ibid. 139-140. 
55 Ibid. 140-142. 
56 Ibid. 142-145. 
57 Ibid. 145-146. 
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confined to a single national entity". "A case may contain a transnational element 
on any one of three levels:"58 (a) "(T]he national level" deals with e.g. the 
problem of "the expansion of the extraterritorial jurisdiction both to prescribe 
rules of substantive criminal law and to enforce them across borders".59 (b) 
"[T]he inter-national level" comprises "the devices of international cooperation 
in criminal matters, such as extradition and mutual assistance", which are 
designed and used "to overcome procedural barriers (for instance, in cases where 
the perpetrator has fled beyond the border or where evidence has to be gathered 
from abroad)".60 (c) "[Tjhe supra-national level" connected with "establishing 
a code of substantive criminal law as well as a criminal court" which is "inde-
pendent of national jurisdiction".61 The term "transnational criminal law" was 
deliberately chosen in order to emphasise that the more usual term "international 
criminal law" reflects only one part of a larger system of regulation.62 
Schölten follows the concept of transnational criminal law (Transnationales 
Strafrecht) used by Eser and Lagodny, but tries to define it not only in the 
negative way, but also in a positive manner. In his opinion the notion, as a 
collective term, comprises fields of criminal law (Strafrechtsgebiete) which are 
related to the fight against "transnational crime" (transnationaler Verbrechen).63 
The recognised parts of transnational criminal law are the following: (a) The 
"rules of the applicability" (Geltungsbereichsrecht), which regulate (aa) the 
preliminary conditions and limits of the jurisdiction of the state (Strafgewalts-
recht), i.e. to what extent the sovereign has the right (or obligation) to prohibit 
and to punish acts committed even extraterritorially, and (ab) the possibility of 
the application of foreign law (Strafanwendungsrecht).64 (b) "International co-
operation in criminal matters" (Internationale Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen) 
which includes (ba) the "international assistance in criminal matters" (Inter-
nationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen), e.g. extradition, transfer of criminal 
proceedings (the procedural aspect), and (bb) the "[ijnternational obligations to 
purse a perpetrator" (Internationale Strafverfolgungspflichten) which means the 
58 ESER LAGODNY: op. cit. v. 
59 Ibid. v. 
60 Ibid. v. 
61 Ibid. vi. 
62 Ibid. v. 
63 SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 7 -9 . 
64 Ibid. 9-12. The more apply the national courts foreign criminal law [See, e.g., WIENER: 
Biintetőpolitika, op. cit. 47.], the more important is the distinction between »Strafgewaltsrecht« 
und »Strafanwendungsrecht«. 
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unification of the definition of crimes by treaties attempting to facilitate 
international assistance and to protect the position of the accused.65 (c) "Supra-
national criminal law" (Supranationales Strafrecht) is placed above the level of 
states and is independent from their legislation. In this field of law two 
components can be distinguished: (a) the material one means the definitions of 
crimes which jeopardise the legal order of a community of nations or the peace 
of the world (b) The formal component connected with (the efforts for establish-
ing) international criminal institutions whose task is to enforce and apply the 
above [under a)] mentioned definitions of crimes. Supranational criminal law 
exist (/) at the level of the public international law, this part is the "Penal law of 
the nations" (Völkerstrafrecht) and operates all over the world, and also (ii) at the 
regional level which in Finland, Estonia and Hungary means the "European 
criminal law" (Europäisches Strafrecht) that according to the author related only 
to the European Union.66 Schölten observe that the above enumerated "fields of 
the transnational criminal law do not stand unrelated side by side. They influence 
each other mutually."67 
II. Survey on the Meanings (Possibly Scope) of the International 
Criminal Law 
According to Swarzenberger the term " International Criminal Law' [...] is now 
used in at least six different meanings"68 (1) The first is "the territorial scope of 
the domestic criminal law".64 The related provisions "belong[...] not to inter-
national but to domestic law", however, they "may [...] be incorporated into a 
treaty and thus become rules of international conventional law". This "termino-
logy was widely accepted in nineteenth-century Continental doctrine".70 (2) The 
second meaning is "internationally prescribed domestic criminal law"71 that 
"refers to instances in which a State is bound under international law to visit upon 
acts of individuals the sanctions of its own domestic criminal law."72 Obliga-
65 SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 12-14. 
66 Ibid. 14-28. 
67 Ibid. 28. See point III. 
68 SCHWARZENBERGER: op. cit. 4. 
69 Ibid. 5 -6 . 
70 Ibid. 6. 
71 Ibid. 6 -8 . 
72 Ibid. 6. 
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tions of this kind may arise (a) from treaties (e.g. "piracy" or "slave trading") or 
(b) from duties of States under international customary law (e.g. "infringements 
of the rights of ambassadors").73 (3) The third meaning is the "internationally 
authorised domestic criminal law".74 Considering (a) piracy iure gentium the 
states are not only "under an international obligation to suppress piracy within 
I their] own territorial jurisdiction", "with the assistance of [their] domestic 
criminal law, such law may be considered to be internationally prescribed" [Cf. 
point (2)], but are also "authorised to assume jurisdiction on the high seas over 
pirate ships".75 Respecting (b) war crimes every belligerent State is under the 
international obligation to punish the violation of the rules of warfare on the part 
of its armed forces, "[t]o this extent the law of war crimes embodies inter-
nationally prescribed rules of domestic law" [Cf. point (2)].76 If members of 
armed forces transgress the rules of warfare and happen to fall into the enemy's 
hands the enemy State77 is authorised to exercise over them extraordinary juris-
diction limited by international standards.78 (4) The fourth meaning is "domestic 
criminal law common to civilised nations". The offences covered by this category 
"either belong to the category of domestic criminal law which is prescribed by 
international law" (e.g. the civilised regulation of common offences against life, 
liberty or property) or "they are principles of domestic criminal law which 
civilised States have de facto in common or consider it opportune to assimilate 
to a common standard by means of international conventions or by parallel 
domestic legislation" (e.g. forgery of foreign coins or banknotes).79 (5) The fifth 
meaning is "international co-operation in the administration of domestic criminal 
justice."80 (6) The sixth is "[ijnternational criminal law in the material sense of 
73 Ibid. 6-7. This category must be distinguished from cases when (a) the cause of domestic 
protection of the status of a country as a neutral power through domestic statutes of a penal 
character is only the convenience and the claim to the demonstration of the international bona 
fides, and from (b) the notion of "domestic law [...] required by international comity" (e.g. 
"against acts likely to discredit the good repute of sovereigns and other dignitaries of foreign 
states"). Ibid. 8. 
74 Ibid. 8-10. 
75 Ibid. 9. (italics added - H. M.). 
76 Ibid. 9. 
77 Swarzenberger has not made clear that whether any enemy state, any belligerent state or any 
other state has extraordinary jurisdiction in these cases. Cf. ibid. 10., 31. 
78 Ibid. 9-10. See also ibid. 31. 
79 Ibid. 10-11. This category is connected with the term "offences against the law of nations" 
which is used in the Constitution of the United States. Ibid. 10. 
80 Ibid. 11-12. 
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word".81 The rules germane to this notion "must be of a prohibitive character 
and be endowed with specifically penal sanctions" Swarzenberger observes that 
in "any other (i.e. non-material) sense this term is merely a loose and misleading 
label for topics which comprise anything but international criminal law".82 In 
his opinion such real "international law has not yet [in 1950] evolved a branch 
of criminal law of its own",83 because it has several unrealised preliminary 
conditions in the international society, politics and law,84 and he could regard 
this notion only as a category (a "proposal") de lege ferenda.** 
According to Wise: "[i]n its widest, most commodious sense, international 
criminal law includes three broad sets of topics. The term also has been used 
more restrictively to refer one or another of three sets of topics standing alone. 
[...] (1) The first group of topics concerns the power which courts of a 
particular state may exercise in criminal cases involving a foreign element. It 
includes questions of jurisdiction over crime, recognition of foreign penal 
judgments, and forms of cooperation [...]. This part of the subject comprises 
international criminal law more or less in the original meaning of the term. (2) 
The second group of [...] topics concerns international standards of criminal 
justice, i.e. those rules or principles of public international law which impose 
obligations on states with regard to the content of their national criminal law or 
procedure. Such standards are of two kinds of, requiring states as a matter of 
international obligation either (a) to respect the rights of persons accused or 
suspected of crime, or (b) to prosecute and punish certain international 
offenses.' [...] (3) The third group of topics concerns international criminal law 
stricto sensu—the rules pertaining to conduct that violates penal prohibitions 
directly imposed on individuals by public international law."86 
81 Ibid. 13-14. He also uses the term: "international criminal law in any proper sense". Ibid., 
16., and mentions: "international criminal law stricto sensu". Ibid. 35. note 74. 
82 Ibid. 14., See also ibid. 13. 
83 Ibid. 33. (italics added — M.H.) See also ibid. 35. The position is still, as it was summed up 
by the Committee on the Permanent Court of International Justice of the First Assembly of the 
League of Nations in 1920: There is not yet any international penal law recognised by all 
nations." Ibid. 23. 
84 Ibid. 35-36. 
85 Ibid. 33-36. Regarding especially that some states are "in law [...] privileged position". Ibid. 
35. [Cf. Art 23. par. 1. second sentence and Art 27. par. 3. first sentence of the of UN Charter] 
and "immune to the application of collective enforcement measures" [Chapter VII. especially 
Arts 39-42. of the UN Charter]. 
86 WISE: op. cit. 284-285. 
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According to Gardocki "When analysing the various definitions, we have 
to face the following fields of problems of criminal law and respective legal 
norms which at least according to one of the definitions were or are included 
in the sphere of international criminal law": ( 1 ) "Norms of (national) criminal 
law which [...] concern [its] range of application." (2) "Norms of (national) 
criminal law and hi- and multilateral treaties regarding extradition, mutual legal 
assistance and certain new forms of international cooperation in criminal maters 
(transfer of criminal proceedings, recognition of foreign penal judgements)." 
(3) "Norms of public international law included in multilateral treaties and 
concerning certain crimes which are regarded as delicto iuris gentium'". These 
treaties oblige the states first of all to penalise these crimes and to [...] 
cooperate in the fight against them". (4) "Norms of public international treaty-
and customary law on the responsibility for crimes under public international 
law, i.e. crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity [so-
called Nuremberg-law]." (5) "Norms of national criminal law on the respon-
sibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity." (6) 
"Norms of public international law, included in multilateral treaties concerning 
human rights, ascertaining standards in the field of substantive and procedural 
criminal law, which the states by their legislation should observe."87 
III. The Connections between the Discussed Fields of International 
Criminal Law Sensu Largo 
As we have seen the traditional and the narrowest notion of international 
criminal law means the rules of the national jurisdiction. 
The connection between the rules of jurisdiction and extradition is "direct 
and evident". If every perpetrator (could) be extradited to the state in the 
territory of which his crime was committed or whose interests (Rechtsgüter) his 
act injured, the execution of the extraterritorial jurisdiction would be 
insufficient. However, for the cases in which the extradition of the perpetrator 
is excluded, should the legislator establish a rule which authorises the national 
procedure because of acts committed in a foreign territory.88 It is manifest if 
87 GARDOCKI: op. cit. 703-704. 
88 SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 29. See also GARDOCKI: op. cit. 705. The "differentiation in the basic 
concepts of the rules of jurisdiction result in a significant consequence for the law of extradition: 
the continental states can accept the principle of the non-extradition of their nationals [Art 16. 
II. 1. of the (German) Constitution (Grundgesetz)], because they fundamentally extend their 
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we examine the principle of the vicarious administration of justice whose 
application is—in the German criminal law (cf. German PC § 7. II. Nr. 1-2.) . 
explicitly—secondary compared to the extradition.84 The relationship between 
the jurisdictional provisions and the rules on other forms of international 
cooperation is not so direct, but the enforcement of the penal claim of the state 
(Strafanspruch) concerning acts committed in foreign territory is usually 
reduced to foreign help provided for the investigation or the proof.90 Further-
more if any other form of international cooperation in criminal matters is not 
at all connected to the principles of jurisdiction, it should relate to the other 
modalities. This statement is based on the one hand on the existence of the 
quite comprehensive "general part" of the national laws which regulate the 
various forms of international cooperation in criminal matters [Cf. Act 
XXXVIII of 1996 (in Hungary) on international judicial assistance (hereinafter: 
Act on jud. assist.) §§ 1-10., 76.], and on the other hand, on the efforts made 
in the framework of the Council of Europe to create a single European 
convention which would provide for the integrated regulation of this field of 
law.91 Thus it is indispensable that the notion of international criminal law 
comprise the rules concerning all forms of international cooperation in criminal 
matters.92 
The application of several rules of international cooperation93 (and some 
provisions concerning jurisdiction) presumes the so-called "double criminality", 
i.e. the act should be penalised in both country. To fulfil this precondition and 
jurisdiction to the acts committed abroad, while the states in the English-speaking world approve 
of the extradition of their nationals, since they leave the crimes committed in foreign territory 
unpunished." JESCHECK WEIGEND: op. cit. 168. and note 32. However, the necessity of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be justified even if the extradition is otherwise possible (e.g. the 
protective principle crimes related to the crimes against the state). 
89 SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 29. See also WIENER: Büntetőpolitika, op. cit. 74. 
90 SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 29. 
91 See WIENER: Büntetőpolitika, op. cit. 53. note 55. This so called "integrated approach" 
is strongly suggested by BASSIOUNI: op. cit. 116., 117. 
92 "Those who use the term international criminal law [...] in the meaning of the territorial 
scope of [...] criminal law, usually deal under this heading, too, with extradition treaties and 
other conventions by which States assist each other in the administration of criminal justice." 
SWARZENBERGER: op. cit. 11-12. 
93 According to the Hungarian law: the extradition, the transfer of proceeding, the transfer 
of sentenced persons, the denunciation to foreign state, and in the lack of reciprocity—the 
mutual assistance in criminal proceedings [Cf. Act on jud. assist. § 5. par. (1) point a) and 
§ 62.]. 
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also to otherwise facilitate the cooperation it is typical that states concluded 
treaties in which they undertook to penalise certain types of conduct.94 In so 
far as a multilateral treaty is concluded mainly to facilitate the fight against a 
more or less new form of crime (criminal phenomenon) which extends over the 
borders by providing a unified penal provision, it should contain special rules 
concerning jurisdiction and usually provides for exceptional (and more 
efficient) possibilities or means regarding cooperation. (This group of crimes 
is deemed as a special group of domestic offences f rom the point of juris-
diction, cf. Hungarian PC Art 4. par (1) point c) phrase II.)95 Other types of 
international conventions which concern human rights (e.g. the ECHR) and 
customary international law also oblige states to penalise certain types of 
human behaviour. Thus it would be advisable to include in the notion of 
international criminal law all the definitions of crimes of domestic law which 
are based on the prescription of public international law. The scientific research 
should also be extended to those prescriptive rules of public international law 
which bind the states to introduce penal provisions into their criminal law. 
The conventions which require states to penalise certain kinds of conduct 
(e.g. Art V. of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, or the Arts. 49/50/129/146. of the four Geneva Conventions I., II., 
III., IV.96) and the definitions of crimes and related rules of jurisdiction which 
were introduced into the domestic criminal law to fulfil an international duty 
94 Cf. WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 165. "Often the purpose of [...] treaties is not 
so much to create new rules which national states would not have developed at a national level 
and without the justification of international law, but rather they are a means of ensuring 
international cooperation between states in order prevent and combat certain forms of 
behaviour." ORIE, A. M. M. RÜTER C. F.-SCHUTTE, J. E. E. SWART, A. H. J.: "Nether-
lands. National Report" International Review of Penal Law Vol. 60. 1989, Nus 1-2. 398. 
95 This provision "of the Penal Code provides that the scope of Hungarian law extends to 
offences committed abroad by non-Hungarian citizens if the offence is regulated by an 
international treaty. In this case the Hungarian law follows the principle of universal punitive 
power (princípium universale). [...] However, the principle of universal punitive power is 
effectuated only if domestic Hungarian law has already declared the particular act to be a 
criminal offence". BÁN WIENER: op. cit. 338. 
96 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949. / Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949. / Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949. / 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Tinte of War, Aug. 
12, 1949. 
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[e.g. Hungarian PC § 155. (genocide), § 158 (violence against civilian persons)97  
§ 4. par. (1) point c) phrase I. (universality principle)] concern crimes for which 
the criminal responsibility have otherwise been directly recognised under inter-
national law. However the precise designation of the source of law on which the 
individual criminal liability is based is not artificial in these cases,98 because 
the distinction can be meaningful and useful, i.e. when the criminal responsibility 
can only be established under public international law, e.g. when at the time of 
the perpetration (a) the given international convention has not been transformed 
into the given national law or (b) the general part rules of the applied domestic 
law provide a justification,99 an excuse100 or an other obstacle of the criminal 
responsibility101 which relives the perpetrator from criminal responsibility. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of the meaningful distinction I deem the above 
mentioned overlap strong enough to include those rules of public international 
law, which directly establish the individual criminal liability of those who 
violate them, in the notion of international criminal law. 
The criminal responsibility can be ascertained not only by national, but also 
by international criminal courts.102 Presently the competence of the ICTY and 
the ICTR means such criminal jurisdiction. These tribunals decide on the 
criminal responsibility of individuals directly under customary international law 
within the limits of their competence (Art 1-8/1-7. of the ICTY/ICTR Statute). 
It is essential to recognise that the statutes do not criminalise a conduct with 
97 Bán and Wiener concerning international crimes (stricto sensu) relate to the Chapter XI. of 
the Hungarian Penal Code and its several provisions. [BÁN—WIENER: op. cit. 342-343., 345.] 
98 Cf. WIENER: Nemzetközi büntetőjog, op. cit. 172. 
99 The rule which authorised the frontier-guards to shoot anyone trying to escape from East 
Germany. Cf. LIGETI, К.: "A jogállami büntetőjogról" (Criminal law and the role of law) in: 
Büntetendőség, op. cit. 92-93. The related decision of the German Supreme Court [Bundes-
gerichtshof (5 StR 370/92. November 3. 1992) (1993) EuGRZ 37.] is reviewed in ECL June 
1993 4. [quoted by WIENER: Büntetőpolitika, op. cit. 62. and note 71.]. 
100 Cf. GAETA, P.: "The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court versus Customary International Law" European Journal of International Law 
Vol. 10. 1999,172-191. regarding the different approaches and similarities in the national law, 
in the customary international law and in the ICC Statute [Art 33.] concerning the regulation of 
the question of superior orders and e.g. war crimes. 
101 E.g. the statutory limitation. Cf. MOHÁCSI P. POLT P.: "Estimation of War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity According to the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary" 
International Review of Penal Law Vol. 67. 1996, №s 1-2. 333-339. concerning the Hungarian 
experiences. 
102 The so called indirect and direct enforcement of the international criminal law according 
to BASSIOUNI: op. cit. 5 -7 . 
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partly retroactive effect,103 but just authorise an international organ to proceed 
with regard to a conduct which was considered to be a crime according to 
customary public international law at the time of its perpetration. Those organs 
also take into account certain national rules of criminal law (cf. Art. 24 par 1 ./Art 
23. par 1. of the ICTY/ICTR Statute). The enforcement of sentences is regulated 
by the national law of the custodian state but under the supervision of the 
ICTY/ICTR (cf. Art 27/26. of the ICTY/ICTR Statute). The domestic law of the 
state which holds the convicted person in prison is significant with respect to the 
pardon and commutation of sentences (cf. Art 28/27. of the ICTY/ICTR Statute). 
These institutions do not constitute a fully integrated international criminal 
justice system,104 so they should rely upon the help of the states to enforce 
their decisions by the traditional forms of international cooperation in criminal 
matters or by means very similar to them (cf. Art. 29/28. ICTY/ICTR Statute). 
So we can see that the rules concerning the international institutions authorised 
to exercise of criminal jurisdiction have several connections with the already 
recognised fields of international criminal law. 
The international human rights documents do not only oblige the states to 
provide criminal protection for certain interests, but at the same time circum-
scribe their jurisdiction. Several human rights requirements are also effective at 
the international level either in a same way as in the national law [e.g. the 
prohibition of torture (cf. Art 7. of the ICPR, Art 3. of the ECHR)] or regarding 
the characteristics of the public international law [e.g. the legality principle 
(nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege) (cf. Art 15. of the ICPR, Art 7. of the 
ECHR)]. So this inherent connection between the obligation and the prohibition 
to penalise, which in the examined case arises from the international law, can 
substantiate that the limits of the domestic jurisdiction stemming from public 
international law can be handled in the notion of international criminal law. 
Among the various rules of the so called European criminal law nearly all 
types of rules which were recognised above as the fields of international criminal 
law can be found: the treaties on various forms of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters concluded within the Council of Europe, the obligations in the 
103 The ICTY has jurisdiction to judge act committed after its establishment. Cf. Art 1. and 
8. of the ICTY Statute. Concerning its preventive impact see SCHÖLTEN: op. cit. 22. Such 
role of ICTR is much more restricted. Cf. Art 1. and 7. of the ICTR Statute. 
104 BASSIOUNI: op. cit. 6. The only two historical examples of the "truly 'direct enforcement 
system' are the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis (IMT) and the International Military Tribunals for the Far 
East (IMTFE)." Ibid. See also ibid. 6-7. 
Globalisation and Conceptualisation in the Sphere of International Criminal Law 245 
community law to protect several interests of the European Union with (criminal 
or administrative) sanction, the authority of the organs of the community to 
enforce their sanctions with disputed nature, the conventions on human rights at 
the European level, etc. These overlaps can establish that the problems of the 
European criminal law are treated in or attached to the notion of international 
criminal law. 
Concluding Comments 
On the basis of this rather brief summary and the related roughly outlined 
examination for lack of competence and education regarding this subject I 
naturally cannot undertake neither to criticise all of the established (or possible) 
conceptualisations thoroughly nor to create of the new (system of) concept(s) (if 
the latter is possible at all). However, I have the following remarks: 
I disagree with those critics that the use of the attribute of "international" 
regarding domestic rules of law would be deceptive. Similar terminology can 
also be found concerning private international law provisions of which partly 
belong to domestic law. I do not share the objection, that the different nature of 
international private law and international criminal law—as the former is law of 
conflicts and the latter prescribes the use of lex fori—hinder the above mentioned 
comparison, because recently the application of foreign criminal law plays a 
more and more important role,"'5 and the civil cases are decided directly on 
internationally unified norms (e.g. law on bill of exchange).106 
When establishing new terminology it is hard to find a proper phrase, 
because most terms could already be in use ("reserved") expressing another 
meaning. It can be well presented by the comparison of Nagy's and Eser's 
notions. According to Professor Nagy the concept of transnational criminal law 
comprises the rules belonging to national law and regulating the questions of 
traditional crimes with foreign elements (e.g. the provisions on international 
cooperation in criminal matters).107 This field of law constitutes a part of his 
105 Cf. WIENER: Büntetőpolitika, op. cit. 47., 65. 
106 Cf. MÁDL F.: "Bevezetés. A nemzetközi személyi és gazdasági forgalom jogi szabályozá-
sáról általában" (Introduction. The regulating of the international passenger traffic and commerce 
in general) in: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga. (ed.: Mádl 
F.—Vékás L.), Budapest, 1997, 23. 
107 TOKAJI-NAGY: op. cit. 83-84. See also BÁN WIENER: op. cit. 336. concerning the 
similar use of the attribute of "transnational" regarding the notion of crime compared with and 
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wide notion of international criminal law. Professor Eser's term of trans-
national criminal law includes all kinds of (either substantive or procedural) 
penal rules that are not completely confined to a single national entity. This 
comprehensive notion comprises international criminal law (i.e. rules of inter-
national cooperation in criminal matters).108 Disregarding the old conceptuali-
sations and terms in the course of the establishment of the allegedly new 
terminology, of which purpose was to avoid the confusion connected with and 
the permanent explanation required by the old expressions, merely increases the 
present misunderstandings in the scientific literature. 
As far as I am concerned, I give preference to the use of comprehensive 
(wide) notion of international criminal law. This concept provides a suitable 
framework for the discussion of the connected issues, without making the 
delimitation and separate examination of them impossible.109 Notwithstanding 
I do not object the use of separate concepts (without a comprehensive one) if it 
does not result in neglecting the mutual connections between these notions in the 
course of the examination. The existence of common questions [especially those 
regarding the sources of public international law and the principles of criminal 
law (nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege)] also supports the use of a compre-
hensive notion of international criminal law, even if the emerging problems 
require diverse solutions in the various fields of the concept. 
separated from the epithet "international". See also TRIFFTERER, O.: "General Report. Part I: 
Efforts to Recognize and Codify International Crimes" International Review of Penal Law Vol. 
60. 1989, №s 1-2., 47. 
108 ESER LAGODNY: op. cit. v-vi. 
109 Cf. GARDOCKI: op. cit. 718-719. 
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KALEIDOSCOPE 
The Transformation of the Constitutional 
Systems in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries 
(15-16 October, 1999, Prague) 
With the above title there was an interesting international conference organised 
by the Constitutional Law Department of the Faculty of Law (Charles University) 
(15-16 October, 1999, Prague) about the actual constitutional problems in Central 
and Eastern European States. The hosts, Prof. Dr. Václav Pavlícek, the head of 
department and Dr. Vëra Jirásková, had invited the lecturers mainly from among 
Czech and Slovak experts; however a smaller number of Polish, German and 
Hungarian lawyers were also present at the conference. This decisively determined 
the territorial extent of the studied issues. Some of the reports spanned the whole 
region including the post-Soviet states and the Eastern regions of Germany as 
well; however, most of the lectures focused on the countries of the Visegrád Group. 
The special topicality of the conference was provided by the recent Czech political 
crisis, which is to be remedied by some political powers by means of the 
modification of the constitution. Of course, all of this affected the whole conference 
and revealed itself mainly in critical comments on the state of affairs in the Czech 
Republic as well as in passionate debates between the participants and also in the 
keen interest in the development of the neighbouring states. 
The conference was opened by the hosts' lectures (Prof. Dr. Pavlícek and 
Dr. Jirásková), who tried to describe the basic tendencies of the constitutional 
development of our region. It is typical—though not at all surprising in the light 
of the geographical conditions and the historical traditions- that none of them 
neglected Germany since the Eastern parts of it had also been affected by the 
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constitutional changes after 1989. According to Prof. Dr. Pavlicek the enactment 
of constitutions, which was subsequent to the change of regimes, followed a 
shared, mainly Western European pattern almost everywhere. The new consti-
tutions also had the same ideological basis the idea of human rights, which had 
been being kept on the agenda by the movements of the dissents in the region 
for the past few decades. Considering the success of the human and minority 
rights the membership in the Council of Europe is to be especially emphasised 
as it affected the transformation of the Central and Western European countries 
positively. However, underlining the importance of human rights was not the 
only alternative, since the stormy renascence of the religion and national ideas 
had taken place after 1989 as well, and it also affected though not so con-
siderably—the latest constitutions. However, according to Dr. Pavlicek, returning 
to the pre-war constitutional traditions not always turned out to be an excellent 
idea, particularly had Czech Republic (see for example either the question of 
Ministers' responsibility or the presidential rights, which are too many compared 
to a parliamentary republic). The simultaneous appearance of the new states and 
the integrational efforts also created an interesting situation. In fact, it meant 
a really new situation for the Czech Republic, because after the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia it became weaker as opposed to Germany, its neighbour of key 
position. It also weakens the position of the Czech Republic that some of its 
political elite prefer having interests in the states to having Czech interests, and 
although there are many politicians in the country, there are only but a few 
statesmen. At the same time, a considerable number of politicians reject to 
promote either the introduction of the institutions of direct democracy or the 
establishment of a new type of forums that would help citizens, such as the 
ombudsman. Meanwhile the number of voters is decreasing and the distance 
between politics and people keeps increasing. 
Dr. Jirásková's lecture concerned three problematical points: the formal sides 
of the acceptance of constitutions, the contents of the new constitutions, and 
the putting of the Central and Eastern European constitutional excitement into 
European and worldwide context. In most states of the region the new consti-
tutions were adopted by properly elected Parliaments (that is, these Parliaments 
were not elected directly with the purpose to create constitutions). Countries 
having acted in a divergent manner include Bulgaria and Romania, where the 
new basic laws were adopted by constituent national assemblies. However, 
according to Dr. Jirásková, the region knows imposed constituents as well, of 
course not in their pure 19th century form. The constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can be regarded as the most similar to this since it was forced into 
the country by the Dayton Agreement. Partially the Russian and mainly the 
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Belorussian constitutions also belong to this category. The way of adoption of 
these two constitutions was considerably different f rom the usual practice. 
Regarding the contents of the new constitutions, these are not different from 
the trends dominating in Europe and the world at present. Among many other 
things the emphasizing of individual rights, the extention of the constitutional 
regulation and the introduction of institutions, have been more or less unknown 
in the region, such as ombudsman, court of auditors, judicial self-government, 
etc., can be regarded as common tendencies of the new constitutions. The future 
will show how these new constitutions containing these institutions can cope 
with difficulties in the practice. 
The succeeding lectures (Prof. Dr. Pavel Peska, Prof. Dr. Frantisek Samalik 
and Dr. Karel Vodicka) dealt with the general relations but their conclusions 
focused mainly on the Czech situation. Prof. Dr. Samalik emphasized the 
historical and social embeddedment of the constitutions. The "timelessness" of 
the constitution manifests itself only in the limitation of the state authority. The 
Czech constitution is an enacted one and it is based on the supreme power of 
the people and as such it can be mainly connected with the traditions of the French 
Revolution. The constitutional practices of Great-Britain and the USA can not 
be suitable models for the Czech Republic since their constitutions and traditions 
are completely different. The lecturer supported the proportional representation 
and he warned the political elite not to remedy its powerlessness and immaturity 
by sacrificing this principle or by turning to the majority system. 
It also must be mentioned here that the conference in Prague was held at an 
interesting point of time. The special topicality of the conference was provided 
by the Czech political crisis which has been able to be experienced recently. 
The dominating political forces (the governing social-democrats joined by the 
so-called oppositional contract and the civil democrats who are theoretically 
oppositional though in some questions they tend to cooperate with the 
government) want to remedy this crisis by the amendment of some of the 
provisions of the constitution and the electoral law. Their main purpose is to 
alter the originally consistently proportional electoral system so that it would 
prefer only the two big parties and they also want to modify the extent of the 
sphere of authority of the president of the republic so that he would have minimal 
freedom of movement at the formation of the government. Therefore, they wish 
to record in the constitution the obligation of the president which compels him 
to charge the representative of a party that has won the most votes with the 
formation of a government. 
Of course, all this affected the whole conference, which could be clearly seen 
from the critical comments on the states of affairs in the Czech Republic and 
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also from the vehement debates between the participants. Besides, the lectures 
on the constitutional development and problems of the neighbouring states 
aroused the audience's interest. The following programme of the conference 
was arranged in a way so that it would respond to that interest. Thus the majority 
of the reports dealing with constitutional problems concerned the constitutional 
regulation of the parties (Prof. Dr. Eduard Bárány, Dr. Vojtech Simicek), the 
role and present state of the constitutional courts (Reader Dr. Vladimír Sládecek, 
Dr. Zdenëk Kühn, Mgr. Radovan Suchánek), the comparative analysis of the 
methods of the amendment of constitutions (Dr. Karel Svoboda), the decent-
ralization (Dr. Eugenie von Trützschler), the differentiation of human rights 
(Prof. Dr. Jiri Boguszak), The success of the principle of the constitutional state 
(Mgr. Tünde Keszegh) and the confessional law (Dr. Michal Lamperter). Probably 
the most vehement debate was the one about the constitutional and legal regulation 
of the parties. The cause of this lies in the duality which is the characteristic 
of the Central European parties: on the one hand they obtained considerable 
power and influence over different spheres of life (first of all in the Czech 
Republic and in Slovakia), but on the other hand they are very unpopular with 
the people. The most interesting particular question asked that who could control 
the economy of the parties, and there was another interesting question regarding 
how it could be avoided that the governing parties would use the state controller 
authorities so as to "nag" the opposition parties. Prof. Dr. Eduard Bárány, the 
lecturer, had a suggestion to eliminate this situation: he said that not the state 
authorities should be the ones that control the parties in this respect but some 
auditor firms selected by a draw. Of course, the democracy within the parties 
should also be increased. 
A further block was formed by the lectures on the national referendum and 
the initiatives of the people in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary (Prof. Dr. Jozef 
Prusák, Reader Dr. Krzystof Skotnicki, Prof. Dr. Dariusz Górecki, Dr. Iván 
Halász). The lecturers tried to introduce the history of the laws of referendum 
in their country together with the legal and political problems which have arisen 
so far. The organizers of the conference devoted such special attention to this 
topic probably because such things as the institution of the national referendum 
and the initiatives of the people do not exist in the Czech constitutional system. 
In the Czech Republic there are vehement political and ideological debates on 
these institutions of the direct democracy partly between the rightist civil 
democratic parties, partly between the social democrats and the populists. The 
rightist civil democrats, who often use the devices of the Common Law legal 
system, keep aloof from the country wide success of direct democracy and they 
consider themselves adherents of representational democracy. The debate arising 
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from this took place between the Czech participants of the conference, the 
majority of whom agreed in principle with the introduction of the institutions 
of the direct democracy in the Czech Republic (for example Prof. Dr. Pavlicek, 
Prof. Dr. Samalik, Dr. Karel Svoboda, etc.). The expected result of these steps 
is a considerable weakening of the extreme role of the parties and also a more 
active political participation of the people. On the other hand, there were other 
Czech participants warning against exaggerated optimism referring to direct 
democracy (Dr. Jindriska Syllová). One of the largest lecture blocks was formed 
by the topic of the planned constitutional amendments, since the question of 
the modification and completion of the constitution are on the agenda at present 
both in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. The main difference between the 
two countries in this respect is that while this is to remedy the problems of the 
country in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia the conclusions of the previous 
four-year governmental period is tried to be drawned. The last term of Vladimir 
Meciar drew attention to many of the defects of the Slovak constitution that 
could not have been remedied under the political circumstances of those days. 
Today's government coalition, however, has the majority needed for the creation 
of a constitution and they are keen on taking advantage of this. There might 
not be a new constitution accepted though, since there is no a consensus on this 
issue yet, not even within the government coalition. However, a renewal of 
smaller or bigger scale is almost unavoidable. The first amendment of the 
constitution has already passed by the legislation; it regulated the position of 
the head of state in the Slovak constitutional system. This issue was discussed 
by the lecture of Dr. Dusan Nikodym, while Reader Dr. L' ubor Cibulka's lecture 
dealt with the other problems of the Slovak constitution. He pointed out that 
the most urgent things to do are to regulate and limit the too much parliamentary 
immunity of the representatives and to introduce the right of the constitutional 
court that makes its decisions obligatorily executable. The latter problem also 
arose during the previous term when the majority of the representatives referring 
to the freedom of conscience and the free mandate, refused to withdraw those 
of their decisions which had been found anti-constitutional by the constitutional 
court (the famous Gaulieder case). The constitutional court 's filling up based 
on the rotary principle, the inclusion of the issue of the proportional repre-
sentative system in the constitution and the responsibility of the Ministers also 
need careful consideration. The joint lecture of Dr. Ladislav Orosz and Mgr. 
Andrea Földesová also dealt with the same topic. Besides the foregoing issues 
they also mentioned the necessity of the establishment of a judicial self-
government and the extention of the sphere of authority of the Supreme Control 
Office. 
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Dr. Zdenëk Koudelka, Reader Dr. Pavel Mates and Reader Dr. Michal Klíma, 
the lecturers dealing with the planned amendments of the Czech constitution 
and suffrage, advised as a rule to the politicians that they should be cautious 
with the constitutional reforms the aim of which is to solve current problems. 
Dr. Koudelka found the introduction of a direct presidential election improbable 
and he also warned against the political effort which wants to compel the 
president to always charge the representative of the strongest party with the 
formation of a government. Moreover, the question asking which the strongest 
party is still remains open. The same cautiousness accompanied with the reports 
dealing with the probable reforms of the electoral system. It is because in the 
Czech Republic there is only one point of view—that is the protection of the 
stability of the homogenous government—which is placed over anything else 
and this is a rather flourishing attitude. The proportional representative system 
has traditions in the Czech Republic, therefore the introduction of some elements 
of the majority system cannot be too radical. The issue of the institution of the 
Senate provides another problem; it has been accompanied by vehement debates 
since its establishment. When it came into existence many experts doubted the 
necessity of an institution like that. Lately, however, they may have reconciled 
with the idea and now they would rather modify its content than to stop it. This 
idea was supported by Prof. Dr. Jiri Grospic's lecture and also by the thoughts 
of other speakers. Dr. Grospic found the problem in the weakness of the Senate 
and he advised the emancipation of the two chambers of the Parliament. This 
idea has a part which corresponds with the idea attributed to Dr. Petr Pithart, 
that is the one that wants to divide each of the branches of power between two 
authorities so that they could control each other even better (that is, the 
legislative power would be divided between the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, the executive power would be divided between the Head of State 
and the Prime Minister and the judicial power would be divided between the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court). However, there were many consti-
tutional lawyers, among them Prof. Dr. Pavlicek and Prof. Dr. Samalik, who 
doubted the expediency and accuracy of this idea. On the other hand, there is 
the other variant of the reform of the Senate and it counts with the establishment 
of regional self-governments and it would like to turn the Senate into a forum 
of the representation of the regions. Certainly, many more debates can be 
expected about the content of the Senate in the Czech Republic. 
It is clear from the above thoughts that the conference in Prague was held 
just in time to provide a forum to discuss and evaluate the problems arisen and 
the first seven years of the running of the Czech and Slovak constitutions, which 
were adopted in 1992. It may have contributed also to the large-scale appearance 
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of Czech and Slovak constitutional lawyers at the conference besides the close 
relatedness of the languages and the awareness of the common past. They not 
only exchanged their opinion but also tried to draft their doubts about some 
planned constitutional reforms. For the Polish, German and Hungarian participants 
it was interesting to see what kind of problems the society of the lawyers of the 
neighbouring states are interested in. We should hope that there will be more 
and more opportunities to the organisation of such meetings and also that the 
interest in each other's problems will increase again at least in the countries of 
the Visegrád Agreement. 
Iván Halász 
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József SZABÓ: A jogbölcselet vonzásában. Válogatott tanulmányok (In Attraction 
of Legal Philosophy. Selected Studies) [Pmdentia Iuris 13.]. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 
1999, 225 pp. 
József Szabó (1909-1992) graduated 
from the faculty of law at the University 
of Szeged and was a student of Gyula 
Moór, an outstanding legal philosopher 
of Neo-Kantian philosophy in the inter-
war period. Szabó was a prominent rep-
resentative of the gifted and promising 
generation, who achieved brilliant ca-
reers during the Second World War, and 
who were involved in the intellectual 
and scientific renewal of the country 
after the war. After graduation he be-
came acquainted with Barna Horváth, 
founder of school and an exceptional 
personality of Hungarian legal phi-
losophy. Horváth's personality and his 
legal philosophical approach represent-
ing the influence of Anglo-Saxon juris-
prudence and legal culture gave rise to 
Szabó's enthusiasm. It was the period 
in the Hungarian legal philosophical 
thinking when, besides the achieve-
ments of Austrian, German and French 
legal philosophy, those of English and 
American jurisprudence were also 
considered. Apart from this, Alfred 
Verdross, professor of international 
law and legal philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Vienna greatly influenced 
him, and they became friends for life. 
Szabó's papers were frequently pub-
lished in the Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, ajournai edited 
by Verdross. 
As a result of Barna Horváth's aim 
to establish a school, the "school of 
Szeged" was founded, and it included, 
besides Szabó, István Bibó, who later 
abandoned legal philosophy, and also 
Tibor Vas, who became Marxist in the 
1950s and renounced the mentality of 
the school. Szabó's legal philosophical 
thinking bears the strongest marks of 
the master's irradiant influence. He 
began to elaborate his independent legal 
philosophical doctrine in the late 1930s. 
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He was also deeply involved in ques-
tions of constitutional and international 
laws. 
During the after-war years he was 
involved in reorganising the law school 
of the University of Szeged. After the 
"decisive year" ( 1949) like the reputa-
tion of many of his contemporaries, his 
reputation was also ruined. After his 
long imprisonment, with a short inter-
ruption after the revolution in 1956, 
Szabó lived in intellectual exile for a 
number of decades. Some of his papers 
and reviews were published only 
abroad. Only the last years of his life, 
after his restitution, brought him the 
opportunity to be involved in the 
professional public life of the country 
for a brief period. 
This volume contains three main 
Szabó's studies of legal philosophy. In 
his writings A jog alapjai [Bases of 
Law] in 1938, A jogászi gondolkodás 
bölcselete [Theory of Juristical Think-
ing] in 1941, Hol az igazság? [Where 
is the Justice?] in 1942 Szabó attempts 
to discredit the Neo-Kantian model by 
using the outcomes of criticism, accord-
ing to David Hume, and the American 
legal realism. Szabó, in his works pub-
lished in the early 1940s, attempted to 
create a "neo-realistic" approach to the 
concept of law. Applying the method 
common in Anglo-Saxon professional 
literature, he modelled the essence of 
legal thinking with describing legal 
cases. With this kind of approach, he 
seemed to discover a number of similar 
features between English and Hungarian 
"traditional" legal attitudes. Citing the 
ideas of Jerome Frank, Edward Robinson 
and Thurman Arnold, the most outstand-
ing personalities of American legal 
realism, Szabó abandoned belief in legal 
security, which was, in his opinion, 
revived by a faulty logical philosophy 
of law. In his theory he also used 
Frank's doctrine of "factsceptics" and 
"rule-sceptics". Szabó claimed that in 
law enforcement it is not merely the 
legal norms one is to consider when 
looking for justice, since the statement 
of facts is as important a precondition for 
a righteous judgement as the interpre-
tation of the corresponding law. He 
believed that legal decisions aie influen-
ced by "psychological circumstances". 
When reading Szabó's works, one 
can clearly perceive the ideas of Ameri-
can legal realism. At that time, in the 
early 1940s, this kind of theory was 
considered rather exceptional in the 
Hungarian literature of legal philosophy. 
The influence exerted by the classical 
representatives of legal realism is un-
deniable. When appreciating Szabó's 
work one can suggest that, in a similar 
way to the evaluation of Horváth's 
work, he also gave particular pragmatic 
explanations to the classical Neo-
Kantian problems. Doing so, he created 
the possibility for a prolific interrelation 
of two legal cultures, and abolished 
the previous one-sided Austrian and 
German orientation in the Hungarian 
legal philosophical thinking. This is 
considered very important even if we 
sometimes come across rather eclectic 
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explanations. Neither the master nor his 
student is an exception to this. Regret-
fully, however, Szabó was not able to 
work out further systematic explana-
tions to his theory of legal philosophy 
called "neo-realistic". 
The volume is erected adequate 
monument to the memory of József Sza-
bó. This selected studies, as thirteenth 
part of "Prudentia Iuris" book-series, 
was published by Department of Legal 
Philosophy and Legal Sociology of 
Miskolc University. A complete Szabó's 
bibliography may be read at the end of 
the volume, illustrating this important 
life-work. 
József Szabadfal vi 
Csaba VARGA: Jogállami átmenetünk (Paradoxonok, dilemmák, feloldatlan 
kérdések) [Transition to Rule of Law (Paradoxes, Dilemmas, Questions with no 
Answer)]. AKAPrint, Budapest, 1998, 234 pp. 
A collection of papers formulating the 
basic message while facing some phi-
losophy of law related issues of the 
process aiming at the successive change 
of political, economic and legal regime 
in the Central and Eastern European 
region, composed of parts on the past 
characterised as No-law, Transition, 
Skirmishes and the Game's Rule, Com-
ing to Terms with the Past, Rule of Law, 
Conformity to Patterns, as well as At-
traction and Disattraction in appendix. 
The book argues for the sui generis 
nature of the challenge, claiming that 
rule of law from quasi-law, consti-
tutional democracy from totalitarian 
dictatorship, market economy from 
centrally planned structures signal the 
complexity of unprecedented trans-
formation the new political elite is 
expected to manage. For in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain in Europe, so much 
as in the new democracies of Latin 
America, the democratic turn meant 
exclusively a political caesura to draw 
by winning against previous corruption, 
but not to undertake basic economic 
switch-off at the same time. In Ger-
many, Italy and Japan, the process of 
after-war transformation was marked 
by military defeat, occupying administ-
ration, imposition of values and tech-
niques of implementation, as well as 
institution of Nuremberg-type trials, 
with drafters of a new constitutional 
regime coming only after the job of 
forcing through a transition was already 
done and completed. As opposed to 
such a model of pacification, the "velvet 
revolution" type of overall changeover 
is rather marked by unbroken legal 
continuity, full-pledged framework of 
the Rule of Law, as well as ethos and 
prestige—unchallenged and unques-
tioned -of constitutional democratic 
establishment. Or, routine practising of 
the store of instruments available within 
the frame of the Rule of Law was defi-
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nitively set aside in order to resort to 
externally imposed authorities, and 
routine was only reinstalled after the 
extraordinary measures did the job, in 
the former case. Notwithstanding, every-
day Rule of Law routine without any 
touch of adaptation has to fill all expec-
tations, in the latter case. Thereby Rule 
of Law, this accumulation of local ex-
perience in its historical germ, reaffirma-
tion of growing social consensus in its 
formation, ideal for everyday routine in 
normal application, has actually been ex-
tended as a panacea to universal use with 
no variety or limitation, albeit it should 
be rather seen as an ideal which, even if 
measured by general and universalisable 
criteria, may call for a variety of imple-
mentations under varying conditions. 
As to the underlying notions, Rechts-
staat, striving to achieve its goals through 
comprehensive and across-the-board re-
gulation by attaching guarantee to each 
aspect it wishes to protect through these 
regulations, on the one hand, and Rule 
of Law, resting on the principle of all-
covering justiciability by instituting the 
right to contact a judicial forum for a 
definitive legal verdict in any such case 
that may have legal relevance, on the 
other, are not treated simply and merely 
as two different legal techniques. Instead, 
the author argues for the claim of them 
representing two different legal ap-
proaches which are rooted in two 
different cultures. 
N. N. 
Felix SOMLÓ: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie ausgewählt und eingeleitet von 
Csaba Varga, (Philosophiae Iuris: Excerpta Historica Philosophiae Hungaricae 
Iuris], Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1999, xx + 114 pp. 
A collection of papers by the outstand-
ing classic authority (1871-1920) of 
philosophising on law in Hungary at the 
turn of century—a philosophy of law 
professor at the universities of Kolozs-
vár (1905- 1917) and Budapest (1918-
1920)—, as well as of articles on Somló. 
Among the writings reedited in the 
volume including the ones on the new 
Hungarian philosophy of law ( 1907), the 
problem of legal philosophy (1908) and 
the relationship between sociology and 
philosophy with particular regard to the 
foundation of legal philosophy through 
sociology (1911)—, especially the papers 
on the standards of evaluating the law 
(1909) and on the law-applying process 
(1911) herald the neo-Kantian tum in his 
new legal philosophy. Curriculum vitae 
and bibliography complete the preface 
(pp. xiii-xx), and critical articles by 
Joseph Kohler, Leonidas Pitamic, Redslob 
and Julius Moór reviewing Somló's work 
and achievement in legal philosophy are 
eventually included in appendix (pp. 
73-112). 
The reprints included in the volume 
anticipate Somló's famous Juristische 
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Grundlehre (first published in Leipzig 
in 1917), which is going to be re-
published in the same sub-series in two 
subsequent volumes. The tribute to 
Somló's memory is to be completed by 
the republication of his papers devoted 
to some key issues in philosophy and 
sociology, introducing to his post-
humous book-size fragments on the phi-
losophical foundations of neo-Kantian 
axiology in a complex ontological and 
epistemological perspective, which will 
also be included in the planned fourth 
volume. 
Despite that for early Somló legal 
philosophy and legal sociology were 
equal in standing, his neo-Kantian con-
ceptualisation led to revision and the 
separation of these interconnected areas 
of legal inquiry. By differentiating pure 
and applied sciences (including so-called 
normative sciences), he laid the founda-
tions of his own neo-Kantian philoso-
phising in law, in which he proposed to 
investigate basically two issues: the defi-
nition of the preconditions of any law 
standing for a research aimed at the 
concept of law withing the framework of 
the basic doctrine of law—, and the search 
for just law (or, in Stammler's original 
terminology, richtiges Recht)—standing 
for the axiology of law. Based upon theo-
retical traditions cultivated by, among 
others, John Austin's The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined and Karl 
Bergbohm's Jurisprudenz und Rechts-
philosophie, Somló offers an analysis of 
the concept and conceptual elements of 
law, regardless of any of its actual or 
potential contents. The outcome of his 
realisation substantiated the scholarly 
reputation in legal philosophy he won 
both in Hungary and especially in 
German-speaking territories. Nowadays 
he is duly regarded as one of the classic 
authorities of neo-Kantian philosophis-
ing on law in Central Europe, among 
thinkers like Rudolf Stammler, Hans 
Kelsen, Rudolf Merkl, Gustav Radbrach, 
and Alfred Verdross. 
Csaba Varga 
Fejezetek a jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből (Chapters on the History of 
Legal Theory). Edited by Miklós SZABÓ [Pradentia Iuris 12.]. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 
1999, 265 pp. 
A complete book on the history of legal 
theory has to satisfy two conditions: it 
has to be comprehensive, that is, has to 
cover the thoughts of all significant 
theorists and it has to give an in-depth 
analysis of the arguments of these theo-
rists. The authors of a short textbook, 
writing the book with undergraduate 
students in mind, must necessarily 
balance the two ideals against each 
other because of space limitations. 
Hungarian textbooks of that kind, as I 
see it, almost always tended to prefer 
the comprehensive presentation of the 
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subject-matter to the indepth analyses 
of arguments. This way vivid theories 
turn often into a collection of stan-
dalone propositions deprived of their 
theoretical context. For some students 
studying the history of jurisprudence in 
so more than memorising the relation-
ship between names on the one hand 
and concepts propositions, and dis-
tinctions on the other. The most im-
portant aim of the authors of the present 
book was to break with this tradition 
and strike a different balance between 
the two competing ideals. 
The book consist of two parts. The 
second, and by far the longer part of 
the book presents the intellectual 
portrait of 17 major figures of modern 
legal theory f rom Immanuel Kant to 
contemporary legal philosophers, like 
Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz and 
Jürgen Habermas. The essays follow 
a uniform pattern: they give a short 
biography of the authors in question, 
sketch the intellectual background of 
the theories, and recapitulate the main 
argument thereof. The strength of this 
highly selective approach is clear: in 
most cases the individual portraits are 
details though to show the complexities 
ad sophistication of the original argu-
ments. 
The authors of the book tried to 
compensate the reader for the lack of 
comprehensive presentation of the 
subject-matter in two ways. First, as 
the preface makes clear, the thinkers, 
whose ideas are presented in the 
second part, were not selected only 
because of their own merits, but 
because they are more or less repre-
sentative of a certain school of thought. 
Second, the first part of the book, 
which consists of three introductory 
chapters, tries to provide a background 
or a conceptual map to the individual 
essays of the second part. The first 
chapter, written by Mátyás Bődig, app-
roaches the history of jurisprudence 
from the perspective of the age-old 
debate between legal positivism and 
natural law. Mátyás Bődig emphasizes 
that both schools of thought have to be 
judged by their best representatives, 
not by their caricatures. For that pur-
pose both legal positivism and natural 
law have to be separated from proposi-
tions they are unjustly associated with. 
Both traditions are often criticized 
because of propositions that were 
seldom, if ever, defended by the best 
proponents of these theories or have 
only a contingent relationship with the 
most important theses of legal posi-
tivism or natural law. If we approach 
both traditions in good faith the 
difference between them, as Mátyás 
Bődig points out by referring to the 
theories of Herbert Hart and John 
Finnis, is much smaller than it is 
usually opposed. The second chapter, 
written by Miklós Szabó, gives an 
introduction to the ideas of our schools 
of legal thought, namely historical 
jurisprudence, marxism, sociology of 
law and legal realism that focused on 
the "social explanation of law,,. The 
last introductory chapter written by 
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József Szabadfalvi, provides an over-
view of the history of Hungarian juris-
prudence from the 18th century natural 
law theories to the Neokantian juris-
prudence of the interwar period. 
The book will be of interest to both 
philosophers and to those teaching 
legal theory. 
lamas Uyorji 
Kornél SOLT: Valóság és jog (Reality and Law). Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 1997, 
156 pp. 
The author is a representative of a 
generation with pre-war start, whose 
academic career has been broken after 
World War II. Now, political barriers 
being removed, he faces two tasks at the 
same time. First, to follow the broken 
traditions; second, to keep up with the 
newest developments of his research 
field. The double task results in a ten-
sion between the author's point of view 
and his comments. 
The rutin topic of the book-as noted 
by the title is the relation between 
reality and law. Solt point of view is 
rather traditional: the structure of law 
(legal norms) follows the structure of 
reality, and so does the structure of 
language and logic. In this way reality 
serves as ontological foundation of law, 
language and logic. Anyhow, this point 
of start serves for the author only to leave 
it. Analyses of reality, law, language and 
logic show the other side of the book: 
they consider the newest developments 
of relevant literature in order to offer a 
sensitive and subtle picture of the topics. 
We learn that "basic elements" of 
reality are neither individual entities, nor 
properties, or relations they are facts. 
Facts are understood by reference to 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, not as "bare 
fats" but as created by human mind. Here 
we arrive at facts of law as facts, emi-
nently created by human mind. When 
facing the nature of mind we are invited 
to step back again to the traditional view: 
mind (or thought) is, and has to, reflect 
reality: the structure of representing 
cannot be different from that of represen-
ted. Laws of logic earn ontological rele-
vance: law of identity, law of contra-
diction and law of tertium non datur 
appear as laws of reality as well. 
The way to legal norms drives through 
language. Following J. R. Searle Solt 
draws a line between content and force 
of "information" (more properly: of lin-
guistic expressions). The force of expres-
sions makes it possible to ask a question 
or to issue an order. By this way language 
is defined as a "bridge" between law and 
reality, with reference to Leibniz-Kripke's 
"possible worlds". The world posited by 
law belongs to the realm of future contin-
gent. it may be realised some time in the 
future, or may be not. 
The central role of language raises the 
question of indeterminacy of language 
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and that of nature of definitions. What is 
indeterminate: the world, or the language, 
or our knowledge, or our concepts? The 
author's answer is: the world cannot be 
indeterminate ("Things are what they 
are,, B. Russel), so language and human 
knowledge and our concepts, which are 
inseparably intertwined, are indeter-
minate. Indeterminacy of language is not 
pathology, it is the very nature of lan-
guage. That is why we need two tolls to 
cope with indeterminacy within law: 
legal definitions and legal interpretation. 
Next part of the book examines them. 
The fore of the book is the question 
of the relation between law and logic. 
Instead of aiming at theoretical problems 
of the relation, Solt introduces the reader 
to G. H. von Wright's deontic logic Citing 
von Wright's point: "logic... has a wider 
reach than truth" the author presents the 
basic concepts of deontic logic and 
possible normative statuses of behaviour. 
Final chapters of the book overview 
some problems, stemming from logical 
status of law. The firs of them is the 
problem of the validity of legal norms. 
The author's final point is that, despite 
different views, logic can be applied to 
legal norms when examining their va-
lidity. The second problem is that of 
types of legal rules. Solt puts forward 
the types of universal and individual 
rules, categorical and conditional rules 
and their possible combination. The 
third issue is the problem of collision of 
norms. He distinguishes between exter-
nal (law and morals) and internal 
collisions on one hand, and strong and 
weak collisions on the other Logic may 
help with dissolving collisions but it 
finally belongs to the realm of individual 
decisions. 
The book can be offered both to 
students of law and to anybody being 
interested in theoretical questions of 
law, language and logic. 
Miklós Szabó 
Miklós SZABÓ: Trivium: Grammatika, logika, retorika joghallgatók számára 
(Trivium: Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric for Law Students). Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 
2001. 
Szabó's book is based on an interesting 
conception. It strives to integrate the 
problems of grammar, logic and rheto-
ric with respect to the theoretical issues 
of legal communication. The conception 
(even in the title of the book) delibera-
tely refers back to the medieval 
tradition of the "trivium" that summed 
up the basic subjects of the curriculum 
of the university: grammatiea, logiea, 
rhetorica. 
The introduction gives an overview 
of the university education in the Middle 
Ages that is to point to the thematic 
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spectrum of grammar, logic and rhe-
toric. However, this recourse to a 
historical explication is (at least partly) 
misleading. The author has no intention 
to maintain that his three traditional 
subjects are still the basic ones with 
respect to the sciences or even juris-
prudence, they lose their original pro-
paedeutic function. He is driven by 
some other considerations that are 
almost completely alien to the medieval 
philosophical context of his subjects. 
Szabó's key term, "communication" 
(discussed in the second chapter) that 
should integrate the elements of the 
book is not connected to the historical 
explication. "Communication" is taken 
as a term developed by some modern 
social sciences (like social psychology). 
His "grammar" goes well beyond the 
problems of the grammatical structures 
of communication. It actually centres 
around the problems of linguistic phi-
losophy (and in some respects the "lin-
guistic turn") and outlines a variety of 
contemporary theoretical initiatives that 
concern the problems of language: 
discourse theory, the theory of speech 
acts, sociolinguistics, etc. Szabó's 
"grammar" has two points: it must es-
tablish a philosophical position with 
respect to language that (1) enables us 
to throw light upon the constitution of 
legal language and to introduce a 
concept of legal semiotics (that might 
be Szabó's primary contribution to the 
contemporary Hungarian jurispru-
dence); (2) helps to break the hegemony 
of classical logic ("a one-dimensional 
concept of logic") and to reconsider the 
connection between logic and law. The 
chapters dealing with the issues of logic 
pay special attention to the "deviant 
forms of logical analysis": deontic logic, 
fuzzy logic, logic of action, etc. One of 
the great merits of the text (and the 
approach) is that this approach allows 
Szabó to give a remarkably sophisticated 
analysis of the problems of "legal logic". 
With respect to "rhetoric", the 
authors conceptual strategy seems to be 
the most convincing. The recourse to 
the medieval tradition underlies his 
rejection of a reductionist conception in 
which rhetoric is taken as merely a set 
of means ("tools", "techniques") that 
serve "eloquence". Szabó attempts to 
reclaim the philosophical dignity of 
rhetoric by pointing to its relevance with 
respect to the issues of logic, rationality, 
communication. 
The book is a great step forward in 
respect to Szabó's inquiries concerning 
an antipositivis and linguistically 
oriented jurisprudence (put forward in 
his "legal dogmatics" in 1996). He 
reached a stage where the original 
initiative turned into a remarkable 
theoretical conception unprecedented in 
Hungarian jurisprudence. 
Mátyás Bódig 
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Péter TAKÁCS: Nehéz jogi esetek. Jogelmélet és jogászi érvelés (Hard Cases. 
A Reader for Law Students). Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2000, 400 pp. 
The very idea lying behind the thema-
tical concept of this book, special literary 
genre, is that practical consequences of 
theoretical propositions in jurisprudence, 
on the one hand, and philosophical 
context of practical legal problems, on 
the other, can be taught and illuminated 
by analysing possible and hypothetical 
legal reasoning in particular real capes. 
Impressed by this idea the author sheds 
light theoretical problems as they emerge 
from legal practice, and points out 
practical difficulties which can be tackled 
only byotheoretical knowledge and skills. 
The term "hard case" is defined in a way 
so as to encompass not only those cases 
in which well-informed lawyers differ in 
their opinion but in which value judge-
ments have some role in influencing the 
outcome. In this way the introductory 
chapter presents five famous historical 
trials having some similarly with trial of 
recent decades. E.g. the author draws a 
parallel between trial of Charles I (1949) 
and that of Ceau§escu ( 1989) in order to 
point out some specific feature of law 
working in political context. The book 
presents some well-known cases discus-
sed in contemporary British, American 
and German jurisprudence in a refashio-
ned way, namely with openly altered 
facts, in order to balance possible 
arguments and provoke the reader to 
find his or her right answers, argue for 
them and practice of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court, the Hungarian 
Supreme Court, and the Hungarian 
Human Rights Commissioners. After 
showing several hypothetical cases, 
such at the Protagoras case or one of 
Jhering's obscured Civilrechtsfälle etc., 
the book gives a short overview of 
debated recent judgements of inter-
national courts. The book, seemingly, 
is a reader for law students, but it does 
not seek to teach rules of any legal sys-
tems rather to elucidate the principled 
and argument-dependent nature of legal 
phenomena. 
N. N. 
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